Co Pilot passes out

roundymac

http://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/co-pilot-passed-out-in-cockpit-before-landing-773423.html
Don't know it this is old news or not, the Examiner has a habit of doing this, fairly frightening stuff all the same.

January

It happened April 27, 2016, it says so in the article.

faoiarvok

The AAIU's reports make very interesting reading if you're that way inclined, and you can sign up to their mailing list on their site (http://aaiu.ie) to receive all the reports when they're published.

smurfjed

fairly frightening stuff all the same.

Why? There are two qualified crew members in the cockpit.
We have had 3 flights over the last two years that were landed by the First Officer after the Captain became incapacitated, strangely enough they were all on A330's, the only thing that the FO's were unable to do was to taxi the aircraft after landing, but this is due to an archaic company rule rather than ability.

roundymac

January wrote: »

It happened April 27, 2016, it says so in the article.

What I meant was it being re-hashed by the paper..

Deagol

roundymac wrote: »

[
fairly frightening stuff all the same.

Why is it frightening? The original reason for having two pilots in the cockpit of commercial flights was precisely in case one became ill or incapacitated.

I believe the rule is still there that the two pilots cannot eat the same meals during flights, in case of food poisoning as part of this redundancy.

It's only as they've become increasingly complex that the need for two people to carry out all the tasks has evolved. Otherwise, the pilot in this case could simply have landed as normal.

Locker10a

Sounds to me like a textbook pilot incap and all crew seem to have followed their training to the letter.

Phoebas

Deagol wrote: »

Why is it frightening? The original reason for having two pilots in the cockpit of commercial flights was precisely in case one became ill or incapacitated.

I believe the rule is still there that the two pilots cannot eat the same meals during flights, in case of food poisoning as part of this redundancy.

It's only as they've become increasingly complex that the need for two people to carry out all the tasks has evolved. Otherwise, the pilot in this case could simply have landed as normal.

If a system requires that redundancy be built in and that redundancy is used up, then that could be frightening.

Maybe not so much to the remaining pilot - hopefully he will just carry on as per procedure. But it could certainly be frightening to passengers or onlookers.

faoiarvok

Also worth noting the professionalism of the cabin crew highlighted in the AAIU report. Shouldn't be surprising to anyone with any knowledge of the industry, but may be to some passengers who think they're simply 'trolley dollies' there to serve them and try upsell scratch cards.

Negative_G

smurfjed wrote: »

the only thing that the FO's were unable to do was to taxi the aircraft after landing, but this is due to an archaic company rule rather than ability.

Is this common in the industry? Whats the rationale?

gordongekko

smurfjed wrote: »

the only thing that the FO's were unable to do was to taxi the aircraft after landing, but this is due to an archaic company rule rather than ability.

Im just curious but what happens if they cant taxi the aircraft?

Water John

AFAIK a London bound flight diverted to Shannon 2 days ago as the pilot became ill.

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gordongekko wrote:

Im just curious but what happens if they cant taxi the aircraft?

They stop on the runway, shut down the engines and await a tug to bring them to stand.

Irish Steve

In some cases, the problem with the first officer getting the aircraft to the stand after landing is that the operator has been a cheapskate, and there's no nose wheel steering available on the right hand seat, which is needed to get the more significant steering angles that are required once off the runway.

JCX BXC

Water John wrote: »

AFAIK a London bound flight diverted to Shannon 2 days ago as the pilot became ill.

It was a United flight to Amsterdam if heard correctly.

roundymac

smurfjed wrote: »

Why? There are two qualified crew members in the cockpit.
We have had 3 flights over the last two years that were landed by the First Officer after the Captain became incapacitated, strangely enough they were all on A330's, the only thing that the FO's were unable to do was to taxi the aircraft after landing, but this is due to an archaic company rule rather than ability.

Why?? Because I'm an anorack, have never been in a cockpit, it just sounds scary to me. There was 3 pilots qualified to fly the AIR FRANCE A330 that they managed to fly into the Atlantic, worry nah, no way, scared ****less to a greater extent.

lintdrummer

roundymac wrote: »

smurfjed wrote: »

Why? There are two qualified crew members in the cockpit.
We have had 3 flights over the last two years that were landed by the First Officer after the Captain became incapacitated, strangely enough they were all on A330's, the only thing that the FO's were unable to do was to taxi the aircraft after landing, but this is due to an archaic company rule rather than ability.

Why?? Because I'm an anorack, have never been in a cockpit, it just sounds scary to me. There was 3 pilots qualified to fly the AIR FRANCE A330 that they managed to fly into the Atlantic, worry nah, no way, scared ****less to a greater extent.

Big difference between losing a primary instrument (and subsequently losing situational awareness) over the atlantic in the middle of a storm at night and a crew member becoming incapacitated in fine conditions with a perfectly servicable aircraft. In one instance you've got confusion and panic, in the other you've got some inconvenience and a higher workload. Not desirable, but as demonstrated so well by this Captain, by following the correct procedures it ended up being a fairly standard approach and landing.

Irish Steve

Just to clarify one issue on the Air France loss, it should have been a complete non event, but due to a lack of adequate training, neither of the crew members on duty at the time were able to recognise what was happening, and had not received adequate training in the management of high level stalls or upsets, for a whole range of reasons.

The AF accident came as a massive wake up call to AIrbus, the regulators and the training organisations in terms of the skill levels required for flight crews, in that it highlighted the very real dangers of over reliance on automation, and served as an uncomfortable reminder that the crews have to have the skills to be able to fly in all phases of flight without the support of the automation systems. A long period of time with increasing reliance on automation had allowed an erosion of the skill levels of the people flying the aircraft, which resulted in the hull and life loss that was the outcome of this accident.

If you watch the Aviation Herald reports on a regular basis, it's actually surprising how often there are reports of a crew member becoming incapacitated, and I can't recall any reports where such an event has ended badly for the flight, the most alarming being when a newly fitted windscreen blew out on a BAC 1-11 jet, and the captain was literally sucked almost completely out of the hole. Despite huge problems as a result, the first officer was able to make a successful emergency landing, and the captain survived the ordeal

Stovepipe

Pilots can incapacitate themselves, too. I have two Captain friends who have had copilots quit, ie, "Captain, I have had enough, I don't want to do this anymore!"; one in Ireland and one in the Middle East. In the Irish case, the Captain simply took over and completed the landing and the copilot was out of the Company within a day. Never flew again...the FO in the Middle East case had been essentially forced into the job by his wealthy family but secretly hated it. Threw his lot in, one day and was gone within hours of returning to base. So, there are a lot of factors going on, that affect pilots...and cabin crew and mech and ops and loaders,etc,etc.

Irish Steve

And before we forget it, the most serious case of pilot incapacity was the Germanwings case, which did not end well, and raised a whole forest of questions about the "how" of pilot recruitment and monitoring, as well as some very serious questions about the security of the flight deck.

Irish Steve

We mentioned at some stage the requirement to ensure that flight crew do not share the same meal. That rule came about for good reasons.

http://avherald.com/h?article=4a409034&opt=0 is a report of the incapacitation of a first officer as a result of food poisoning.

keith_sixteen

Irish Steve wrote: »

Just to clarify one issue on the Air France loss, it should have been a complete non event, but due to a lack of adequate training, neither of the crew members on duty at the time were able to recognise what was happening, and had not received adequate training in the management of high level stalls or upsets, for a whole range of reasons.

Sorry if I am coming across as contrarian but I just cannot reconcile everything you say above. Why exactly should it have been a non-event?

If, as you say there was a lack of training for an whole range of issues, to me, it sounds like it was an accident waiting to happen, no?

I just for the life of me cannot understand why something so basic as a stalling aircraft could not be managed by professional pilots, even with all the training in the world, I still think these guys got the basics wrong.

Irish Steve

You are pretty close to the truth, effectively, for all the wrong reasons, it was indeed an accident waiting to happen, the harsh reality is that the crew members in charge at the time of the accident were not adequately trained in recognising and managing the problem, if they had been adequately prepared, they would have used the procedure from the check list for unreliable airspeed, which would have resulted in the aircraft continuing to fly without drama.

The underlying issue that has become an increasing issue is the over dependence on automation for most of the flight, which means that there are an increasing number of pilots who do not have significant experience of flying the aircraft on "raw data", which required the pilot to have a much better understanding of what the instruments were telling them about the aircraft performance, and to have also developed the skills in manipulating the flight controls to control the aircraft in the extremes of the flight envelope. At high levels, there is very little margin between the stall speed and the never exceed speed, due to the air being much thinner at high levels, and the other very significant factor is that control inputs from the crew without the automation in the loop can have a significant effect on the aircraft, to a much greater extent than the same movements at lower levels, and the combination of all of these factors resulted in a crew that were not able to analyse or resolve the problem that happened as a result of the loss of a meaningful airspeed indication, and the aircraft automation was not able to give accurate resolution information to help them because of the nature of the failure that caused the initial problem.

There have been significant changes in training and simulator sessions to ensure that there cannot be a repeat of an accident like the AF accident, and much discussion about how to analyse and resolve the issues of high level high speed stalls.

Airbus also have had to make changes, in as much as their sales pitch for many years was that the Airbus family could not be stalled, and while that is a valid statement to make about an aircraft operating at lower levels with all the automation and protections operating correctly, it has now been recognised that at high levels, and with significantly degraded automation and protection systems, the Airbus family will stall just like any other aircraft if not correctly handled. That has meant changes to procedure manuals, training systems and repetitive training to ensure that the people flying the aircraft can both recognise and manage abnormal events.

plodder

I've always found that case (AF447) fascinating and wonder sometimes if people want to put the blame too much on the pilots.

I think the reason why they didn’t recognise what was happening was partly due to training issues but also partly due to design features of the Airbus, such as the counter-intuitive behaviour of the stall warning and the lack of physical linkage between the side-sticks, or any other tactile feedback, which might have alerted the pilot not flying, sooner, to what the pilot flying, was doing.

Negative_G

plodder wrote: »

I've always found that case (AF447) fascinating and wonder sometimes if people want to put the blame too much on the pilots.

I think the reason why they didn’t recognise what was happening was partly due to training issues but also partly due to design features of the Airbus, such as the counter-intuitive behaviour of the stall warning and the lack of physical linkage between the side-sticks, or any other tactile feedback, which might have alerted the pilot not flying, sooner, to what the pilot flying, was doing.

The reliance on automation and the subsequent degradation of situational awareness is absolutely a systems issue.

However, in my opinion, the fault lies firmly at the feet of the pilots.

The lack of communication, command & control from the PIC and the inability to analyse the data presented to them was inexcusable.