2010 Dubai Crash Report (UPS B747)

smurfjed

http://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Investigation%20Reports/Attachments/40/2010-2010%20-%20Final%20Report%20-%20Boeing%20747-44AF%20-%20N571UP%20-%20Report%2013%202010.pdf

Scary reading.

smurfjed

Wise Old Elf

smurfjed wrote: »

Scary reading.

smurfjed

On phone so didn't read it all, but it looks like it escalated very quickly into an unrecoverable situation once the controls were no longer visible.

Quedtion though, when the PF programmed in the ILS why didn't it descend along the glide slope (may be a stupid q)?

Bsal

That's the most in-depth report I have ever read through. What an awful situation the crew found themselves in.

homerjay2005

can ye give a summary of what caused the crash?

boeingboy

Yes what an in depth analysis they published. The FO being the only useful crew member never gave up. RIP

brandon_flowers

boeingboy wrote: »

Yes what an in depth analysis they published. The FO being the only useful crew member never gave up. RIP

Don't know if you are having a go at the Cpt or not but if he had no oxygen in his mask there was no point in him staying in his seat. He would have collapsed of carbon monoxide poisoning sitting there also. I am not a medic but his behavior before he left his seat suggested he was already agitated by the lack of oxygen.

I am pretty sure they would have went down no matter what became of the cpt, they had no chance once the smoke took over in the cockpit. No controls, can't see controls, can't see visual references, smoke everywhere. The FO did make a brave effort.

The important global point here is the absolute liability that are lithium-ion batteries. I have said it before in the Dreamliner thread but they are a nightmare to store, nightmare to charge, nightmare to use. They are so fickle and so prone to runaway and the fact that the majority are made in China and Taiwan with very poor QA/QC monitoring going on they tend to blow up very easily.

And finally as an engineer it is a brilliantly written report and very thorough investigating, not something you would come to expect from a Middle Eastern country when I see some of their HSSE reporting into fatalities on shipyards.

cml387

Disco Stuart wrote: »

On phone so didn't read it all, but it looks like it escalated very quickly into an unrecoverable situation once the controls were no longer visible.

Quedtion though, when the PF programmed in the ILS why didn't it descend along the glide slope (may be a stupid q)?

It was hopeless. The aircraft was too high and too fast with limited or no pitch control (the fire had damaged control lines).

boeingboy

brandon_flowers wrote: »

Don't know if you are having a go at the Cpt or not

Now why on earth would I do that :rolleyes: I dont know if completing the Smoke Removal Clist and venting the hatch in cockpit roof would have changed anything. Met the Capt on 2 occasions. Nice man. RIP

smurfjed

venting the smoke removal Venturi in the cockpit roof

They did open the hatch, but as pack 2 & 3 automatically went off when they activated the fire arm switch. #1 pack failed for unknown reasons, so there was no differential pressure.

@Disco Stuart, they were too fast and too high, the aircraft overflew DXB at 320 KIAS and 4200 feet, it was also on a heading 30 degrees off the runway heading.

@BoeingBoy... welcome back...

smurfjed

lomb

What would it take to smash the side windows on a jet? Thats what I would be trying to do if that happened to me. Is there a crash axe in the cockpit? Control loss meant it was doomed probably anyway . Why are Li ion batteries legal to transport in aircraft or are these incidents just very rare?

donkey balls

Cargo for aircraft from memory is broken down in to two different cats, Cargo for pax aircraft and CAO( Cargo Aircraft Only) even then with cargo aircraft it is broken down again from IDG to ADG with the later loaded were the crew have access to it in case of a fire.
Even then the dangerous goods are separated on the pallets/containers in case one was to leak on to another and cause smoke/ fire from emitting from the package.
Here is a link to a system Fedex use on the freighters.

http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/2010Conference/files/Cargo_Fire/PetzingerFedex/PetzingerFedexPres.pdf

YbFocus

What a brave fight they put up, can't imagine not being able to see anything and not being able to do anything to rectify the problem. RIP.

brandon_flowers

boeingboy wrote: »

Now why on earth would I do that :rolleyes: I dont know if completing the Smoke Removal Clist and venting the hatch in cockpit roof would have changed anything. Met the Capt on 2 occasions. Nice man. RIP

If you reread your post you say the FO was the only useful crew member therefore it automatically implies the Cpt was useless. Just phraseology, obviously you weren't having a go.

happy_head

lomb wrote: »

What would it take to smash the side windows on a jet? Thats what I would be trying to do if that happened to me. Is there a crash axe in the cockpit? Control loss meant it was doomed probably anyway . Why are Li ion batteries legal to transport in aircraft or are these incidents just very rare?

Yes there is a crash axe in the cockpit, but not needed to open windows as there is a window on each side of the flight deck that opens with a handle. It's often opened during turn arounds to keep cool, clean windscreen and shout down to ground staff. The is also a rope beside this window that the pilots can use to lower themselves out the window after a crash landing etc.

lomb

Would opening the window not have solved the problem of visibility virtually completely?
Of course they may have been worried about oxygen feeding the fire but if the cockpit has a door that wouldnt be too much of a worry presumably and even if it did without seeing anything it was hopeless anyway so worth a shot?
Was there time to get the jet down even on the water before control authority was lost? Probably a 50% chance of survival so worth a gamble if its a no hope situation.
Previous fires have ended badly eg Valujet 592.

smurfjed

@lomb B747 cockpit windows don't open (as pointed out by eatmyshorts), and the smoke Venturi should have removed the smoke, unfortunately ALL 3 packs were off (2 by design and #1 failed). Boeing has since changed the Non Normal Checklist to ensure that at least #1 or #3 PACK must be ON. The plan was to do an auto land so visibility wasn't a major requirement.

The report assessed a water landing or a landing in Doha as possible alternatives, but there was no conclusive result.

It's also important to remember that while the Captain left his seat within 7 minutes due to lack of oxygen, the F/O was breathing regulated air so he was breathing fumes as well as oxygen. Unfortunately the normal/100% oxygen switch is on the front of the mask, so its not easy to see once the mask is on.

The F/O had 77 hours on type, this might be about 10 takeoff and landings.

smurfjed

eatmyshorts

happy_head wrote: »

Yes there is a crash axe in the cockpit, but not needed to open windows as there is a window on each side of the flight deck that opens with a handle. It's often opened during turn arounds to keep cool, clean windscreen and shout down to ground staff. The is also a rope beside this window that the pilots can use to lower themselves out the window after a crash landing etc.

The side windows on a 747 do not open.