What decided the battle of Kursk?

jonniebgood1

What was the most decisive deciding factor in the battle of Kursk.

It is obviously not just one factor but there seems to be several contributors that led to the Red army success. Such as the command structure of the Germans led to directly to Hitler at that stage, good intelligence of the German plans allowed the Russians time to prepare for Citadel, Strength of Russian forces at this time, new tactic of more defensive rather than blitzkreig type warfare, etc. It was the largest tank battle ever so what opinions are there on what won the battle?

Stovepipe

On the Russian side, defence in depth, such as minefields covered by anti-tank guns and machine-guns; better co-ordination and use of artillery, especially massed artillery to break up tank attacks; camouflage (German panzer commanders reported that the enemy anti-tank guns were usually invisible until they fired first) and an overall much higher standard of training, entrenchment, fire planning, supply, replacement of casualties and so on. The Germans expended huge amounts of time and effort to breach the minefields, which threw the timetable out the window. Also, the Red Air Force was qualitatively and quantitatively much better and it's newer fighters and fast bombers were as good as German aircraft and provided much greater cover for the ground troops than before.Also, the new German heavy tanks did not match their promised quality

regards
Stovepipe

CerebralCortex

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

What was the most decisive deciding factor in the battle of Kursk.

It is obviously not just one factor but there seems to be several contributors that led to the Red army success. Such as the command structure of the Germans led to directly to Hitler at that stage, good intelligence of the German plans allowed the Russians time to prepare for Citadel, Strength of Russian forces at this time, new tactic of more defensive rather than blitzkreig type warfare, etc. It was the largest tank battle ever so what opinions are there on what won the battle?

That's it right there.

Ping Chow Chi

good intelligence and actually trusting that intelligence would be my best guess

Tony EH

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

What was the most decisive deciding factor in the battle of Kursk.

It is obviously not just one factor but there seems to be several contributors that led to the Red army success. Such as the command structure of the Germans led to directly to Hitler at that stage, good intelligence of the German plans allowed the Russians time to prepare for Citadel, Strength of Russian forces at this time, new tactic of more defensive rather than blitzkreig type warfare, etc. It was the largest tank battle ever so what opinions are there on what won the battle?

Very simply, The Russians had forewaning and prepared a sterling defence. It really is that simple. It was the depth of the defensive lines that forced the Germans to run out of steam.

TerrorFirmer

The Russians knew, through intelligence, where the strike would occur. Which led them, unsurprisingly, to develop a 'defense in depth'.

Such defense, again unsurprisingly, led to a battle in which it was an absolute miracle, and a testament to the fierce nature of the German units involved, that the Wehrmacht manged to threaten the Russian line seriously.

In fact, the Wehrmacht almost broke through this intensely prepared line, despite intelligence guided methods as of its defense.

It pitted 800,000 soldiers of the Wehrmacht against significantly more of their SU counterparts - perhaps 130,000,000, at least. The fact that the Germans took as much ground/made the advancements they did against defenders advantageous fire is nothing short of a miracle given their numbers.

That they almost pierced the defenses at Prokhorovka despite a massive numerical disadvantage, is a testament.

Kursk was the turning point. Those that said Stalingrad are wrong.

Stovepipe

One account (possibly by Otto Carius, I don't remember) told of how when the Tigers struck the minefields and were stopped with broken tracks and shattered wheels, the timetable became a lost cause as it took too long to either retrieve or repair the tanks as the minefields were continuously swept with machine gun and/or antitank fire. Sometimes, the heavy tanks such as the Tiger and Elefant managed to force a passage thru a minefield but the antitank defence nailed the lighter tanks, such as the Mark IVs and Panthers. Also, the loss rate from breakdowns of the new tanks was such that the recovery forces were overstretched and many tanks were abandoned. The volume of fire from the Soviet artillery was also commented upon, as some sources said that it was to a much higher intensity and accuracy than before.
regards
Stovepipe

Tony EH

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

...Kursk was the turning point. Those that said Stalingrad are wrong.

Stalingrad isn't necessarily "wrong" as such, because there are three major "turning points" in the ETO during WWII, although I dislike that term as it suggests that Germany may have stood a chance at actually winning the war.

1. Moscow. Marked the end of Barbarossa and showed the Germans and the world that the war in the East was going to be a long haul and that Russia was not the rotten edifice that Hitler thought it was. It gave the Western allies years of breathing space and even panicked Hitler into his reckless declaration of war on the US, in the hopes that Japan would join his crusade against Bolshevism.

2. Stalingrad. After a remarkable Summer campaign that again shocked the world, the disastrous culmination of Stalingrad was both a huge blow and a much needed boost to the allies. Again, though, the Germans had over-extended themselves in an attempt to knock out the Red Army, just as they had done in 1941. They completely underestimated Soviet strength in men and material. In other ways though, Stalingrad could have been worse. If the 6th Army had not held out as long as it did and tied up the entire Soviet Don Front, it could have led to the immediate loss of the armies in the Caucasus and possibly the Crimea too. The fact that they held out allowed the Germans to consolidate their positions somewhat and avoid a truly devastating rout and the complete loss of the Southern Front. As it stood, Manstein was able to halt the Russians at Kharkov, but it could have been much worse. After Stalingrad, however, many Germans knew that the game was up. But, if enough bloody noses could be delivered to the Russians, the possibility of a stalemate was on the cards.

3. Kursk. The last throw of the dice in Russia. With the war in the East effectively lost, Kursk represents an attempt by the Germans to stage a crushing defeat on Soviet arms and thus stabilise the front and bring the Germans into a position of strategic power and possibly open a way to negotiation, or at least a cessation of battle. Kursk represents a turning point in the fact that after that battle, the Germans would never again be able to stage such a large offensive, whereas the Russians could...and did.

Fred Cohen

Tony EH wrote: »

Stalingrad isn't necessarily "wrong" as such, because there are three major "turning points" in the ETO during WWII, although I dislike that term as it suggests that Germany may have stood a chance at actually winning the war.

1. Moscow. Marked the end of Barbarossa and showed the Germans and the world that the war in the East was going to be a long haul and that Russia was not the rotten edifice that Hitler thought it was. It gave the Western allies years of breathing space and even panicked Hitler into his reckless declaration of war on the US, in the hopes that Japan would join his crusade against Bolshevism.

2. Stalingrad. After a remarkable Summer campaign that again shocked the world, the disastrous culmination of Stalingrad was both a huge blow and a much needed boost to the allies. Again, though, the Germans had over-extended themselves in an attempt to knock out the Red Army, just as they had done in 1941. They completely underestimated Soviet strength in men and material. In other ways though, Stalingrad could have been worse. If the 6th Army had not held out as long as it did and tied up the entire Soviet Don Front, it could have led to the immediate loss of the armies in the Caucasus and possibly the Crimea too. The fact that they held out allowed the Germans to consolidate their positions somewhat and avoid a truly devastating rout and the complete loss of the Southern Front. As it stood, Manstein was able to halt the Russians at Kharkov, but it could have been much worse. After Stalingrad, however, many Germans knew that the game was up. But, if enough bloody noses could be delivered to the Russians, the possibility of a stalemate was on the cards.

3. Kursk. The last throw of the dice in Russia. With the war in the East effectively lost, Kursk represents an attempt by the Germans to stage a crushing defeat on Soviet arms and thus stabilise the front and bring the Germans into a position of strategic power and possibly open a way to negotiation, or at least a cessation of battle. Kursk represents a turning point in the fact that after that battle, the Germans would never again be able to stage such a large offensive, whereas the Russians could...and did.

I'd add two more in there, admittedly not turning points but instrumental in the German defeat.

4. Leningrad. Demonstrating the will of the Russian people injure all the hardships inflicted upon them and still defend the Motherland.

5. The Partisans. Inflicted enormous damage on the rollerbann, tied down a large amount of troops, sapped German moral, fought like tigers, never gave up and were treated like traitors after the war.

Jim S

The depth of preparation, the salient was one enormous tank trap, minefield and killing zone, the defenders out numbering the attackers.
The German attack was known well in advance and the format of the attack lacked any sense of surprise.
The Russians had the reserves which allowed them to go over on the attack ( around Orel) as soon as the Germans ran out of steam , a German victory at Kursk would have been pyrrhic at best they would not have had anything left to exploit it with.
The Russians beat the Germans at their own game.

TerrorFirmer

Jim S wrote: »

The depth of preparation, the salient was one enormous tank trap, minefield and killing zone, the defenders out numbering the attackers.
The German attack was known well in advance and the format of the attack lacked any sense of surprise.
The Russians had the reserves which allowed them to go over on the attack ( around Orel) as soon as the Germans ran out of steam , a German victory at Kursk would have been pyrrhic at best they would not have had anything left to exploit it with.
The Russians beat the Germans at their own game.

Exactly. The Germans used their entire strategic reserve in attacking the salient. It was defended, not only in depth, but in depth with precise expectations of the incoming assault. That the Germans managed to penetrate as far as they did, threaten so much, is a testament to their ferocious ability. But it was always going to be one sided.

They would have fared far better in sticking to Manstein's Sea of Azov plan.

CerebralCortex

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

Exactly. The Germans used their entire strategic reserve in attacking the salient. It was defended, not only in depth, but in depth with precise expectations of the incoming assault. That the Germans managed to penetrate as far as they did, threaten so much, is a testament to their ferocious ability. But it was always going to be one sided.

They would have fared far better in sticking to Manstein's Sea of Azov plan.

Any reading material on that plan. It sounds interesting.

Jim S

Citadel ended in the worst possible was for the Germans , having committed themselves beyond the point of no return they pulled the plug when the Allies landed in Sicily.
Manstein wanted to continue as it would damage the Russian ability to attack to what extent this might have had a beneficial out come to the Germans is perhaps doubtful.
With North Africa falling in May , the highly doubtful Italian confidence in staying in the Axis, the political will to invade Italy - "Citadel" should have been viewed as even more high risk undertaking.
Typically Hitler's judgement was to place all on the turn of one card, victory at Kursk would ultimately have been wasted as they had neither the resources or logistics which would allow them to exploit any victory.
( Manstein saw this as one of Hitler's major failings , he saw only the victory on the battlefield and not what had to follow it.)

jonniebgood1

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

The Russians knew, through intelligence, where the strike would occur. Which led them, unsurprisingly, to develop a 'defense in depth'.

Such defense, again unsurprisingly, led to a battle in which it was an absolute miracle, and a testament to the fierce nature of the German units involved, that the Wehrmacht manged to threaten the Russian line seriously.

In fact, the Wehrmacht almost broke through this intensely prepared line, despite intelligence guided methods as of its defense.

The Lorenz on-line teleprinter cipher codes were at this stage broken by the British at Bletchley park. I saw a program recently on BBC that credited the staff at Bletchley park with having a great impact on the Kursk battle due to the intelligence they could provide using their 'collosus' code breaking computer. A thread to look at Tommy Flowers who built it may be an interesting topic as information about the codebreakers is still being declassified. Until his later years he received no credit for this.

Jim S

The Russians have denied that Ultra information passed on them was of value, and that their spies provided them with what they needed to know , perhaps typicality of the Russians ( Cold War, etc) to deny any outside assistance).
The Russians were well aware of the German build up, it would have been impossible to miss and the airwaves must have delivered a mass of intelligence on the attack.
From the outset the Russians had determined not only to halt the Germans but to counter attack them, going so far as to build a transport infrastructure which would support their operations.
Even though the Germans felt they held the initiative ( in making the attack) this was really not the case the Russians probably played their first card by allowing the Germans to think they had a serious chance of success and skilfully pulling the mat from under their feet.

http://www.rzm.com/books/rzm/rzmbk013.cfm

http://www.amazon.com/DEMOLISHING-MYTH-Prokhorovka-Operational-Narrative/dp/1906033897

Don't have any of these but they represent some fresh looks at the Kursk salient.

BlaasForRafa

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

The Lorenz on-line teleprinter cipher codes were at this stage broken by the British at Bletchley park. I saw a program recently on BBC that credited the staff at Bletchley park with having a great impact on the Kursk battle due to the intelligence they could provide using their 'collosus' code breaking computer. A thread to look at Tommy Flowers who built it may be an interesting topic as information about the codebreakers is still being declassified. Until his later years he received no credit for this.

I think the British vastly overrate the value of what they did at Bletchly park, possibly because they couldn't beat the germans in any battle that was remotely evenly matched so they need to big up their self-esteem in some way.

It was incredibly obvious as to where the blow at Kursk would be made, the germans stripped the rest of the front of 80% of their fighters and almost all their ground attack aircraft and stripped the rest of the front of the vast majority of Panzer and motorized divisions, the russians would have to be stupid (like Stalin in 1941) to not know about the german preperations.

ejmaztec

Jim S wrote: »

The Russians have denied that Ultra information passed on them was of value, and that their spies provided them with what they needed to know , perhaps typicality of the Russians ( Cold War, etc) to deny any outside assistance).
The Russians were well aware of the German build up, it would have been impossible to miss and the airwaves must have delivered a mass of intelligence on the attack.
From the outset the Russians had determined not only to halt the Germans but to counter attack them, going so far as to build a transport infrastructure which would support their operations.
Even though the Germans felt they held the initiative ( in making the attack) this was really not the case the Russians probably played their first card by allowing the Germans to think they had a serious chance of success and skilfully pulling the mat from under their feet.

http://www.rzm.com/books/rzm/rzmbk013.cfm

http://www.amazon.com/DEMOLISHING-MYTH-Prokhorovka-Operational-Narrative/dp/1906033897

Don't have any of these but they represent some fresh looks at the Kursk salient.

With the likes of Kim Philby (and his other ex-Cambridge chums) working for them inside British Intelligence, they probably got information before the British "officially" gave it them.

Jim S

BlaasForRafa

I think the British vastly overrate the value of what they did at Bletchly park, possibly because they couldn't beat the germans in any battle that was remotely evenly matched so they need to big up their self-esteem in some way.

The Battle of the Atlantic, Battle of Britain, Battle for Malta / The Med. in general.( eg 1st battle of El Alamein).
To say that Ultra was boosted to compensate for a second best war record is I think unfair.
Coastal Command devastated the Uboat arm in its transit to and from the Biscay ports, Coastal Forces and Strike Command paralysed German traffic off Europe's coastline., the Royal navy destroyed the Kriegsmarine in Norway leaving it unable to support any potential invasion of GB, Bomber Command overcame German home defences, these spring to mind.
Could the British have beaten the Germans in an evenly matched battle the only place they really met outside France was in North Africa and it was a neck and neck event until after 1st El Alamein.
The British were always playing catch up in terms of some equipment and vehicles, in terms of the soldier as an individual they were quite evenly matched.

jonniebgood1

BlaasForRafa wrote: »

I think the British vastly overrate the value of what they did at Bletchly park, possibly because they couldn't beat the germans in any battle that was remotely evenly matched so they need to big up their self-esteem in some way.

It was incredibly obvious as to where the blow at Kursk would be made, the germans stripped the rest of the front of 80% of their fighters and almost all their ground attack aircraft and stripped the rest of the front of the vast majority of Panzer and motorized divisions, the russians would have to be stupid (like Stalin in 1941) to not know about the german preperations.

Parts of the history of Bletchley are still classified but the information in this link seems to support the opinion that Bletchley was not that relevant to Kursk. In the overall picture its importance was greater when Britain was struggling in the war. An argument can be put (and often is) that Bletchley shortened the war.

Q. The was a programme recently on Kursk - one might say that a Russian counter-factual historian would say that if we didn't have the Ultra which we got in various ways, then we wouldn't have been able to win the battle of Kursk and Hitler would have been able to carve up Russia. This is perhaps another case . . .

Another case. Stalingrad of course is another one. Those two battles were crucial, especially Stalingrad. Again it wasn't only through us they were getting . . . we did give them the central facts in advance of Kursk. But as we now know, we didn't know at the time, the one single Russian agent in Bletchley was at that time (just that short period of time before and after Kursk in '43) actually giving them decrypts through the Russian Embassy in London. So all sorts of complications about the story. He didn't know that they were getting the supply from London officially, and we didn't know that he was sending the decrypts unofficially. Quite a complex problem! http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/Historical/hinsley.html

jonniebgood1

Jim S wrote: »

Could the British have beaten the Germans in an evenly matched battle the only place they really met outside France was in North Africa and it was a neck and neck event until after 1st El Alamein.
The British were always playing catch up in terms of some equipment and vehicles, in terms of the soldier as an individual they were quite evenly matched.

Equipment quality and numbers were always decisive. When the British eventually gained major advantages in North Africa it was due to the larger numbers of equipment available to Montgomery. At Kursk the Russians had greater resources even though the quality of their equipment may not have been of the same standard of the Germans. On an individual soldier basis the Red army soldiers though had more appropriate gear for the colder seasons which was a massive advantage in stalemates like Stalingrad.

Jim S

jonniebgood1

When the British eventually gained major advantages in North Africa it was due to the larger numbers of equipment available to Montgomery. At Kursk the Russians had greater resources even though the quality of their equipment may not have been of the same standard of the Germans. On an individual soldier basis the Red army soldiers though had more appropriate gear for the colder seasons which was a massive advantage in stalemates like Stalingrad.

True the "Tiger" convoy brought almost every major advantage to the 8th Armycould have wished for whilst the DAK supply line and loss of control of the air and sea left them at a distinct disadvantage.
In terms of quality of equipment the Russians probably had an edge on the Germans at Kursk , the Panther being totally unready for combat, their extensive preparations and numbers titling the balance in their favour.
The Red Army soldier was a tough individual as was his opposite number.

ezjmatec

With the likes of Kim Philby (and his other ex-Cambridge chums) working for them inside British Intelligence, they probably got information before the British "officially" gave it them.

More than likely true.