Why were the French so ineffective in 1940

jonniebgood1

Why were the French so poor in 1940. They had one of the strongest armies in terms of numbers and equipment. Despite this they fell apart without putting up a strong fight (excluding isolated incidents).

Western Front 1940:


Just months after the German invasion the French had a puppet government in the south of the country and much of its equipment had been surrendered to the Germans who would re-use it later in the war. They were paying Germany for the occupation and the Royal navy was left in a position where they felt they had to attack the French fleet in Algeria to prevent it falling into German hands.

Armour: In May 1940 France had over 3,000 tanks, and in terms of numbers, quality and firepower they were generally superior to those employed by the Germans. http://ww2total.com/WW2/History/Orders-of-Battle/France/French-Army-1940.htm

So how did it go so wrong for the French?

Jawgap

They say every army prepares to fight the last war and this is probably the classic example of that maxim in action.

The map contains hints as to why it went wrong.

The French (and British) had better weapons, especially tanks but they used them completely differently to the Germans - scattering them instead of concentrating them in armoured spearheads.

Their doctrine was also obsolete - the Germans had developed the whole idea of maneuver warfare whereas the French, still haunted by WWI, relied on static defences, thinking they were safe behind them. They didn't practice defence in depth. For the French war was conducted to the pace of a horse not a tank.

This was compounded by the failure to anchor the Magniot line on the Channel so the Germans could just drive around it. The Germans also appreciated that they didn't need to confront the whole French Army they just need to achieve local superiority for a break through.

Finally, German command and control systems were superior - their tanks and major maneuver units were equipped with radios, they operated a system of 'mission tactics' or mission directives (Auftragstaktik) and they had the audacity to attack with vigour, aggression and energy.

thecommietommy

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

Why were the French so poor in 1940. They had one of the strongest armies in terms of numbers and equipment. Despite this they fell apart without putting up a strong fight (excluding isolated incidents).

Western Front 1940:


Just months after the German invasion the French had a puppet government in the south of the country and much of its equipment had been surrendered to the Germans who would re-use it later in the war. They were paying Germany for the occupation and the Royal navy was left in a position where they felt they had to attack the French fleet in Algeria to prevent it falling into German hands.


So how did it go so wrong for the French?

Don't forget, it wasn't just the French the Germans swept aside like a hot knife through butter. Poland was defeated in a few weeks ( helped by Joe Stalin's forces from the east also). Likewise even after Dunkirk, the Brits got humiliating defeats in Norway, Crete etc And when the Germans entered war with the USSR they hammered the Soviet forces taken huge terroritory until Stalingrad and so on.

So maybe the nation that has given us Charlemagne, the Normans and Napoleon didn't do too bad in retrospect.

pedroeibar1

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

So how did it go so wrong for the French?

Jawgap pretty much hit the nail. There also were big differences in leadership and air support. At the outbreak of the war Guderian was a General and could implement his ‘mobility’ tactics; his French equivalent (in terms of strategic thinking) was a Colonel and had been held back in rank and ignored because he had ‘upset’ his superiors. French CIC Gen. Gamelin remained stuck in the groove of WW1 tactics.
BTW the French Colonel was de Gaulle.

silverharp

the "Art of War" also talks about picking your allies carefully. it was dumb to go to war over Poland , the French should have bided their time and they would have had more time to prepare. As it was by losing they handed the Nazis a pool of labour and resources.

Delancey

Jawgap wrote: »

They say every army prepares to fight the last war and this is probably the classic example of that maxim in action.

Kinda sums it all up really .

Despite more and better tanks than the Germans the French ' frittered ' them away in penny packet actions.

It was Napoleon who said something along the lines of '' an army that shelters behind walls is already beaten '' - apply that to the Maginot Line and it can be seen that the French were far more interested in Defence than Offense . The French were hampered also by very poor leadership at the top with ageing senior commanders who had made their name in the last war.

The then Colonel Charles de Gaulle protested the spending on the Magionot Line arguing the money would be better spent on more motorised divisons for the army - he was a voice in the wilderness.
For an army that had done much to pioneer motorised troops in WW1 the French amazingly went back to horses to a large extent in the inter war years.

Jawgap

The fate of Fort Eben-Emael in Belgium sums up the whole reason why Germany succeeded and Belgium / France / GB failed.

The fort was defended by over 1000 troops and practically bristled with anti-tank weapons and machine guns.

The Germans (a few dozen paratroopers) landed on it with gliders - there were no anti-aircraft defences to speak of, and what there was relied on sound location - which is not much good when it's gliders that are coming in.

When the operation was launched, the main assault group's commander landed short, but without having to be told the senior NCO present simply took over and carried through the attack - no waiting for orders or referring up the chain of command, he knew the operation; he knew what the boss wanted so he just got on with it.

In a more general sense, time wasn't the issue. The French didn't lack weapons or manpower they lacked an effective way to use them.

Von Clausewitz described fortresses as the 'knots which hold strategy together' they were not strategic- he also suggested any protection they afforded was indirect in the sense that a rational enemy would rarely take them on directly but would be channeled by them. Because of that it was pointless to garrison them heavily - they should be garrisoned lightly, with a mass of force held in the rear to take the enemy once their intentions became clear.

Kilkenny14

Jawgap hit the nail on the head. 1940 is the classic example where one side (Germany) adopts a plan of attack ( the Ardennes offensive) in which the other side does exactly what they predict and is then incapable of recovering in time.

It did not help France that Gamelin suffered from health problems, as well as that one of subordinates General Georges was unfit for command but was never removed. He never recovered by being badly wounded during the assassination of the King of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934. Their failure to replace doomed France.

jonniebgood1

Jawgap wrote: »

The French (and British) had better weapons, especially tanks but they used them completely differently to the Germans - scattering them instead of concentrating them in armoured spearheads.

The difference between the French and British effort levels seems to have been massive. Can that all be down to difference in leaderships? The French people had rumblings of being used as a pawn by Britain in the time leading up to the war according to Beevor. That and a division between communist and ruling classes in between the wars led to them having low morale. It just seems surprising with the reliance on weapons in WWII that the French were not able to withstand the Germans better.

Reekwind

I don't really credit most of the reasons given in this thread. That's not to say that the likes of air support weren't factors but I'd counter that they were of little relevance. The defeat of France was so shocking, so unexpected, that people have been looking for reasons ever since and sought ways to maximise the supposed gap between German and French capabilities. How Germany was destined to win and France to lose. Enter the Blitzkrieg myth et al

The reality is much simpler. The French lost the war because they got their strategic deployments so horribly, catastrophically wrong. The French expected the thrust from the north and had no response when it came from the south. They were completely exposed, their armies flanked and then pinned against the Channel. It was good fortune (yes, fortune) that Germany had the right men and weapons needed to capitalise on this but the error was French and there could be no recovery from it

(In fairness, this was the French response to their intelligence reports rather than some blundering insistence on re-fighting WWI)

Everything from radios and armour thickness to morale and doctrine fades into irrelevance in light of this simple error. No army could have recovered from that setback. The Soviets (who also got their deployments horribly wrong) were able to recover by trading space for time (as the French had done in 1870) but that wasn't possible in 1940. After the initial error it was game over

The difference between the French and British effort levels seems to have been massive. Can that all be down to difference in leaderships?

I wouldn't say it was just governments (the British elite in general was relatively pro-German and anti-French) but the short answer is yes. France started rearming in earnest before Britain and, despite a noted lack of backbone, consistently pushed an aggressive line against German expansionism... but they did so within the context of Anglo-French discussions and were not willing to break with the UK

The French people had rumblings of being used as a pawn by Britain in the time leading up to the war according to Beevor. That and a division between communist and ruling classes in between the wars led to them having low morale

The low morale amongst the troops was caused by the months of sitting around in wet ditches during the Phony War, not any consideration of high politics. Indeed the Communists, despite the last minute chaos of the Nazi-Soviet NAP and government persecution, had long been the staunchest advocates of rearmament and a policy of 'national defence'

At a higher level however the Popular Front era had left deep scars. Particularly amongst the Right. It's not a huge exaggeration to say that once the initial defeat had become clear senior politicians and officers (particularly Weygand, whose behaviour was shocking) deliberately sabotaged the defence efforts. Their objective was to ensure the survival of the French army (they were much less concerned about the Republic) into a reactionary post-war era that they could influence. Which they did with Vichy

Julian Jackson has produced a very good trilogy on France during the period: The Popular Front in France, The Fall of France and France: The Dark Years. He writes from a social/political perspective rather than a military grognard and I'm a big fan

Gee Bag

Reekwind wrote: »

I Julian Jackson has produced a very good trilogy on France during the period: The Popular Front in France, The Fall of France and France: The Dark Years. He writes from a social/political perspective rather than a military grognard and I'm a big fan

They look like interesting titles.

Can any one recommend good books about the French military in WW2 or a general history of the French military in the 20th century?

paky

silverharp wrote: »

the "Art of War" also talks about picking your allies carefully. it was dumb to go to war over Poland , the French should have bided their time and they would have had more time to prepare. As it was by losing they handed the Nazis a pool of labour and resources.

yes but the prince says that one shouldnt enter into an alliance with someone who is stronger than them. hitler wanted an alliance with the british at the beginning and even looked up to them. it was inevitable that there was going to be show down at some time between the major superpowers given germanys ambitions. it was better the british and french attacked germany sooner rather than later. just look at how the russian and german alliance changed so quickly.

you have to think of how the balance of power was interfered with when germany attacked poland.

jonniebgood1

Reekwind wrote: »

The reality is much simpler. The French lost the war because they got their strategic deployments so horribly, catastrophically wrong. The French expected the thrust from the north and had no response when it came from the south. They were completely exposed, their armies flanked and then pinned against the Channel. It was good fortune (yes, fortune) that Germany had the right men and weapons needed to capitalise on this but the error was French and there could be no recovery from it

(In fairness, this was the French response to their intelligence reports rather than some blundering insistence on re-fighting WWI)

Poor preparation and ignoring their extensive network of spies add to their ignomy in this. Leader of the Vichy government, Petain put the loss down to a "moral laxness". His own lack of courage was a part of the loss that needs to be considered. He went on to lead Vichy France as a puppett Nazi state but surely he had other options. Could he not have ruled in exile continuing the fight in the rest of the country. Ernest Mays book 'Strange Victory' on the Fall of France states quite simply that "Germany's strange victory occured because the French and British failed to take advantage of their superiority". It might seem over simplified but of the face of it and despite Petain and others giving other reasons this seems to be the crux of the battle.

jonniebgood1

paky wrote: »

hitler wanted an alliance with the british at the beginning and even looked up to them. it was inevitable that there was going to be show down at some time between the major superpowers given germanys ambitions.

Hitler did not realise that this was not possible until after the British attacked the French fleet in Algeria to prevent it falling into German hands.

Stovepipe

Hi all,
Another point: the main centre of the action happened in the the top third of the country, so a significant portion of the French military never saw a German, much less shot at one. The Germans were not attempting to drive South to capture all of France, because they knew full well that their vehicles were not up to it and an assault on Paris would have been a nightmare. Coordination and liaison between the British and French ranged from the outright inept to first-class, depending often on the quality of the officers concerned. A lot of French units fought very well, judging by the number of panzers lost, especially the useless Pz 1 and almost-useless Pz II.French and British artillery, I have read, were regarded as being very effective. Inter-arm cooperation on the German side was, by comparison, very, very good but was not flawless.The radios were good but not magic. There are records of Army rage against the Luftwaffe because of failures by the Stukas to bomb correctly, ie, the right target at the right time., including several blue-on-blue incidents. There were also incidents where the Army and SS didn't work well together. When you think about it, given that the British and French depnded so much on telephonic and manual dispatch of orders, it's a miracle that they managed anything.
regards
Stovepipe

jonniebgood1

Stovepipe wrote: »

Another point: the main centre of the action happened in the the top third of the country, so a significant portion of the French military never saw a German, much less shot at one. The Germans were not attempting to drive South to capture all of France, because they knew full well that their vehicles were not up to it and an assault on Paris would have been a nightmare.

They did not attempt to drive south because they did not need to. If the French had regrouped further south and used it as a base for attacking the Germans they would have deserved credit for doing so. What happened to all intensive purposes was they gave in. There is a marked contrast between the French reaction to WWII adversity and other countries (though not all) such as GB or Russia. The reaction of the Soviet leadership to France was particularly scathing when many french military vehicles were used in Barbarossa.

johngalway

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

french military vehicles were used in Barbarossa.

Thanks for posting, that was a good read