Incitment to hatred Act 1989

gozunda

General musings ...

The Prohibition of Incitement To Hatred Act, 1989 specifies

“hatred” as meaning "hatred against a group of persons in the State or elsewhere on account of their race, colour, nationality, religion, ethnic or national origins, membership of the travelling community or sexual orientation;"

Does the act allow that an individual therefore could not take an action under that legislation where that person is / was not specifically targeted by reason of one of the above qualifying criteria eg religion, ethnic origin etc?

Notwithstanding I am allowing that an individual would have been singled out for publication of material that the other criteria of that act could be classed as incitment to hatred.

Peregrinus

You are correct. If I wish to incite hatred against a group of people in the State on account of their being Nazi war criminals, the Act does not forbid that. But if I wished to incite hatred against them on the grounds of being German, or male, or white, then I'd have a problem.

PS: I should add that if you are "singled out" for attack, there may be another issue; it;s only "hatred" if its hatred against "a group of persons".

That doesn't mean I have to attack a group; if I attack gozunda but you can show I am doing so in terms likely to inflame hatred against a wider group, and on account of race, colour, etc, then the Act applies.

Lmklad

Correct. There are other Acts that might cover the given situation depending on location and context, eg. Sec 6 Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act for public places

Manach

Given the act is prior to the ECHR 2003 act, would such provisions need to be viewed in the light of the various Freedoms, especially that of speech, article? In other words that the burden to prove there existed an actually incitement be fairly blatant and be beyond a criminal level of proof?

Pro Hoc Vice

Manach wrote: »

Given the act is prior to the ECHR 2003 act, would such provisions need to be viewed in the light of the various Freedoms, especially that of speech, article? In other words that the burden to prove there existed an actually incitement be fairly blatant and be beyond a criminal level of proof?

Free expression in the ECHR is limited.

ARTICLE 10

Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. this right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

234

Manach wrote: »

Given the act is prior to the ECHR 2003 act, would such provisions need to be viewed in the light of the various Freedoms, especially that of speech, article? In other words that the burden to prove there existed an actually incitement be fairly blatant and be beyond a criminal level of proof?

What standard of proof would be higher than the criminal one but still attainable?

Manach

Again this is pondering on my part and from my reading awhile back a book on the Internet and discussion therein by the author Helen Nissenbaum on what are the potential elements to chill online speech .

For the first there are, as well known, very few absolute rights. However the ones regarding free speech are fairly high on the list on ones that the ECtHR has been reluctant to accept the rights of states to abridge/derrogate on this. Part of which I think comes from the convention's Cold War origins as a presenting on choice between the liberal West vs Communist East (mentioned in Jacob's book " ECHR" AFAIR ).

For the second, Criminal does have the higher degree of proof in a Jurisdiction but given the added complexity of when adding a Human right's element, a "lightsource" so to speak when interpreting an act, it is not unreasonable to assume a shade more evidential proof than normal is to be sought?

Pro Hoc Vice

Manach wrote: »

Again this is pondering on my part and from my reading awhile back a book on the Internet and discussion therein by the author Helen Nissenbaum on what are the potential elements to chill online speech .

For the first there are, as well known, very few absolute rights. However the ones regarding free speech are fairly high on the list on ones that the ECtHR has been reluctant to accept the rights of states to abridge/derrogate on this. Part of which I think comes from the convention's Cold War origins as a presenting on choice between the liberal West vs Communist East (mentioned in Jacob's book " ECHR" AFAIR ).

For the second, Criminal does have the higher degree of proof in a Jurisdiction but given the added complexity of when adding a Human right's element, a "lightsource" so to speak when interpreting an act, it is not unreasonable to assume a shade more evidential proof than normal is to be sought?

Can you point to any case law to back up your claim re freedom of expression in the ECHR. Many laws in Europe have been upheld.

The protection afforded by the constitution or the convention is that a law either complies or it does not. If the criminal statute is up held then it's the law and the usual rules about proof apply.

Manach

Case wise. I can look through a text and see if anything is relevant.

As for ECHR Act, my assumption (AFAIR from lecture notes) was that any law when being interpreted had to be looked (at a sub-constitutional level) to see if meet the obligations of the ECHR when examined. This would be apart and separated from an appeal to the ECtHR under the 2003 act. I could be mistaken on this?

Manach

From a 15m reading Jacob's text: the response would be, it depends.

The key case in imposing limitations it Gunduz, where freedom of expression in hatred cases is upheld.
However, Jacob mentioned that there were qualifiers. One being context as per Jersild (if it were part of a media discussion) and in another if it were part of a political speach, as per Surek (albeit this was a split decision). These seem to suggest that limitation is possible in both circumstances, but these would need to reach a fairly high bar, for the authorities to prove that this was the case.

As well and for ECHR rights in general, the restrictions must be ones authorised by the convention and "shall not be applied from any other purpose ther than those for which they have been prescribed". The up-shoot from Jacob's seems to be that the court would frown on but the narrowest restrictions on rights but this is very fact specific as the Strasbourg judgements vary quite a bit.

Victor

gozunda wrote: »

Does the act allow that an individual therefore could not take an action under that legislation where that person is / was not specifically targeted by reason of one of the above qualifying criteria eg religion, ethnic origin etc?

Note that there are certain matters that can be proxies for the relevant grounds, e.g. saying all blue-eyed people should are evil could fall foul of the act as a large majority of blue-eyed people are white. Likewise, saying Monaco should be nuked for crime X (which would likely kill all resident Monegasques), etc.

Manach wrote: »

Given the act is prior to the ECHR 2003 act, would such provisions need to be viewed in the light of the various Freedoms, especially that of speech, article?

Certainly in the USA, hate speech is seen as an act and not protected by freedom of speech. In Ireland, I'm sure the would be seen as a matter of competing rights and the right of the Oireachtas to strike a balance between those rights.

karlitob

gozunda wrote: »

General musings ...

The Prohibition of Incitement To Hatred Act, 1989 specifies

“hatred” as meaning "hatred against a group of persons in the State or elsewhere on account of their race, colour, nationality, religion, ethnic or national origins, membership of the travelling community or sexual orientation;".

Hi all

Hope it’s ok to revive this thread.

I’ve just finished reading this act. Would anyone be able to guide on further reading - cases, or perhaps there’s been some academic review of this legislation that would be an interesting read.

The act doesn’t define hatred in the way I thought it would (ie intense dislike). It rather, as above, against groups, though notably omitting sex and disability.

The below is from the act on the section ‘actions likely to stir up hate’.

“if the written material, words, behaviour, visual images or sounds, as the case may be, are threatening, abusive or insulting and are intended or, having regard to all the circumstances, are likely to stir up hatred.”

I’m struggling a bit with the line between offence and incitement to hatred.

For example, post Charlie hebdo massacre - what if a person or a media outlet like RTE published those cartoons. Would that not be - “having regard to all the circumstances”, an action “likely to stir up hate”.

I’m also struggling a little with the idea that it can be a criminal offence for one persons words to generate an emotion in another person. How can you prove that a person, based on your words, now ‘hates’ this particular group; that they did not hold these views already.

I understand incitement to violence. I get that someone can say such awful things to a person that it can provoke them - especially when they have not sought out to hear/read those awful things (Twitter etc) - so much so that their anger can turn to violence. And I can also understand how someone can say such awful things to a persons (or groups) so frequently and so often that it could make that group turn violent.

But is that not where you are penalising a person for generating an ‘action’. No different to convincing someone to commit murder, you’re still part of the enterprise.

And I get that conspiracy to commit a murder which did not occur, could be analogous to prosecution ‘hate speech’ before violence. But I don’t think it’s as linear as they for hate speech as it is for murder.


Anyway, like lots of things - a little bit of knowledge on my part is dangerous and would welcome opinions and insights.

Peregrinus

karlitob wrote: »

. . . For example, post Charlie hebdo massacre - what if a person or a media outlet like RTE published those cartoons. Would that not be - “having regard to all the circumstances”, an action “likely to stir up hate”.

No. Think this through.

Your reason for suggesting that “post Charlie Hebdo massacre” we know that the display of the cartoons is likely to stir up hatred is that we know that the initial publication and subsequent redisplay of the cartoons has stirred up hatred - it led to murder.

But you’re forgetting the limited definition of “hatred” that you already quoted - hatred on account of race, colour, nationality, etc. But the people who were murdered for publishing or displaying the Charlie Hebdo cartoons weren’t targetted on account of their race, colour, nationality, etc - they were targetted because they had published/displayed the cartoons. That’s not “hatred” as defined for the purposes of the Act.

So, whatever other dangers you may risk by publishing the Charlie Hebdo cartoons today, prosecution under the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act is not one of them.

karlitob wrote: »

I’m also struggling a little with the idea that it can be a criminal offence for one persons words to generate an emotion in another person. How can you prove that a person, based on your words, now ‘hates’ this particular group; that they did not hold these views already.

The prosecution doesn’t have to show that. The offence is committed of the words, etc, “are intended or, having regard to all the circumstances, are likely to stir up hatred.” You don’t have to show that they actually did stir up hatred. So, in a trial, the question won't really be what effect your words actually had; it will be what effect the jury think your words were intended to have, or were likely to have.

(Plus, I think you’re wrong to suggest that you can only “stir up” hatred in people who don’t already hate. I might already hate Jews, for example, but you could do things intended or likely to cause me to hate them more strongly, or to act on my hatred, or whatever. That would be stirring up hatred.)

karlitob wrote: »

Anyway, like lots of things - a little bit of knowledge on my part is dangerous and would welcome opinions and insights.

You might be interested in this review of the operation of the Act which was completed last year.

karlitob

Thanks for that. Appreciate you taking the time to respond. It’s an interesting area. Spotted in the paper today that there has been 5 convictions in 31 years. Will read the article below to understand that better.

Peregrinus wrote: »

No. Think this through.

Your reason for suggesting that “post Charlie Hebdo massacre” we know that the display of the cartoons is likely to stir up hatred is that we know that the initial publication and subsequent redisplay of the cartoons has stirred up hatred - it led to murder.

But you’re forgetting the limited definition of “hatred” that you already quoted - hatred on account of race, colour, nationality, etc. But the people who were murdered for publishing or displaying the Charlie Hebdo cartoons weren’t targetted on account of their race, colour, nationality, etc - they were targetted because they had published/displayed the cartoons. That’s not “hatred” as defined for the purposes of the Act.

So, whatever other dangers you may risk by publishing the Charlie Hebdo cartoons today, prosecution under the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act is not one of them.

You might have to talk me through this again, if you don’t mind.

Firstly, does the act not include religion as one of those groups?

Secondly, by publishing the pictures - the publishers would be very aware that the publication of those pictures - given the context that persons were murdered for it in the first place - would give rise to hatred amongst Muslims.

Is that not what the act says?

Peregrinus wrote: »

The prosecution doesn’t have to show that. The offence is committed of the words, etc, “are intended or, having regard to all the circumstances, are likely to stir up hatred.” You don’t have to show that they actually did stir up hatred. So, in a trial, the question won't really be what effect your words actually had; it will be what effect the jury think your words were intended to have, or were likely to have.

Thank you. Understood.

The act says that it will be a defence
-“ if he is not shown to have intended to stir up hatred, to prove that he did not intend the words, behaviour or material concerned to be, and was not aware that they might be, threatening, abusive or insulting.”

So I presume this means that you can be threatening, abusive and insulting as long as you didn’t intend your words to stir up hatred. Though I’m imagine there might be other laws agains threatening and abusive language.

However, I’m still not clear on what the definition of hate is? What does it mean?

Peregrinus wrote: »

(Plus, I think you’re wrong to suggest that you can only “stir up” hatred in people who don’t already hate. I might already hate Jews, for example, but you could do things intended or likely to cause me to hate them more strongly, or to act on my hatred, or whatever. That would be stirring up hatred.)

I was gonna say that I didn’t think I suggested that. Actually, I did. But that was argument in the context of the legal proof, and on my incorrect presumption that the law had to prove outcome rather than intent. How do you ‘prove’ that someone words developed new feelings of hate for a group? My words were a cause that had an effect.

Because, and I think obviously, all people have prejudices and words by a person of group can clearly magnify feelings towards a group - is there not a contributory negligence component here (wrong analogy I know). You hated them by x amount already and I increased it by 0.x%

But again, and I know it’s not for the law to prove, but it surely is very hard to ‘prove’ that you hate the Jews more than what you used to because of someone’s words. Where’s the measuring stick?

As I say, I made an incorrect premise on intent v outcome but intent must also be hard to prove, especially since it’s not clear - to me at least - what hate is?

Peregrinus wrote: »

You might be interested in this review of the operation of the Act which was completed last year.

Thank you. Exactly what I was looking for.

karlitob

Some interesting points here. Better articulated than mine but ultimately who is the arbiter of what is or isn’t hate speech, and what a persons intent might be, and against what yardstick is hate measured.

Plus - he’s got a great name.

https://www.google.ie/amp/s/www.irishtimes.com/opinion/legislation-against-hate-speech-is-ill-advised-and-counter-productive-1.4112340%3fmode=amp

ohnonotgmail

karlitob wrote: »

Thanks for that. Appreciate you taking the time to respond. It’s an interesting area. Spotted in the paper today that there has been 5 convictions in 31 years. Will read the article below to understand that better.



You might have to talk me through this again, if you don’t mind.

Firstly, does the act not include religion as one of those groups?

Secondly, by publishing the pictures - the publishers would be very aware that the publication of those pictures - given the context that persons were murdered for it in the first place - would give rise to hatred amongst Muslims.

Is that not what the act says?

the act is concerned with hatred against people because of their religion. the publishing of the charlie hebdo pictures did not do that. It stirred up hatred of the publishers by others because of the religion of those others.

karlitob

ohnonotgmail wrote: »

the act is concerned with hatred against people because of their religion. the publishing of the charlie hebdo pictures did not do that. It stirred up hatred of the publishers by others because of the religion of those others.

Thanks for reply.

My example was not the publication of the cartoons by the Charlie hebdo publishers but what would have happened if media corporations in ireland published the same cartoons in the aftermath of Charlie hebdo. I also thought it was hatred against groups and not people.

The legislation states that

“if the written material, words, behaviour, visual images or sounds, as the case may be, are threatening, abusive or insulting and are intended or, having regard to all the circumstances, are likely to stir up hatred.”

So while one would accept that RTE would not have the intent to stir hatred,
- how do you prove intent to stir hatred
- what is the definition of hatred
- and, even if not intended, it would be clear that in the aftermath of Charlie hebdo, the publication of those photos could stir up hate in those who hate Islam.

Clearly, to muslims, these cartons are abusive and insulting; they would perceive it as being an allowance for more offensive publications (a la Trump and the Proud Boys, a thin end of a wedge); and to them it would have the effect of making their society less ‘tolerant’ etc to their views.

So, again
- how do you prove intent to stir hatred
- what is the definition of hatred

ohnonotgmail

karlitob wrote: »

Thanks for reply.

My example was not the publication of the cartoons by the Charlie hebdo publishers but what would have happened if media corporations in ireland published the same cartoons in the aftermath of Charlie hebdo. I also thought it was hatred against groups and not people.

The legislation states that

“if the written material, words, behaviour, visual images or sounds, as the case may be, are threatening, abusive or insulting and are intended or, having regard to all the circumstances, are likely to stir up hatred.”

So while one would accept that RTE would not have the intent to stir hatred,
- how do you prove intent to stir hatred
- what is the definition of hatred
- and, even if not intended, it would be clear that in the aftermath of Charlie hebdo, the publication of those photos could stir up hate in those who hate Islam.

Clearly, to muslims, these cartons are abusive and insulting; they would perceive it as being an allowance for more offensive publications (a la Trump and the Proud Boys, a thin end of a wedge); and to them it would have the effect of making their society less ‘tolerant’ etc to their views.

So, again
- how do you prove intent to stir hatred
- what is the definition of hatred

I disagree with the part in bold. the only hatred I seen was from the islamic side.

Peregrinus

If you publish cartoons that depict the Prophet in an unflattering light, or indeed that depict him at all, does this stir up hatred against Muslims? I don’t see much evidence that it does. Can we point to any examples of Islamphobic hatred that appear to have been sparked or intensified by the publication? I don’t think we can.

It offends Muslims, or certain Muslims, certainly. But offending a person or a group, and stirring up hatred against them, are two completely different things. Offending someone, even deliberately, may or may not be sh!tty behaviour, but it’s not an element of the offence under the Incitement to Hatred Act; on its own, it can’t possibly support a prosecution.

There’s a line we can draw here.

• If I publish a cartoon depicting the Prophet having sex with a child, that incites hatred against the Prophet (but the Prophet is not a group) and it offends Muslims (but offending a group is not stirring up hatred against them).

• But if I publish a cartoon depicting a generic, stereotypical Muslim man having sex with a child — much as Julius Streicher published cartoons depicting generic, stereotypical Jews doing precisely this in the pages of Der Stürmerin Germany in the 1930s — that incites hatred against Muslims. Now you’ve got the makings of a charge under the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act

“What is the definition of hatred?” The definition in the Act has already been quoted. To an extent it’s a circular definition; “hatred” for the purposes of the Act is defined as a particular sort of hatred; hatred against a group on account of their race, colour, religion, etc. Which just raises the question; when the word “hatred” is used within that definition, what does it mean?

It has its ordinary meaning, is the answer — the meaning you can ascertain by consulting a good dictionary. Intense dislike or aversion; loathing, hostility; malevolence.

“How do you prove intent to stir up hatred?” How do you prove intent to do anything? And yet intent is an element of many or most criminal offences; crimes which don’t require intent are the exception. So this isn’t a novel question, or one that arises only in relation to this offence.

Proving intent is helped by a standard legal presumption; that someone is presumed to intend the foreseeable consequences of his actions. So if I hit you an almighty wallop across the back of the head with a lump hammer, it is foreseeable that you will be severely injured or killed, and I am presumed to have intended that outcome. This will make possible a conviction for murder, in which an intent to kill or seriously injure is an element. (I might rebut the presumption with evidence that, e.g., I was under an insane delusion at the time and genuinely did not know that I was hitting a person.)

Similarly if I engage in speech which attributes hateful characteristics to Jews, Muslims or another group constituted by race, colour, religion, etc, it is foreseeable that this will stir up hatred against the group and there is a presumption that I intended that.

smellyoldboot

It's real simple guys: Any such law is deemed void and non existent where said incitement is delivered by persons other than of white Irish non traveller extraction.

Law shall only be applied in instances where target of said incitement is anything other than white Irish/European non traveller extraction. In cases where aforementioned group is target of incitement, absolute freedom of speech applies.

Peregrinus

smellyoldboot wrote: »

It's real simple guys: Any such law is deemed void and non existent where said incitement is delivered by persons other than of white Irish non traveller extraction.

Law shall only be applied in instances where target of said incitement is anything other than white Irish/European non traveller extraction. In cases where aforementioned group is target of incitement, absolute freedom of speech applies.

Uh-huh? You have any examples of where incitement to hatred by non-white people went unprosecuted where analagous speech by white people was prosecuted? 'Cause now would be a really good time to point to those examples. Otherwise we might think you were just talking out of your arse and you wouldn't want that, would you?

smellyoldboot

Peregrinus wrote: »

Uh-huh? You have any examples of where incitement to hatred by non-white people went unprosecuted where analagous speech by white people was prosecuted? 'Cause now would be a really good time to point to those examples. Otherwise we might think you were just talking out of your arse and you wouldn't want that, would you?

Of course I do, there is endless documentation of cases that were neither prosecuted or pursued. Give me ten seconds to go find all those.

Peregrinus

smellyoldboot wrote: »

Of course I do, there is endless documentation of cases that were neither prosecuted or pursued. Give me ten seconds to go find all those.

Don't forget the analogous cases where white people were prosecuted - otherwise your claim is not made out.

Yyhhuuu

If one were to call somebody a pansie or the equivalent five letter word starting with Q and ending with R could one be prosecuted under the 1989 Act?

Peregrinus

Yyhhuuu wrote: »

If one were to call somebody a pansie or the equivalent five letter word starting with Q and ending with R could one be prosecuted under the 1989 Act?

Depends on the context. The question is always whether the words used "are intended or, having regard to all the circumstances, are likely to stir up hatred".

So, if you write a novel in which one of the characters uses these words of another, I don't think you have a problem. Or, if you use the words jocosely, of a friend - it might be a poor attempt at humour, it might be in bad taste, but I don't think it's going to amount to the incitement to hatred offence. Or if you use the words ironically.

On the other hand, if you use the words in an inflammatory speech in which you bracket gay people with other groups identified as dangerous or antisocial and darkly suggest, for example, that "our children are at risk" - yeah, now you have a problem.

guitarhappy

Victor wrote: »

Certainly in the USA, hate speech is seen as an act and not protected by freedom of speech.

Totally incorrect. Hate speech is reprehensible but is protected speech under the First Amendment to the Constitution, unless it is integral to illegal conduct or incites imminent lawless action. The speech itself is protected.

Peregrinus

smellyoldboot wrote: »

Of course I do, there is endless documentation of cases that were neither prosecuted or pursued. Give me ten seconds to go find all those.

This has been quite a long ten seconds, smelly.

smacl

Peregrinus wrote: »

Depends on the context. The question is always whether the words used "are intended or, having regard to all the circumstances, are likely to stir up hatred".

So, if you write a novel in which one of the characters uses these words of another, I don't think you have a problem. Or, if you use the words jocosely, of a friend - it might be a poor attempt at humour, it might be in bad taste, but I don't think it's going to amount to the incitement to hatred offence. Or if you use the words ironically.

On the other hand, if you use the words in an inflammatory speech in which you bracket gay people with other groups identified as dangerous or antisocial and darkly suggest, for example, that "our children are at risk" - yeah, now you have a problem.

It can be a fine line when you come to novels. e.g. having read the Houellebecq's Platform, I can appreciate why some might find it offensive, and also the charges raised for incitement to hatred, but certainly would not want to see it banned which of course it wasn't. I think a lot of this comes down to intent.

Peregrinus

smacl wrote: »

It can be a fine line when you come to novels. e.g. having read the Houellebecq's Platform, I can appreciate why some might find it offensive, and also the charges raised for incitement to hatred, but certainly would not want to see it banned which of course it wasn't. I think a lot of this comes down to intent.

(From memory, the charges related not to anything in the novel, but to remarks Houlllebecq made when being interviewed during the promotional tour for the novel.)

smacl

Peregrinus wrote: »

(From memory, the charges related not to anything in the novel, but to remarks Houlllebecq made when being interviewed during the promotional tour for the novel.)

Fair enough, I thoroughly enjoyed a number of his books but he does come across as a bit of a prick by times.

karlitob

ohnonotgmail wrote: »

I disagree with the part in bold. the only hatred I seen was from the islamic side.

I agree with you in spirit. It’s the question that I’m asking.
Define ‘hate’.

karlitob

Peregrinus wrote: »

On the other hand, if you use the words in an inflammatory speech in which you bracket gay people with other groups identified as dangerous or antisocial and darkly suggest, for example, that "our children are at risk" - yeah, now you have a problem.

Thanks for your earlier comment. Good explanation.

I would imagine that in this example, you’re again back to the definition of hate and intent. Did Gert Wilders not win a European Court case on this type of thing.

Is it not ok to say that our ‘children are at risk’ or other such statement about a particular group of people who hold views of a particular religion. What’s wrong with the speech being inflammatory? And again, how is that defined?

GM228

karlitob wrote: »

Spotted in the paper today that there has been 5 convictions in 31 years. Will read the article below to understand that better.

Part of the reason for this is because prosecutions can instead be taken under S6 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994, this was noted in the 2019 submission by the Council of the Bar of Ireland,it is easier to prosecute under that Act due to the less onerous proofs and the fact that a DPP direction is not required to make such a charge.

karlitob

Peregrinus wrote: »

(From memory, the charges related not to anything in the novel, but to remarks Houlllebecq made when being interviewed during the promotional tour for the novel.)

Surely what he said would get nowhere near an Irish court would it?


https://www.google.ie/amp/s/www.irishtimes.com/news/french-novelist-accused-of-inciting-racial-hatred-1.1095722%3fmode=amp

Peregrinus

karlitob wrote: »

Surely what he said would get nowhere near an Irish court would it?


https://www.google.ie/amp/s/www.irishtimes.com/news/french-novelist-accused-of-inciting-racial-hatred-1.1095722%3fmode=amp

Based on the newspaper report, I would think not.

Peregrinus

karlitob wrote: »

I would imagine that in this example, you’re again back to the definition of hate and intent. Did Gert Wilders not win a European Court case on this type of thing.

Wiilders was tried and acquitted in the courts of the Netherlands; the case never went to the European Court of Human Rights. (Had he been convicted, it might have ended up there.) To analyse the case you'd need to look at exactly what Wiilders said, and also at the terms of the Netherlands law under which he was charged, which may not be in the same terms as the Irish law. I haven't done either.

karlitob wrote: »

Is it not ok to say that our ‘children are at risk’ or other such statement about a particular group of people who hold views of a particular religion. What’s wrong with the speech being inflammatory? And again, how is that defined?

Inflammatory was my word; it doesn't occur in the Act.

As for what's wrong with "our children are at risk"; there may be nothing wrong with it. In a prosecution under the Incitement to Hatred Act, the state has to show that what was said:

(a) was threatening, abusive or insulting (and these words aren't specially defined; they have their ordinary meaning); and

(b) was intended (or, in all the circumstances, was likely) to stir up hatred (with "hatred" being specially defined to mean hatred against a group on account of race, colour, nationality, etc.

So, is "our children are at risk" enough to secure a conviction? You'll need to look at those words in the context of everything else that was said, and the occasion on which it was said. But, for example, if I used those words in a speech in which I asserted that homosexuality is a perversion, that gay people are disposed to abuse children, that gay culture facilitates or promotes the abuse of children and that we should impose restrictions affecting gay people in order to protect our children, I'd have to say yeah, I'm at some risk of prosecution and conviction. And I don't think that risk goes away if the group I target is defined by religion rather than by sexual orientation; both are covered by the incitement to hatred legislation.

karlitob wrote: »

I agree with you in spirit. It’s the question that I’m asking.
Define ‘hate’.

The word "hate" isn't used in the Act; the word "hatred" is. And we've already looked at how the the word "hatred" is defined. Is there something in that definition that you don't understand?