Can we prove the existence of the human soul?

8kczg9v0swrydm

I was wondering would this be possible with recourse to empirical observation and reason alone.

Off the bat, I can think of two arguments:

1) Our attraction, as human beings, to beauty, goodness and truth - for example, aesthetics play no essential part in our survival/procreation as human beings. Yet, we cannot help being attracted to beauty, often for no other reason that to intellectually apprehend it;

2) Our admiration for people who sacrifice their lives for others - such people have been admired throughout history, with statues built for them and epics written about them. However, an act of sacrifice, like saving a drowning person while drowning oneself in the process, runs clean contrary to what Darwinian theory describes as our key imperative (survival). If this is so, is it our soul which is capable of valuing another life over our own? Is it our soul which is drawn to such feats?

Black Swan

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

Can we prove the existence of the human soul?

I was wondering would this be possible with recourse to empirical observation...

If by "empirical observation" you are referring to use of the scientific method, then your title is problematic. In science we cannot "prove" anything, only suggest that something may exist so long as the preponderance of objective evidence supports such a suggestion.

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

1) Our attraction, as human beings, to beauty, goodness and truth

Are these three very different concepts all combined together as if they belong to one category?

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

for example, aesthetics play no essential part in our survival/procreation as human beings. Yet, we cannot help being attracted to beauty, often for no other reason that to intellectually apprehend it;

There is a body of scholarly literature for the discipline of ethology (i.e., the study of animals in their natural habitats, including homo sapien ancestors) pioneered beginning in the 1930's by Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, followed by a host of others to the present day. Aesthetics as an attraction to beauty has been related to "procreation" beauty displays, pair-bonding, defense of offspring, clan, and territories, leadership in troops (e.g., the trappings of leadership for baboons, humans, etc.), and on and on, suggesting an "essential part in our survival" as a species, comparatively.

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

2) Our admiration for people who sacrifice their lives for others - such people have been admired throughout history, with statues built for them and epics written about them. However, an act of sacrifice, like saving a drowning person while drowning oneself in the process, runs clean contrary to what Darwinian theory describes as our key imperative (survival).

To what extent does self-sacrifice of one or more baboons in the defense of the troop against a preying leopard aid in the survival of the troop? Ethologist Eugene Marais, and others, have observed such behaviors in our natural world. Does this suggest comparative consistency with Darwinian species survival? Crossing over to human survival, Robert Ardrey in The Territorial Imperative has suggested several comparative examples between species, including humans, where self-sacrifice of one or more members may help the survival chances of the family, group, nation, and species.

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

If this is so, is it our soul which is capable of valuing another life over our own? Is it our soul which is drawn to such feats?

What is the soul? I have not found a clear definition of it; rather, it was been treated as if it exists without question. How do you measure it by "empirical observation?"

8kczg9v0swrydm

Black Swan wrote: »

If by "empirical observation" you are referring to use of the scientific method, then your title is problematic. In science we cannot "prove" anything, only suggest that something may exist so long as the preponderance of objective evidence supports such a suggestion.

We can use empirical observation (here, establishing patterns of behaviour) to arrive at what is called 'moral certainty' - a place where we can affirm or deny something 'beyond reasonable doubt'. Few things in philosophy can be proven 'beyond all doubt', therefore a standard of 'moral certainty', based on such empirical observation, will have to suffice.

Are these three very different concepts all combined together as if they belong to one category?

I am hoping to make a very broad argument here. We are attracted to these things without any immediately apparent reason. Why so?

There is a body of scholarly literature for the discipline of ethology (i.e., the study of animals in their natural habitats, including homo sapien ancestors) pioneered beginning in the 1930's by Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, followed by a host of others to the present day. Aesthetics as an attraction to beauty has been related to "procreation" beauty displays, pair-bonding, defense of offspring, clan, and territories, leadership in troops (e.g., the trappings of leadership for baboons, humans, etc.), and on and on, suggesting an "essential part in our survival" as a species, comparatively.

That is an interesting observation. However, if these finding are correct, it appears that these animal displays are used for purely practical reasons. As far as I can see, only humans create beauty for beauty's sake (for example, in art). This is despite the fact that some more advanced animals (such as apes) are potentially able to create primitive art. Yet they do not - I would argue that is because they possess no inner drive to appreciate such beauty. If something possesses no utility, animals are not interested.

To what extent does self-sacrifice of one or more baboons in the defense of the troop against a preying leopard aid in the survival of the troop? Ethologist Eugene Marais, and others, have observed such behaviors in our natural world. Does this suggest comparative consistency with Darwinian species survival? Crossing over to human survival, Robert Ardrey in The Territorial Imperative has suggested several comparative examples between species, including humans, where self-sacrifice of one or more members may help the survival chances of the family, group, nation, and species.

I find it interesting that animals are also willing to die fighting for their heard/troop. I wonder to what extent such animals appreciate all of the consequences involved in joining such a fray - do they consciously realise that this is the last act of their lives or is it a case of launching themselves and hoping for the best?

I think human beings find it fascinating and awe inspiring that another person can make a total gift of self, up to and including their life. One man who comes to mind is Maximillian Kolbe in Auschwitz. This man took the place of a fellow prisoner who was about to be sent to a grueling 'starvation chamber' by the Nazis, in punishment for another prisoner escaping. Kolbe asked the Nazi commander to take the man's place and died in agony so that the other man could live. On top of that, the other man was a complete stranger. What makes a human being do this? I doubt that the survival of his species was high on Kolbe's mind.

What is the soul? I have not found a clear definition of it. To reiterate your earlier question, how do you measure it by "empirical observation?"

It is a tough concept to define. Aristotle held the soul to be the form of the body, which would mean that it is what makes us human (form has a complicated meaning in Aristotle). It has the powers of intellect and will as well as a lower part, made up of the passions. Aristotle wrote an entire work on the soul - De Anima.

Plato described the soul as a something akin to a charioteer with two horses. The charioteer is the intellect and it is responsible for steering the two horses, which represent the higher and lower passions. The higher passions (eg righteous anger) help him with the more unruly horse (appetites). And so the soul is on a journey.

I do not think we can measure a soul by empirical observation, I beg your pardon, perhaps I did not phrase myself correctly. What we can do though is put forward arguments, based on such observation, to try to establish the existence of the soul with a moral certainty.

Black Swan

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

We can use empirical observation (here, establishing patterns of behaviour) to arrive at what is called 'moral certainty' - a place where we can affirm or deny something 'beyond reasonable doubt'.

Peter Lloyd in Philosophy Now suggested that caution should be exercised when using "moral certainty" as the basis to affirm something "beyond reasonable doubt." He gave two examples, one historic and one more contemporary:

The Inquisition was premised on the moral certainty of the Roman Church. Its officers were wholly convinced that the Christian scriptures as interpreted by the Pope were true, and that they revealed an objective system of morality. On those grounds, any individuals who did not share those values were inescapably found to be a threat to the realization of Christian values in this world. Therefore they were persecuted and ferociously tortured to make them recant their ‘heresies’.

In our own century, we find that countries which succumbed to totalitarian ideologies – Stalin’s Russia, Mao’s China, Hitler’s Germany – created societies in which those who professed to see the true values deemed themselves entitled to indoctrinate, intimidate, or exterminate those who disagreed.

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

Few things in philosophy can be proven 'beyond all doubt', therefore a standard of 'moral certainty', based on such empirical observation, will have to suffice.

It appears that you are placing your arguments only within the philosophical domain, and without citing any primary or secondary empirical data, analysis, or results obtained from the use of the scientific method by you or others for support of your positions. This is consistent with your continued use of "proven" in your argument, when in science we only suggest.

8kczg9v0swrydm

Black Swan wrote: »

Peter Lloyd in Philosophy Now suggested that caution should be exercised when using "moral certainty" as the basis to affirm something "beyond reasonable doubt." He gave two examples, one historic and one more contemporary:

The term 'moral certainty' is used here in an entirely different context. Lloyd is using the term to describe certainty about moral matters (while trying to link the Catholic Church with the Nazis - well done Peter, you are a brave, original thinker!)

In traditional usage, the term 'moral certainty' means a high degree of probability or certainty beyond reasonable doubt, whether about moral issues, or any other matter.

Merriam Webster: https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/moral%20certainty

Hence, to go back to my original point, moral certainty can be achieved through empirical observation. Pointing to certain patterns of behavior would be sufficient to establish said 'high degree of probability'.

Do humans act differently than the ethographically observed behavior of baboons (cited earlier)? In History and War (Chapter XI) of The Lessons of History by Will and Ariel Durant (1968) it was reported that "In the last 3,421 years of recorded history only 168 have seen no war." War appears to be normal human behavior, and peace not. Do you also "wonder to what extent such (humans) appreciate all of the consequences involved in joining such a fray?"

The point about warfare is interesting. Sadly, we can never just get along and sooner or later someone will reach for the nearest club, spear or rifle. At the same time, we cannot say that everything about war is evil. There is good in why we fight wars eg. to defend, stop genocide etc.

Humans definitely appreciate such consequences (perhaps not all, and not all the time). I would like to point back to my Maximillian Kolbe example - he knew he was going to die a painful death and there would be no way out. Yet he still did it. What could possibly have motivated him? My theory is that he possessed a virtuous soul capable of such an act. Kolbe, his soul attracted to the beauty and goodness of the act he was about to undertake, followed this impulse to commit himself to sacrificing his life. He received no physical reward for it, and it led to his total extermination in painful circumstances.

Kolbe is not an isolated incident throughout history. What else could account for such feats?

Perhaps too broad sweeping; and in the case of mentioning Darwin's theory of evolution as being a survival imperative, a bit of an oversimplification. Darwin's focus was on differential reproduction, while Herbert Spencer's was "survival of the fittest." He coined the term seven years before Darwin.

Even though Spencer could have come up with the idea, "survival of the fittest" is a sine qua non in Darwin's own theory, making it into a number of his books including the fifth edition of On the Origin of Species. The Darwinian Imperative is a term used to describe the drive for survival.

Then how do we know what we know with validity and reliability as pertains to this thing you call soul?

Hmm, to measure soul would be to measure spirit (a spiritual substance) - I think the only ones who can do this are American cheerleaders.

We can establish it's existence through arguments based on empirical observation. Thinking out loud, perhaps it would be possible to 'measure' some of the functions of soul, but my initial reaction to the word 'measure' used in connection to soul is to think that we are bringing a knife to the gunfight.

Things can be established through empirical observation, but also through logic, deduction, induction... Unless we are talking to Humeans, in which case all bets are off. Most philosophers, ancient and modern, would disagree with his radical empiricist position.

Black Swan

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

In traditional usage, the term 'moral certainty' means a high degree of probability or certainty beyond reasonable doubt, whether about moral issues, or any other matter.

Merriam Webster: https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/moral%20certainty

Hence, to go back to my original point, moral certainty can be achieved through empirical observation. Pointing to certain patterns of behavior would be sufficient to establish said 'high degree of probability'.

Your Webster definition cited here was a legal one, not a scientific one; two very different domains, especially with regard to the "probability" of something receiving support using the scientific method. Consequently, proceeding with your method would be problematic for many, and may fall considerably short of establishing the necessary conditions to support sufficiency.

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

Humans definitely appreciate such consequences (perhaps not all, and not all the time). I would like to point back to my Maximillian Kolbe example - he knew he was going to die a painful death and there would be no way out. Yet he still did it. What could possibly have motivated him? ...Kolbe is not an isolated incident throughout history. What else could account for such feats?

Caution should be exercised when attempting to claim that one case may be representative of a population. This may be an example of an ecological fallacy; i.e., of attempting to reason from one unit of analysis to another. Furthermore, such individual cases were anecdotal, prescientific, convenience sampled, and Weberian value-laden, consequently problematic when attempting to generalise from one person to a population.

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

We can establish it's existence through arguments based on empirical observation.

Precisely how?

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

Thinking out loud, perhaps it would be possible to 'measure' some of the functions of soul

Are you advocating a structural-functionalist position for measurement (e.g., Levi-Strauss, Saussure, et al)?

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

but my initial reaction to the word 'measure' used in connection to soul is to think that we are bringing a knife to the gunfight.

This old cliché does not lend support for your original question: "Can we prove the existence of the human soul?"

Torakx

It's difficult to measure, surmise, judge, presume etc the existence of a soul, without a very clear definition of what it is exactly we are looking for.

Most if not all of the time, the answer to a question is in refining definitions.
When we reach the very foundation of a philosophical idea or problem, a lot of the time it solves itself.
This is something I found was important for programming computers, but it seems to work for most problems.

Also it can help to use examples that don't have a Soul as a comparison.
Does an animal have a Soul(if Souls existed)?

If no, then are we speaking of so called "free will"? Or what differences change things between animal and human?

If yes, then can we say it's not necessarily about "free will" and more to do with animism?
On the yes aspect, I might go on further in order to break the chain, by asking about insects, and then rocks.

I personally suspect we humans do and don't have a Soul, or are a Soul.
It seems to me that since we have such trouble defining Soul, it means we can't prove it's existence in the material reality, as physical or part of nature.
But we have the word and it represents something, but with many varying pespectives(subjectivity). So we can say it exists(Descarte "I think therefore I am").
I don't know about moral certainty, what that really means by your definition.
For me, "moral" entails(but not equals) subjective preference. Moral certainty sounds a lot like subjective certainty, with a preference in service to life.... or death maybe too.
I don't know if morals are always good or life serving...
If we have bad morals, are they bad good serving, or good death serving? LOL sorry... i'm tired..
Pick anything useful here to consider..the rest can be seen as rambling.

Black Swan

Torakx wrote: »

It's difficult to measure, surmise, judge, presume etc the existence of a soul, without a very clear definition of what it is exactly we are looking for.

Agree.

Peregrinus

Yes. You can certainly argue that darwinian explanations do not account, or do not adequately account, for certain phenomena that we observe, like the appreciation of beauty or the approbation of self-sacrifice. But refuting one account of these things does nothing to establish the validity of an alternative account. For that, at a minimum we actually have to have an alternative account.

We could, I suppose, define "soul" as "that which leads us to appreciate beauty, approve of selflessness" etc, etc, and then argue that the observed fact that we do value beauty, etc, proves the existence of the soul. That would be true but trivial. It wouldn't tell us very much about the nature of the soul and in particular it wouldn't prove that it was immaterial or that it transcends the observed natural order or anything like that.

8kczg9v0swrydm

I was recently reading a bit more about soul from the philosophical standpoint, specifically what that Medieval giant Aquinas had to say about it. (Ed Feser, Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide, Chapter 4: Psychology. NB would highly recommend this little book!).

It seems to me that Aquinas saw the soul as the principle of life for all things which are alive (he defined this as the ability to direct your own movements). As long as something was alive, it had soul, this vivifying principle. Plants and animals have vegetative and sensitive souls. These make them essentially different from 'dead' things like a rock, water etc.

Man for Aquinas is a bit different. On top of the vivifying function, human soul also possesses intellect and will - intellect consisting of the ability to grasp truth, especially universals (this would be the essence of a thing, such as the 'catness' of a cat;)) and will being the ability to commit ourselves to rational actions as illumined by the intellect (hence qualitatively different from what might broadly be called the "will" of an animal, which in effect only follows instinct). Aquinas then has a pretty long and complex argument for why the intellect is strictly speaking not a physical property (it is not something material). This is important because it allows Aquinas to conclude that the human soul, not being limited to the material body, possesses a natural immortality.

Against Plato and Descartes, Aquinas is very strong on the proposition that the soul and body make up one substance, the human being. The body alone will not do, nor is the soul without a body truly complete. For Aquinas, we are constituted of these two essential elements, the material and the immaterial.

Black Swan

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

As long as something was alive, it had soul, this vivifying principle. Plants and animals have vegetative and sensitive souls. These make them essentially different from 'dead' things like a rock, water etc.

To what extent was this definition of soul essentially the same as biological life; i.e., a rose by another name?

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

Man for Aquinas is a bit different. On top of the vivifying function, human soul also possesses intellect

There are several measures for intellect, many that are outside of a theological soul claim.

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

...and will being the ability to commit ourselves to rational actions as illumined by the intellect

What rational actions? Max Weber in Economy and Society noted three different types: Traditional, value-rational, and rational-legal. The traditional and value-rational may not produce the best results, especially when compared with the rational-legal. For example, the traditional may be linked to the actions taken under the divine right of kings. An example of the confounding of value-rational may be had depending upon your self-interests: One person's freedom fighter is another's terrorist. Traditional and value-rational may suggest that "rational actions as illumined by the intellect" may be highly problematic, if not spurious, when measuring outcomes.

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

(hence qualitatively different from what might broadly be called the "will" of an animal, which in effect only follows instinct).

Way beyond instinct, there is a body behaviourism literature that suggests various types of learning by animals, including humans. See BF Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity; or of more scientific interest, Skinner's Cumulative Record. For example, you can teach humans, pigeons, and pigs how to competitively play ping pong table tennis using an intermittent reinforcement schedule. It is an Olympic sport too, although only humans play for the gold.

8kczg9v0swrydm

Black Swan wrote: »

To what extent was this definition of soul essentially the same as biological life; i.e., a rose by another name?

Yes, but Aquinas is trying to highlight something important here. Biological life is special. To self-direct your own movements makes a thing different from 99% of others things in the universe. What accounts for this difference, this specialness? For Aquinas, the soul.

There are several measures for intellect, many that are outside of a theological soul claim.

Can you please elaborate here?

What rational actions? Max Weber in Economy and Society noted three different types: Traditional, value-rational, and rational-legal. The traditional and value-rational may not produce the best results, especially when compared with the rational-legal. For example, the traditional may be linked to the actions taken under the divine right of kings. An example of the confounding of value-rational may be had depending upon your self-interests: One person's freedom fighter is another's terrorist. Traditional and value-rational may suggest that "rational actions as illumined by the intellect" may be highly problematic, if not spurious, when measuring outcomes.

Way beyond instinct, there is a body behaviourism literature that suggests various types of learning by animals, including humans. See BF Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity; or of more scientific interest, Skinner's Cumulative Record. For example, you can teach humans, pigeons, and pigs how to competitively play ping pong table tennis using an intermittent reinforcement schedule. It is an Olympic sport too, although only humans play for the gold.

I think that Aquinas simply meant that we can commit ourselves to actions which our human intellect has shown us to be true and good. Interestingly, he also holds the idea that we can only ever commit ourselves to something we deem good, although this good will often (unfortunately for the human race) be only an 'apparent good' and not an objectively verifiable good. For example, a person who commits suicide will pursue the perceived good of lessening physical or emotional pain. Even a person who would commit suicide to try to disprove this point (to show that a person can commit to something they view as wholly evil) would still be pursuing the apparent good of satisfaction at disproving a philosophical point. But this is a digression.

I am somewhat familiar with Skinner, but I still think that his experiments do not show that animals think like humans. Even if they can be taught actions or games, this is heavily laced with instinct - when an action is performed, the animal will get a reward or will avoid pain inflicted when the action is not done. In fact, this is the only way to motivate animals.

The human and animal minds are not simply different by degree, but by quality. The human mind is essentially the intellect, capable of grasping truth irrespective of instinctual considerations, and therefore divorcing human actions from them. An animal will remain a prisoner of its instinct for the duration of its existence.

looksee

I would like to point back to my Maximillian Kolbe example - he knew he was going to die a painful death and there would be no way out. Yet he still did it. What could possibly have motivated him? My theory is that he possessed a virtuous soul capable of such an act. Kolbe, his soul attracted to the beauty and goodness of the act he was about to undertake, followed this impulse to commit himself to sacrificing his life. He received no physical reward for it, and it led to his total extermination in painful circumstances.

I do not have the language of, or background in, philosophy to argue intellectually but have a thought in reference to the above example. I do not in any way wish to take from Kolbe's act, and most probably it happened as in the quote above.

However it is arguable that in such a situation a man so utterly depressed by his circumstances might see this as a form of 'socially acceptable' suicide and allow him to die without the guilt of suicide, and allow his friends and family the opportunity to see him as a hero rather than a failure; reasoning that could have been conscious or unconscious - this person might not even have been aware of his own depression. The point being that possibly all dramatic acts of virtue can be brought back to self. Which is a rather sad and cynical attitude, but the possibility should perhaps be considered.

Are the medics who treat contagious patients at risk to themselves, the wartime conscientious objectors who risked their lives as stretcher bearers, the police who go in, unarmed, and defuse dangerous situations not engaged in equal, if not as dramatic, acts of virtue?

monara

looksee wrote: »

reasoning that could have been conscious or unconscious

I am interested in the idea of unconscious reasoning. Could you elaborate?

possibly all dramatic acts of virtue can be brought back to self

. Are there any acts that cannot be brought back to self?:)

Fathom

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

To self-direct your own movements makes a thing different from 99% of others things in the universe.

To use a percent weakens your argument. Huff in How To Lie With Statistics cautions about this.

Darrell Shy Sculptor wrote: »

What accounts for this difference, this specialness? For Aquinas, the soul.

Soul? A mysterious concept. Can you operationalize it for measurement? Or could it be a catch-all term for the unexplained?

Fathom

looksee wrote: »

reasoning that could have been conscious or unconscious

A nominal level either/or mutually exclusive categorization. Freud promulgated this observation. Derrida challenged it.

looksee wrote: »

this person might not even have been aware of his own depression.

The DSM-5 notes types of clinical depression. Self-awareness may be problematic sometimes.

Fathom

ChristopherRay wrote: »

Just go beyond the wish to prove anything and your soul will prove itself

Differences between religion and science. No "prove" in scientific method. Science suggests. Religion relies on faith. Repetitious affirmations. Science challenges suggestions by testing the null hypothesis.

dorothyramey

The “soul” is just a series of chemical reactions taking place in the brain.(Sounds boring, but that's what I'm sticking to)

Joe1919

https://www.boards.ie/discussion/comment/119074805#Comment_119074805

A 500 euro note is just a combination of paper, ink and foil.

Both above are (imo) examples of a sort of reductionism ( or reductive materialism), a sort of oversimplification (imo).

Fathom

Old thread. But worth revisiting. Both before, and now, it would appear that we lack a clear definition of soul. Without this, we may tunnel in different directions (metaphor) without meeting or coming to an understanding of the concept soul.