The eye of the storm- Ulster, 1922

jonniebgood1

The period of time between the end of the war of independence and the start of the civil war, early 1922, seems to have been a time of unease and undefined activitiy. The treaty had been agreed and there was internal wrangling in over whether the treaty was acceptable or not. I was looking for information about an incident involving Monaghan footballers involvement with a prison rescue attempt in Derry and came across this interesting history Ireland article based on this period of time and an altercation in Clones.

On Saturday 11 February 1922 a gun battle at a County Monaghan railway station resulted in the deaths of four Ulster Special Constables, the local IRA commandant and the wounding of numerous other combatants and civilians. What really happened? Robert Lynch investigates.

The events at Clones were inevitably interpreted in radically different ways by both unionists and nationalists, occurring as they did amidst the establishment of two new administrations in Ireland. For unionists the Clones incident was a ‘massacre’ ruthlessly planned and carried out by the IRA. Nationalists tended to paint the Specials’ arrival in Clones as akin to some form of invasion of Free State territory, exacerbated by the brutal and unprovoked murder of the local IRA commander. What was the truth behind these conflicting claims? http://www.historyireland.com/volumes/volume12/issue3/features/?id=310

Collins’s determination to halt the executions of the Derry prisoners had gone even further, sending two of his ‘squad’ to England to assassinate the two hangmen who were to execute the prisoners; however, they had already left for Ireland. At this point Clones became the centre of frenetic IRA activity. The town itself contained the 5th Northern Divisional headquarters and lay within a few miles of both the Tyrone and Fermanagh borders. Its strategic position meant also that it had become the headquarters of the Ulster Council, within easy reach of both Aiken and MacEoin’s commands in Armagh and Longford respectively. Both geographically and politically Clones lay at the centre of a political storm that would soon erupt on its very doorstep.
While diplomatic efforts to release the ‘Monaghan footballers’ continued apace, the local situation became extremely tense. In response to the kidnappings, Specials poured into border areas. Bridges were blown and all but major roads were mined or trenched. The Specials set up checkpoints at the remaining border crossings and local farms were abandoned by their owners. A stalemate ensued, and both sides exchanged fire across the now-fortified border areas. It was against this backdrop that at around 5.15pm on Saturday 11 February the ill-fated train containing the Specials arrived at Clones station. The party itself consisted of nineteen uniformed ‘A’ Specials led by Sergeant William Dougherty. Six of the constables were armed. They had left Newtownards via Belfast earlier in the day. Their final destination was Enniskillen, where they were to reinforce the local USC platoons as part of the wider build-up of forces along the Monaghan border. It certainly was a provocative route to choose, especially when one considers that the British army had evacuated Clones only days before to concentrate at the Curragh and Dublin. The clumsy choice of route did cause some consternation after the event although no evidence exists to suggest that it involved any sinister motives, some kind of administrative blunder being the favoured interpretation.
On arrival at Clones, Sergeant Dougherty gathered the six-man armed party together on the platform. The rest of the men made their way to the buffet. One or two others strolled about the station, mingling with civilians and kicking their heels until the train arrived. No IRA men appeared to be present at the station, although Constable John Guiness recalls noticing ‘some suspicious looking young men on the platform all the time’. It is likely that at least one of these young men was responsible for alerting the IRA to the presence of the Specials and thus inadvertently turning an innocent journey into a tragic confrontation. Meanwhile, in the IRA’s divisional headquarters at the workhouse in Clones, battalion commandant Matt Fitzpatrick had recently arrived with some other officers. Fitzpatrick responded rapidly to the news of the Specials’ arrival. Quickly arming themselves, he and three other officers leapt into a car and headed for the station, informing others to gather more men and follow him up as soon as possible. They sped off, covering the short distance to the railway station within minutes.

‘They have it in for you boys’

Back at the station the Specials were preparing to leave. The Enniskillen train had arrived and some of the party had taken their seats while others dawdled on the platform and drifted towards their carriages. As the last half-dozen or so Specials climbed aboard the train, Special Constable Peter Martin recalls that one of the railway porters came to the door of his compartment and, pointing to the recently arrived IRA officers, said ‘They have it in for you boys’. Fitzpatrick and his three officers had just entered the main door of the station. Revolver in hand, he walked to the engine to stop the train from leaving. IRA lieutenant Patrick Rooney recalls the events as follows:

‘When we got on the platform we turned towards the engine as the train was due to start. We then saw the engine was not attached. We turned back towards the rear of the train. Commandant Fitzpatrick was leading the men down the platform. I was behind him. On reaching the first compartment where there were Specials the commandant shouted ‘Hands up! Surrender’, immediately there was a shot from the compartment and Commandant Fitzpatrick dropped dead in front of me.’

It was never established who fired this fatal shot, and the issue of which side had initiated the violence would become the subject of bitter argument over the following weeks, with both sides claiming vociferously that they were the innocent victims of an unprovoked attack. However, what followed these few disputed seconds is more certain. Fitzpatrick, shot in the head with a single bullet, fell dead between two carriages. Immediately the situation exploded into chaos. The IRA, now numbering around twenty, dived for cover and a hail of bullets was fired at the Specials’ carriages. An anonymous witness relates the chilling scene as follows: ‘After we had been seated about two minutes shots suddenly rang out, about six being fired into our carriage in quick succession, one of the bullets flashing across my face and grazing my hat. I could hear shots being discharged all over the train mingled with the yells and screams of the men in the other carriages. I heard one man appeal for mercy, and another call for his mother.’

Frederick Browne of Enniskillen recalled seeing several individuals jumping out of the train on the opposite side, only to be held up by an armed IRA man who forced them back into the carriages where the main attack was taking place. Hector Jeffers, a trooper in the Inniskilling Dragoons, who was in a compartment with one of the Specials, stated:

‘I heard the thud of a bullet coming through the woodwork of the carriage, a few minutes after this the special constable said ‘I am hit’, and when I looked round he was bleeding from the mouth. His eyes closed and I think he died in a few minutes.’

The scene on the platform was chaotic. Some of the Specials caught in the open attempted to surrender, only to be raked with machine-gun fire, whilst others either fled or returned fire from the wrecked carriages.
By all accounts Constable Robert MacMahon was the first Special to be killed. Three others were to follow: Sergeant Dougherty and Constables James Lewis and William McFarland. The train had been riddled with bullets, concentrated mainly on carriage 85, where the Specials were located. Countless civilians were wounded, including Patrick Crumley, the former nationalist MP for South Fermanagh. Eight other Specials were wounded to varying degrees. Constable John Cummings was hit by machine-gun fire below the waist and as a result lost his right leg. Constable George Lendrum had six machine-gun bullets in him but somehow survived. Others escaped unscathed, although most, like Albert Lyttle, were very lucky. His cap was knocked off by a bullet and another passed harmlessly through his tunic.
The IRA, now arriving in large numbers, gave orders for everybody to leave the train. The civilians were separated from the remaining Specials, of whom only three were unwounded. An anonymous witness related his view of the terrible aftermath:

‘A number of passengers were ordered to clear the dead and wounded out of the carriages. The victims, numbering upward of 20, were carried from carriages and laid prostrate in the ladies’ waiting room. The passengers having completed the gruesome work of clearing the carriages, returned with their faces, hands and clothing saturated with blood.’

The train itself left 45 minutes late, around 6.30pm. Despite the IRA allowing the civilians to continue their journey, it appears that only a few took this opportunity. In Clones itself IRA units from counties Monaghan, Fermanagh and Cavan poured into the Clones area. They extinguished street lamps and put out lights in local shops and houses. Tensions were running extremely high. In Monaghan town a local girl was shot accidentally by the IRA around 9pm. When the train finally arrived at Lisbellaw, its carriages wrecked and covered in blood, the local population exploded in riotous anger.

Its quite a graphic description and also interesting in the reactions of figures such as Churchill who did not allow retaliatory action. As the linked piece points out the events in the North around this time are largely ignored for a variety of reason. Riots in Belfast followed the Clones incident and set the agenda for how things would proceed in the North. The British released the prisoners in Derry and in turn the IRA released most of the prisoners they had taken. So was Collins correct in his policy or as the article suggests, was he isolating the Catholic minority in the North?

jonniebgood1

There is a little bit more background information on the arrest of the monaghan footballers here in a timeline:

Sporadic IRA activity in North continues in early 1922: On January 14, some Monaghan Gaelic footballers were arrested in County Tyrone on their way to Derry to play in the Ulster championship; the group included an IRA commander from the Fifth Northern Division, and several others, who were planning to rescue three IRA men awaiting execution in Derry for murder. In response, in early February, the IRA kidnapped 42 prominent loyalists in Fermanagh and Tyrone as hostages for the footballers. Soon after, several members of the Ulster Special Constabulary were shot in Southern territory as they traveled from Newtownards to Enniskillen across the undulating border. Premier James Craig wanted to send 5000 men to the south to rescue the hostages. Churchill intervened; by mid-February, Craig had released the footballers, and Collins arranged for some of the hostages to be released, including, it may be expected, the 81-year-old hostage Anketell Moutrey, who sang metrical psalms and “God Save the King” without ceasing (Bardon, History of Ulster, p. 486). http://mason.gmu.edu/~wcarpent/hist635/irish_civ_war_outline.htm

The timeline also has a reference to "Craig-Collins Pacts" from this year. The exact detail of those meetings would be interesting to look at?

jonniebgood1

Behind the scenes there was some brinkmanship by Collins according to this DCU information

The three men due to be hung in Derry – Pat Leonard, Thomas O’Shea and Patrick Johnstone – had their sentences commuted to 15 penal servitude through the intervention of the Lord Lieutenant but this news had come too late to stop the kidnappings. This was the work of the ‘Ulster Council’ set up under chair of Frank Aiken with the sanction of Collins, Mulcahy and O’Duffy. There is a furious unionist reaction to the kidnappings. They complain to London and Churchill complains to Collins who says that he had made every effort to prevent such acts and that he would make every effort to get the kidnapped released. However, according to a memo later written by Ernst Blythe, the plans for the kidnappings had been submitted and approved by O’Duffy, Mulcahy and Collins. http://www.dcu.ie/~foxs/irhist/February%201922%20-%2007-08%20-%20Kidnapping%20of%20Loyalists.htm

jonniebgood1

From the same source is some general information on a meeting between Collins and Craig:

Collins - Craig Meeting in Dublin

Serious differences emerged over settlement of boundary issue with Collins putting forward a series of alternatives based on different ways finding out majorities (i.e. counties, constituencies, county council areas, Poor Law areas, etc.) – all of which would have given large tracts of the Six Counties to the Free State. Afterwards, Craig told reporters that he had British government’s assurances that the Boundary Commission would make only minor changes. However, Collins issued a statement saying that the South would not coerce the northeast but would not allow them to coerce their nationalist minority. Anti-partitionists were in a clear majority in Fermanagh and Tyrone, and large parts of Derry, Down and Armagh. He called for an all-Ireland parliament to draft a constitution for the whole country. This was a coming into the open of the conflicting assurances that Llyod George had (deviously?) given both sides during the Treaty negotiations.

Also, discussed was the situation of the expelled workers. Unemployment situation meant that Craig could not get Catholic workers re-employed in Belfast shipyards. Craig undertook to ensure that expelled workers were engaged in relief work. Collins was also of the impression that political prisoners would be released.

Two related issues: (1)Macardle says that Collins, on his own initiative cancelled the Belfast Boycott which the Dáil had imposed and Curran says that he lifted the boycott on the 24th Jan. It seems, according to Phoenix, both were right. Collins did undertake – on his own initiative – to drop Belfast Boycott at his meeting with Craig in London on 21st January. But he got it formally dropped on the 24th. (2) On the issue of recognising the Northern parliament, Hopkinson says that Collins did not want to recognise Northern Ireland parliament but, as noted above, Macardle suggested that he had implicitly done this by entering into discussions with Craig. http://www.dcu.ie/~foxs/irhist/February%201922%20-%2002%20-%20Collins-Craig%20Dublin.htm

jonniebgood1

The 'northern offensive' was a deliberate attempt by Collins to undermine the northern govenment. It did not work. The government used it as an opportunity to enforce division in NI that was to continue for generations to come.

This offensive was designed to undermine the authority of the newly established Belfast government. In what became known as the Northern Offensive Michael Collins, Liam Lynch and others conspired to undermine the unionist led government through a military and economic war. http://www.donegaldaily.com/2011/03/04/letterkenny-author-makes-history-with-book-on-donegals-part-in-civil-war/

Was the northern offensive a mistake or was it necessary?