duration of district court bench warrants

Peterbilt

Does anyone how long a bench warrant for arrest from a DC lasts? A year? Five years? Ten years?
Thanks.

Fred Swanson

This post has been deleted.

Peterbilt

:eek::eek::eek::eek:
WTF!!!

GM228

As Fred said they never expire, this is correct - technically, however a delay in execution may allow for an order of prohibition.

The Supreme Court in Cormack and Farrell vs DPP [2008] IESC 63 gives some guidance on the issue (sorry for the long quote, but it's worth reading in it's entirety):-

http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2008/S63.html

DELAY IN THE EXECUTION OF BENCH WARRANTS

The law unambiguously requires gardai to execute bench warrants without delay and within a reasonable timeframe. In this context the courts must ensure that court processes and orders are given due respect by the relevant State authorities and the execution of a bench warrant is not something to be simply left to the relevant State authority as a matter of discretion.

In Dunne v. Director of Public Prosecutions (Unreported, High Court, 6th June, 1996) Carney J. described the status of a warrant in the following terms:-

“A warrant of apprehension is a command issued to the gardai by a court established under the Constitution to bring a named person before that court to be dealt with according to law. It is not a document which merely vests a discretion in the guards to apprehend the person named in it; it is a command to arrest that person immediately and bring him or her before the court which issued it. That it is a command rather than merely an authority or permission to arrest can clearly be seen from the terms of the warrant in the instant case.”

Similarly, with regard to the execution of committal warrants, Barron J. in The State (Flynn) v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison (Unreported, High Court, 6th May, 1987) Barron J. outlined the guiding principles for the execution of committal warrants for sentencing purposes when stating as follows:-

“It is implicit that a warrant should be issued there and then when the sentence is to be imposed, and where the sentence is imposed on appeal, as soon as reasonably possible. Likewise, once it has issued, it must be executed as soon as is reasonably possible. If not, then a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment may find himself or herself serving such sentence at a future date merely through a failure of administrative processes.”

In Bakoza v. Judges of the Dublin Metropolitan District [2004] IEHC 126, the delay in the execution of a bench warrant led to the prohibition of the trial of the applicant notwithstanding that there were suggestions that the applicant had made “an attempt to go to ground and avoid the court process” by inter alia changing address without notifying the gardai. Peart J. held that:-

“As far as the efforts of the gardai to execute the warrant are concerned they were in my view minimal and perhaps short of what the court should regard as reasonable. It is true that efforts were made on a few occasions in the immediate aftermath of the issue of the warrant, but thereafter nothing was done. I am always acutely conscious of the limited resources available to the gardai and it goes without saying that, as stated by Carney J., there can be no question that reasonable effort would extend to a “national manhunt”, but I believe that even if further enquiries proved unfruitful the fact that they were made would show intent and would indicate that the gardai did not simply file the warrant away and forget about it when their initial efforts bore no fruit. If such a situation were to be the extent of the effort made to apprehend persons on foot of warrants issued by the courts of this country, the task of evasion so often undertaken by persons hoping to avoid the criminal process would be an easy one indeed, and the rule of law would be in some considerable jeopardy as a result. There must be a middle ground short of a national manhunt, but in excess of a few unsuccessful knocks on the door. Each case would have to be considered on its own facts.”

While prohibition was granted in that case, MacMenamin J. took a different view in Conway v. DPP (Unreported, High Court, 14th December, 2007) when refusing prohibition in a case where the delay in executing a bench warrant was fourteen and a half years from 1992 until 2006. The applicant was seeking prohibition of his trial for various offences, the most serious of which was manslaughter. In the course of his judgment, upheld by this Court on appeal, MacMenamin J. noted that “few meaningful steps were taken towards his apprehension” but also commented that he was not satisfied that the applicant’s identity or location was easily ascertainable by gardai. In refusing the relief sought, MacMenamin J. stated:-

“the applicant cannot assert a right to an expeditious trial in circumstances where his own conduct has actually frustrated that right. Any prejudice asserted, even if accepted on foot of the evidence, is too general to constitute specific prejudice … I consider that this is an application which in the first instance should be refused on discretionary grounds by reason of the applicant’s own conduct in absconding from custody and leaving the jurisdiction. On the state of the evidence it is not possible to conclude that culpable delay has been made out either on credibility or on the balance of probability”.

I am satisfied that the judgments of the various High Court judges to which I have referred emphasise the obligation on the gardai to execute bench warrants promptly. By way of example it is not open to the gardai to take no active steps or simply wait for the wanted person to gratuitously fall into their laps by being arrested in relation to some other offence. Equally, the issuing of a warrant need not trigger a national manhunt, nor need it involve the deployment of totally disproportionate time and resources in an effort to execute the warrant. Nor should an applicant be granted relief where he himself has contributed to the delay in executing the warrant by furnishing false particulars of his identity or address or by engaging in other forms of deceit and evasion to frustrate the gardai in the execution of their duties. Any judge who has sat in Cloverhill Courthouse to deal with bail applications on a Monday will be well aware that a huge amount of garda time is taken up, presumably to the detriment of other police work, in searching out and apprehending individuals some of whom have a long history of bench warrants for failing to honour the terms of their bail.

In the context of delay therefore, the legal position in relation to the execution of bench warrants may be simply stated. There is an obligation on the Garda Siochana to execute same promptly or within a reasonable time. A failure to do so may amount to blameworthy prosecutorial delay. However, members of the gardai can not automatically be assumed to be in default where immediate execution of warrants does not occur, bearing in mind the multiple other duties and obligations requiring to be performed by them. They may encounter all sorts of difficulties when endeavouring to execute bench warrants which are brought about by deceit and false information given to them. Nonetheless, it must be the case that a point in time will arise where the continuing failure to execute a bench warrant will amount to blameworthy prosecutorial delay sufficient to trigger an enquiry whether an applicant’s right to an expeditious trial has been compromised to such a degree as to warrant prohibition. It is impossible to be more specific as to what timeframe for the execution of a warrant should obtain other than to stress that warrants must be executed promptly or at least within a reasonable time. For reasons set out below, that permissible timeframe must be one of shorter duration where summary proceedings are concerned.

DELAY IN SUMMARY PROSECUTIONS

Counsel for the applicants in these cases has argued that the amount of delay which may be tolerated for the prosecution of a summary offence is considerably less than that which might be allowed for a serious or complex charge. He submitted that the whole philosophy underpinning the summary disposal of criminal offences is the public interest and that of alleged offenders in having such matters disposed of as expeditiously as possible. I accept the validity of this contention. It follows that delay in summary proceedings is less to be tolerated than in other cases. Counsel for the applicant has, however, gone further and argued that where the court, as in DPP v. Arthurs [2000] 2 ILRM 363, believes the delay to be excessive, there is then no requirement on the court to conduct any form of balancing exercise between the community interest in having crimes prosecuted and the applicant’s right to an expeditious trial.

Any consideration of this submission may usefully begin by having regard to what was stated by Powell J. in delivering the unanimous opinion of the US Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo 407 US 514 [1972]. That court there emphasised that a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial could not be established by any inflexible rule but could be determined only on an ad hoc balancing basis in which the conduct of the prosecution and that of the defendant are weighed. As Powell J. stated:-

“A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for enquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an enquiry is necessarily dependant upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.”

The latter part of this citation was adopted with approval by Finlay C.J. in The Director of Public Prosecutions v. Byrne [1994] 2 I.R. 236. The importance of the reference is to show that the courts both in the U.S. and in this jurisdiction do not simply drop a time guillotine on the prosecution of summary offences but rather emphasise instead that delay in minor cases is less to be condoned or tolerated. It is of some importance that Powell J. did not outrule a balancing test in this context.

Counsel’s main submission on the effect of delay on summary prosecutions is almost entirely based upon a decision delivered by O’Neill J. in DPP v. Arthurs [2000] 2 ILRM 363. In that case the High Court prohibited the trial of an applicant in a case of summary proceedings for assault where a delay of two years and three months had passed from the date of the alleged offence to the date of the hearing. The case had been adjourned on three occasions in the District Court because of the length of court lists on dates when the case was scheduled to be heard. O’Neill J. expressed the view that a delay of this magnitude constituted “an unwarranted invasion of the accused’s constitutional right to an expeditious trial” and prohibited the trial without conducting any form of balancing exercise and notwithstanding the absence of evidence of prejudice.

While counsel has argued that this decision has received a measure of approval from this court in Maguire v. DPP [2004] 3 IR 241, it is only fair to point out that the decision in that particular case concerned a bail application. A quite different view was taken by this court in Devoy v. Director of Public Prosecutions (Unreported, Supreme Court, 7th April, 2008) where, in a case of alleged prosecutorial delay, this Court disapproved the judgment in Arthurs, noting that the judgment did not set out any criteria to determine what might constitute an exorbitant delay in the context of prosecution of summary offences. I would be strongly of the view that courts should not act as legislators to frame a subjective limitation period for the prosecution of criminal offences, even offences of a summary nature, and should in every case where delay is established conduct the balancing exercise indicated in Barker v Wingo. This is the approach replicated in the Irish cases which have applied similar, if not identical, criteria in this jurisdiction; see PM v. Malone [2002] 2 IR 560; PM v. DPP [2006] 3 IR 172; McFarlane v. DPP (No. 2) (Unreported, Supreme Court, 5th March, 2008).

Peterbilt

Thanks for those replies. Thought I might lie low for a while and it would go away Ah well, not to worry. They can call anytime.

lifeandtimes

GM228 wrote: »

As Fred said they never expire, this is correct - technically, however a delay in execution may allow for an order of prohibition.

The Supreme Court in Cormack and Farrell vs DPP [2008] IESC 63 gives some guidance on the issue (sorry for the long quote, but it's worth reading in it's entirety):-

http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2008/S63.html

Thats a great read, thanks very much