Outcome of the war if Britain and France refuse to support Poland

HavingCrack

What does everyone think would happen if Britain and France do not declare war on Germany following the latter's invasion of Poland. Effectively another Czechoslovakia incident. Would the war have progressed on the Eastern Front in a similar manner or would Barbarossa have happened 12-14 months sooner and would the outcome have been different?

Victor

Potentially, it would have meant no campaign in Denmark or Norway and France, etc. not invaded. Italy would probably continue messing about in the Balkans and Africa.

So, with no declaration of war from the UK or France, Germany would have a certain sense of security. Hitler had told Krupp that war wouldn't start in the East until 1943, however, given the events of 1936-1939, it is not certain that Germany would just chew the cud and assimilate Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The leaves the question as to what point a general war would break out. If the UK or France wouldn't start a war over Poland, would they start one over Greece (and by implication Yugoslavia), I think unlikely, although the argument could be made that they would be running out of trip wires.

Notably, The UK and France were re-arming and while the southern part of the Maginot Line was complete by 1939, the northern part wasn't. Assuming no hostilities from 1939-1941, could the Maginot Line have been completed, thereby making any German attack into France at least problematic.

Of course, we can't forget the USSR - would they have attacked Finland again or indeed, the likes of Romania and that becomes a German casus belli for Barbarossa? I don't see the western powers intervening.

Realistically, it becomes a whole different timeline.

Manach

Assuming that the Western Powers did not back their guarentee to Poland this would have left deem isolated diplomatically. The USSR would not have trusted them to honour any agreement and thus might have come to a greater level of understandings with the Reich that the historical Ribbontrop pact. How this would have effected any future invasion of the USSR, with the full attention of the Wehrmacht against them instead of it being spread along a number of fronts, would be interesting.

TerrorFirmer

Romania and Hungary were trying to modernize their armies when Barbarossa broke out. If the invasion happened even a year later, instead of having German flanks defended by poorly equipped troops armed with defensive capabilities insufficient to even penetrate the T34 let alone wage a successful defensive action, you'd probably have Romanian and Hungarian armies equipped with heavy caliber anti-tank guns, and Panzer III and IV grade tanks and assault guns instead of the pitiful light tanks they started the war with. This would have made a massive difference in the field, especially in situations like Stalingrad. Hungarian armies only started preforming well in 1944, far too late to make any impact on the direction of the war, for example.

War was probably inevitable, even if Poland did not spark it off as it did. If not Hitler at fault, then Mussolini.

Russian tactical and strategic brilliance came into being through some extremely harsh lessons no other nation could have borne in terms of the cost of human life and resources. A Red Army invasion of Europe on their own initiative would probably not have succeeded.

HavingCrack

Victor wrote: »

Potentially, it would have meant no campaign in Denmark or Norway and France, etc. not invaded. Italy would probably continue messing about in the Balkans and Africa.

So, with no declaration of war from the UK or France, Germany would have a certain sense of security. Hitler had told Krupp that war wouldn't start in the East until 1943, however, given the events of 1936-1939, it is not certain that Germany would just chew the cud and assimilate Poland and Czechoslovakia.

What was the latest Germany could go to war? I remember hearing a date of 1942 somewhere, I must dig the source out. Presumably Pearl Harbour will still occur in this alternate timeframe. However if Britain and France are sitll nto at war with Germany does the US never become involved in Europe?

Victor wrote: »

The leaves the question as to what point a general war would break out. If the UK or France wouldn't start a war over Poland, would they start one over Greece (and by implication Yugoslavia), I think unlikely, although the argument could be made that they would be running out of trip wires.

As you say Greece would have to be the final straw, if not there there aren't many countries left.

Victor wrote: »

Notably, The UK and France were re-arming and while the southern part of the Maginot Line was complete by 1939, the northern part wasn't. Assuming no hostilities from 1939-1941, could the Maginot Line have been completed, thereby making any German attack into France at least problematic.

As an aside how far off full re-armament were Britain and France in 1939? As you say the Maginot Line could possibly be completed by 1941 so would equipment and manpower levels reach those of Germany's in that same timeframe?

Victor wrote: »

Of course, we can't forget the USSR - would they have attacked Finland again or indeed, the likes of Romania and that becomes a German casus belli for Barbarossa? I don't see the western powers intervening.

Realistically, it becomes a whole different timeline.

The whole idea fascinates me. As you say the entire course of the war is changed drastically, US entry into Europe may never even happen which leads to the Cold War having an entirely different slant if it ever occurs at all.

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

Romania and Hungary were trying to modernize their armies when Barbarossa broke out. If the invasion happened even a year later, instead of having German flanks defended by poorly equipped troops armed with defensive capabilities insufficient to even penetrate the T34 let alone wage a successful defensive action, you'd probably have Romanian and Hungarian armies equipped with heavy caliber anti-tank guns, and Panzer III and IV grade tanks and assault guns instead of the pitiful light tanks they started the war with. This would have made a massive difference in the field, especially in situations like Stalingrad. Hungarian armies only started preforming well in 1944, far too late to make any impact on the direction of the war, for example.

War was probably inevitable, even if Poland did not spark it off as it did. If not Hitler at fault, then Mussolini.

.

However would the Barbarossa campaign result in an entirely different outcome if the invasion of France is not neccessary in 1940. Stalingrad etc. may not even have happened.

TerrorFirmer

HavingCrack wrote: »

As an aside how far off full re-armament were Britain and France in 1939? As you say the Maginot Line could possibly be completed by 1941 so would equipment and manpower levels reach those of Germany's in that same timeframe?

In spring 1940, combined Allied arms - on the continent only, and say, readily available air support from across the channel - outnumbered those of Germany, and not only in quantity, but frequently in quality also. French Armour was largely better than German armor, a particularly notable point considering armor was the driving force of the new form of warfare that broke out in 1939. The difference was German training was superior, as was tactical execution.

Most people in 1940, including a lot of the German general staff, actually thought Germany would lose a war with France - the six week triumph shocked many Germans as much as it did the French themselves.

One of Germany's big problems was industrial output. Only in 1944 did the war economy reach acceptable output levels, but by then, not only was the war already lost, but the fuel needed in tandem with said output was not available. It was so bad in the early years of the war that German industry could barely produce even to cover military maintenance, let alone sustain a war. This proved crucial to the later campaigns.

Victor

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

In spring 1940, combined Allied arms - on the continent only, and say, readily available air support from across the channel - outnumbered those of Germany, and not only in quantity, but frequently in quality also. French Armour was largely better than German armor, a particularly notable point considering armor was the driving force of the new form of warfare that broke out in 1939. The difference was German training was superior, as was tactical execution.

Yes, it was certainly tactics and experience won the Battle of France. I'm not so certain about the French tanks, but certainly the British tanks were (for their time) well armoured machine-gun carriers while the German one were lightly armoured fighting vehicles that were under-gunned, thereby resulting in a stalemate in a face-off between them. By ignoring the British tanks, the Germans were able to hit the soft underbelly of the infantry and supply lines.

TerrorFirmer

Victor wrote: »

Yes, it was certainly tactics and experience won the Battle of France. I'm not so certain about the French tanks, but certainly the British tanks were (for their time) well armoured machine-gun carriers while the German one were lightly armoured fighting vehicles that were under-gunned, thereby resulting in a stalemate in a face-off between them. By ignoring the British tanks, the Germans were able to hit the soft underbelly of the infantry and supply lines.

The French Char B was more heavily armored and equipped than the average German tank, of which many were Panzer II quality. Same for the Matilda, the Germans found them difficult to face head on. But against both, a war of rapid movement combined with effective air support overwhelmed both. Usually, the Germans maneuvered as to be able to hit the Char B broadside, where there was a weakness in the armor. Rommel himself recorded being unable to penetrate the armour of a British Matilda tank at Arras with a 37mm gun. The limited counterattack at Arras is a good example of how effective Allied armor could have been if used en masse as the Germans did.

thecommietommy

HavingCrack wrote: »

What does everyone think would happen if Britain and France do not declare war on Germany following the latter's invasion of Poland. Effectively another Czechoslovakia incident. Would the war have progressed on the Eastern Front in a similar manner or would Barbarossa have happened 12-14 months sooner and would the outcome have been different?

I hope I'm not been pedantic or derailing the thread, but Poland ( as well as Hungary) also invaded Czechoslovakia in 1938 along with the Germans - and the USSR also invaded Poland along with the Germans. All buried away in history these days

Tzar Chasm

If Britain hadnt declared War on Germany in 39 could the Nazis have cultivated a relationship with Britain? would they then have joined against Russia, and more to the point could the Americans have been brought in against the Russians??

HavingCrack

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

In spring 1940, combined Allied arms - on the continent only, and say, readily available air support from across the channel - outnumbered those of Germany, and not only in quantity, but frequently in quality also. French Armour was largely better than German armor, a particularly notable point considering armor was the driving force of the new form of warfare that broke out in 1939. The difference was German training was superior, as was tactical execution.

I actually had no idea :eek::eek: I'm slightly embarressed . I always had the impression that German armaments heavily outnumbered those of Britain and France.

Are Britain and France close to full re-armament in 1939 then? Or is their industrial capacity continuing to increase (the economic and industrial side of the war has never been my strong point unfortunately).

More importantly if a general war does not break out until 1941 will British and French tactics have caught up or are they still slavishly devoted to the doctrines of WW1.

HavingCrack

thecommietommy wrote: »

I hope I'm not been pedantic or derailing the thread, but Poland ( as well as Hungary) also invaded Czechoslovakia in 1938 along with the Germans - and the USSR also invaded Poland along with the Germans. All buried away in history these days

A bit off topic but worth noting as you say, it's left out of a lot of history detailing the period.

You're referring to the Zaolzie incident I presume? The population in the area were overwhelmingly Polish and like the Sudeten Germans welcome the Polish occupiers as liberators from "Czech tyranny". Czechs and Germans were deported and the speaking of languages other than Polish banned, very unsavoury altogether. Unlike the Sudetenland the mood turned sour very quickly however. A lot of the Polish citizens of the area were poorly treated by the Warsaw government who parachuted in Poles from other areas to look after the administration of the district.

The story isn't as clear cut as it can be made out. Zaolzie was originally considered to be part of "Poland" during the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Czechoslovakia seized it in a short conflict in 1919. Stuttman is the only author who ever even touches on the subject actually.

Source: "Illustrated WW2 Encyclopedia"-Stuttman (1980) several editions

The USSR occupation of eastern Poland is what makes the entire thread so interesting. If the western Allies do not intervene in 1939 does Hitler launch an invasion of the Soviet Union in Spring 1940?

HavingCrack

Tzar Chasm wrote: »

If Britain hadnt declared War on Germany in 39 could the Nazis have cultivated a relationship with Britain? would they then have joined against Russia, and more to the point could the Americans have been brought in against the Russians??

A lot of the German general staff felt they had much more in common with Britain than they did with Italy. They were seen as natural allies against the Soviet Union in some circles. I suspect an alliance is unlikely however. Italian machinations in East Africa, Egypt(in particular) and the Balkans would probably cause an outbreak of war with Britain. Would Germany abandon her ally? From the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece this seems unlikely.

However, the invasion of Greece was to prevent Britain gaining a foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean, threating the German flank in the Balkans. If Britain is not yet at war with Germany will Hitler come to Mussolini's aid? As show by Munich, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Anglo German Naval Agreement Hitler had no problems with breaking treaties. Would he ignore Mussolini's pleas for help?

Victor

HavingCrack wrote: »

Are Britain and France close to full re-armament in 1939 then?

Nowhere near it. If they were fully re-armed, they wouldn't have been defeated (so easily) in 1940.

Or is their industrial capacity continuing to increase (the economic and industrial side of the war has never been my strong point unfortunately).

I think the British went to three shifts per day in the armaments factories in 1939, but that doesn't mean the rest of the economy had moved into war production. Further what was being produced, would soon be found to be largely outdated and ineffective.

More importantly if a general war does not break out until 1941 will British and French tactics have caught up or are they still slavishly devoted to the doctrines of WW1.

Tactics had moved on from WW1 - the British had done tactics in the Middle East (there was resistance to doing it at home, for fear of being accused of warmongering), but one only really learns tactics when faced by the enemy, in enemy vehicles on the actual battlefield.

HavingCrack

Victor wrote: »

Nowhere near it. If they were fully re-armed, they wouldn't have been defeated (so easily) in 1940.

I always thought that, some of the posts in this thread threw me a bit though .

Victor wrote: »

I think the British went to three shifts per day in the armaments factories in 1939, but that doesn't mean the rest of the economy had moved into war production. Further what was being produced, would soon be found to be largely outdated and ineffective.

It's unlikely an economy will ever move into war production until a war actually starts though.

Victor wrote: »

Tactics had moved on from WW1 - the British had done tactics in the Middle East (there was resistance to doing it at home, for fear of being accused of warmongering), but one only really learns tactics when faced by the enemy, in enemy vehicles on the actual battlefield.

Agreed.

TerrorFirmer

Some large misconceptions in this thread. Victor I am sorry to say your posts are somewhat incorrect.

To say France and Britain were not 're-armed' is misleading. I state again as I have already, on paper, regardless of whether each nation was fully re-armed, Germany was outnumbered, and outgunned, in spring 1940. In spring 1940, directly compared, French and British tanks, namely the Matilda MK 1 and Char B, proved themselves superior to most German armour. Only tactical flair and innovation won the day, with minor contributions from equipment in tandem (as I have mentioned, every German tank had radio, every Allied tank did not, which rendered allied armor at a distinct disadvantage).

You cannot look at the war in the west and base it upon paper statistics. On paper, the allies had more planes, more soldiers, more tanks, and better logistics. The German army launched an offensive that fully embraced the concept of a 'lightning war' aka Blitzkrieg. This style of warfare, though discussed in both Britain and France, did not take hold amongst the higher echelons. Therefore, when the Germans invaded, their tactical direction overwhelmed French opposition in totality. You had armored spearheads engaging dispersed lines, not to mention, the French air force, numerically comparable, melted away in the face of well trained, and a modern Luftwaffe. This was not a war of equipment, it was one of evolving battlefield direction, and France was behind the times. Only in Russia, would Germany eventually meet its match.

An analogy, if you will, is like placing an amateur in a field with a fully automatic, 1200rpm capable weapon, and his opposition, an expert marksman, with a vintage, bolt action rifle. To whom do you entrust your support? It really was not so different in spring 1940. French and allied superiority in armor and numerical strength was no match for radical innovations in land based warfare that were largely hitherto untested (apart from in Poland, but speaking generally across the continent).

Also, it is easy to speak of weaker eastern nations carving up Czechslovakia, but these were instances of opportunism. Stalin would never have dared invade Poland without such an agreement with Germany to carve up the spoils; likewise, the other Balkan nations would never have done so without such circumstances.

Hungary and Romania were in the middle of re-arming their respective militaries when Barbarossa broke out. They depended hugely on German aid, for several years at that point.

With regards war industry, on that point, Britain was actually ahead of Germany, in many ways. Germany was ill prepared for any lengthy conflict, and her industry was incapable of supporting a sustained war effort until 1944 -far too late to influence the war. German war aims demanded a quick, overwhelming victory - hence why victory over France appeared relatively painless. But, even in 1940/1941, German industry could barely keep up with maintenance demands, let alone those of the battlefield. So when Barbarossa turned into a bloody, drawn out stalemate, the Wehrmacht finally found itself in extreme difficulty - a stalemate war front, demanding massive reserves in both manpower and armour, which the reich frankly could not spare, having gambled on a short, crushing campaign. Interestingly, by early 1942, Guderian reported that while the Russian campaign was relatively comparable to that in France in term of armored losses, lack of reserves hindered continuing advances. The German economy finally gathered pace by 1944, but by then, it was far too late to affect the outcome of the war, not to mention, oil supply was dwindling to a trickle. More armored vehicles rolled off production lines in late 1944 then the 3 previous years combined! But,with no fuel, they were largely abandoned.

Hope this sheds some light!

Victor

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

Some large misconceptions in this thread. Victor I am sorry to say your posts are somewhat incorrect.

To say France and Britain were not 're-armed' is misleading.

Re-read what was said:

Victor wrote: »

HavingCrack wrote: »

Are Britain and France close to full re-armament in 1939 then?

Nowhere near it. If they were fully re-armed, they wouldn't have been defeated (so easily) in 1940.

They were not **fully** re-armed. They were nowhere near what they had in 1919 or would have in 1944. Indeed, the Free French were sustained for several years on what had been ordered from North America in 1939-40.

TerrorFirmer

Yes but my whole point was that Germany were not 'fully re-armed' in that same respect, if that's the view you want to take. At the outset of war, France was superior to Germany on paper, that cannot be stressed enough. You're painting a picture of a German army rolling over an obsolete French one, which is entirely incorrect - in spring 1940, British and French equipment was on par with, and often exceeding, that of Germany in quality, and was in excess in terms of quantity. Vastly superior German planning and execution won the day.

Even if one wanted to say the war began in 1941 when France was 'fully re-armed' (even though I consider that phrase entirely misleading and incorrect), by that stage, Germany would similarly possess far greater resources of Panzer III and IV tanks, which were more than a match for the likes of the Grant, which is probably the best tank available prior to the M3 (not available in the timeframe we're discussing).

Like I've already stated, French armour in 1940 was generally superior and on multiple occassions, the Germans reported that in head on battles they were unable to penetrate the Char B. At Arras, the heavy armor of the British Matilda created panic. Here are a few good excerpts for your consideration:

Only 50% of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready,[60] often being more poorly equipped than their equivalents in the British and French Armies, or even as well as the German Army of 1914.[62] In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern. A small number of the best-equipped and "elite divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions".[62]

The real trump card for the Germans was the radio.[66] The Panzers all had radios that allowed voice communication with other units. This enabled German armour to respond rapidly to a constantly changing battlefield situation. It allowed for last minute changes in tactics and improvisations to be formed far more quickly than the enemy. Some commanders regarded the ability to communicate the primary method of combat.[66] Radio drills were even considered more important than firing accurately.[66] Communication allowed German armour to coordinate their formations, bringing them together for a mass firepower effect in the attack or defence. This offset the French advantage in numbers and equipment, which was deployed in "penny-packets". The French also lacked radios and orders were passed from mouth to mouth. The opposing systems would give the Germans a decisive edge in battle.[66]

The main tool of the German land forces was combined arms combat. In contrast to the Allies, they relied in highly mobile offensive units, with balanced numbers of well trained artillery, infantry, engineer and tank formations, all integrated into Panzer divisions. They relied on excellent communication systems which enabled them to break into a position and exploit it before the enemy could react. Panzer divisions could carry out reconnaissance missions, advance to contact, defend and attack vital positions or weak spots. This ground would then be held by infantry and artillery as pivot points for further attacks. Although their tanks were not designed for tank versus tank combat, they could take ground and draw the enemy armour on to the division's anti-tank lines.

French tactical deployment and the use of mobile units operationally was also inferior to that of the Germans.[76] Tactically, armour was spread thinly along the French line: French infantry divisions were supported by tank battalions of about 100 tanks, which prevented them from being a strong, independent operational force. Making matters worse, only a handful of French tanks in each unit had radios installed, making communication difficult, most of them being unreliable.[76] French tanks were also very slow in speed in comparison to the Panzers (except for the Somua S-35), as they were designed as infantry support, enabling German tanks to offset their disadvantages by outmanoeuvring the French on the battlefield.

In operational terms, the French did not seem to give much thought to armoured units as offensive weapons. Although some people such as Colonel de Gaulle tried during the 1930s to convince French High Command of the necessity to form armoured divisions supported by aviation and infantry, military conservatism prevented these "new ideas" from emerging. The French High Command was still obsessed with holding the front as it had in 1914-1918. The state of training was also unbalanced, with the majority of personnel trained only to man static fortifications.[80] Little training for mobile actions were carried out between September 1939 and May 1940.[81]

Really, I'm not sure why you're creating a scenario that the French were 'not fully re-armed' in the sense of it being a reason for their defeat. It was not. The addition of heavier armor (even though it cannot be stressed enough that the existing armor was heavy enough to outclass the invaders in a conventional battle that the French High Command based their entire strategy around) would not have made an iota of difference. As it were already, the Germans encountered and easily overcame superior armor.

Tactics, tactics, tactics - combined arms, speed, communication were key. France lacked in those areas badly. And would have done regardless of their equipment.

Ping Chow Chi

I could be wrong, but I thought one of main reasons Germany made huge gains into Russia was because Stalin had resently purged his officer class in his armed forces (and that Stalin didn't believe that they would fight on two fronts at the same time) I would assume (maybe incorrectly I admit) that the longer Germany waited the more able the officer class and the more prepared the Russian armed forces would have been.

An interesting one would have been what would have happend if France had decided that Russia held more of a threat than Germany and joined the German side.

Maoltuile

Terrorfirmer is entirely correct in the reasons for German success in the West. For that matter, the war in Poland is also given to popular myth about the opposition the Wehrmacht faced:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Poland#Poland

Reekwind

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

Tactics, tactics, tactics - combined arms, speed, communication were key. France lacked in those areas badly. And would have done regardless of their equipment.

That's just another restatement of "a German army rolling over an obsolete French one" though. Only here it is superior military doctrine that trumps the obsolete French defenders

While that certainly played a role, it wasn't poor communications that doomed the French, although it certainly hindered it, but the fact that the defending armies were just horribly deployed. It was the massive strategic errors of the French High Command (plus credit to Hitler for backing Manstein) that left the door open for the panzers to roll through. There could be no recovery from the decision to station virtually the entire Allied field forces far north of the actual German axis of attack. Discussion of hardware or tactics must be placed in that context

The same is actually true of Barbarossa. Regardless of the operational readiness of the Red Army, which was dire, the stunning success of the operation (in its initial weeks) was the product of the near complete strategic surprise that the Germans enjoyed, in conjunction with some bafflingly idiotic Soviet deployments. The Red Army was pretty much served up on a platter, arrayed as it was just inside the border, for the invaders to carve up as they wished