Does SSL create a false sense of security

srsly78 wrote: »

So why do you find it implicit that network admin is also admin on the client?

Simply because the likely scenario we are discussing pretty much requires (i.e its possible but EXTREMELY difficult to execute otherwise) that these interactions with a proxy are happening on a local network. So generally in managed environments like that, such as AD, a network admin would also have local admin.

srsly78 wrote: »

In that case it isn't an attack, the client (corporate pc/device) has certs loaded for the corporate network. That's the system working as designed.

Even then, what if I used my (personal) smartphone on your corporate guest wifi? Could you decrypt my https then? (note: not a nokia or other phone that is already mitmed!!)

Nope, but so what? Any professional network admin is not going to allow unauthorized personal devices on a network that has anything worth stealing. In fact anywhere I've worked that has anything remotely secure has a blanket ban on wifi, or there is a DMZ. The OP was right this thread has descended into nerd sniping which is getting tiresome. I've had enough.

Vmware always warns about the certificate when conencting to the Vcenter application...no-one ever checks it, they just recognise it as "the usual" and click accept. So, in that situation, mitm would work.

I would suspect that while not everyone would read a certificate warning, enough would click "accept" or "continue to this site anyway (not recommended)" because its an annoying pop-up stopping them from getting what they want, that it is a viable threat. low hanging fruit and all that.

Wasnt there a vulnerability to do with certificate signing trees? (it allowed you to forge a certificate higher up on the authorisation tree and the "lower" cert accepted it as suthentic because of its superior breeding or something) I'll have a look and see if I can find a link....