Lion Air flight crashes after take off-Jakarta

RiseToMe

https://news.sky.com/story/lion-air-flight-crashes-after-taking-off-from-indonesian-capital-jakarta-11538880


Not much more information yet other than above

coffeepls

That’s more than they’re saying on BBC and Flightradar24 tbh. They’re just saying it’s ‘lost’ so far.
Here’s the link to the flight path too:
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/jt610#1e5ff318

STB.

A new 737 Max 8.

13 minutes into the flight.



Debris of plan spotted by tugboat.
https://www.thestar.com.my/news/regional/2018/10/29/lion-air-crash-tugboat-crew-in-karawang-see-debris-of-plane/

PukkaStukka

Very grim picture emerging of this event this morning. I've been reading a tweet from FR24 of the available flight data, and it seems there serious control issues of some sort prior to the loss. The vertical descent was reported at -30,000ft per minute. Passenger personal items and life vests are reported to be floating at the site. Some replies to that tweet suggest that A/C has issues with the speed sensors on the captain's side during a previous flight. The first officers was allegedly fine and the captain's was repaired. None of this has been formally confirmed though. A shocking loss.

vectorvictor

Sad news.

As it involves a new variant it is particularly interesting to wait to see the cause and I'm sure current operators will be paying attention.

That said, rarely a year goes by that Lion Air don't plant one into the ground

JCX BXC

The flight data is strange, from takeoff the altitude is all over the place, very jumpy, as well as the speed to a lesser extent. I also note that the plane didn't climb much past 5,000ft, whereas normally on that route they'd be in excess of double/triple that altitude by the location the crash occured. The route typically has a left turn shortly before the crash location that this aircraft did not make, however the reasons for this are endless, likely weather in most cases.

No point in drawing speculation from this, but it will be very interesting to see what happened.

PukkaStukka

vectorvictor wrote: »

That said, rarely a year goes by that Lion Air don't plant one into the ground

They hardly loose one every year in fairness. Last hull loss I've seen reported was in 2004. This aircraft was barely out of the wrapper and the crew had 11k hours each. They weren't noobs either.

Gringo180

Some technical issues on the flight previous to the crash. I cant imagine the fear of all on board in the last seconds/minutes of the flight. Horrible news.

L1011

PukkaStukka wrote: »

They hardly loose one every year in fairness. Last hull loss I've seen reported was in 2004. This aircraft was barely out of the wrapper and the crew had 11k hours each. They weren't noobs either.

They wrote off an eight week old frame in 2013, with no deaths luckily

vectorvictor

PukkaStukka wrote: »

They hardly loose one every year in fairness. Last hull loss I've seen reported was in 2004. This aircraft was barely out of the wrapper and the crew had 11k hours each. They weren't noobs either.

You need to get your Google checked they've lost many planes since 2004.

In the past five years alone they've crashed another new delivery 737 into the sea splitting it in two, one into a cow and about six other incidents of hard landings , excursions and other dents and bumps.

The period prior to that was equally as bad

vectorvictor

PukkaStukka wrote: »

and the crew had 11k hours each. They weren't noobs either.

No they didn't . They had about half that.

Gringo180

Surely they should be banned from Aviation so? Bad luck stops after 1 or 2 crashes not 5 or 6.

Skuxx

The aircraft was only delivered in August. Is this the first serious incident involving a B38M?

L1011

Gringo180 wrote: »

Surely they should be banned from Aviation so? Bad luck stops after 1 or 2 crashes not 5 or 6.

They have been banned from the EU before

STB.

Skuxx wrote: »

The aircraft was only delivered in August. Is this the first serious incident involving a B38M?

They were only certified by the FAA and EASA last year. Within a month CFM the turbofan division reported quality issues to Boeing in the manufacturing of the LPTs in the particular LEAP engines supplied. From what I've read Boeing have been dogged in bad luck waiting on parts to arrive.

€48 million a piece. I gather Lion have 11 of them. Reports that the pilot had asked to return to the airport before losing contact.

Meanwhile the Australians have told government workers and contractors to stop using the airline until the findings of the investigation were out.

duskyjoe

airspeed issues allegedly on previous flight ? sounds like another birginair. God rest those that perished- a dreadful week for aviation

Collie D

vectorvictor wrote: »

You need to get your Google checked they've lost many planes since 2004.

In the past five years alone they've crashed another new delivery 737 into the sea splitting it in two, one into a cow and about six other incidents of hard landings , excursions and other dents and bumps.

The period prior to that was equally as bad

Is a cow an aviation term I don't understand or an actual cow?

john boye

Brennus335 wrote: »

Unreliable airspeed and altitude disagree on previous sector.

That pic hasn't been verified apparently so isn't reliable atm

Ciano35

Collie D wrote: »

Is a cow an aviation term I don't understand or an actual cow?

No, it literally hit a cow after leaving the runway.

Edit: Sorry I have that wrong, it hit a cow that was on a runway.

https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/08/travel/plane-hits-cow/index.html

faoiarvok

Ciano35 wrote: »

No, it literally hit a cow after leaving the runway.

Edit: Sorry I have that wrong, it hit a cow that was on a runway.

https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/08/travel/plane-hits-cow/index.html

Don’t know how much blame for that particular incident can be laid at the airline’s door.

billy few mates

Brennus335 wrote: »

Unreliable airspeed and altitude disagree on previous sector.

Where did you get this...?

duskyjoe

billy few mates wrote: »

Where did you get this...?

Aviation Herald. Google is your best friend as they say


“the airline reported the aircraft encountered a technical problem, the crew was about to return to Jakarta. There had also been a technical problem on the previous flight, this problem however was fixed (editorial note: the aircraft remained on the ground in Jakarta over night for 8 hours prior to the accident flight, there is a write up circulating in the Internet only claiming the aircraft had experienced unreliable airspeed and altitude on the previous flight, the captain's instruments were identified faulty, control was handed to the first officer and the flight continued to destination below RVSM airspace”

john boye

duskyjoe wrote: »

Aviation Herald. Google is your best friend as they say


“the airline reported the aircraft encountered a technical problem, the crew was about to return to Jakarta. There had also been a technical problem on the previous flight, this problem however was fixed (editorial note: the aircraft remained on the ground in Jakarta over night for 8 hours prior to the accident flight, there is a write up circulating in the Internet only claiming the aircraft had experienced unreliable airspeed and altitude on the previous flight, the captain's instruments were identified faulty, control was handed to the first officer and the flight continued to destination below RVSM airspace”

It also states

"we removed this write up repeatedly from our reader comment board because of its unverified nature and because it supposedly contains names of flight crew)"

recedite

Snip

STB.

john boye wrote: »

It also states

"we removed this write up repeatedly from our reader comment board because of its unverified nature and because it supposedly contains names of flight crew)"

The BBC are reporting it.

A technical log obtained by the BBC from the plane's previous flight suggests that the airspeed reading on the captain's instrument was unreliable, and the altitude readings differed on the captain's and first officer's instruments.

"Identified that CAPT [captain's] instrument was unreliable and handover control to FO [first officer]," the log reads. "Continue NNC of Airspeed Unreliable and ALT disagree."
The crew decided to continue their flight and landed safely at Jakarta.

Presumably this the source.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Dqq18auUcAA6yFP.jpg:large

duskyjoe

it’s outrageous this tech log page is freely available on the net- pure nuts. the post crash inquiry already comprised with this stuff floating about for the general public to decipher and cleaver leaving the investigators in a very challenging situation

Irish Steve

Looking at that tech log set of entries, there is another very significant and possible contributor to this scenario.

As well as instrument issues, maintenance work was also carried out on the elevator feel circuit. I don't know the specifics of the Max aircraft, but I have to wonder if the problems with the instruments also then contributed to the elevator feel system giving strange or inappropriate responses.

If that was the case, unreliable instruments AND unreliable pitch control would be a pretty disastrous combination of event if they were both happening at the same time.

duskyjoe

and the aircraft was just over 3 months old? jezuz wept- god rest those who perished-awful

Car99

Tech log page free for all to view and make uninformed assumptions . That is disgraceful. Tough enough for the engineer that issued the final CRS for that aircraft to deal with the questions coming his way without having the internet "experts" to deal with.

starvin

Elevator Feel System
The elevator feel computer provides simulated aerodynamic forces using airspeed (from the elevator pitot system) and stabilizer position. Feel is transmitted to the control columns by the elevator feel and centering unit. To operate the feel system the elevator feel computer uses either hydraulic system A or B pressure, whichever is higher. When either hydraulic system or elevator feel pitot system fails, excessive differential hydraulic pressure is sensed in the elevator feel computer and the FEEL DIFF PRESS light illuminates.

This is an extract from a training manual for the 737 NG model. If the MAX system is similar then an elevator feel fault along with a unreliable air data source would leave the aircraft very hard to control in pitch.

goingnowhere

Isn't it a regulatory requirement to keep a copy of the tech log at base?

If the copy wasn't available then there would be questions

kona

Id have expected a dual inspection after flushing a pitot too.

starvin

The log book should stay with the aircraft, with copies at the base. If the aircraft is not at a main base it’s not unusual to photograph and email copies of log pages to the airlines maintenance department for entry into their computer records.

STB.

Car99 wrote: »

Tech log page free for all to view and make uninformed assumptions . That is disgraceful. Tough enough for the engineer that issued the final CRS for that aircraft to deal with the questions coming his way without having the internet "experts" to deal with.

I can only assume that somebody took a picture of it with a camera phone. Saw it up as a response on Flightradar's twitter.

billy few mates

Irish Steve wrote: »

Looking at that tech log set of entries, there is another very significant and possible contributor to this scenario.

As well as instrument issues, maintenance work was also carried out on the elevator feel circuit. I don't know the specifics of the Max aircraft, but I have to wonder if the problems with the instruments also then contributed to the elevator feel system giving strange or inappropriate responses.

If that was the case, unreliable instruments AND unreliable pitch control would be a pretty disastrous combination of event if they were both happening at the same time.

The maintenance action recorded on the elevator feel circuit is just removing and cleaning the Cannon plug. This would have no influence or effect on the incident that followed, although it’s called an elevator feel 'computer' it’s actually a simple mechanical computer rather than an electronic ‘computer’. There are basically no electrical inputs to the system, it takes pitot and hydraulic pressure and using a combination of diaphragms and springs it mechanically adjusts the the elevator feel for airspeed (like the power steering system on your car). The only Cannon plug on the feel computer is for the differential pressure switch (if the switch detects a difference of 25% between A and B systems metered pressure it brings on the light).
This action would be more related to troubleshooting a faulty warning rather than a fault in the system.
That’s how it works on the NG anyway and as far as I’m aware this is the same system on the Max.
I’m wondering if they left the static ports blanked after the pitot static checks detailed in the maintenance entry above....

Roger_007

This may be a stupid question but is there not a simple GPS system as a backup to indicate speed and altitude in the event that the primary sensors fail. Maybe I'm being too simplistic, I've no expertise in this.

Gaoth Laidir

Roger_007 wrote: »

This may be a stupid question but is there not a simple GPS system as a backup to indicate speed and altitude in the event that the primary sensors fail. Maybe I'm being too simplistic, I've no expertise in this.

GPS (ground) speed is not a reliable indicator of airspeed (the speed of the airflow over the wings), which is the only speed that counts when flying a plane. GPS altitude, unless coupled with the altimeter, will normally not give the correct pressure altitude, which again is all that counts.

smurfjed

@Gaoth Laidir..... in our simulation training replicating the AF A330 accident, I have found that the GPS is an excellent tool to use for comparison purposes.

Gaoth Laidir

smurfjed wrote: »

@Gaoth Laidir..... in our simulation training replicating the AF A330 accident, I have found that the GPS is an excellent tool to use for comparison purposes.

It will be in the same ball park alright and of course useful in an emergency, but what I meant was that in general, to have one plane using GPS while others use pressure altitude would lead to problems in all but standard conditions.

duskyjoe

[/quote]

“GPS (ground) speed is not a reliable indicator of airspeed (the speed of the airflow over the wings), which is the only speed that counts when flying a plane. GPS altitude, unless coupled with the altimeter, will normally not give the correct pressure altitude, which again is all that counts.[/quote]”

look up BUSS - the last bastion to hang your hat on with a loss of airspeed. It’s an airbus thing and will save the day using gps data. Gps is not an accurate means of measuring airspeed and altitude but the BUSS will save the day on a dark night

plodder

Boeing Close to Issuing Safety Warning on 737 Max

tnegun

Am I understanding this right? Those poor pilots where trying to make sense of several failures and the aircraft kept pushing the nose down? I'm assuming they couldn't over powered it with just control inputs and would of had to recognise it was the trim system pushing the nose down and disable it?

bkehoe

tnegun wrote: »

Am I understanding this right? Those poor pilots where trying to make sense of several failures and the aircraft kept pushing the nose down? I'm assuming they couldn't over powered it with just control inputs and would of had to recognise it was the trim system pushing the nose down and disable it?

A runaway trim is one of the few memory actions which we have to remember and train for in the simulator. Its up there with an engine failure checklist which also has memory items. Its a simple checklist which involves switching it off and then trim manually like in a PA28!
While I'd never wish this kind of confusing set of failures on anyone I am surprised that a pilot hand flying couldn't realise that the aircraft was gradually going out of trim and not responding to his trim inputs as it would require the pilot flying to pull back more and more to maintain level flight. The trim system is extremely obvious on the 737; it makes clicking clanking noises and has 2 very big spinning wheels with white markers on them to aid visibility beside each pilot.

LeakRate

It adds up with the the copy of the logbook that was circulating, IAS Disagree, ALT Disagree, and FEEL DIFF PRESS warnings all associated with erronous AOA sensor readings. Hard to believe it wasnt picked up by maintenance on the 4 previous write ups when a bite test of the ADIRS should have shown a fault for the left AOA as per the FIM.

Mebuntu

bkehoe wrote: »

A runaway trim is one of the few memory actions which we have to remember and train for in the simulator. Its up there with an engine failure checklist which also has memory items. Its a simple checklist which involves switching it off and then trim manually like in a PA28!
While I'd never wish this kind of confusing set of failures on anyone I am surprised that a pilot hand flying couldn't realise that the aircraft was gradually going out of trim and not responding to his trim inputs as it would require the pilot flying to pull back more and more to maintain level flight. The trim system is extremely obvious on the 737; it makes clicking clanking noises and has 2 very big spinning wheels with white markers on them to aid visibility beside each pilot.

In this photo of the 737-700 the black trim wheels for Capt and F/O are shown. Is it just a question of throwing the switches shown in the Stab Trim and the forced nose down then can be corrected manually? The Max seems to have the switches in the same position.


http://imgproc.airliners.net/photos/airliners/0/3/9/0865930.jpg?v=v40

billy few mates

Mebuntu wrote: »

In this photo of the 737-700 the black trim wheels for Capt and F/O are shown. Is it just a question of throwing the switches shown in the Stab Trim and the forced nose down then can be corrected manually? The Max seems to have the switches in the same position.


http://imgproc.airliners.net/photos/airliners/0/3/9/0865930.jpg?v=v40

Yes, the two guarded switches for the stab trim cutout you see to the right. There are two trim motors, one for the main electric trim motor (via pickle switches) and a separate auto trim motor used when the autopilot is engaged (autopilot trimming the stab).
Moving those switches to cutout isolates the electrical supply to each motor.

View Profile

bkehoe wrote:

A runaway trim is one of the few memory actions which we have to remember and train for in the simulator. Its up there with an engine failure checklist which also has memory items. Its a simple checklist which involves switching it off and then trim manually like in a PA28! While I'd never wish this kind of confusing set of failures on anyone I am surprised that a pilot hand flying couldn't realise that the aircraft was gradually going out of trim and not responding to his trim inputs as it would require the pilot flying to pull back more and more to maintain level flight. The trim system is extremely obvious on the 737; it makes clicking clanking noises and has 2 very big spinning wheels with white markers on them to aid visibility beside each pilot.

Yeah but who trains for a trim runaway while encountering an airspeed unreliable situation. Work load would have been enormous with erroneous stall and overspeed warnings. Could be hard to pick up on the trim runaway during such an event.

bkehoe

View Profile wrote: »

Yeah but who trains for a trim runaway while encountering an airspeed unreliable situation. Work load would have been enormous with erroneous stall and overspeed warnings. Could be hard to pick up on the trim runaway during such an event.

Agreed but even when you set your pitch and power settings for airspeed unreliable from the initial memory action, you then trim the aircraft, basics of flying. If it isn't trimming then it will be obvious. One can even physically grab the stab trim wheels to stop them from spinning if required.
The crew the night before would appear to have been able to deal with this and while I totally agree and acknowledged before it's a huge workload with associated startle factor, it shouldn't be beyond the capability of an average crew to keep the aircraft flying in some form, however 'messy' and that's why we train for these things.

Gaoth Laidir

From satellite pictures at the time it looks like they were probably in VMC or near enough at the time of the crash. Makes it even more strange that they let it crash.

Cloudio9

bkehoe wrote: »

The crew the night before would appear to have been able to deal with this and while I totally agree and acknowledged before it's a huge workload with associated startle factor, it shouldn't be beyond the capability of an average crew to keep the aircraft flying in some form, however 'messy' and that's why we train for these things.

Do we know if the situation happened with the crew the night before at a much higher altitude? Presumably it wasn’t on takeoff or they would have returned.

bkehoe

Cloudio9 wrote: »

Do we know if the situation happened with the crew the night before at a much higher altitude? Presumably it wasn’t on takeoff or they would have returned.

Play back the previous flight on Flightradar...The flight the night before started a descent at about 5000ft after takeoff as well, around the same altitude as on the accident flight.
An immediate return for unreliable airspeed on one source certainly isn't something that would be required, and is one of several options facing a crew, so nothing unusual that the previous crew identified the problem, identified which instruments were giving correct indications and then continued to fly back to their maintenance base where the a/c could be checked by engineering.