Black Buck Raids

alanmcqueen

Just finished this:

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Vulcan-607-Rowland-White/dp/0593053915

Very much a boy's own adventure with all the characters straight out of Victor magazine. That being said, it's a very interesting story. An extremely long range raid with obsolete aircraft essentially which presented a number of technical difficulties which were overcome with re-training, araldite, raiding museums and a fair degree of 'cracking on'.

The book deals primarily with Black Buck One, which really was a close run thing.

Just wondering if anyone else has any views on the validity of these raids?

Or anything on Falklands for that matter;)

OS119

alanmcqueen wrote: »

...Just wondering if anyone else has any views on the validity of these raids?

my own view is that they were, like the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano, one of the 'swingers' of the war - it was a strategic military success (it closed the PS runway to fast jets, reduced its ability to take very heavily loaded transport aircraft, and diverted almost all Argentine fighter interceptors from the theatre of conflict to a place they could harm nobody). it was also a political (in the widest sense) success as well - it was a massive indicator to the Argentine military establishment, as well as to individuals within that establishment, that not only was the political/military calculation that the Junta had made about the UK's willingness and ability to fight for the islands grossly eronious, but that they had, in a objective sense, gone to war with an enemy that could fight in a way they had no effective counter to.

which is catastrophic for morale.

alanmcqueen

I have no doubt that the Argentinians were shook by the raid. Nott's assertion thereafter that raids on the mainland would not be a possibility reduced the draw on Argentinian fighters (maybe not a great idea on his part). The Argentinian failure to prepare PS adequately for its use as an airfield - and its defence - was its greatest error but the Air Force were only consulted about the invasion at a very late stage.

Cmdr Sharkey - Mr Sea Harrier - was not impressed by the the raid - nothing more than an attempt by the RAF to justify its existence, not to mention the RAFs insistence that it could supply air cover where needed led to the decision to scrap the Ark Royal and effect the end of the big carriers for the RN. The RN have a good case that they could have done it for less resources utilised.

It was a close run thing and a monumental effort to get one bomber on target. If it had happened a few months later the Vulcans would have been gone leaving the RAF with no options bar the carrier deployed GR.3s.

Personally, though it was a valiant effort, and definitely showed the Argentinians they meant business, given the UK was postured to take on the USSR, it was a surprise that the V force had no refuelling capability, no LGBs - or even iron bombs - and most of all no anti-radiation missile capability (prepared to take on the largest AD network in history?)

OS119

the RN have a very good point with regards to the RAF's campaign against carrier aviation - and indeed any aviation that isn't controlled by them - particularly if it involves non-hotel accommodation and weekends. the incident with the RAF 'moving' Australia 2000 miles west to prove that they could provide land-based air cover over the Indian ocean is well known.

however, the hugely humble Mr Ward completely fails to account for the strategic nature of the raid - the very fact that the RAF put a strategic nuclear strike bomber over PS with 17 tankers (i think, maybe 17 tankings...) in support, on an 8000 mile round trip, is the thing that scared the shit out of the Argentines - having a pair of GR3's do the same actual damage would have had nothing like the psychological effect that getting 'the big stick' out of the cupboard had.

certainly the Vulcan force was on its arse in 1982, it was at the back of the queue for funding, its avionics were trash - however it didn't need AAR because its mission profile was well within the capabilities of its unrefuelled range, and its ECM, while primitive, was believed to be effective (ish) against the soviet systems it was designed to face. the issue with ARM's, and indeed a stand off weapon is entirely correct, though its quite possible that the RAF considered the Vulcan to be so inapproprite for the low-level penetration role that it would never actually be used, and therefore not worth spending money on.

Stovepipe

What took the Vulcans and others off the low-level role was the continuous stress on airframes. The Vulcan happened to endure the longest because it happened to be toughest. The Victor and Valiant began to crack at an alarming rate when they tried low-level with them and it wasn't economic to keep repairing them. Even the brick ****house Buccaneer began to show cracks from constant low-level flying at high speed.
Black Buck was a triumph of improvisation (raiding museums for spares, pulling old boys out of retirement o remind people how old avionics were set up and so on), as was the entire Task Force. It showed how the British, so long used to keeping old **** going, put it into practise successfully.
For a laugh, find and read about the AAC and Navy Wasp/Scout ops.

regards
Stovepipe

cyrusdvirus

OS119 has it bang on with the psychological affect that this had on the Argentinian forces.


You know the Carrier Battle Group is approaching, and you are gearing up for that.... next thing a strategic Bomber goes and cuts the airfield in half.

You know it can't have come from the CBG, all you know is that someone reached out from very far indeed and slapped you around the back of the head. That was BOUND to have an affect.

Add into that the Conqueror sinking the Belgrano and disappearing without so much as a by your leave......

Manic Moran

Cmdr Sharkey - Mr Sea Harrier - was not impressed by the the raid - nothing more than an attempt by the RAF to justify its existence, not to mention the RAFs insistence that it could supply air cover where needed led to the decision to scrap the Ark Royal and effect the end of the big carriers for the RN. The RN have a good case that they could have done it for less resources utilised.

Cdr Sharkey seems an opinionated type, though, I am inclined to take some of his assessments with a little bit of salt.

You also have the slight issue of the fact that Vulcans were able to drop bombs on Stanley without too much difficulty, whereas the same day a Harrier was hit by ground fire attacking the same target, and one lost three days later I believe also over Stanley. Stanley was the most heavily defended part of the island, if there was any target where it would have made sense to use the great capabilities of Vulcan, that would be it.

Besides, what sort of stupidity is it not to use a resource you have in a war? How does it help the war effort by not sending Vulcans down to bomb Argentina? Other than Sharkey's prestige, what was the damage done to the British objective by bringing an extra bombload or two along or knocking out one or two of the anti-aircraft guns which were hitting his aircraft?

NTM

alanmcqueen

Yes, Cmdr Sharkey is a one man RN band. I think he should have concentrated more on the lack of RN AEW and exocet defence. If the Mirages could have carried more fuel or operated from PS his precious Sea Harriers would have found life more 'interesting'.

Knowing your enemy could drop c.10tons of bombs on you must have effected Argentinian morale on the islands, particularly as it appeared to be so easy and without cost to the RAF - so it was worth the effort.

I know the remaining raids had varying success but the initial impact - pardon the pun - of the first raid was the most important.

Big bombers are a big loss; can see why the US hang onto theirs.