My main problem

RandomName2

My problem with the Fiscal Compact Treaty is not with the direct changes brought about by the treaty, but with the possibility that it opens the way to more significant alterations with our nation budgetary control.

While the Fiscal Compact Treaty brings about increased international budgetary surveilance (hands off policy), this proposal brings about international budgetary approval (hands on).

If this comes to pass, surely there is little point in engaging in the election process in this country as the majority of national representatives' proposals, principles, and responsibilities are rooted in the budget.

PopeBuckfastXVI

Could such alterations happen without recourse to a referendum? I'd say any such alterations would fall squarely under increased pooling of sovereignty and require a referendum. If so would you not vote no to that hypothetical referendum on your hypothetical alteration?

RandomName2

PopeBuckfastXVI wrote: »

Could such alterations happen without recourse to a referendum?

I don't know. :pac:

PopeBuckfastXVI wrote: »

If so would you not vote no to that hypothetical referendum on your hypothetical alteration?

Yup

oscarBravo

RandomName2 wrote: »

While the Fiscal Compact Treaty brings about increased international budgetary surveilance (hands off policy), this proposal brings about international budgetary approval (hands on).

Does it?

PopeBuckfastXVI

RandomName2 wrote: »

I don't know. :pac:



Yup

So would you not vote on this treaty, instead of voting on the hypothetical treaty at this referendum?

RandomName2

oscarBravo wrote: »

Does it?

Well the Commission seem to think so, at least, and seeing as they drafted it...

oscarBravo

RandomName2 wrote: »

Well the Commission seem to think so, at least...

Do they?

RandomName2

PopeBuckfastXVI wrote: »

So would you not vote on this treaty, instead of voting on the hypothetical treaty at this referendum?

Quite honestly torn on the matter. Even if the latter did require a referendum, a accession to the Fiscal Compact Treaty would be used as significant leverage, both at national and international levels.

Not that I find anything particularly good about the Fiscal Compact Treaty itself; it's just that I don't see anything particularly bad.

RandomName2

oscarBravo wrote: »

Do they?

From their website:

require eurozone countries to present their draft budgets at the same time each year. The Commission could then issue an opinion on them, if necessary, and ask governments to revise them in line with their eurozone obligations

oscarBravo

The document itself only seems to mention the excessive deficit procedure, which is a Eurozone obligation. I thought it was accepted at this stage that a member state in excessive deficit would have to agree its budgetary provisions with the other member states.

Is there something new here?

RandomName2

oscarBravo wrote: »

The document itself only seems to mention the excessive deficit procedure, which is a Eurozone obligation. I thought it was accepted at this stage that a member state in excessive deficit would have to agree its budgetary provisions with the other member states.

Is there something new here?

Commission approval of national budgets would be pretty new. It is done within the framework of adhering to the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact, but worryingly, this, along with public disclosure seem to be the only restraints at this stage, upon the decisions of the Commission. The Commission is granted budgetary veto by this proposal.

oscarBravo

RandomName2 wrote: »

The Commission is granted budgetary veto by this proposal.

I've just re-read the document, and I can't find that in it. Can you point it out for me, please?

RandomName2

oscarBravo wrote: »

I've just re-read the document, and I can't find that in it. Can you point it out for me, please?

Chpt 3 Article 5 for starters.

oscarBravo

RandomName2 wrote: »

Chpt 3 Article 5 for starters.

Just so we're clear, your problem is that we're not going to be allowed to implement budgetary policies that are completely at odds with the legally-binding commitments that we've signed up to as part of our membership of a single currency?

Are you suggesting that we should be given free reign to implement a budget that constitutes "particularly serious non-compliance with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact"?

Apart from the idea that we should be allowed to do whatever the hell we want whenever the hell we want and regardless of the consequences to anyone else - which is a somewhat toddler-esque worldview - I'm not clear what the actual problem is.

RandomName2

oscarBravo wrote: »

Just so we're clear, your problem is that we're not going to be allowed to implement budgetary policies that are completely at odds with the legally-binding commitments that we've signed up to as part of our membership of a single currency?

Are you suggesting that we should be given free reign to implement a budget that constitutes "particularly serious non-compliance with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact"?

Apart from the idea that we should be allowed to do whatever the hell we want whenever the hell we want and regardless of the consequences to anyone else - which is a somewhat toddler-esque worldview - I'm not clear what the actual problem is.

My problem is with the idea of the Commission having a veto on internal plans constructed for the manner in which the Irish spend their taxes. The Irish would have no means of affecting this; the Commission being insulated by several layers of governmental and supranational structures.

The Commission is meant to veto national budgets only when national budgets are not in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact. No specific mention of GDP, public spending, credit, etc; one could argue that any budgetary measure either strengthened or weakened obligations in relation to the SGP.

Not only would the Commission have a veto, but be able to suggest alternative budgets. One may as well abolish Irish political parties and, as such, cut out the middle man.

oscarBravo

So that's a yes? We should be given free reign to implement a budget that constitutes "particularly serious non-compliance with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact"?

Scofflaw

RandomName2 wrote: »

My problem is with the idea of the Commission having a veto on internal plans constructed for the manner in which the Irish spend their taxes. The Irish would have no means of affecting this; the Commission being insulated by several layers of governmental and supranational structures.

The Commission is meant to veto national budgets only when national budgets are not in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact. No specific mention of GDP, public spending, credit, etc; one could argue that any budgetary measure either strengthened or weakened obligations in relation to the SGP.

Not only would the Commission have a veto, but be able to suggest alternative budgets. One may as well abolish Irish political parties and, as such, cut out the middle man.

And the same for every other country in the eurozone, which seems highly unlikely.

I have much the same problem as oB here - I'm not seeing this supposed "Commission veto". The ability for the Commission to "issue an opinion on them, if necessary, and ask governments to revise them in line with their eurozone obligations", which you seem to be taking as a veto, is treated in detail in the proposal.

The Chapter 3, Article 5 you refer to says:

Where the Commission identifies particularly serious non-compliance with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact, it shall, within two weeks from the submission of the draft budgetary plan, request a revised draft budgetary plan from the Member State concerned. This request shall be made public.

So the request is made public....and? And then what happens? What powers does the Commission have to veto the proposed budget? The answer is "none". What happens instead is treated in Article 6:

1. The Commission shall, if necessary, adopt an opinion on the draft budgetary plan by 30 November.

2. The Commission opinion shall be made public and, at the request of the Parliament of the Member State concerned, shall be presented by the Commission to the Parliament concerned.

3. The Commission shall make an overall assessment of the budgetary situation and prospects in the euro area as a whole. The assessment shall be made public.

4. The Eurogroup shall discuss opinions of the Commission on the national budgetary plans and the budgetary situation and prospects in the euro area as a whole on the basis of the overall assessment made by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 3. The assessment shall be made public.

In other words, if the Commission doesn't like the proposed budget, what it can do is ask for a revised budget - and if it doesn't get one, or doesn't like the revised one either, then it can issue an opinion. Publicly, no less. And then Charlie McCreevy says "feck off" and the nation rejoices...

The Article 6 procedure is fleshed out a bit more in the explanatory notes:

Each of the Member States whose currency is the euro should consult the Commission and other Member States whose currency is the euro before the adoption of any major fiscal policy reform plans with potential spillover effects, so as to give the possibility for an assessment of possible impact for the euro area as a whole.

They should consider their budgetary plans to be of common concern and submit them to the Commission for monitoring purposes in advance of the plans becoming binding.

The Commission should be in a position, if necessary, to adopt an opinion on the draft budgetary plan, that the Member State and in particular budgetary authorities should be invited to take into account in the process of the budget law adoption.

Such an opinion should ensure that Union's policy guidance in the budgetary area is appropriately integrated in the national budgetary preparations. In particular, this opinion should include an assessment of whether or not the budgetary plans appropriately address the recommendations issued in the context of the European semester in the budgetary area.

The Commission should stand ready to present this opinion to the Parliament of the Member State concerned at its request.

The extent to which this opinion has been taken into account should be part of the assessment, if and when the conditions are met, leading to the decision to place the concerned Member State in excessive deficit procedure, where no follow-up to the early guidance from the Commission should be considered as an aggravating factor.

Summarised, that says:

1. if a government is about to undertake a major fiscal reform with probable effects on the rest of the eurozone...
   
2. ...it should let the Commission know in advance.
   
3. The Commission can then give its opinion on the reform...
   
4. ...which the government is invited to take into consideration...
   
5. ...and which the Commission may (presumably on invitation) also present to the national parliament, although this would usually make sod-all difference in our case.
   
6. If the government doesn't take the Commission's opinion into consideration...
   
7. ...and the state then winds up in an excessive deficit procedure...
   
8. ...the failure to take the Commission's opinion into account can be considered an aggravating factor.

This proposal is certainly not what you are concerned it is! It is a way of issuing an adverse opinion on a proposed budget because of dangers to the fiscal rules, or spillover effects to other eurozone members. It provides us (the public) with an external assessment of the government's plans, but there is nothing I can see in there which could be described even at a wild stretch as giving the Commission the power to veto national budgets!

Which is hardly surprising, since I can't see the governments of Europe having sat down and decided with virtually no fanfare or media attention to abolish most of their meaningful functions at one fell swoop.

cordially,
Scofflaw

RandomName2

oscarBravo wrote: »

So that's a yes? We should be given free reign to implement a budget that constitutes "particularly serious non-compliance with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact"?

Of course it's a yes. A country (or individual) should have the freedom to do whatever he wants in general - he may be punished if he does wrong, but his intentions and plans should not have to be approved by another authority. Unless, of course, as an applicable analogy you feel that you should have to have your domestic budget approved by your local TD?

RandomName2

Scofflaw wrote: »

The Chapter 3, Article 5 you refer to says:

I don't see how quoting

Where the Commission identifies particularly serious non-compliance with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact, it shall, within two weeks from the submission of the draft budgetary plan, request a revised draft budgetary plan from the Member State concerned. This request shall be made public.

contradicts what I suggested. Rather, the opposite.

Scofflaw

RandomName2 wrote: »

I don't see how quoting



contradicts what I suggested. Rather, the opposite.

Because "request" is "ask". Not "the Commission can require..." or the "Commission can veto any proposed plan and...".

Are you serious about this? Because one might expect it to be big news if the governments of the eurozone are about to allow the Commission to veto national budgets, and while I certainly appreciate the often agenda-driven nature of news, you're well off into conspiracy territory for this not to have been huge news, and Lord knows there's enough eurosceptic papers out there who would have been all over it.

The alternative is that you're looking at the usual situation where the Commission can say "we don't like this", and the country concerned can say "oh well, that's just tough", and the idea that this is some kind of veto is a very personal interpretation by you.

After all, the text goes on to talk about what happens if the Commission doesn't like the budgetary plan - which, if they had a veto, wouldn't happen - and what we're looking at in the way of sanctions is that the Commission can publicly give an opinion on the budget. Scaaary, right?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Eliot Rosewater

RandomName2 wrote: »

Of course it's a yes. A country (or individual) should have the freedom to do whatever he wants in general - he may be punished if he does wrong, but his intentions and plans should not have to be approved by another authority. Unless, of course, as an applicable analogy you feel that you should have to have your domestic budget approved by your local TD?

In general that would be the case but by joining the eurozone we have put other EU member states at risk whenever we follow ultimately destructive budget policies. If we want the freedom to do whatever we want with our budget we should leave the euro and at least not put those other countries at risk. Suggesting otherwise is kind of like saying that once you get admitted to a pub you should be allowed to do whatever you want - even if that includes kicking the barman in the nuts.

RandomName2

Eliot Rosewater wrote: »

In general that would be the case but by joining the eurozone we have put other EU member states at risk whenever we follow ultimately destructive budget policies. If we want the freedom to do whatever we want with our budget we should leave the euro and at least not put those other countries at risk. Suggesting otherwise is kind of like saying that once you get admitted to a pub you should be allowed to do whatever you want - even if that includes kicking the barman in the nuts.

Oh you can go into a bar and kick the barman in the nuts if you like: it's just that if you do so you will be asked to leave/ end up in a fight/ be arrested. The analogy for Europe is whether or not Greece... stays in the pub... :pac:

(although, I have to undermine my analogy by pointing out that Greece cannot be explicitly asked to leave, and doing so would itself create a good deal of fallout (as there are other ball-kickers in the room). Also, punishment is not on the cards for obvious reasons...)

RandomName2

Scofflaw wrote: »

Because "request" is "ask". Not "the Commission can require..." or the "Commission can veto any proposed plan and...".

Are you serious about this? Because one might expect it to be big news if the governments of the eurozone are about to allow the Commission to veto national budgets, and while I certainly appreciate the often agenda-driven nature of news, you're well off into conspiracy territory for this not to have been huge news, and Lord knows there's enough eurosceptic papers out there who would have been all over it.

Hmm... well at draft level it might not make big news.

But okay: request means 'ask', but if a Garda asks to see an individual's driving licence, for instance, and the individual refuses, does the Garda say 'okay, so you don't feel like doing that. Fair enough, carry on.'? Nope.

But what clout does the Commission have if a party does not accede to their requests? The Commission, of course, has handed down fines many times before, but always within the framework of an established economic compact. This draft does not seem to mention anything about the Commission augmenting their capacities in relation to the imposing of fines on states in a situation such as this, but broadly speaking, could this not fit within the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact? If the Commission's request is predicated on a perceived breach of the Pact, and fines have been imposed for the breaching of the Pact in the past, then surely a state not accepting the Commission's suggested alternative budget could be fined in this manner?

Scofflaw

RandomName2 wrote: »

Hmm... well at draft level it might not make big news.

But okay: request means 'ask', but if a Garda asks to see an individual's driving licence, for instance, and the individual refuses, does the Garda say 'okay, so you don't feel like doing that. Fair enough, carry on.'? Nope.

But what clout does the Commission have if a party does not accede to their requests? The Commission, of course, has handed down fines many times before, but always within the framework of an established economic compact. This draft does not seem to mention anything about the Commission augmenting their capacities in relation to the imposing of fines on states in a situation such as this, but broadly speaking, could this not fit within the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact? If the Commission's request is predicated on a perceived breach of the Pact, and fines have been imposed for the breaching of the Pact in the past, then surely a state not accepting the Commission's suggested alternative budget could be fined in this manner?

No...that's the bit I originally quoted you. The Commission can, as I said, publicly disagree with the proposed budget, and take it into account in an excessive deficit procedure.

That does mean that if the Commission didn't like the budget, and they're now considering whether to recommend that an excessive deficit procedure be undertaken against the country, they may be more likely to make that recommendation.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Eliot Rosewater

RandomName2 wrote: »

Oh you can go into a bar and kick the barman in the nuts if you like: it's just that if you do so you will be asked to leave/ end up in a fight/ be arrested. The analogy for Europe is whether or not Greece... stays in the pub... :pac:

Keeping with the pub analogy (!) if the bouncer at the door knew you were highly drunk and in an aggressive mood he would surely be in the right to preemptively stop you from entering. And, as you say, the EU is a strange kind of pub where if you try to eject someone the Heinken tap runs out, or something ...