Social Constructivism

DadaKopf

Hasn't been the most successful experiment, has it?

I'd be interested in discussing Social Constructivism. I think it's interesting because it's an approach that attempts to reconcile two opposing approaches to ontology and epistimology.

The first approach is the scientific one, which through its methodologies in the natural and social science realms, maintains that there is a clear separation between facts and values. The second approach may be collectively called the post-modern/post-Marxist/anti-foundationalist, which holds that facts and values are interwoven, two sides of the same coin and inseparable.

The question is whether Enlightenment notions of objective knowledge can be reconciled at all with postmodern notions of knowledge as the product of intersubjective social relations.

The debate continues in many fields from philosophy to international relations and, with the Bush administration and Islamic fundamentalists preaching a strange mix of faith and divine (objective) Truth, I think it's an important issue to get to grips with.

SkepticOne

DadaKopf wrote:

I'd be interested in discussing Social Constructivism. I think it's interesting because it's an approach that attempts to reconcile two opposing approaches to ontology and epistimology.

That URL links to a review of a book by Francis Remedios which in turn is an introduction to the ideas of Steve Fuller who describes himself as a "social epistemologist". It is hard to get a handle on social constructivism from reading this as it is too many levels removed from the subject at hand.

Google returns this link on social constructivism which seems to contain some of the basic assumptions:

Social constructivism is based on specific assumptions about reality, knowledge, and learning. To understand and apply models of instruction that are rooted in the perspectives of social constructivists, it is important to know the premises that underlie them.

Reality: Social constructivists believe that reality is constructed through human activity. Members of a society together invent the properties of the world (Kukla, 2000). For the social constructivist, reality cannot be discovered: it does not exist prior to its social invention.

Knowledge: To social constructivists, knowledge is also a human product, and is socially and culturally constructed (Ernest, 1999; Gredler, 1997; Prat & Floden, 1994). Individuals create meaning through their interactions with each other and with the environment they live in.

Learning: Social constructivists view learning as a social process. It does not take place only within an individual, nor is it a passive development of behaviors that are shaped by external forces (McMahon, 1997). Meaningful learning occurs when individuals are engaged in social activities.

Is this what you mean by social constructivism? What do you mean by the "scientific" approach? I think the two can be reconciled but we need to make sure we're talking about the same thing.

DadaKopf

Well, to my knowledge, social constructivism a la Anthony Giddens is view which proposes a reflexive mechanism whereby knowledge and 'reality' are created.

Giddens's theory of structuration notes that social life is more than random individual acts, but is not merely determined by social forces. To put it another way, it's not merely a mass of 'micro'-level activity - but on the other hand, you can't study it by only looking for 'macro'-level explanations. Instead, Giddens suggests, human agency and social structure are in a relationship with each other, and it is the repetition of the acts of individual agents which reproduces the structure. This means that there is a social structure - traditions, institutions, moral codes, and established ways of doing things; but it also means that these can be changed when people start to ignore them, replace them, or reproduce them differently.

[...]

[P]people's everyday actions reinforce and reproduce a set of expectations - and it is this set of other people's expectations which make up the 'social forces' and 'social structures' that sociologists talk about. As Giddens puts it, 'Society only has form, and that form only has effects on people, in so far as structure is produced and reproduced in what people do'.

Many theorists have adapted these ideas to different spheres of research, but social constructivism seems to attempt to find a middleground between those who think that facts and values are distinct and mutually exclusive (scientists, rationalists etc.) and those who believe that they're the same thing. It, effectively, attempts to build a bridge between the two philosophical traditions by proposing a social mechanism through which 'social reality' is created through the interactive relationships between social (and, I guess natural) structure and social action.

Theorists like Alexander Wendt have applied social constructivism to the study of international relations. I found this article which summarises his well-known Anarchy is What States Make of It:

Rationalist models are incorrect to assume that only the behavior of states is affected by the structure of the international system. Instead, the interests and identities of states are themselves constructed by the distribution of ideas within that system.

In classic international relations theory, there's a distinction made between facts and values. Realists believe that global politics is ordered by the fact of anarchy (i.e. there is no authority higher than individual states), which they believe is the natural order of things, the law of the jungle - it's true for all time and we can't escape being violent towards each other. Contrary to the Realist view, Liberals believe that the world can be peaceful if we all establish institutions that protect a set of universal values such as human rights. Both these views are founded on rationalist principles derived from the Enlightenment. (Perhaps I wrongly labelled this the "scientific approach".)

However, Wendt's social constructivist perspective presents an alternative scenario: that the so-called objective structure of anarchy is only exists because a set of socially constructed values and activities sustain that structure. The thing keeping people acting the same way is people's adherence to their own identity. So his approach attempts to understand the relationship between facts and values through the lens of interests and identities rather than solely looking at structures and capabilities or appealing to higher univeral values.

I've also begun reading an amazing journal article called 'What is Anthropological Enlightenment?' by a guy called Marshall Sahlins. An interesting part of his article deals with how the globalisation of Western values and concepts, while presented as universal, objective truths, are simply the imposition of Western cultural traits in the same way paternal kinship structures are cultural traits of the Masai in Africa. As an anthropologist, he presents evidence that different social practises, even under Western-led capitalism, produces some very interesting outcomes. Far from the world becoming more alike, he notes that:

[A]mong the modern Mendi people [a tribe in New Guinea] the exchange obligations between clans and personal kin create a demand for modern currency far greater than the demand generated in existing market outlets. Hence, from a Mendi point of view, they have the true exchange economy, by contrast to the mere "subsistence system" of white men. Now there's a howdy-do.

Here, Sahlins is explaining how indigenous societies throughout the world are exploiting the dominant, Western-led structures of the world economy in a way that maintains the order of their own social systems, their identities and, to use a phrase made famous by Sahlins, their 'cosmologies'. This example challenges the assumption that the only universally 'true' economy is a Western capitalist market economy - and the Left is guilty of this mistake as much as the Right (for what the terms are worth).

To me, this provides some evidence for the social constructivist approach. Therefore the intellectual traditions of Europe and America represent just one cosmology among many which arise not out of the discovery of objective (or noumenal) reality but of the intersubjective generation of social reality.

At the same time, I don't exactly see how it's a major shift away from postmodern approaches, which examine structures, too, and provide a critique of Enlightenment philosophical traditions.

So this issue cuts to the heart of Western philosophy.

Anyway, pick this post to shreds all you like, I know it's nonsense. Anyway, I'm spent after all that!

DadaKopf

Here's a Constructivism resource I found: http://home.scarlet.be/~lazone/.

SkepticOne

I think there's a danger that the general ideas of social constructivism are being lost in the specifics of international relations. A lot of what is being said (for example) by Wendt and others in your links seems fairly sensible; but it is not entirely clear whether these things follow from general social constructivism.

For example Wendt says:

Wendt:
Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims:
(1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory;
(2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material; (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.
(edited passage from Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, 88 (June 1994), pg 385.)

While I don't totally agree with the above, this seems fairly sensible; but I don't see the need to make assumptions at a more fundamental level (e.g. the ones given in my post earlier) to say what Wendt is saying.

So, in your opinion, does social constructivism have a meaning without being applied to a specific topic like international relations?

DadaKopf

Sorry, I should have said that my reference to IR is mostly because its through IR that I know most about social constructivism.

But this is a philosophy forum and we should stick to the philosophical issues. I'm just always mindful of situating philosophical ideas within an applied context, otherwise philosophy's pointless IMHO.

Let's stick to the stuff about Giddens above, and what you previously quoted:

Reality: Social constructivists believe that reality is constructed through human activity. Members of a society together invent the properties of the world (Kukla, 2000). For the social constructivist, reality cannot be discovered: it does not exist prior to its social invention.

Knowledge: To social constructivists, knowledge is also a human product, and is socially and culturally constructed (Ernest, 1999; Gredler, 1997; Prat & Floden, 1994). Individuals create meaning through their interactions with each other and with the environment they live in.

Learning: Social constructivists view learning as a social process. It does not take place only within an individual, nor is it a passive development of behaviors that are shaped by external forces (McMahon, 1997). Meaningful learning occurs when individuals are engaged in social activities.

Does social constructivism have implications for philosophy? It seems to act as a critique of positivism and as a means to ground postmodern theories in (perhaps paradoxically) social research.

I mean, either there are objective facts about the world that shape our existence, or that these 'facts' are arbitrary categories invented by humans. Or, these facts are the product of the social invention of structures - which tries to combine the two.

But can you really combine two philosophical outlooks: one that maintains an opposition between facts and values, and one which maintains that setting up such an arbitrary dichotomy is committing a category mistake? It's the difference between the philosophy of Kant and Marx versus Derrida and Foucault.

In turn, I think these respective attitudes fundamentally shape the kind of worlds we live in. Which is why I tried to contextualise the argument.

SkepticOne

DadaKopf wrote:

I mean, either there are objective facts about the world that shape our existence, or that these 'facts' are arbitrary categories invented by humans. Or, these facts are the product of the social invention of structures - which tries to combine the two.

The problem I have with a lot of what might be called "postmodern" theory is that it appears to throw away scientific advance. In the more extreme forms, all scientific theories are equivalent and are simply the result of various power relationships.

I mean, either there are objective facts about the world that shape our existence, or that these 'facts' are arbitrary categories invented by humans. Or, these facts are the product of the social invention of structures - which tries to combine the two.

I would take the view that there is an objective word. This world may be more subtle than previously imagined perhaps with the advent of more modern theories of physics, but nevertheless it is there. There are then two possible positions on 'facts'. Either they exist prior to investigation or they come into existance through the process of investigation and dissemination. In either case, however, they are not totally arbitrary. They are subject to testing. A theory can have various degrees of good or bad 'fit' with reality with respect to a particular purpose. Now while you might argue that this purpose is socially constructed, the 'fit' of the theory with respect to that purpose is not arbitrary. You can't just invent the theory to suit your aims.

The type of theories a society develops is, of course, subject to various social and economic pressures, but I believe this is better understood in terms of studying different areas of reality rather than the creation of 'realities'.

I think this is close to the way working scientists regard what they are doing as well as closer to the way ordinary people use the word reality.

However, when dealing with pure social constructs (possibly national boundaries are an example of this), analysing things in this way may not be appropriate. To a Pakistani the area known as Kashmir is part of Pakistan, not India. The issue of Kashmir is probably better understood in terms of the history of the area, the language or religion of the people in the area, the opinion of the people in the neigbouring countries and within Kashmir, the relative strengths of the armies of India and Pakistan and so on.

There are uses for both a values-based analysis as well as a fact-based one.

But can you really combine two philosophical outlooks: one that maintains an opposition between facts and values, and one which maintains that setting up such an arbitrary dichotomy is committing a category mistake? It's the difference between the philosophy of Kant and Marx versus Derrida and Foucault.

I would be interested to know why Derrida and Foucault think its a category mistake.

What I think may be possible is to place values-based analysis and fact-based analysis within a larger conceptual framework. Possibly the two types can be considered the extreme ends of a continuous spectrum. This framework would then have to have a systematic way of placing the thing under discussion at the appropriate point on the spectrum.

The 'Enlightenment' approach would then be seen as seeing only the extreme ends of the spectrum. Derrida sees everything but fails to place things at any particular point (though I would say that a lot of postmodernism tends to bias things towards the values-based end of things). This is my impression of social constructivism. Although it doesn't draw a distinction, I get the impression that it views everything as values-based.

Religious fundamentalism could be seen as a mistake in placement of a particular item on the spectrum.

Alternatively, the approaches discussed might simply be two of many different approaches but these don't fall in to a simple one-dimensional spectrum. This would be a sort of epistemological pluralism. This would only be satisfactory if it can be explained why a particular approach fits a particular entity or topic and this would be part of the framework. It is likely that multiple approaches are required. Epistemological pluralism could be extended to ontological pluralism where things 'are' in different or even multiple ways.

I know there's been work done in this, but I haven't had time to research the different types of pluralism. I haven't yet seen any systematic approach but my knowledge of philosophy is limited.

Aristotle believed that different types of thing required different types of understanding. A lot of modern philosophy tries to shoehorn everything into one way of looking at things.

Perhaps a starting point could be empirical. Look at the way people actually discuss and understand the various issues and see if these fit a pattern. This would be more psychological than philosophical, but it is better than nothing and may point the way further.

simu

But isn't social constructivism just another flavour of post-modernism? I can see how it would be useful in some fields such as social science because it takes factors into account that might have been ignored by earlier, more narrow models but, as Skeptic One asked, how does it reconcile with "hard" science that insists there is other "stuff" out there?

The question is whether Enlightenment notions of objective knowledge can be reconciled at all with postmodern notions of knowledge as the product of intersubjective social relations.

I think it's possible - they both seem to be useful ways of dealing with/understanding different aspects of "reality" or "stuff that goes on around us" or whatever you want to call it! Actually, I would be interested if people have examples of instances where the two seem to clash irreconcilably to test this!

solo1

Jesus Christ. Can someone please summarise the thing using smaller words? Tell me what social constructivism is in 25 words (of max. two syllables) or less. Please.

simu

solo1 wrote:

Jesus Christ. Can someone please summarise the thing using smaller words? Tell me what social constructivism is in 25 words (of max. two syllables) or less. Please.

Buy a dictionary and come back here:).

Pherekydes

solo1 wrote:

Jesus Christ. Can someone please summarise the thing using smaller words? Tell me what social constructivism is in 25 words (of max. two syllables) or less. Please.

Chew your own meat.

solo1

Chew your own meat? Dude, I don't need an Indian spirit guide, I need someone to tell me what social constructivism is.

Buy a dictionary and come back here

There is no dictionary in the world that can make sense of

postmodern notions of knowledge as the product of intersubjective social relations.

Dades

LOL

http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/showthread.php?t=238123

solo1

What? I didn't use any complicated words there. Maybe "sublimation", but that just means, sort of like distillation, you know, a purifying process.

Dades

Relax
I was adhering to the thread itself, not your comments in it.
Though now I think that may have been disingenuous of me.

solo1

Oh right. Sorry. I misunderstood. It's all good now.

As you were, gentlemen.

cazeone

Here's an article by Jean Bricmont & Alan Sokal (of the Social Text Parody fame):
http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/bielefeld_final_rev.pdf
...which goes into some detail on the various forms of relativism and realism, a critique of the relativists and a brief argument for his own form of realism.

It's a more fleshed out version of a chapter from their book Intellectual Impostures, which I've recently finished. Most of the book is spent tackling abuses of scientific concepts and terminology from various post-modern fields.

m1ke

I think it's about time that something came along that could put the conceptual tools of 'postmodernism' to work and i'm pleased constructivism is doing this: trying to strike a balance(well in IR anyway). I suppose the danger is that in acknowledging elements of both positivist(like truth) and 'postmodern'(intersubjective understanding) approaches it will counteract itself.

The analysis of marshall sahlins work sounds interesting, but does it not over look the role of material factors: e.g the scale of the economy of the western world vs the scale of the economy of the mendi tribe.

solo1

I suppose the danger is that in acknowledging elements of both positivist(like truth) and 'postmodern'(intersubjective understanding) approaches it will counteract itself.

Yeah, I lie awake at nights worrying about that.