Plane down near Moscow

Noxegon · 11-02-2018 2:12pm #1

https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/plane-crashes-near-moscow-killing-71-people-1.3388348

11-02-2018 2:38pm

https://twitter.com/flightradar24/status/962671391538667520

LeakRate · 11-02-2018 3:41pm

Reports of a mid air collision with a helicopter.

Miike · 11-02-2018 4:23pm

LeakRate wrote: »

Reports of a mid air collision with a helicopter.

Later retracted by all but one Russian News agency

porsche boy · 11-02-2018 6:07pm

The speed graph on flightradar is odd to say the least. If its accurate it could suggest engine issues or if not suggests sensor issues.

Doltanian · 11-02-2018 6:09pm

It was weird even last night I was think we are well overdue a plane crash, 2017 was statistically the safest year on record for Aviation ever.

faoiarvok · 11-02-2018 6:10pm

porsche boy wrote: »

The speed graph on flightradar is odd to say the least. If its accurate it could suggest engine issues or if not suggests sensor issues.

FR24 data should be taken with quite a few grains of salt, especially if trying to look into fine details

Edit: although from the screenshot in the tweet above, I’m not sure I see anything crazy in it.

PukkaStukka · 11-02-2018 6:49pm

I caught a quick glimpse of footage from the accident site on BBC news. The aircraft fragments were quite small and scattered. There didn't seem to be any large pieces of fuselage

CPTM · 12-02-2018 2:19am

In 2013, the same plane had to shut down it's right engine within 15 minutes of take off and return to the airport.

https://www.aeroinside.com/item/2861/rossiya-a148-at-st-petersburg-on-jul-28th-2013-engine-shut-down-in-flight

Since September 2017, 3 AN-148s have suffered engine problems which required an engine shut down and a return to the airport or prompt diversion to a local airport within 20 minutes of take off.

It's not enough to draw conclusions obviously, since engine shut downs do happen for different reasons and planes should have the capacity to land with one engine working. But seems to be a lot since September alone.

ninebeanrows · 12-02-2018 6:10am

The captain chose not to de ice before take off.

lfc200 · 12-02-2018 8:10am

Weathercheck wrote: »

The captain chose not to de ice before take off.

If plane hadn't been de-iced and ice was the issue would they have made it 20km from the airport?

PukkaStukka · 12-02-2018 9:00am

Captain Fintan Ryan was on Morning Ireland discussing this awful event. He seemed careful not to speculate on likely causes but did note available data indicated wild fluctuations in airspeed before the crash. He also appeared to cast doubt on reports of the aircraft being on fire prior to the crash as the cloud base was very low.

martinsvi · 12-02-2018 11:41am

I would like to point out that the raw ADS-B output for this aircraft type (unlike most western jets) does not include speed information. The speed you are seeing on the FR24 graph is an interpretation and can be widely inaccurate

CPTM · 13-02-2018 3:26pm

Investigators are thinking that there was ice on the speed sensors and that caused the crash. Would de-icing the plane before take-off have covered the sensors too? Or does de-icing cover the wings only?

www.bbc.com/news/amp/world-europe-43048921

L1011 · 13-02-2018 4:29pm

CPTM wrote: »

Investigators are thinking that there was ice on the speed sensors and that caused the crash. Would de-icing the plane before take-off have covered the sensors too? Or does de-icing cover the wings only?

www.bbc.com/news/amp/world-europe-43048921

Pitot tubes have heaters in them on even vaguely modern Western aircraft; I'd hope its the case in this as its not a particularly antiquated design.

martinsvi · 13-02-2018 4:36pm

CPTM wrote: »

Investigators are thinking that there was ice on the speed sensors and that caused the crash. Would de-icing the plane before take-off have covered the sensors too? Or does de-icing cover the wings only?

www.bbc.com/news/amp/world-europe-43048921

I would be very surprised if the actual investigators would participate in any sort of speculation at any stage during the investigation. More than likely that train of thought is not coming from anyone reliable.

To answer your question - the airspeed is measured by sensing a pressure in a tube. Typical de-icing shower would not de-ice the inside of the tube. If the tube was blocked they would have no speed indication during takeoff run and would have rejected the take off early.

these tubes generally have heaters in them to keep the ice away. It is also worth remembering that there are 4 of these tubes for redundancy purposes, so even if one or two of them fail, this shouldn't lead to a complete loss of airspeed information

martinsvi · 13-02-2018 4:46pm

L1011 wrote: »

Pitot tubes have heaters in them on even vaguely modern Western aircraft; I'd hope its the case in this as its not a particularly antiquated design.

Not going to dig out the CS/FAR 25 design docs now to quote the exact requirement, but generally you can't certify an aircraft for IFR/known icing condition flight if you don't have a heated pitot..

PukkaStukka · 13-02-2018 4:57pm

From AVHerald with my emphasis in bold

AVHerald wrote:

On Feb 13th 2018 the MAK reported that the flight data recorder needed to be torn down, the memory modules were removed from the FDR and inserted in a new electronics. Thereafter it was possible to read out all data which consist of 16 flights including the accident flight. The work to decode the data has started. The media of the voice recorder are currently being prepared for download.

In the afternoon of Feb 13th 2018 the MAK reported, that decoding of the FDR data has been completed. Preliminary analysis shows, that the pitot heatings for all three pitot probes were off while the pitot heatings had been turned on prior to departure on the previous 15 flights. About 2:30 minutes after becoming airborne a special situation developed at about 1300 meters of height and a speed of 465-470 kph (250 KIAS) when a disagreement between the speed readings #1 and #3 developed with the speed reading #2 not registering, #1 was showing about 30kph (15 knots) more than #3, an according message was issued. No significant altitude deviations between the pitot systems were noticed. At about 2000 meters height speed reading #1 began to reduce while #3 increased, another speed disagree message was issued. The crew disconnected the autopilot and continued in manual control. Speed readings from #3 reached 540-560 kph (290-300 KIAS), #1 speed readings continued to decrease. 50 seconds after the autopilot was disconnected the aircraft experienced vertical loads between 0.5 and 1.5G, the #1 speed reading reached 0, the #3 began to decrease reaching 200 kph (108 KIAS), the aircraft pitched down to about 30-35 degrees below horizont, the vertical load was 0G. Before collision with the ground #3 speed readings began to rapidly increase reaching 800 kph (432 KIAS) just before impact, #1 speed readings remained at 0. The pitch angle remained at 30 degrees below horizont until impact, 5 seconds prior to impact a right bank of 25 degrees developed.

The MAK wrote: "A preliminary analysis of the recorded information, as well as an analysis of similar cases that occurred in the past, suggest that the development of a special situation in the flight could be caused by incorrect data on the flight speed on the pilots indicators, which in turn was apparently due to icing of the pitot probes when the heating systems are off."

martinsvi · 13-02-2018 4:59pm

you're joking me... cowboys don't read checklists I guess..

PukkaStukka · 13-02-2018 5:03pm

martinsvi wrote: »

you're joking me... cowboys don't read checklists I guess..

Wha is doesn't say is whether the heating was off due to oversight or equipment failure. We can't jump to conclusions

martinsvi · 13-02-2018 5:13pm

PukkaStukka wrote: »

Wha is doesn't say is whether the heating was off due to oversight or equipment failure. We can't jump to conclusions

quite true, having thought about it, most modern jets wouldn't have a manual switch for heating, would they? Manual switch seems to be a turbo prop thing

PukkaStukka · 13-02-2018 5:25pm

martinsvi wrote: »

quite true, having thought about it, most modern jets wouldn't have a manual switch for heating, would they? Manual switch seems to be a turbo prop thing

It could be a number of things alright. Being an aircraft that isn't of mainstream design means it could have weird quirks like manual switching alright. In which case is there not some kind of secondary warning to alert the crew that the heating was off.

Or perhaps a breaker(s) could've tripped due to a fault taking out the heaters. Could there have been a maintenance issue that left the heaters inoperative.

Or, chillingly, crew oversight with work factors / pressures also at play.

Whatever, it's dreadful.

PukkaStukka · 13-02-2018 6:43pm

This from RTE but a tad wide of the mark perhaps?

http://www.rte.ie/news/world/2018/0213/940413-russia-plane-crash/

Negative_G · 13-02-2018 10:22pm

An awful tragedy.

I know it's primarily driven by human nature but aviation must be the worst profession for armchair experts to appear and speculate after an accident or incident.

View Profile · 13-02-2018 10:30pm

Yes I've the benefit of sitting in my armchair. However, pitch and power lads! If the situation looks and feels wrong - revert to the basics and you can't go far wrong.

RIP to the victims.

Negative_G · 13-02-2018 10:58pm

View Profile wrote: »

Yes I've the benefit of sitting in my armchair. However, pitch and power lads! If the situation looks and feels wrong - revert to the basics and you can't go far wrong.

RIP to the victims.

And if the PF is experiencing somatogravic illusion? Will power and pitch help then? Maybe it would, equally it could exacerbate the problem.

I'm not having a good pop at you, just purely playing devils advocate. I agree with your sentiment generally though.

martinsvi · 13-02-2018 11:10pm

Negative_G wrote: »

And if the PF is experiencing somatogravic illusion? Will power and pitch help then? Maybe it would, equally it could exacerbate the problem.

I'm not having a good pop at you, just purely playing devils advocate. I agree with your sentiment generally though.

looking back at my training - power and pitch is something that's mentioned a lot but never really was drilled in to me unlike the stall recovery - not until CPL and especially JOC training anyway .. until then when you see the speed dropping, push the nose down, power up. That was the anthem!

smurfjed · 14-02-2018 7:49am

I believe that the industry started introducing power/pitch/attitude (Unreliable Airspeed) charts/data following this accident.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birgenair_Flight_301

I find it strange that a glass cockpit aircraft "might not" have a CAS (Warning/Caution) message about Pitot heat status.

duskyjoe · 14-02-2018 12:06pm

There is no way a certified transport aircraft would not have a master warning , master caution alert system re pitot heat turned off prior to take off. Me thinks orange lights, bells, whistles are a given in that part of the world and that the MEL is an excuse to depart document as against can we go document. Madness.

martinsvi · 14-02-2018 12:28pm

duskyjoe wrote: »

There is no way a certified transport aircraft would not have a master warning , master caution alert system re pitot heat turned off prior to take off. Me thinks orange lights, bells, whistles are a given in that part of the world and that the MEL is an excuse to depart document as against can we go document. Madness.

this is the "ECAM" for AN-148, or as they like to call it "KISS"
basically the way it apparently works is that if the Pitot heat is off, you will see the first 3 messages you see on the screen - ППД1(2,3) НЕТ ОБОГРЕВА literally means Pitot Tube 1(2,3) No Heating.

Once you turn on the heating, the message disappears unless there is a fault - in that case, the message comes back and on the button itself one would see ОТКАЗ (literally translates as "failure") light illuminated

Candamir · 14-02-2018 4:33pm

Negative_G wrote: »

And if the PF is experiencing somatogravic illusion? Will power and pitch help then? Maybe it would, equally it could exacerbate the problem.

I'm not having a good pop at you, just purely playing devils advocate. I agree with your sentiment generally though.

Absolutely would. That’s why pilots learn instrument flying. I would assume most transport catagory aircraft have pitch and power settings in case of unreliable airspeed. Eg after T/O 15degrees and TOGA power.

Negative_G · 14-02-2018 5:25pm

Candamir wrote: »

Absolutely would. That’s why pilots learn instrument flying. I would assume most transport catagory aircraft have pitch and power settings in case of unreliable airspeed. Eg after T/O 15degrees and TOGA power.

I think you need to read a little about what I referred to.

Power and pitch is all well and good if you believe your instruments. There has been plenty of accidents because the PF believed one thing, while their instruments are telling them a different thing.

There is rarely one singular cause of an accident. The suggestion that power and pitch is the one stop shop for a problem solving is a bit naive and insulting to flight crew considering how little we know at this stage.

Candamir · 14-02-2018 6:50pm

Negative_G wrote: »

I think you need to read a little about what I referred to.

Power and pitch is all well and good if you believe your instruments. There has been plenty of accidents because the PF believed one thing, while their instruments are telling them a different thing.

There is rarely one singular cause of an accident. The suggestion that power and pitch is the one stop shop for a problem solving is a bit naive and insulting to flight crew considering how little we know at this stage.

Ehhhhh........ In the context of unreliable airspeed - which is what was being discussed. All that’s required to set power and pitch is N1/ epr and a standby horizon. Do you mean you should believe the seat of your pants before your instruments? That has been the cause of many accidents, yes. And yes of course we know very little at this stage, but unreliable airspeed is what was being postulated, and that is what I was replying to. I wasn’t being insulting to pilots at all! Not sure where you got that from.

Negative_G · 14-02-2018 10:43pm

Candamir wrote: »

Ehhhhh........ In the context of unreliable airspeed - which is what was being discussed. All that’s required to set power and pitch is N1/ epr and a standby horizon. Do you mean you should believe the seat of your pants before your instruments? That has been the cause of many accidents, yes. And yes of course we know very little at this stage, but unreliable airspeed is what was being postulated, and that is what I was replying to. I wasn’t being insulting to pilots at all! Not sure where you got that from.

"Postulated", "discussed". Heres a more appropriate layman word - speculation.

Do I believe you should believe the seat of your pants before your instruments? What a stupid question. So stupid in fact I am not going to addresss it as you already know the answer.

Here is a question for you, have you done any UPRT? Have you ever experienced the leans? I expect the answer to both is a firm no. I have carried out and experienced both.

As I said previously, aviation has more than its fair share armchar experts. If only all the armchair sullenburgers out there were actual pilots, sure there would never be another accident or incident again.

If you want to address a point while quoting me, perhaps you might want to include your context or perspective on your post. Don't assume I will re-read the thread to gain your ascertain or your opinion. I dont have the time or the inclination.

View Profile · 14-02-2018 11:22pm

Negative_G wrote:

And if the PF is experiencing somatogravic illusion? Will power and pitch help then? Maybe it would, equally it could exacerbate the problem.

A commercial pilot will experience somatographic illusion regularly and learn to ignore it. So yes, pitch and power will always help in this case.
I don't see how it would exacerbate the situation.

View Profile · 14-02-2018 11:29pm

Negative_G wrote:

Here is a question for you, have you done any UPRT? Have you ever experienced the leans? I expect the answer to both is a firm no. I have carried out and experienced both.

Instrument rated pilots will trust their instruments. To have all 3 attitude indicators fail is quite unlikely. That's your primary reference. If airspeed is deemed unreliable, pitch and power will keep you flying safely until touchdown.

Negative_G · 14-02-2018 11:31pm

View Profile wrote: »

Instrument rated pilots will trust their instruments. To have all 3 attitude indicators fail is quite unlikely. That's your primary reference. If airspeed is deemed unreliable, pitch and power will keep you flying safely until touchdown.

Thank you for stating the obvious.

Any other infinite words of wisdom since we are going down that road?

Why not throw in "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate" aswell.

L1011 · 14-02-2018 11:41pm

Calm down, please.

Candamir · 14-02-2018 11:44pm

Negative_G wrote: »

"Postulated", "discussed". Heres a more appropriate layman word - speculation.

Do I believe you should believe the seat of your pants before your instruments? What a stupid question. So stupid in fact I am not going to addresss it as you already know the answer.

Here is a question for you, have you done any UPRT? Have you ever experienced the leans? I expect the answer to both is a firm no. I have carried out and experienced both.

As I said previously, aviation has more than its fair share armchar experts. If only all the armchair sullenburgers out there were actual pilots, sure there would never be another accident or incident again.

If you want to address a point while quoting me, perhaps you might want to include your context or perspective on your post. Don't assume I will re-read the thread to gain your ascertain or your opinion. I dont have the time or the inclination.

Seriously? What’s your problem? I think you may have gotten the wrong end of the stick here.

BTW, a firm ‘yes’ and ‘yes’ to the above.

View Profile · 14-02-2018 11:47pm

Negative_G wrote:

Any other infinite words of wisdom since we are going down that road?

Yeah. Learn to relax. You might live a little longer.

Candamir · 14-02-2018 11:48pm

View Profile wrote: »

Yeah. Learn to relax. You might live a little longer.

Good advice

Irish Steve · 15-02-2018 12:16am

I think we need to put a bit of context back into this discussion.

Not that long ago, an A330 in the cruise suffered an unreliable airspeed incident, and for all sorts of reasons, the flight deck crew were unable to deal with it correctly, and the aircraft and all on board were lost, at a relatively relaxed phase of the flight, all it needed was for them to recognise the issue, and apply appropriate pitch and power and the aircraft would have continued to fly, rather than making a very big splash into the Atlantic as a result of stalling all the way down.

The Antonov was departing, and the standard departure process goes along the lines of checking that both sides are reading the same airspeed during the ground roll, then using the airspeed to determine V1, (the go/nogo decision speed), V2, (rotate) and then the appropriate climb speed, and both pitch and power are adjusted during that phase to maintain the speed, which will then be increased as flaps and slats are stowed, and then increased as the climb rate is reduced once the initial departure climb out has been completed.

More than somewhat simplified, that's the standard that's pretty much universal for departure.

What's the critical number 1 item that's been referred to a number of times during that paragraph? Yup, got it in one, speed.

Now, make the mental transition to even recognise that the speeds have gone screwy.

First, you have to recognise that there's a problem with the speed, which because of the rarity with which it happens, may take a few moments.

Next, you have to make the mental transition to ignore the speed indication that's wrong, and start to fly the aircraft using the other cues that are available to you, but remember, the departure climb out is a time of high work load, and flying without a reliable air speed during that phase of flight is not something you would choose to do, and if forced to do it, the information about what pitch and power settings to use are not likely to be figures that you can instantly recall from memory, as the chances are you have never had to use them, so the first problem will be finding the right page in the QRH to get the relevant figures, and remember, this is an already high work load part of the flight, as your going to be dealing with heading changes, course changes, possibly ATC level off instructions, and the changes of speeds caused by the normal departure reconfigurations that happen all the time.

And that's assuming that you've been able to find the mental capacity to actually analyse that you're trying to fly the aircraft with unreliable airspeed, and depending on how unreliable the airspeed it, and how quickly you've copped it, the aircraft may already be doing things that you're only partially prepared for.

Yes, it's possible that for reasons as yet unknown, the crew didn't turn the pitot heat on at the appropriate moment during the check lists. At this stage, we don't know what they did, or why, or if there was a technical issue with the aircraft that meant there was a failure.

Recognising that failure and dealing with it sounds easy, but believe me, at that phase of the flight, with the high workload, recognising and appropriately managing the problem may well turn out to have been more complex than the crew was capable of dealing with, which resulted in the crash.

So, on that basis, can we all please recognise that sitting comfortably in our chairs behind a keyboard is a very different scenario than being behind the controls of an aircraft that has suddenly started doing things that you are not expecting, and in ways that you've not planned for, and for reasons that are not completely clear or predictable.

That's why commercial pilots fly a significant number of hours before they get their licence, and why they spend time in simulators on a regular basis, it's preparation for the time when they may have to deal with something that's outside of their experience, and all we can do is hope that their training and intuition enable them to arrive at a valid analysis of what's wrong before things are too out of control to be able to recover.

So, let's get back to having a reasonable discussion, without the sniping and other comments that are coming in to the thread.

Candamir · 15-02-2018 9:22am

Yeah, except that pitch and Power settings would be fairly standard for immediate departure, and up to the end of the acceleration phase, so if something doesn’t look right, it’ll be fairly obvious. Of course it’ll take a few seconds/ maybe a minute to figure out what’s going on. Also pitch and power settings for unreliable airspeed are memory recall items - for airbus anyway (the type I fly), I presume there’s similar recall checklists for other types, so there’s no routing around in the QRH. (Tbh, I’m not familiar with flying antonovs, so taking in general terms here!)
In the AF situation, if all the crew had done were apply a reasonable pitch and Power, it’s very likely the situation would have resolved itself within a few minutes (as it did in other similar incidents). So it’s odd that some people seem very resistant to the idea of setting a reasonable pitch and power which will keep you safe while you figure out what’s going on.

martinsvi · 15-02-2018 1:15pm

to deal with unreliable speed indication you first have to recognize that indeed the speed is unreliable. When pitot ices up the indicated speed goes down with the rate of climb, and builds back up with a decent making you believe that everything is correct

If you overreact and push the nose down, it will in return cause momentary weightlessness even further making one believe that you are in a stall and as such the recovery should be initiated.

at just 6000ft up in a jet, I don't think there's a lot of time to initiate a stall recovery and then change your state of mind for an unreliable airspeed scenario

I don't think anyone here is resistant to the idea that pitch and power can save the day, commander had 23 years of flying behind him, I'm fairly sure he knew the pitch and power mantra as well if not better than anyone here.

I think what Negative_G and myself are trying to say, is that being in the same scenario the chances of us ending up with the same result are fairly high..

In the meantime something popped up in the Russian aviation forums that might be of interest - it's a crews experience summary, I don't know how accurate it is. What it says there is that the captain has flown 60 hours since the beginning of the month and that before the flight he had 134 rest hours. That would indicate a fairly awkward roster to say the least. This also indicates that he qualified as a captain at the end of last year and has 58 hours in the left hand seat. The FO was quite fresh, 812 hours, all on type

Candamir · 15-02-2018 1:51pm

martinsvi wrote: »

I think what Negative_G and myself are trying to say, is that being in the same scenario the chances of us ending up with the same result are fairly high..

If you’re professional pilots, I’d bloody hope not!

I’m going to assume that the vast majority of pilots could handle an unreliable airspeed situation such as what’s being suggested here - a quick search of Avherald’s reports of similar incidents would seem to confirm my suspicions. Thankfully.

(Disclaimer: Again, we’ve no idea what actually happened in the Moscow incident, so I’m in no way referring to it)

martinsvi · 15-02-2018 2:09pm

you missed my point - you can only handle unreliable airspeed if you know your airspeed is unreliable. Throw some turbulence in the mix, some other distractions (troubleshooting a completely different issue perhaps?) and whoila - the holes on the swiss cheese align

PukkaStukka · 15-02-2018 2:52pm

martinsvi wrote: »

you missed my point - you can only handle unreliable airspeed if you know your airspeed is unreliable. Throw some turbulence in the mix, some other distractions (troubleshooting a completely different issue perhaps?) and whoila - the holes on the swiss cheese align

The reports on the day were that the cloudbase was low, so if they were in cloud when the problems became acute, the lack of visual reference would probably have been a factor.

Brennus335 · 15-02-2018 2:58pm

martinsvi wrote: »

you missed my point - you can only handle unreliable airspeed if you know your airspeed is unreliable. Throw some turbulence in the mix, some other distractions (troubleshooting a completely different issue perhaps?) and whoila - the holes on the swiss cheese align

Agree with you 100% there.
Recognising you have an unreliable airspeed condition is the most difficult bit, and sometimes it not as obvious as you might think.

I've often sat in the back of the sim, and watched the 2 guys screw up am unreliable airspeed after lift off problem, even though we discussed it in the briefing room beforehand, and they knew it was coming.

Candamir · 15-02-2018 3:24pm

martinsvi wrote: »

you missed my point - you can only handle unreliable airspeed if you know your airspeed is unreliable. Throw some turbulence in the mix, some other distractions (troubleshooting a completely different issue perhaps?) and whoila - the holes on the swiss cheese align

No, I take your point. However, if it doesn’t look right, you do something, right? So in that critical after T/O phase, when the sh1t is hitting the fan, knowing what a reasonable pitch and Power setting is will give you time, and keep you safe, while you diagnose the problem.

Brennus335 wrote: »

Agree with you 100% there.
Recognising you have an unreliable airspeed condition is the most difficult bit, and sometimes it not as obvious as you might think.

I've often sat in the back of the sim, and watched the 2 guys screw up am unreliable airspeed after lift off problem, even though we discussed it in the briefing room beforehand, and they knew it was coming.

And I presume the 2 guys went back and did it again, and again and again, as many times as was necessary, until they had the hang of it?
Yes it’s confusing, and yes people mess up, which is why having some idea of what pitch and power is reasonable at various stages of flight will keep things aloft until you’ve figured out what’s going on. I think that’s been drilled into us all since AF447.
The notion was put forward earlier that ‘pitch and power’ was of limited used because ‘ somatographic illusion’ something. That’s obviously nonsense.

Negative_G · 15-02-2018 3:42pm

Candamir wrote: »

The notion was put forward earlier that ‘pitch and power’ was of limited used because ‘ somatographic illusion’ something. That’s obviously nonsense.

You are picking and choosing what you read to suit your own narrative. Weak.

Another poster said "power and pitch lads", implying that this simple advice can get an aircraft out of most sticky situations.

I then addressed that directly saying thats all well and good but if a the PF was suffering somatographic illusion, power and pitch may not help as the PF might not be 100% aware or sure of what the aircraft is actually doing.

The 'notion' as you call it was merely to address that another 'notion' that power and pitch isn't the answer to all problems and I put forward a logical example (which has caused many CFIT accidents) where power and pitch may not have a desirable outcome.

It really isn't that hard to understand.

Brennus335 · 15-02-2018 3:46pm

Candamir wrote: »

No, I take your point. However, if it doesn’t look right, you do something, right? So in that critical after T/O phase, when the sh1t is hitting the fan, knowing what a reasonable pitch and Power setting is will give you time, and keep you safe, while you diagnose the problem.

And I presume the 2 guys went back and did it again, and again and again, as many times as was necessary, until they had the hang of it?
Yes it’s confusing, and yes people mess up, which is why having some idea of what pitch and power is reasonable at various stages of flight will keep things aloft until you’ve figured out what’s going on. I think that’s been drilled into us all since AF447.
The notion was put forward earlier that ‘pitch and power’ was of limited used because ‘ somatographic illusion’ something. That’s obviously nonsense.

The pitch & power settings are not the issue here.
The issue is the difficulty in actually identifying an unreliable airspeed scenario. Sometimes it can be so incidious, that it's very hard to diagnose.

Knowing pitch & power settings is useless, if you don't realise you're in a situation where you need to apply them.

Plane down near Moscow

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