Rescue 116 Crash at Blackrock, Co Mayo(Mod note in post 1)

Coil Kilcrea wrote: »

I would very much hope that this tragic event might finally force the politicians to properly resource the Air Corps. Time and time again we've kicked this can down the road, huffed and puffed, and generally acted the eejit. SAR services undertaken by a private operator is one thing but our Air Corps should have the capability to assist, provide top cover and general back up as necessary.

It's time to finally join the dots.

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Growler!!! wrote: »

It would be very difficult to distinguish between the flash from the lighthouse and the flash from the aircraft strobe light also taking into account the whiteout effect of the landing lights while flying in IMC. Also the pilots would have been looking inside at their instruments while flying in these conditions.

You mentioned stats about the lighthouse. Did it mention the power output in Lux or Candella?

We have debated this issue over some considerable numbers of posts. I dont think there is anything new to say, which again is why hopefully the final report may add some expert perspective on this

Again , Its not the key issue, on the key issue , ( in essence a navigation issue ) I think that there is sufficient information to form a conclusion.

I say its not the key issue, because if they had detected the rock, and avoided it , the main issue still remains

plodder wrote: »

When you say "resolved in that regard", do you mean that they have issued an interim safety recommendation, and that's the end of it? I would hope that is not the end of it, because it doesn't look likely to be within CHC's competence to review the data sources for Honeywell's terrain database.

The interim safety recommendation was nothing to do with the EGPWS, rather a review of operator routes , based on the fact that this one had a 300 foot rock at the start of the recommended route .

I suspect that was because , as was mentioned elsewhere , these routes were drawn up long before reliable GPS locations fixing and is quite common too place a waypoint near or at an identifiable location .

This has the unfortunate issue with the arrival of high performance position fixing , in boat navigation , where historically , a waypoint might use a nav buoy , and now people just program up the waypoint and the accuracy is such that they run into the same buoy. !!!

The issue is that the EGPWS was not going too save the crew ( cause the data wasn't present ) , and expert discussion elsewhere suggest even if the feature was in the database its unlikely to have reported it in time any way .

Hence , its " resolved" in that it it place no part in providing the crew with any info

A bigger issue surrounds the use of the radar , that certainly needs investigation , to determine if there are SOP or training or equipment issues here . But again this is not the kernel of the accident, even if it is a question that hopefully will be answered

BoatMad wrote: »

Growler!!! wrote: »

It would be very difficult to distinguish between the flash from the lighthouse and the flash from the aircraft strobe light also taking into account the whiteout effect of the landing lights while flying in IMC. Also the pilots would have been looking inside at their instruments while flying in these conditions.

You mentioned stats about the lighthouse. Did it mention the power output in Lux or Candella?

We have debated this issue over some considerable numbers of posts. I dont think there is anything new to say, which again is why hopefully the final report may add some expert perspective on this

Again , Its not the key issue, on the key issue , ( in essence a navigation issue ) I think that there is sufficient information to form a conclusion.

I say its not the key issue, because if they had detected the rock, and avoided it , the main issue still remains

So you're not going to answer my question and shutting down any further debate on the subject you brought up?

I believe the debate as you call it was you saying that in your sea going experience the light should have been seen.
I believe that it could not be seen based on my aviation experience (Cat2/3 ops). You brought the subject back up in your post above in relation to the final report giving reasons why the light was not seen or recognised.

You are correct as it is not the main issue. If it was seen then this incident would not have occurred. I am merely trying to counter your assertion that the light should have been seen using my own experience.

So you're not going to answer my question and shutting down any further debate on the subject you brought up?

merely that everyone has stated their ( our ) positions and understanding and deductions and in the absence of any more information , I personally dont think there is anything more to say , thats all ,

I brought up that subject , not to debate it further here, but to suggest , its on elf the areas where the main report might/must investigate
, i.e. why did all the detection methods fail, we conclusively know whey the EGPWS didnt work.

As I said before, the issue that the detection methods failed is part of the event cascade, but the fundamental error remains

BoatMad wrote: »

merely that everyone has stated their ( our ) positions and understanding and deductions and in the absence of any more information , I personally dont think there is anything more to say , thats all ,

I'm glad to hear it.

gctest50 wrote: »

No no, if it saves your ass it's a bonus

bonus, yes, but it does not excuse the underlying error of navigation

wiping you brow , after a brown trouser moment , and patting the computer is not a reason to say there was not problem in your decision logic

its called automation complacency

Its one thing to deduce that the crew selected a route and an altitude without any backup information present in the aircraft that would have prompted a change off decision , but thats not the case

I see where you are coming from. You are focusing on the navigation issue. It may well have been (and probably was) the major proximate cause. But, the investigation has to look at everything, including the systems that might have saved them, had they worked. Otherwise, what is the point of having these systems?

Yes I beleive the core issue is a navigation error

Yes the report ( as I said several times ) needs to look at the failure of the " save you ass" system which did not do that . In particular the radar failure is peculiar to say the least

the point of warning systems , is that they are " aids" to piloting the craft , they are not responsible for that piloting , the human is . Hence any professional navigator uses the inputs of all systems to inform them, but ultimately they must plan on the basis that these systems are NOT 100% reliable and proceed accordingly

Obviously they can't guarantee every object is in the database, but we need to find out why Blackrock wasn't. And the implication coming from the report is quite disturbing on that front

it wasn't there because Honeywell didnt put it there , and I suspect there are many structures not in the database , Yes this needs to quantified and any reliance of such systems flagged, but again this is not the kernel of the accident

The general feeling elsewhere is that these systems are far from satisfactory and of limited functionality . The main reason SAR is fitted with them , is that from time to time , in a SAR activity , the aircraft is moving in a unplanned way . Rescue 116 was not engaged in a SAR activity , it was following a conventional flight plan style of operation

plodder wrote: »

Come on, who is saying you should "plan an inherently dangerous route?" I'm saying you should do your best to not make mistakes in the first place, and then if you have a system that might save your ass, then use it.

It's like TCAS: it seems like you're saying it should be switched it off, and ATC and pilots should just not make navigation errors. It's a technological system that isn't perfect, but has saved countless lives.

yes , but the fact remains that controlled airspace , the navigation within it and the existence of defined flight paths does not depend on the existence of TCAS

Thats the kernel, you fly safely using ALL information available to you and your decisions must take into account the fact that warning systems are NOT 100% reliable

The report says that the low altitude switch was on, and it's hard to understand why that was the case. This constrains the capabilities of the system including the "look ahead" mode which relies on the terrain database and GPS. Given, that the system knows what speed an aircraft is flying at, what its position and heading are, and what obstacles lie ahead, it should be able to give ample warning in this situation. But, it can't do that if the terrain isn't in the database.

Again , no professional navigator , would knowingly select a route and altitude that then relies on a "last ditch" warning system to save their asses. Sorry , its simply not an form of SOP to my knowledge

Nobody using terrain warning , whether in a boat or in the air, can in any way , have 100% reliance on these systems. As an example, modern yacht systems, in an attempt to overcome the issues around map zoom issues, now have software that attempts to identify obstacles on the route chosen ( by examining the underlying map database ) , this is similar to what the EPGWS does.

However no navigator, would totally rely on that system, to sail that route without manually inspecting the underlying data yourself and using ANY other supporting information that may be present on the boat would be crazy ( but it happens )

So, I hope to be seeing a range of different scenarios explored of what might have happened,

we have been told exactly what happened, thats not in dispute

and excuses aren't presented like "Oh we don't need to look at X. It wouldn't have helped because the crew did Y"

the operation of warning systems , like FLIR, Radar and EPGWS and their contribution ( or NOT ) to the pilots SA, will of course be interesting and provide useful pointers to future operations

However the performance of the warning systems ( i.e. the crews use of it and the underlying technology ) is not the key issue

Again the issue is why did a experienced crew select a route with a known obstacle ( i.e. that information was on board the aircraft ) and then fly that route .

The answer is clear in my mind, even if its deductive