Airport fire service response times

cocoshovel

The other night I began thinking about the response times of Airport Emergency services to crashes/aircraft incidents. (not sure if this belongs here or on the ES forum)

I remember hearing somewhere a few years back that there is a set standard on how long they should take from the initial incident until they arrive at the scene, and I remember it being a very small timeframe, around 1 minute or less. Does anybody know what the standard is, either internationally or does it vary from country to country?

Take a look at this video. Its in a tiny airport I know, but the response time is about 30 seconds in total from the second the aircraft went off the runway until the Firetruck is on its way.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-z2o0acIlm4

Here's another one. This time in Okinawa, and a fairly large airport. In this situation, the first firetuck doesnt arrive on scene for well over 3 minutes, and remember that the video started at least a minute into the fire so it would be approaching 4 minutes response time. A bit bad dont you think?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDJawUi5AMY

Realistically is it possible for Firetrucks to reach aircraft in a timely manner in huge airports like Amsterdam, where the furthest runway is literally kilometers from the terminal.

Id be interested to hear and just generally discuss this topic and also in regards to response times in Irish airports.

Strumms

From my airside safety training which all be it was a few years ago now, the guys need to be able to reach any part of the airport or ramp within 3 or 4 minutes of the incidents being called in. As I say it was a while back so open to correction on the minutes.

Stealthirl

The 1st clip is St. Barts i belive, the arrival descent is extremely steep so id say there well practised there.It was on a program about Extreme airports/landings and came in 3rd

troposphere

cocoshovel wrote: »

Here's another one. This time in Okinawa, and a fairly large airport. In this situation, the first firetuck doesnt arrive on scene for well over 3 minutes, and remember that the video started at least a minute into the fire so it would be approaching 4 minutes response time. A bit bad dont you think?

From the report seems like they some communication problems that resulted in the delay.

At about 10:34, the Airport Fire Station received a crash-phone call from the Tower, saying, “Fire in Spot 41, on the No. 2 engine of a Boeing 737.” The call lasted 77 seconds from 10:33:58 to 10:35:15. Crash-phone calls can be received in the Fire Command Room, while they can be monitored in the standby room. The staff member who was the driver of the No. 7 vehicle (medical transport vehicle) remained in the Fire Command Room, and the six other staff members went on board the three fire engines: the chief, an operator and a driver went on board the No. 2 vehicle (chemical fire engine); an operator and a driver went on board the No. 6 vehicle (chemical fire engine); and a driver went on board the No. 5 vehicle (water truck). The three vehicles set out at almost the same time, about 10:35. The driver of the No. 7 vehicle set out at about 11:09 after making reports and requests to support-providing agencies. The director of the Naha Office of the Air Safety Foundation, who had visited the Airport Office on the job, returned to the Fire Command Room at about 10:38.

At the time that the three airport fire engines set out as the first dispatch from the garage and moved onward, JTA Flight 602 (Boeing 737-400) that had landed on Runway 18 at 10:34:47 was taxiing on Taxiway E4 after leaving the runway, and the airport fire engines and the aircraft were in positions directly facing each other. The ground controller visually noticed the airport fire engines setting out from the garage and gathering in front of the Airport Fire Station. JTA Flight 602 called the ground controller as initial contact with reporting their position on Taxiway E4; the ground controller cleared the aircraft to taxi to Spot 27. These communications took place during the period from 10:35:46 to 10:35:56. The three airport fire engines remained stopped just short of holding position P2 (about 50 m in front of the garage, where a JASDF Fire-Fighting Squad vehicle was on standby at that time). The operator of the No. 2 vehicle tried twice to establish communication with the Tower over the MCA radio for clearance to run on Taxiway A (including taxiway segments A3, A2 and A1 to reach the fire site). These calls were made at 10:35:55 and 10:36:24, but there was no response to the calls from the Tower. The ground controller heard a voice through the MCA radio speaker just before the communication with JTA Flight 602 ended, but could not understand any of the words. At 10:36:31, immediately after the operator of the No. 2 vehicle made a second attempt to establish contact with the Tower, the No. 1 ANA tug vehicle towing a Boeing 767 on Taxiway A0 contacted the Tower over the MCA radio, and the ground controller instructed the tug vehicle to hold on Taxiway A0. None of the Controllers in the Tower noticed the two calls from the Airport Fire Station through the MCA radio.

As there was no response from the Tower, the three airport fire engines decided to use the automobile paths in the apron areas as their route and started off toward the fire site. After a while, worrying that running on the automobile paths would result in arriving late at the fire site, the three fire engines entered Taxiway A from the apron side after overtaking JTA Flight 602 taxiing on Taxiway A3 (apron taxiway) toward Spot 27. Shortly after the three fire engines began driving down Taxiway A, the No. 2 vehicle noticed an on-coming Boeing 767 about 1,300 m ahead on Taxiway A0 and retreated toward the apron to avoid it, but the other two vehicles continued running on the taxiway. Overtaken by these vehicles, the No. 2 vehicle drove along the taxiway following them.

The No. 6 and No. 2 fire engines started fire-fighting operations at 10:38:25 and 10:38:58, respectively. The ground controller attempted to contact with the airport fire engines through the MCA radio once while the vehicles were running on Taxiway A and twice while they were engaged in fire-fighting operations. However, there was no response to these calls.

The three airport fire engines arrived at the fire site and started fire-fighting operations at about 10:38:25, that is, about 5 minutes and 32 seconds after the fire started and about 4 minutes and 27 seconds after the crash-phone call. Thereafter, the fire engines from the relevant organizations arrived at the fire site in the order described in (1) above and began fire-fighting operations. By the time the airport fire engines started fire-fighting operations, the flames had spread, covering the areas from the inboard portion of the right wing to the entire left wing and from the midway section of the fuselage to its aft portion, with blazing up and black smoke rising high in the sky.

After being informed that four cabin crew members remained in the Aircraft, the Naha City Fire Department crew searched inside the Aircraft three times between 11:00 and 11:29. At about 11:33, China Airlines staff confirmed that all passengers and crew members had evacuated from the Aircraft before the fire-fighting operation began.

At about 11:37, the fire was extinguished.

GiBBYAir

According to ICAO...

Response time
9.2.19 The operational objective of the rescue and fire fighting service shall be to achieve a response time not exceeding three minutes to any point of each operational runway, in optimum visibility and surface conditions.
9.2.19A The operational objective of the rescue and fire fighting service shall be to achieve a response time not exceeding two minutes to any point of each operational runway, in optimum visibility and surface conditions.
9.2.19B The operationsl objective of the rescue and fire fighting service shall be to achieve a response time not exceeding three minutes to any other part of the movement area in optimum visibility and surface conditions.
Note 1.C Response time is considered to be the time between the initial call to the rescue and fire fighting service, and the time when the first responding vehicle(s) is (are) in position to apply foam at a rate of at least 50 per cent of the discharge rate specified in Table 9-2.

Page 149
http://legacy.icao.int/fsix/_Library%5CManual%20Aerodrome%20Stds.pdf

Basically 3 minutes to anywhere within the airfield boundary for slower/bigger/biggest fire tenders, 2 minutes for the zippy, smaller ones - the big ones should NEVER arrive at a scene AFTER the smaller tenders have run out of foam!

xper

cocoshovel wrote: »

Realistically is it possible for Firetrucks to reach aircraft in a timely manner in huge airports like Amsterdam, where the furthest runway is literally kilometers from the terminal.

At large airports, there may be more than one fire station and it/they will be located on the airfield, often nowhere near the passenger terminals, in such a manner that the responses times meet the regulations.

For your example, Schipol's remote western runway has its own fire station beside it (Google Maps) while there are two bigger stations on the north and south sides of the main complex, both away from the central terminals.