Rescue 116 Crash at Blackrock, Co Mayo(Mod note in post 1)

BoatMad wrote: »

The issue here is the reports speculates on how the rear crew detected the island , for all we know he could have just seen it with his own eyes

The fundamental problem was that the pilots had lost situational awareness and were simply not mentally attuned to the fact that an island was in their path.

there are serious issues about the ( over) reliance on technology in this accident that are also common with several other air crashes . Its becoming an increasing issue as technology becomes centre stage in all our lives

If they looked out the window they would have seen nothing it was pitch black and foggy, accurate technology would have saved them

I hope this issue of communication between R116 and R118 gets a good deal more attention immediately and doesn't have to await a final report.

R116 was tasked to provide Top Cover. However, by the time it was up and away, R118 was en route to Blacksod for a refuelling before heading out to the FV location. The report says that 116-118 direct comms was achieved only once, on secure VHF while 118 was at/near Blacksod. According to the report this was around 23:10-23:20, around 15 minutes after 116 left Dublin.

By the time 116 would have safely arrived at Blacksod and refuelled, it would have been 01:00 ish allowing for a best case scenario, before it left Blacksod to perform its mission of Top Cover provision. At that stage, 118 was more or less on the way back from the operation, based on its arrival at Blackrock to start searching, with the casualty still on board, at 02:13.

118 was lost to all comms for some time as evidenced by Shannon's efforts to make contact via a Translantic Aircraft (which also failed) together with 116's many attempts as described in the report. Being out of contact for so long seems to need explanation, as does a HEMS mission heading out so far ahead of its Top Cover accompaniment as to make that Top Cover largely redundant, at least from a comms perspective and possibly also from a SaR perspective if 118 itself had gone down.

The report stressed this matter of communications being on the mind of the 116 crew, and may have been why they were so far out, attempting to make contact before deciding to refuel.

At least 2 issues arise: a) if Top Cover is needed why would there be such a gap between the HEMS and Top Cover aircraft leaving Black Sod, and b) can satellite comms that deal with the deficiencies of radio be put in place to help plug that particular issue immediately.

Means Of Escape wrote: »

Fair enough
From the report can it be gathered that there are different altitude protocols when approaching a landing site over land as distinct from approaching over sea due to greater number of obstacles over land ?

we cannot determine that, all we know is the stated page contained no altitude information and the" briefing page " mentioned as detailing the obstruction was not copied in the report

No cause for concern being no "known" obstacles approaching Blacksod

Both the moving maps on board and the briefing guides too the approached detailed the obstacle that was Blackrock. The map would have needed to be zoomed in to check the course in detail ( this is a very common issues with small sized moving maps) and the briefing notes would have to have been consulted. All we can conclude is that they are not as the crew actions seemed to indicate that they were unaware of its existence

Again flying for a considerable distance at 200 feet over sea at night with very few external visual guides with only instruments to rely on is very risky and doubly so for this unfortunate crew not having the sole obstacle on their systems .

Indeed to a non pilot , flying 10 miles at 200 feet would seem foolish , you could gets ships that tall ( or fly into a oil platform being towed or whatever )

ot having the sole obstacle on their systems

their map systems have been confirmed to have the obstacle details on it. however the nature of vector maps is that detail is removed at higher levels of zoom, I speculate ( and I accept it is a speculation ) that the crew did nor review the approach route in detail on the mapping system ( there was certainly no mention of such and action )

It's distressing to read through the transcript and the sequence of events. It's difficult to comprehend for many reasons. And frankly, I don't have the words. But I'm struck by the fact that hover capability has to be an advantage in transitioning from IFR to VFR and wonder why not descend over the Blacksod landing pad?

Possibly a stupid question but it's puzzling me .....R111 also springs to mind where they tried to within a few hundred feet.

BoatMad wrote: »

you have obviously never sailed at night , This is a 16 mile range nautical light flashing every 12 seconds , it would have been clearly visible ahead . to obscure that light would have required dense fog and even then the loom would be detectable.

us.

The helicopter was below the cloud, the lighthouse was in the cloud (not fog) based on the reported weather. I don't know how light travels through cloud and suggest neither do you as it wouldn't be something you'd encounter in your sailing experience.

Bigbok wrote: »

I fly on the S93 twice a month to the oil rig and I have never been 200ft?if flying between rigs we aren't allowed below 400 or 600 ft?when coming in to land at the heliport in sumbrugh we are well above 600ft until we are literally above our landing area before coming down,so what were they doing 8km out at 200ft???

BoatMad can clarify that especially to all non pilots (hitting ships ,oil rigs etc)

I don't know anything about helicopters.

Can someone please explain to me, an amateur, why a helicopter would fly f
so low that it can actually hit a landmass. Surely this is very very low .

Also can someone please explain to me why it would hit an island which is a TINY speck in a massive ocean is this just a massive unfortunate coincidence.

arubex wrote: »

It may be that there is no current STC on the S-92 for a suitable SATCOM installation.

A couple of sources reference the S-92s being equipped with satellite comms.

https://flyinginireland.com/2015/03/irish-coast-guard-enhancing-capabilities/
http://www.dttas.ie/sites/default/files/publications/maritime/english/irish-coast-guard-publications/s92-compared-s61cr.pdf

I've read elsewhere from aircrew that satellite comms are often considered to be more pain than they're worth, with long connection delays, numerous dropped connections, long complicated numbers required to dial.

BoatMad wrote: »

I do not believe than the operator route details contains specific flight levels that were tp be maintained at each waypoint, Hence you are speculating here.

Your posts are full of speculation, so I find it odd that you're calling someone else out on it. Stop the speculation yourself, and use the report function.

de biz wrote: »

The preliminary report confirms that R118 landed at Blacksod at approximately
22.28 hrs.

It would be interesting to see the track and vertical profile of their approach path.

Nope! It left Sligo at 22:28

L1011 wrote: »

Your posts are full of speculation, so I find it odd that you're calling someone else out on it. Stop the speculation yourself, and use the report function.

I'm failing to see where boatmads posts are "full" of speculation. I think it's pretty obvious he's read the preliminary report at length and has a good understanding of what he's talking about.

IMO he's been one of the best contributers to this thread.

Gaoth Laidir wrote: »

Boatmad, they most likely could not see the light from Blackrock and would not have been looking for it anyway. As I explained last night, flight visibility at that height - just below cloudbase - would have been a lot less than the 3000 m reported at sea level at Belmullet. At that speed they would have covered 500 m between flashes. Flight visibility could have been around that or even less, so there may have been only 1 flash for them to spot. Add in the strobe light from the aircraft itself and the focus on instruments and we can put to bed this discussion on the lighthouse.

Boating is one thing, flying is a totally different dimension.

sorry , the period of the light is 12s , that is one ( or more flashes ) every 12 seconds, The light is sectored and has a range of 16Nm ( this is the surface range) This is a considerably powerful light compared to surface sea based lights

They were 1.5 nm away from the lighthouse when the turn began ,and it took over a minute to cover the distance to the lighthouse

the aspect of the lighthouse would have become visible as the Heli proceeded through its turn , gradually appearing own the left hand side of the aircraft

They then had anything from 50 seconds where the light would be visible , that upwards of 4 flashes , even if they had 30 seconds they would have seen 2-3 flashes

To suggest that at 200 feet , which is about 100 feet higher then the bridge of a big cargo vessel , at 1 mile out that a 16nM light was not visible is in my view simply ridiculous


I would contend and entirely different thing ( and I have witnessed it in boats )

The pilots were involved with the automation and in completing the turn to the waypoint, Thy had formed an incorrect mental picture of the route ahead to that waypoint. If ( they may not have been looking out the window) or when they saw a brief flash , it was simply ignored because the reality did not match the mental picture and the picture being supplied by the automation

Ive seen people at sea run into objects that were clearly there , because the automation told them , is was clear.

L1011 wrote: »

Your posts are full of speculation, so I find it odd that you're calling someone else out on it. Stop the speculation yourself, and use the report function.

if you could like to detail any " speculation " that I have referred to , I would be glad to review it. Where I have made a deduction I have always said so.

I pointed out this particular speculation , because the report did not mention nor was there any indication that the approach to blacksod contained vertical information

mickdw wrote: »

Is it a case that if they had initially intended to fly to blacksod that they would have had a briefing on intended approach etc whereas this flight departed heading for sligo meaning the blacksod approach was not understood to the same degree that it might otherwise have been.

The pilots ( via the CVR) were seen to be discussing that they both had not been to blacksod for a long time.

Hence it cant be reasonably deduced ( as opposed to speculation ) that they were not familiar with the approach in the same way the local crew of 118 were

They did have on board information that set out the obstacles on the elected approach route, but again it is a reasonable deduction that they didi not access that information


The rest seemed to be a standard approach that SAR crews do , but this is based on commentary that is not available directly from the crew, as we have NO idea why the particular decisions to select such an approach and the various flight levels were chosen

Cloudio9 wrote: »

Boatmad you seem to be in denial about the fact that the cloud base was reported as 300ft which is below the lighthouse.

and you seem to be entirely unaware of the power of a 16NM light especially 1 mile away from it . The loom in the cloud alone would have been extensive

to suggest it was invisible is ridiculous . it may not have been immediately obvious , but to someone that was aware it should have been there , it would have been most definitely obvious

Note that the aftercast for blackrock was

Visibility 2-3 km
Weather Mist and drizzle
Cloud Overcast with a cloud base of 300-400 ft

fog was not mentioned and the cloud base was certainly enough for the light to be visible