Wehrmacht and SS-Einsatzgruppen tensions

jonniebgood1

How were relations between the ordinary German soldiers and the ordinary members of the einsatzgruppen. I have read recently that the wehrmacht soldiers in some cases resented the relative comfort that the SS-Einsatzgruppen soldier had. This was specifically in relation to the kovno area in Lithuania. The einsatzgruppen did not have to endure the conditions on the front line and were usually posted well behind the front. A similar situation is referenced here in a book summary

There was tension between the German army and the SS-Einsatzgruppen, at high levels and lower levels, especially early on. At high levels, the leaders of the Wehrmacht believed that the strategy of mass-murdering Jews in their towns and cities was ill-advised, especially in terms of world public opinion. At lower levels, the German soldiers of the Wehrmacht, who were of course risking their lives to serve their country, were resentful of the SS-Einsatzgruppen members who fancied themselves soldiers but spent their days risklessly murdering unarmed, defenseless civilians. http://open.salon.com/blog/ranjit_souri/2010/04/12/post_not_ready_still_working_on_photos

Was this common? I thought they worked in unison so how widespread was this tye of feeling and did any hostilities arise from it? Does'nt seem to be much info on this.
Does anyone have any further information or sources on this?

Morlar

Kind of reads like an excuse for an Einsatsgruppen thread. Based on a comment in a website review of a book ?

berettaman

You should read Rupert Butlers book the black angels-the story of the waffen SS. It speaks of tensions between the wehrmacht and the SS at practically all levels above NCO. There were various gripes about pensions and conditions..I.E theregular army were being paid more! It also seeks to distinguish between the scumbags that over saw the death camps and the guys in the panzer divisions that were in the teeth of the fighting. A good read although it doesn't cover the concentration camps in detail (done elswhere anyway) but focuses on their actual combat record and the interaction of Himmler with the Wehrmacht..The Erickson guy that did the road to stalingrad is supposed to be doing a book on exactly how much the Higher Wehrmacht knew about what the Einsatzgruppen were up to. Should be good. Hard to accept that top Generals were too busy fighting Russians (and each other in terms of rivalry)not to know what was going on..

jonniebgood1

Morlar wrote: »

Kind of reads like an excuse for an Einsatsgruppen thread. Based on a comment in a website review of a book ?

Why would an excuse be needed for discussing einsatzgruppen in a WWII forum? It is based on a passage in 'forged in fury' by Michael Elkins by the way, the review quoted was supplementary. You should engage positively in the conversation, it could be an interesting subject.

berettaman wrote: »

You should read Rupert Butlers book the black angels-the story of the waffen SS. It speaks of tensions between the wehrmacht and the SS at practically all levels above NCO. There were various gripes about pensions and conditions..I.E theregular army were being paid more! It also seeks to distinguish between the scumbags that over saw the death camps and the guys in the panzer divisions that were in the teeth of the fighting. A good read although it doesn't cover the concentration camps in detail (done elswhere anyway) but focuses on their actual combat record and the interaction of Himmler with the Wehrmacht..The Erickson guy that did the road to stalingrad is supposed to be doing a book on exactly how much the Higher Wehrmacht knew about what the Einsatzgruppen were up to. Should be good. Hard to accept that top Generals were too busy fighting Russians (and each other in terms of rivalry)not to know what was going on..

Thanks for the book link, I would have presumed that the SS were paid more as an 'elite' force so find that surprising. Looking into Himmlers relationship with the Wehrmacht will be a good starting point, what did they think of him I wonder.
How did the ordinary soldiers relationship develop with their SS counterparts as the war situation worsened in the east? As part of the eastern warfare information is more difficult to find on this.

marcsignal

The resentment went both ways.

Initially the Wehrmacht looked down on the SS as 'Asphalt Soldiers' (only impressive on the parade ground).
The SS were also issued with out dated weapons at the beginning, and expected to do the same job.

Waffen SS soldier armed with an out dated Erma MP 28E


Erma MP 28E

chicken and egg situation imo.

Morlar

marcsignal wrote: »

The resentment went both ways.

Initially the Wehrmacht looked down on the SS as 'Asphalt Soldiers' (only impressive on the parade ground).
The SS were also issued with out dated weapons at the beginning, and expected to do the same job.

chicken and egg situation imo.

I think there is an important distinction to be made between

a)
the multiple front line combat SS divisions
&
b)
the tiny percentile of SS who were in einsatzgruppen, rearguard anti-partisan & civilian 'resettlement' units.

Resentment did exsist, however the frontline SS combat divisions saved the wehrmacht on so many occassions in time the 'resentment' faded away and basically amounted to nothing.

There was also resentment between Wehrmacht and Feldgendarmerie, (leading to formation of Jager Feldgendarmerie units), also Postal units, supply and so on. In fact artillery units within wehrmacht were also the source of friction, however they also saved the infantry on so many occassions it was really a non factor. I think the phrase eventually was 'infantry's best friend'.

I have also read in unit histories of 'resentments'/Friction between different regiments of the same combat division, different divisions within the same kampfgruppe/sector and so on. It is to be expected and in reality is of not much consequence to the scheme of things. As I said, the whole thing reads like an excuse for starting an einstazgruppen thread imo.

Stovepipe

the soldier in the picture is not armed with a German weapon, rather a PPD-41, which was the forerunner to the famous PPsh-41.
regards
Stovepipe

jonniebgood1

The period relating to Kovno was the beginning of Barbarossa. The advance of the front was rapid. The Osprey publishing warrior set 'German infantryman (2) Eastern front (1941-43) suggests that most of the infantry troops complained bitterly about the amount of marching they had to do at this time. Would the einsatzgruppen have been a mechanised division? If the marching was as torcherous as described it would make it easy to resent a section of men who did not have to march. From this set a soldier is credited with this description

Nobody can convince me that any non-infantryman can imagine what is taking place here. Think of the most brutal exhaustion you have ever experienced, direct burning sunlight, weeping sores on your feet - and you have my condition not at the end but at the beginning of a 45km march. It takes hours before your feet become insensitive to the painful wounds at each step on these roads which are either gravel or sand at the edges. (pg13)

marcsignal

Stovepipe wrote: »

the soldier in the picture is not armed with a German weapon, rather a PPD-41, which was the forerunner to the famous PPsh-41.
regards
Stovepipe

You're right! Well spotted Stovepipe
I'd just googled the Erma, and that pic was there. I didn't notice myself.

Reekwind

From what I've read the distinctions between the Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppen can be greatly exaggerated. There may have been some operational tensions, of the sort that you get between any organisations, but both were actively involved in various atrocities and extermination campaigns. For example, even if "the leaders of the Wehrmacht believed that the strategy of mass-murdering Jews in their towns and cities was ill-advised", that didn't stop them from swinging behind genocidal measures like the Hunger Plan or the deliberate starvation of Soviet POWs

I don't have it on hand but Mark Mazower's Hitler's Empire does go some way towards exploding the myth of the 'fighting Wehrmacht' and the 'genocidal SS/Einsatzgruppen'. I'm trying to remember what other works have dealt this, Tooze's Wages of Destruction, perhaps?

jonniebgood1

marcsignal wrote: »

The resentment went both ways.

Initially the Wehrmacht looked down on the SS as 'Asphalt Soldiers' (only impressive on the parade ground).
The SS were also issued with out dated weapons at the beginning, and expected to do the same job.

Were all SS known as 'Ashphalt men or just a certain group of them?

After 1929 the SS began to expand rapidly, and standards in personnel unsurprisingly began to lower. This slide was arrested early in in 1933 after Hitler had been elected Chancellor of Germany, when a review was carried out on all existing members. The political changes also led Hitler to call for the creation of a dedicated guard formation from the ranks of the SS, and instructed one of his oldest colleagues, First World War veteran Josef "Sepp" Dietrich, to set the wheels in motion. Dietrich quickly set about selecting a group of men applying rigorous standards, and by the spring of 1933 had established the SS-Stabswache Berlin, consisting of 117 men. The primary role of this new Stabswache was the guarding of the Reich Chancellery, and as a result they were quickly given the nickname "asphalt soldiers". Of course, none of the unit's detractors would have known that of these initial 117 men, over sixty were to become company commanders or above, with three becoming divisional commanders. http://en.specwar.info/special_forces/Waffen-SS/history.php

I have read elsewhere that the SS were known as Asphalt men due to their uniforms colour and training.

citizen_p

The waffen ss didn't perform well in the Invasion of Poland (this was the SS-VT technically, precursor to the Waffen SS), well not as well as their wehrmacht counterparts and were seen as somwhat reckless, this soon changed with the invasion of france and future campaigns after they were reorganized...

jonniebgood1

I've come across an early example from 'Hitler's death squads: the logic of mass murder' by Helmut Langerbein (pg26)



This is an incident that was earlier in the war than refered in OP. For clarity the initial query is in relation particularly to the einsatzgruppen/ wehrmacht relationship, of course this may include SS leaders and SS in general as the relationship was complex and changing from the early 1930's till the end of the war.

marcsignal

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

Were all SS known as 'Ashphalt men or just a certain group of them? I have read elsewhere that the SS were known as Asphalt men due to their uniforms colour and training.

I understand it was initially a 'marketing term' if you want to call it that, to promote the Leibstandarte SS, but from what I learned, Wehrmacht soldiers used it as a lightly scarstic term, for men they didn't consider regular soldiers, but rather political ones.

Mouseys point about their wrecklessness in Poland was also a part of this. The Wehrmacht considered the SS casualties, were down to lack of professionalism. The idea/cult of the suicidal SS warrior was a new concept, and not fully comprehended by regular troops.

Stovepipe

Hi there
I have read accounts where the SS, such as Totenkopf, while praised by the Wehrmacht for their dogged bravery, were reckless and wasteful of their own mens' lives in action in Poland and France.
I can't remember the name of a recent book about the Wehrmacht in Poland but Leni Reifenstal is pictured in it, crying at the sight of civilians being shot by Wehrmacht within hours of the first assault. She had been tasked with filming the attack and stopped when she saw the killing of civilians.
regards
Stovepipe

berettaman

Great thread. Some many interesting tangents. Where do I start? Himmler was a supposed to be a complete crank herbalist. SS recruits led a very spartan existence, breakfast (was porridge and mineral water, himmlers idea) lots of drill, weapons/tactics training and docterine.In the early days they had to be at least 1.7 metres tall and have no fillings in their teeth! Recruits were urged by Himmler to revel in their godlessness as to believe in the bible was deemed "too Jewish"?!. As the war went on it was all about resouces and each arm of the german military were fighting for men and materiel. Interestingly the SS formed the viking division from scandanavian recruits and it had a muslim division in the balkans. go figure
The liebstandarte, germania and gross deutschland divisions did the bulk of the fighting and won the respect of the wehrmmacht as the war wore on for their tenacity and bravery. Interesting Rupert Butlers book sites many SS verterans expressing admiration for the ANZAC trpoops it encountered during the war on the Greece penninsula(I think). They felt they matched them for physical fitness/bravery and unwillingness to take a backward step. B

BlaasForRafa

berettaman wrote: »

The liebstandarte, germania and gross deutschland divisions did the bulk of the fighting and won the respect of the wehrmmacht as the war wore on for their tenacity and bravery. Interesting Rupert Butlers book sites many SS verterans expressing admiration for the ANZAC trpoops it encountered during the war on the Greece penninsula(I think). They felt they matched them for physical fitness/bravery and unwillingness to take a backward step. B

Grossdeutschland was a Heer division. It often gets lumped in with the Waffen SS as it fought with the Liebstandarte, Das Reich and Totenkopf at the 3rd battle of Kharkov and on the same front of the battle of kursk.

Reekwind

Got hold of Mazower's work. Quoting him:

"Neither soldiers nor SS men had waited for [draconian] orders and from 2 September onwards, Polish citizens of all ages fell victim to frontline troops, at times carrying out reprisals for 'partisan' attacks, at others merely murdering at random"

So from the very beginning of the occupation of Poland the Wehrmact was involved in war crimes. It took a brief while for some officers to adjust to this reality but those arrested for such crimes - military or SS - were either released or given lenient sentences. The Wehrmacht would continue to carry out vicious anti-partisan campaigns, relying heavily on collective punishment, and two years later OKW had come so far as to declare that "the struggle against Bolshevism requires a ruthless and energetic assault above all against the Jews, the main carriers of Bolshevism" (September 1941, Mazower)

So any friction between the Wehrmacht and SS was more a matter of politicking than any real moral differences. Both were, institutionally at least, fully signed up to a vicious war of annihilation in the East

Morlar

Reekwind wrote: »

Got hold of Mazower's work. Quoting him:

"Neither soldiers nor SS men had waited for [draconian] orders and from 2 September onwards, Polish citizens of all ages fell victim to frontline troops, at times carrying out reprisals for 'partisan' attacks, at others merely murdering at random"

Firstly, SS men were soldiers.

If he is distinguishing between Wehrmacht and Waffen SS frontline combat troops he is using either loaded or incorrect terminology.

Also, could he be less specific ?

Who exactly did the wehrmacht kill from sept 2 1939 'onwards' ?

What were the circumstances ? Are you taking isolated examples to condemn an entire army of conscripted landser ? Is this how we should also treat the British or American armies ?

You are aware that the invading German army came across multiple instances of mass murder of defenceless ethhic Germans ?

Do you mean killings in retaliation or in cold blood ?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloody_Sunday_%281939%29

The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau investigation in 1939–1940 concluded that the events were a result of panic and confusion among the Polish troops.[14] The Wehrmacht investigation included the interrogation of captive Polish soldiers, ethnic Germans from Bydgoszcz and surrounding villages, and Polish civilians. The bodies of the victims were exhumed and the cause of death and the possible involvement of military rifles was assessed.[15] According to this investigation, a squad of Polish soldiers was sent in to clarify the situation after hearing shots being fired within the city.[citation needed] Uniformed Polish soldiers, assisted by the local Polish population, were led to houses from which shots were allegedly heard.[citation needed] In households where weapons were found, people were subject to summary executions and other atrocities.[citation needed] To a significant extent, those conclusions are repeated in post-war German historiography.[citation needed]
[edit] German reprisals and further atrocities
Polish hostages including a priest awaiting execution in Bydgoszcz. September 1939

The killings were followed by German reprisals and oppression, including a "de-Polonisation" campaign.[4][11] In an act of retaliation for the killings on Bloody Sunday, a number of Polish civilians were executed by German military units of the Einsatzgruppen, Waffen SS, and Wehrmacht.[16] According to German historian Christian Raitz von Frentz, 876 Poles were tried by German tribunal for involvement in the events of Bloody Sunday before the end of 1939. 87 men and 13 women were sentenced without the right to appeal.[4] Polish historian Czesław Madajczyk notes 120 executions in relation to Bloody Sunday, and the execution of 20 hostages after a German soldier was allegedly attacked by a Polish sniper.[4][17]

I think with sweeping statements like that detail and context can be everything.

I would also point out that from immediately after D-day American troops raped approx 3,500 women. Could the equivalent sweeping statement be just as easily made that 'the US army were complicit in massive warcrimes against the civilian population from d-day +1'.

Whatever standard you are applying to condemn the Wehrmacht should apply elsewhere too, or not at all.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8084210.stm

In his book, Mr Hitchcock raises another issue that rarely features in euphoric folk-memories of liberation: Allied looting, and worse.

"The theft and looting of Normandy households and farmsteads by liberating soldiers began on June 6 and never stopped during the entire summer," he writes.

One woman - from the town of Colombieres - is quoted as saying that "the enthusiasm for the liberators is diminishing. They are looting... everything, and going into houses everywhere on the pretext of looking for Germans."

Even more feared, of course, was the crime of rape - and here too the true picture has arguably been expunged from popular memory.

According to American historian J Robert Lilly, there were around 3,500 rapes by American servicemen in France between June 1944 and the end of the war.

"The evidence shows that sexual violence against women in liberated France was common," writes Mr Hitchcock.

"It also shows that black soldiers convicted of such awful acts received very severe punishments, while white soldiers received lighter sentences."

Of 29 soldiers executed for rape by the US military authorities, 25 were black - though African-Americans did not represent nearly so high a proportion of convictions.

Reekwind

jonniebgood1 wrote:

I've come across an early example from 'Hitler's death squads: the logic of mass murder' by Helmut Langerbein

From The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality:

"[Blaskowitz's] objections, however, seem to have been based not so much on fundamental moral concerns as on pragmatic and tactical considerations. Blaskowitz thought that 'slaughtering' ten thousand Jews and Poles in mass shootings was inefficient and would also have an adverse effect on discipline among his troops"

Morlar wrote: »

Firstly, SS men were soldiers

Arguably they should be categorised as 'paramilitaries' but frankly I'm not interested in splitting hairs. The distinction is both obvious and, given the shared responsibility for the atrocities, fairly irrelevant

Also, could he be less specific ?

Yes. Mazower himself gives Zlocew, the execution of twenty Polish "so-called criminals", the deaths of 50 Jews, the massacres at Bydgoszcz, etc, as examples. Excuse me if I'm not keen enough to type out a few pages of text

Who exactly did the wehrmacht kill from sept 2 1939 'onwards' ?

Are you seriously denying that Wehrmacht personnel were involved in the deaths of numerous Polish civilians throughout the war? That is simplt perverse. Not only did its troops commit war crimes against the civilian population - Polish and Jewish - but they also facilitated those of the SS. It was the army that turned its prisoners over to SS death squads at Bydgoszcz and the army was entirely aware of the systematic system of racial liquidation that the SS units, which were technically under Wehrmacht jurisdiction, was putting into practice.

Are you taking isolated examples to condemn an entire army of conscripted landser ?

Armies are institutions. If the Wehrmacht had taken prompt action to discipline its soldiers and put procedures in place to ensure that there was no repeat of them, well, then that would be different. But it didn't. Despite the protestations of some officers, which were not supported in any real way by their superiors, the Wehrmacht reconciled itself to 'outrages' against civilians and went on to commit atrocity after atrocity later in the war. Which entirely undermines the myth that the Wehrmacht was somehow isolated from or immune to the Nazi state's genocidal campaign of extermination

To quote Westermann (in The Oxford Handbook of Holocaust Studies)

"...Rossino i]Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity[/i outlined the German preparations for a premeditated Volkstumskampf against the Polish people. This ethnic battle involved mass murder by Wehrmacht and SS forces, and their joint enforcement of draconian reprisal policies, the brutal treatment of Polish civilians and the ghettoisation and deportation of Jews. The initiation of severe reprisals against the Polish population by the German army set an ominous precedent and became 'a critical component of the racial-ideological warfare waged by the Third Reich'"

You are aware that the invading German army came across multiple instances of mass murder of defenceless ethhic Germans ?

Yes. I don't see how this excuses the crimes of the Wehrmacht. The Nazis understood this of course, and the murder of 50 Jews in Sept 1939 was largely excused by the courts on the basis that "because of the numerous atrocities committed by the Poles against ethnic Germans, [the perpetrators] were in a state of irritability" (quoted in Mazower). Personally however I don't believe that 'race war' is an adequate excuse for murdering civilians

Do you mean killings in retaliation or in cold blood ?

Nor do I believe that collective punishment against civilian populations is in any way acceptable

I think with sweeping statements like that detail and context can be everything

The detail is that many hundreds, if not thousands, of Polish and Jewish civilians were murdered by Wehrmacht soldiers in the first weeks of the occupation. You can put context to this if you want but it does not excuse it

I would also point out that from immediately after D-day American troops raped approx 3,500 women. Could the equivalent sweeping statement be just as easily made that 'the US army were complicit in massive warcrimes against the civilian population from d-day +1'.

You could say that, if you wanted to entirely ignore the "detail and context". Anyone who seriously compares the Nazi occupation of Poland to the Liberation, or contends that the crimes of the Wehrmacht are somehow acceptable, is either ignorant or a Nazi apologist

But perhaps you have an example of US or British soldiers murdering hundreds of POWs?

Morlar

Reekwind wrote: »

From The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality:

"[Blaskowitz's] objections, however, seem to have been based not so much on fundamental moral concerns as on pragmatic and tactical considerations. Blaskowitz thought that 'slaughtering'

ten thousand Jews and Poles in mass shootings was inefficient and would also have an adverse effect on discipline among his troops"

You are quoting from an utterly flawed book that has not surprisingly come up before :

http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/showpost.php?p=59184294&postcount=83

Morlar wrote: »

As an aside I am in the middle of reading a really really shoddy book

http://www.amazon.com/Wehrmacht-History-Myth-Reality/dp/0674025776/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1235583775&sr=8-1

To give you an idea of how terrible and onesided the book is here is a snip of a couple of reviews :

"The book is a polemic with carefully cherry-picked facts and contradictory evidence omitted to arrive at the author's conclusion that "... only those few resistance fighters in the Wehrmacht who protested against extermination (of the Jews) in one way or another deserve our respect." (page 296) "

"Wolfram Wette's book, "The Wehrmacht", is an attempt to take a simple question (Were all members of the Wehrmacht guilty of war crimes under international law?) and assert a simple answer

(Yes. All but a dozen of the claimed 20 million members of the Wehrmacht were guilty of war crimes.). "

In all honesty its a terrible book so far but the reason I mention it is because the author began work on it after seeing a photo exhibition which ran for a limited time and showed a series of approx 90 pictures of atrocities commited by the wehrmacht. I could not find it online anywhere (working properly) but there are plenty of those photos out there alright.

Anyway the exhibition was called "War of Extermination: The Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941-1944" touring exhibition Hamburg institute for Social Research. You can read more about it on page Vii here if your interested :

http://books.google.ie/books?id=VMqpuY24EkoC&printsec=frontcover&dq=

http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/showpost.php?p=59565121&postcount=88

Morlar wrote: »

.. - I meant a terribly badly put together book. This was why I included excerpts of 2 seperate but indicative reviews I wish I had read before I bought it :

.....

I dont have it to hand but I can remember reading sentences over and over again trying to make sure I had read it right. The conclusions are very flimsy. The author takes every opportunity to portray the Wehrmacht as almost universally bad in terms of their moral outlook. It is not just wW2 either but WW1 too.

In terms of ww2 to put it bluntly the author seems to assert that the absence of proof proves only how efficient the cover-up must have been and how widespread was the complicity in warcrimes.

Another point which I did not know when I wrote the above post was that the author wrote the book after visiting the exhibition, however the exhibition (of atrocity photos) was later withdrawn. Something the author neglects to mention.

The reason it was withdrawn was because it was discovered that many photos of atrocities labelled as 'Wehrmacht warcrimes' were in fact bolshevik/Soviet NKVD or mis-identified latvian/lithuanian etc. The people who put the exhibition together may have been a little over-zealous in my view. Pictures were removed from the exhibition and it was re-launched. That would be just one criticism of the book. Dont take my word for it - if you read it you might agree just how shabbily put together it is. Then again you may not - in my view it is shockingly bad in terms of how un-balanced and biased it is. It is a book with an extremely unbalanced agenda using the flimsiest of pieces of information thrown together to paint a wholly bad picture of an entire army.

Reekwind wrote: »

Arguably they should be categorised as 'paramilitaries' but frankly I'm not interested in splitting hairs. The distinction is both obvious and, given the shared responsibility for the atrocities, fairly irrelevant

Statements such as those do nothing for your credibility whatsoever.

The 40 or so SS Frontline combat divisions were comprised of Soldiers.

Attempting to portray them as less than soldiers / paramilitaries is categorically factually incorrect. It's attempt to delegitimise their military record, which is considerable. I take it you read the earlier post re the difference between :

Morlar wrote: »

I think there is an important distinction to be made between

a)
the multiple front line combat SS divisions
&
b)
the tiny percentile of SS who were in einsatzgruppen, rearguard anti-partisan & civilian 'resettlement' units.

I will say it again - this is an important distinction. Trying to blur the lines between those seperate elements is misleading.

This is a WW2 history forum, being accurate in terminology or at least attempting accuracy is expected. Your statement above that the frontline combat SS divisions were 'not soldiers', is either based on a very shallow knowledge of this field of study, or it is a political/ideological viewpoint masquerading as neutral WW2 historiography.

Reekwind wrote: »

Yes. Mazower himself gives Zlocew, the execution of twenty Polish "so-called criminals", the deaths of 50 Jews, the massacres at Bydgoszcz, etc, as examples. Excuse me if I'm not keen enough to type out a few pages of text

Which massacres at Bydgoszcz ? The massacre of ethnic Germans as part of widespread atrocities ? Or, the reprisals against Poles for those atrocities ?
Intentionally omitting relevant contextual details, because they undermine the point an author is trying to make, is misleading.

Reekwind wrote: »

Are you seriously denying that Wehrmacht personnel were involved in the deaths of numerous Polish civilians throughout the war? That is simplt perverse. Not only did its troops commit war crimes against the civilian population - Polish and Jewish - but they also facilitated those of the SS.

This is quite typical of your discussion level, accuse the person with whom you are discussing of saying something which they have not said. It is tiresome, weak & not very convincing.

The Wehrmacht is a distinct organisation to the SS. No one has denied warcimes were committed on all sides. However trying to condemn a 20,000,000 strong army on the basis of handfuls of examples, some of which are retalliatory in aspect is simply incorrect.

Reekwind wrote: »

It was the army that turned its prisoners over to SS death squads at Bydgoszcz and the army was entirely aware of the systematic system of racial liquidation that the SS units, which were technically under Wehrmacht jurisdiction, was putting into practice.

Perhaps you can clarify if you are referring in this part here to SS-Einsatzgruppen and not Waffen SS ? The level of awareness among Wehrmacht leadership, officers and men of the specific details of SS-Einsatzgruppen activities is a complex area (much like the organisational and leadership structure of the SS or the Police). It is not an area you can accurately cover in one-liners such as that.

Reekwind wrote: »

Armies are institutions. If the Wehrmacht had taken prompt action to discipline its soldiers and put procedures in place to ensure that there was no repeat of them, well, then that would be different. But it didn't. Despite the protestations of some officers, which were not supported in any real way by their superiors, the Wehrmacht reconciled itself to 'outrages' against civilians and went on to commit atrocity after atrocity later in the war. Which entirely undermines the myth that the Wehrmacht was somehow isolated from or immune to the Nazi state's genocidal campaign of extermination

You might be surprised to learn that not just the Wehrmacht but the Waffen SS disciplined soldiers throughout the entirety of the war.

Reekwind wrote: »

To quote Westermann (in The Oxford Handbook of Holocaust Studies)

"...Rossino i]Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity[/i outlined the German preparations for a premeditated Volkstumskampf against the Polish people. This ethnic battle involved mass murder by Wehrmacht and SS forces, and their joint enforcement of draconian reprisal policies, the brutal treatment of Polish civilians and the ghettoisation and deportation of Jews. The initiation of severe reprisals against the Polish population by the German army set an ominous precedent and became 'a critical component of the racial-ideological warfare waged by the Third Reich'"

You are aware you are quoting one historian, who is in turn quoting another historian ? There is no evidence present in those conclusions. Merely the use of one conclusion to support another.

There were often draconian reprisal policies, Civilians were at times treated with great brutality (as they were under red army occupation also), there was ghettoisation and deporation of jews (as there also was of ethnic Germans). These facts are seperate to the conclusions you are drawing about the organisational character of the wehrmacht.

Reekwind wrote: »

Yes. I don't see how this excuses the crimes of the Wehrmacht. The Nazis understood this of course, and the murder of 50 Jews in Sept 1939 was largely excused by the courts on the basis that "because of the numerous atrocities committed by the Poles against ethnic Germans, [the perpetrators] were in a state of irritability" (quoted in Mazower).

No one has said that the retalliatory nature of an action excuses the action, in terms of taking an ideologically neutral approach it is important not to leave out the relevant context in presenting such information.

Reekwind wrote: »

Nor do I believe that collective punishment against civilian populations is in any way acceptable

Nor do I. Particularly where the civilian population are actually entirely innocent. I would also apply this to the ethnic Germans who were massacred during and after the 2nd World War. Including the millions of missing ethnic Germans (3m as of Govt Study 1953).

Reekwind wrote: »

The detail is that many hundreds, if not thousands, of Polish and Jewish civilians were murdered by Wehrmacht soldiers in the first weeks of the occupation. You can put context to this if you want but it does not excuse it

I would be interested in the breakdown of how many, when and where. Rather than one liners such as 'hundreds if not thousands'.

I would also be interested in determining who the guilty parties were and what was the context. There are also warcrimes in the modern context, (not to mention the other armies of WW2). The fact that warcrimes exsist does not prove top-down, comprehensive, organisational support for warcrimes.

Reekwind wrote: »

You could say that, if you wanted to entirely ignore the "detail and context". Anyone who seriously compares the Nazi occupation of Poland to the Liberation, or contends that the crimes of the Wehrmacht are somehow acceptable, is either ignorant or a Nazi apologist

No one has compared Poland to D-Day. What was compared were the standards you are using to condemn an organisation, and whether or not you applied those standards equally to all sides or just the German side.

Reekwind wrote: »

But perhaps you have an example of US or British soldiers murdering hundreds of POWs?

What would that have to do with anything ? For the record however they did, most famously at Dachau where wounded SS combat veterans were taken outside, lined up and machine gunned. The men who did that were never punished (being on the winning side), this does not however prove a comprehensive top-down policy of warcrimes in that case either.

Reekwind

Morlar wrote: »

The 40 or so SS Frontline combat divisions were comprised of Soldiers

I love that logic. We can call these men soldiers because they were Soldiers. Perfect :rolleyes:

SS members, regardless of whether they served in combat divisions or not, fell under the authority of the Reichsführer. That is, they were outside of the traditional army structures

Which massacres at Bydgoszcz ?

This is going to be painful

What massacres at Bydgoszcz were the Wehrmacht involved in? I know that you like 'precision' but I expect you to apply some basic thought to my posts. Or perhaps this is a luxury on "WW2 history forum"?

This is quite typical of your discussion level, accuse the person with whom you are discussing of saying something which they have not said. It is tiresome, weak & not very convincing

Well then you tell me, "who exactly did the wehrmacht kill from sept 2 1939 'onwards'"? Do you accept that there were thousands of Polish civilians amongst this?

Perhaps you can clarify if you are referring in this part here to SS-Einsatzgruppen and not Waffen SS ? The level of awareness among Wehrmacht leadership, officers and men of the specific details of SS-Einsatzgruppen activities is a complex area (much like the organisational and leadership structure of the SS or the Police). It is not an area you can accurately cover in one-liners such as that.

The activities of the Einsatzgruppen were not a secret. It has already been shown in this thread that senior Wehrmacht officers were aware of the "slaughter" of Jews and Poles

You might be surprised to learn that not just the Wehrmacht but the Waffen SS disciplined soldiers throughout the entirety of the war.

For executing civilians? I'd like to see the evidence of that. jonniebgood1 was correct to note Hitler's October amnesty: this effectively served as a 'green light' for continued brutality against civilian populations. And that is the critical 'context': the Wehrmacht was an arm of Nazi Germany and not immune to the constant pressures, from above and below, for escalating violence against perceived racial enemies

You are aware you are quoting one historian, who is in turn quoting another historian ?

Well yes. I think that's pretty evident from how I explicitly referenced the second historian. I've not read the second work though

There were often draconian reprisal policies, Civilians were at times treated with great brutality (as they were under red army occupation also), there was ghettoisation and deporation of jews (as there also was of ethnic Germans). These facts are seperate to the conclusions you are drawing about the organisational character of the wehrmacht.

No, not when it can be shown that the Wehrmacht was intimately involved in "draconian reprisal policies", massacres of civilian populations and the formulation of genocidal starvation policies

Nor do I. Particularly where the civilian population are actually entirely innocent. I would also apply this to the ethnic Germans who were massacred during and after the 2nd World War. Including the millions of missing ethnic Germans (3m as of Govt Study 1953).

And the relevance of this 'whataboutism' when discussing the crimes of the Wehrmacht is...?

The fact that warcrimes exsist does not prove top-down, comprehensive, organisational support for warcrimes.

We know that there were specific measures from Germany's political leadership that encouraged draconian measures (eg, Himmler's Oct 3 order to shoot suspected "insurgents" on sight) and we know that the Wehrmacht authorities made no real efforts to curtail these. And this is just dealing with the initial period in Poland - trying arguing that there was no "organisational support for warcrimes" in the occupation of the USSR

What was compared were the standards you are using to condemn an organisation, and whether or not you applied those standards equally to all sides or just the German side.

Which is silly. Are you going to suggest that because some GIs committed rape then the US Army is as morally suspect as the Wehrmacht?

Morlar

Reekwind wrote: »

I love that logic. We can call these men soldiers because they were Soldiers. Perfect :rolleyes

This is the case. The clearly flawed logic here is yours, in attempting to paint the combat divisions of the Waffen SS as being composed of non-soldiers or paramilitaries. Calling that mistake on your part as 'flawed logic' is being charitable.

Reekwind wrote: »

SS members, regardless of whether they served in combat divisions or not, fell under the authority of the Reichsführer. That is, they were outside of the traditional army structures

Indeed they were a distinct organisation to the Wehrmacht. This is your evidence that they were made up of non soldiers ?

Reekwind wrote: »

Well then you tell me, "who exactly did the wehrmacht kill from sept 2 1939 'onwards'"? Do you accept that there were thousands of Polish civilians amongst this?

You have made the point of 'hundreds if not thousands', I have simply asked you to establish this by saying who, where and when. What part of that is not clear ? Also - from sept 2 onwards can mean from sept 2 until 1945. Whereas your point could be summarised as 'immediately, for racial reasons only and in very large numbers' - there is a difference there.

Reekwind wrote: »

Well yes. I think that's pretty evident from how I explicitly referenced the second historian. I've not read the second work though

So - posting a conclusion, based on a conclusion to support a conclusion is suffice in your view to establish something ? That is not the way I see it.

I also think most readers would prefer you to point to evidence rather than conclusion if you are seeking to establish something.

Reekwind wrote: »

No, not when it can be shown that the Wehrmacht was intimately involved in "draconian reprisal policies", massacres of civilian populations and the formulation of genocidal starvation policies

They clearly are isolated & seperate facts to your conclusion.

Reekwind wrote: »

And the relevance of this 'whataboutism' when discussing the crimes of the Wehrmacht is...?

Context is important to any meaningful study of WW2 period Europe.

Reekwind wrote: »

Which is silly. Are you going to suggest that because some GIs committed rape then the US Army is as morally suspect as the Wehrmacht?

I have pointing out the flawed nature of the conclusions you present here, you are yet again applying one standard to one side only, and you clearly don't like it when the patently obvious limits of this approach are highlighted.

jonniebgood1

Morlar wrote: »

Statements such as those do nothing for your credibility whatsoever.

The 40 or so SS Frontline combat divisions were comprised of Soldiers.

Attempting to portray them as less than soldiers / paramilitaries is categorically factually incorrect. It's attempt to delegitimise their military record, which is considerable. I take it you read the earlier post re the difference between :

Originally Posted by Morlar View Post
I think there is an important distinction to be made between

a)
the multiple front line combat SS divisions
&
b)
the tiny percentile of SS who were in einsatzgruppen, rearguard anti-partisan & civilian 'resettlement' units.

I will say it again - this is an important distinction. Trying to blur the lines between those seperate elements is misleading.
.

How far do you go with this distinction? In the Ukraine and Belarus the einsatzgruppen worked in tandem with the wehrmacht yet you wish to distinguish between them for some reason. How does your distinction work with the extermination carried out in Minsk for example? http://books.google.ie/books?id=cDP1d8RMND8C&pg=PA223&lpg=PA223&dq=wehrmacht+minsk+19,000&source=bl&ots=ZWzwa3YhFx&sig=1_7dBC9QZO-l8y0udXaYukXty-4&hl=en&ei=cRFHTpLDBMbQhAeM5M3CBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CEkQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q&f=false

I see you also commenting on credibility of other posters!!! I laughed out loud at the irony of this.

Morlar

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

How far do you go with this distinction?

You seem to be confusing 'ss-Einsatzgruppen & wehrmacht', with 'ss-Einsatzgruppen & Frontline Combat SS'. Not really sure how that is possible when the distinction has been pointed out multiple times at this stage. Unless the point of this thread is simply to try to blur those lines ?

Any assertion that the 40 or so frontline SS Combat divisions were made up of 'non soldiers' or paramilitaries - does lack credibility.

Perhaps you can point to where in your linked reference the Wehrmacht were engaged in Einsatzgruppen activity ?

I take it you see this reference as proof that the ss-einsatzgruppen and wehrmacht were one and the same ? If not, what exactly are you asserting that it (your linked book) proves ?

P.S. you really are not one to laugh

jonniebgood1

Morlar wrote: »

You seem to be confusing 'ss-Einsatzgruppen & wehrmacht', with 'ss-Einsatzgruppen & Frontline Combat SS'. Not really sure how that is possible when the distinction has been pointed out multiple times at this stage. Unless the point of this thread is simply to try to blur those lines ?

Any assertion that the 40 or so frontline SS Combat divisions were made up of 'non soldiers' or paramilitaries - does lack credibility.

Where did I suggest this?

Morlar wrote: »

Perhaps you can point to where in your linked reference the Wehrmacht were engaged in Einsatzgruppen activity ?

I take it you see this reference as proof that the ss-einsatzgruppen and wehrmacht were one and the same ? If not, what exactly are you asserting that it (your linked book) proves ?

The book references 19,000 Jews shot by the wehrmacht. I assert nothing with this, I am querying the relationship between the Einsatzgruppen and the wehrmacht (as per OP) and how it developed. You have queried the attribution of war crimes to the wehrmacht:

Morlar wrote: »

Who exactly did the wehrmacht kill from sept 2 1939 'onwards' ?

What were the circumstances ? Are you taking isolated examples to condemn an entire army of conscripted landser ?

I think as you have queried that we can look into it further in the context of the OP. The link I provided suggests the wehrmacht were involved in shooting of a large number of people. Were they working in tandem with the einsatzgruppen and were the general SS men involved? Or alternatively maybe the book I linked is incorrect, I keep an open mind for the moment.

BlaasForRafa

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

How far do you go with this distinction? In the Ukraine and Belarus the einsatzgruppen worked in tandem with the wehrmacht yet you wish to distinguish between them for some reason. How does your distinction work with the extermination carried out in Minsk for example? http://books.google.ie/books?id=cDP1d8RMND8C&pg=PA223&lpg=PA223&dq=wehrmacht+minsk+19,000&source=bl&ots=ZWzwa3YhFx&sig=1_7dBC9QZO-l8y0udXaYukXty-4&hl=en&ei=cRFHTpLDBMbQhAeM5M3CBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CEkQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q&f=false

I see you also commenting on credibility of other posters!!! I laughed out loud at the irony of this.

It would help the credibility of your posts if you knew the difference between "the Wehrmacht" the the Heer. The seemingly interchangeable way the names of two different organisations is used on this thread is headwrecking. The Heer were the german army, the Wehrmacht was the entire armed forces which included the Heer, Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe, Waffen SS. In theory the Waffen SS was independant but operationally it operated under the orders of the OKW or OKH defending on the theatre of war it was in.

Also the seeming confusion of terms regarding the SS is headwrecking, although somewhat understandable given the nature of links between several organisations. The SS was divided into two main parts, the Waffen SS which were frontline combat units and the Allegemeine SS (the General SS) which consisted of many sub-organisations like the police, gestapo, kripo, einsatzgruppen, concentration camp guards, anti-partisan units, Rona and many more. The Allegemeine SS answered directly to Himmler whereas the Waffen SS answered directly to Hitler (and operationally to the OKW and/or OKH).

Although the Waffen SS was involved in the holocaust and in warcrimes against civilians in general, the Allegemeine SS had a far far bigger role.

The Waffen SS were soldiers and not some paramilitary unit which some here inexplicably have said. Heinz Guderian said of the Waffen SS in Panzer Leader "There was a feeling of comradeship which existed on the battlefield between the Waffen SS and Army formations. I fought with SS-Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler and with SS Division Das Reich: later as Inspector General of Armoured Troops I visited numerous SS divisions. I can therefore assert that to my knowledge the SS divisions were always remarkable for a high standard of discipline, of esprit de corps, and of conduct in the face of the enemy. They fought shoulder to shoulder with the panzer divisions of the Army and the longer the war went on the less distinguishable they became from the army."

Guderian on the Allegemeine SS "A far different judgement must be passed on the Allegemeine SS. The SS took over numerous police functions of a most dubious sort. Then unite of the Allegemeine SS were armed. The number of foreign formations was here also constantly on the increase; these were markedly worse than the units of the Waffen SS, as, for example, was shown by the behaviour of the Kaminski and Dirlewanger Brigades in the crushing of the Warsaw uprising. I never had anything to do with the SD and its Einsatzkommandos and am therefore not able to give any first hand information concerning them"

Stovepipe

Hi all
@Blaas, I agree about the correct use of terms but generally, everybody uses the term "Wehrmacht" for the German Land Army and the term "SS" for the Waffen SS. Obviously, historians and well-informed readers know the difference, especially between the Waffen SS field formations,ie Das Reich, and the police/Einsatzgruppen. Sometimes, the distinction is blurred, though, given that many of the second-line SS units were regularly in action in anti-partisan combat, a lot of which was as bloody and costly as "regular" battlefront combat.
regards
Stovepipe

jonniebgood1

BlaasForRafa wrote: »

It would help the credibility of your posts if you knew the difference between "the Wehrmacht" the the Heer. The seemingly interchangeable way the names of two different organisations is used on this thread is headwrecking. The Heer were the german army, the Wehrmacht was the entire armed forces which included the Heer, Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe, Waffen SS. In theory the Waffen SS was independant but operationally it operated under the orders of the OKW or OKH defending on the theatre of war it was in.

Also the seeming confusion of terms regarding the SS is headwrecking, although somewhat understandable given the nature of links between several organisations. The SS was divided into two main parts, the Waffen SS which were frontline combat units and the Allegemeine SS (the General SS) which consisted of many sub-organisations like the police, gestapo, kripo, einsatzgruppen, concentration camp guards, anti-partisan units, Rona and many more. The Allegemeine SS answered directly to Himmler whereas the Waffen SS answered directly to Hitler (and operationally to the OKW and/or OKH).
.........

Thank you for the detailed breakdown. I agree the water is being muddied here but arguing over terminology does'nt help. I was quite clear in my OP and previous post on what area I wished to look at.

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

Originally Posted by Morlar View Post
Who exactly did the wehrmacht kill from sept 2 1939 'onwards' ?

What were the circumstances ? Are you taking isolated examples to condemn an entire army of conscripted landser ?

I think as you have queried that we can look into it further in the context of the OP. The link I provided suggests the wehrmacht were involved in shooting of a large number of people. Were they working in tandem with the einsatzgruppen and were the general SS men involved? Or alternatively maybe the book I linked is incorrect, I keep an open mind for the moment.

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

How were relations between the ordinary German soldiers and the ordinary members of the einsatzgruppen. I have read recently that the wehrmacht soldiers in some cases resented the relative comfort that the SS-Einsatzgruppen soldier had.

For clarity the reference to 'wehrmacht soldiers' here means all other parts of the german army other than the einsatzgruppen. I thought this would be clear but apologise if it was not. Also I would prefer avoiding comments in relation to this "somewhat understandable" confusion, as it takes away from the issue being discussed .

To try and get back to the subject of the thread take Minsk for example (as per book link) 19,000 people were killed. Was this exclusively an einsatzgruppen action or was there collaberation between other elements of the 'wehrmacht'. This is an important point to clarify as there are plently of people who would claim that the ordinary soldier was not involved in this. So were they? There were tensions in Kovno as per OP between the ordinary soldiers and the einsatzgruppen. As the war developed did this continue or did the einsatzgruppen get greater military support in their operations.

Morlar

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

In the Ukraine and Belarus the einsatzgruppen worked in tandem with the wehrmacht yet you wish to distinguish between them for some reason. How does your distinction work with the extermination carried out in Minsk for example? http://books.google.ie/books?id=cDP1d8RMND8C&pg=PA223&lpg=PA223&dq=wehrmacht+minsk+19,000&source=bl&ots=ZWzwa3YhFx&sig=1_7dBC9QZO-l8y0udXaYukXty-4&hl=en&ei=cRFHTpLDBMbQhAeM5M3CBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CEkQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q&f=false

Morlar wrote: »

Perhaps you can point to where in your linked reference the Wehrmacht were engaged in Einsatzgruppen activity ?

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

To try and get back to the subject of the thread take Minsk for example (as per book link) 19,000 people were killed. Was this exclusively an einsatzgruppen action or was there collaberation between other elements of the 'wehrmacht'. This is an important point to clarify as there are plently of people who would claim that the ordinary soldier was not involved in this. So were they? There were tensions in Kovno as per OP between the ordinary soldiers and the einsatzgruppen. As the war developed did this continue or did the einsatzgruppen get greater military support in their operations.

You are introducing this source, I really think it is up to you to clarify what point you are intending to establish with it. You have already been asked and failed to clarify. Also pointing to a book and saying 'this book says 19k killed' is insufficient.

You need to say who, what, where and when, not just 'it's in the book'.

Which page of the book and which passage which event where when ? If there was an incident of that sort do you think that enough to condemn an entire 20,000,000 army ?

If not, then what are you contending that it actually establishes ?

BlaasForRafa

Thank you for the detailed breakdown. I agree the water is being muddied here but arguing over terminology does'nt help. I was quite clear in my OP and previous post on what area I wished to look at.

Getting the terminology right is a part of having a discussion about what actually happened rather than what one thinks happened or what one presupposes had happened.

For clarity the reference to 'wehrmacht soldiers' here means all other parts of the german army other than the einsatzgruppen. I thought this would be clear but apologise if it was not. Also I would prefer avoiding comments in relation to this "somewhat understandable" confusion, as it takes away from the issue being discussed .

To try and get back to the subject of the thread take Minsk for example (as per book link) 19,000 people were killed. Was this exclusively an einsatzgruppen action or was there collaberation between other elements of the 'wehrmacht'. This is an important point to clarify as there are plently of people who would claim that the ordinary soldier was not involved in this. So were they? There were tensions in Kovno as per OP between the ordinary soldiers and the einsatzgruppen. As the war developed did this continue or did the einsatzgruppen get greater military support in their operations.

I prefer to use the terms for individual units if possible rather than catch all terms which can mean just about anyone in the general area. By the period you are talking aboutthe war had moved far east and Army Group Centre would have been involved in the battles around Bryansk and minsk would firmly be considered a rear area at this point.

The book you linked to mentions the 707th infantry division being in the Minsk area at the time but it dosen't mention the context that although it was called an infantry division, it wasn't, it was a security division which is a different thing altogether. Security divisions were made up of older troops who were unfit for front line combat, at the time the Heer was already short of infantry so it wouldn't have wasted frontline troops on rear area security.

From the book you linked to all it says about the minsk incident is "Shootings of jews by frontline troops during advance which occurred in a number of cases had the character of antisemitic attacks or brutal acts of retaliation. killings by frontline troops however did not affect most cities; nor did they reach the massive dimensions of the massacres later carried out by the SS, police, and security troops. After the advance, army participation was apparently limited: it is only possible to document the murder of so-called "country jews" by several security divisions, the participation in massacres by Security Police with their own shooting commandos on the local level, and voluntary participation in shootings by numberous individual soldiers and officers. The operations of the 707th infantry division (sic) are in fact an exception."

I'd suggest that if you want to research it more that you find out more about the 707th security division, who commanded it at the time and what organisation it reported to at the time, that way you'll find out more about why it was involved in whatever action it took at the time. It seems unlikely to me that it would have been under direct command of army group centre at the time.

As for whether there were tensions between the frontline Heer troops and einsatzgruppen, I'd suggest that troops who were involved in constant fighting for months would resent rear-area personnel of any type.

jonniebgood1

BlaasForRafa wrote: »

Getting the terminology right is a part of having a discussion about what actually happened rather than what one thinks happened or what one presupposes had happened.

I prefer to use the terms for individual units if possible rather than catch all terms which can mean just about anyone in the general area. By the period you are talking aboutthe war had moved far east and Army Group Centre would have been involved in the battles around Bryansk and minsk would firmly be considered a rear area at this point.

The book you linked to mentions the 707th infantry division being in the Minsk area at the time but it dosen't mention the context that although it was called an infantry division, it wasn't, it was a security division which is a different thing altogether. Security divisions were made up of older troops who were unfit for front line combat, at the time the Heer was already short of infantry so it wouldn't have wasted frontline troops on rear area security.

I have not found any information in detail enough to show the make up of this division, i.e. older soldiers so would appreciate if you could source that. It is interesting that the older troops may have been used for this type of security.

BlaasForRafa wrote: »

I'd suggest that if you want to research it more that you find out more about the 707th security division, who commanded it at the time and what organisation it reported to at the time, that way you'll find out more about why it was involved in whatever action it took at the time. It seems unlikely to me that it would have been under direct command of army group centre at the time.

You are correct in this. I will look into some more information on the activities of this division to see were they acting on their own or as part of a command structure. It seems from this book that it may have been a bit of both. The Holocaust and history:.... pg. 277. Michael Berenbaum. This also introduces context to the conversation in the second section particularly.


The reference to 707th continues on pg 278:

Braemers command in this perios is listed as "24 June 1941-20 Apr 1944: Armed Forces Commander of Ostland (Headquarters in Riga)." http://www.specialcamp11.fsnet.co.uk/General%20der%20Kavallerie%20Walter%20Braemer.htm
and mojor general gustav von bechtolsheim, commander of 707th (15 February 1941: Chief of the General Staff of the XXIII Army Corps. [Initially held in Army Group North reserve, the XXIII Army Corps, commanded by General der Infanterie Albrecht Schubert, took part in the invasion of the Soviet Union from 22 June 1941. Transferring to control of Army Group Center, the corps saw heavy combat at Polozk, Velikiye Luki and Toropez.]
1 October 1941: Chief of the General Staff of the XXIX Army Corps on the Eastern Front. [Commanded by General der Infanterie Hans von Obstfelder, the XXIX Army Corps saw action in southern Russia at Sumy, Belgorod and Kharkov. Oberst (later General der Infanterie) Eberhard Kinzel assumed the post of corps chief of staff upon the transfer of Oberst Freiherr von Mauchenheim genannt Bechtolsheim to France.]) http://www.bridgend-powcamp.fsnet.co.uk/General%20der%20Artillerie%20Anton%20von%20Bechtolsheim.htm

The suggestion is there that it was army command who facilitated mass shooting by the 707th through loose command orders. It is open to debate but I have'nt seen any evidence of reprimand to 707th for these mass shootings. Again I am open to being corrected on that. Having a control on security is necessary when the situation suitable for underground resistence occurs but this is clearly more than just security.
This leads to more queries although I am sure some may question this.
The main one to me is how widespread was this type of security division. Was there an equivalent to this 'security division' in each sector or for each army group (apologies if this is incorrect terminology also)?

Morlar

We seem to have moved from 19k killed in 1939 to September of 1941, 2 years into the war and the killing of 10k as an isolated event.

This basic information on the 707 may be useful :


http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=20967

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/Infanteriedivisionen/707ID.htm

&

http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=3975

707. Infanterie-Division was formed on 2 May 1941 as part of the 15. Welle (wave). It was transferred to the Eastern front in August 1941 where it served mainly on security and anti-partisan operations in the rear area of Heeresgruppe Mitte. The division was destroyed near Bobruysk in June 1944 during the Soviet summer offensive. It was formally disbanded on 3 August 1944.



Known war crimes

This division was involved in the murder of 10.000 Belorussian Jews in the fall and winter 1941/42, it is the only Wehrmacht division known to have been involved in the Holocaust to such an extent.



Soldiers of Infanterie-Regiment 727 took part in the killing of at least 12 Soviet civilians captured near the village of Gololobowo in September 1942.

Commanders
Generalmajor Gustav Freiherr von Mauchenheim gennant von Bechtolsheim (3 May 1941 - 22 Feb 1943)
Generalleutnant Hans Freiherr von Falkenstein (22 Feb 1943 - 25 Apr 1943)
Generalleutnant Wilhelm Rußwurm (25 Apr 1943 - 1 June 1943)
Generalleutnant Rudolf Busich (1 June 1943 - 3 Dec 1943)
Generalmajor Alexander Conrady (3 Dec 1943 - 12 Jan 1944)
Generalleutnant Rudolf Busich (12 Jan 1944 - 15 May 1944)
Generalmajor Gustav Gihr (15 May 1944 - 27 June 1944) (POW)

Operations Officers (Ia)
Oberstleutnant Fritz-Wedig von der Osten (May 1941 - May 1943)
Oberstleutnant Edmund Graf von Boullion (May 1943 - Feb 1944)
Major Klaus Mayer (Feb 1944 - June 1944)

Area of operations
Germany (May 1941 – Aug 1941)
Eastern Front, central sector (Aug 1941 – June 1944)

Nicknames

Gamsbock-Division



Order of battle

Grenadier-Regiment 727
Grenadier-Regiment 747
Artillerie-Abteilung 657
Feldersatz-Bataillon 707 (1)
Nachrichten-Kompanie (later, Abteilung) 707
Pionier-Kompanie 707
Versorgungstruppen 707


Footnotes
1. Feldersatz-Bataillon 707 was redesignated Feldersatz-Bataillon 657 on 1 September 1943.



Published sources used
Hannes Heer - Extreme Normalität: Generalmajor Gustav Freiherr von Mauchenheim gen. Bechtolsheim. Umfeld, Motive und Entschlussbildung eines Holocaust-Täters

Peter Lieb - Täter aus Überzeugung? Oberst Carl von Andrian und die Judenmorde der 707. Infanteriedivision 1941/42

C.F. Rüter & D.W. de Mildt - Justiz und NS-Verbrechen (Nazi crimes on trial)

jonniebgood1

Morlar wrote: »

We seem to have moved from 19k killed in 1939 to September of 1941, 2 years into the war and the killing of 10k as an isolated event.

the 19k reference was Minsk in the white ruthenia area (if from previously linked book) http://books.google.ie/books?id=cDP1d8RMND8C&pg=PA223&lpg=PA223&dq=wehrmacht+minsk+19,000&source=bl&ots=ZWzwa3YhFx&sig=1_7dBC9QZO-l8y0udXaYukXty-4&hl=en&ei=cRFHTpLDBMbQhAeM5M3CBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CEkQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q&f=false . The date was not mentioned specifically but would have been barbarossa and 1941 also. I will read your links on the 707th later.

Morlar

This work from a jewish author may also provide a little context to the events of Minsk:

The Minsk Ghetto, 1941–1943
Jewish Resistance and Soviet Internationalism

Barbara Epstein

This author refers throughout to jews, communists, belorussians, officials fleeing red army, westerners (jews and communist jews who fled eastward) and so on, as far as the other side goes she only ever seems to refer to them as the 'Germans'. She is not a military historian, more of a political historian.

If the Germans assumed unanimous local support, they turned out
to have been wrong, at least in the case of Minsk. A powerful resistance
movement emerged. In the ghetto and also outside it, in the area
that both Jews and non-Jews called “the city,” secret opposition groups
formed, made up of rank-and-file Communists (who, unlike the Communist
leaders, had remained in Minsk) and others whom the Communists
trusted; these groups came together in a united underground movement
that included both Byelorussians and Jews. With the help of this
united underground movement, and also of many Byelorussians who
were not members of the underground, thousands of Jews fled the ghetto
12 Jewish-Byelorussian Solidarity in Minsk and joined partisan units in the surrounding forests. No one knows for sure how many Jews from the Minsk ghetto survived to join partisan units, but they certainly numbered in the thousands, and some estimate as many as 10,000, from a ghetto whose population was approximately 100,000 at its height. Nowhere else in occupied eastern Europe were such large numbers of Jews able to flee the ghettos and engage in resistance. What made this possible in Minsk was the alliance of Jews with non-Jews outside the ghetto.2 My account of resistance in the Minsk ghetto is based on more than fifty interviews with ghetto survivors and on a slightly larger number of written memoirs, most of which are by ghetto survivors, including members of the ghetto underground, with a smaller number by members of the Byelorussian underground outside the ghetto. These accounts, written and oral, show that there was widespread resistance in the Minsk ghetto, and that it took a different form than the much better-known resistance movements in Polish and Lithuanian ghettos such as Warsaw and Vilna. In these ghettos, as in others in Poland and Lithuania, Jewish underground movements attempted to mobilize revolts within the ghetto walls. Such efforts were successful only in the Warsaw ghetto, where a revolt of great magnitude took place. Elsewhere, however, underground movements were unable to mobilize such revolts, because it was clear that the revolts would be defeated. But given the absence of allies outside these ghettos, it was difficult to find an alternative to internal revolts. In the Minsk ghetto, by contrast, there was no effort to mobilize an internal revolt. Instead, the main aim of the underground movement was
to send as many Jews to the forest as possible to join the growing sovietaligned partisan movement. Flight to the partisans also became the aim of large numbers of ghetto Jews who did not belong to the underground;
in effect, it became the major strategy of resistance of the ghetto as a
whole.

=============

In the ghetto, some “westerners” among the secret groups (Jews, mostly Communists, from outside the Soviet Union, who had fled to Minsk and were trapped there) laughed at these concerns and argued that the best way to locate the First Committee would be to form an underground organization. Since the legitimate underground committee did not appear, and the need to organize resistance was pressing, an underground organization was formed with the term “Second” tacked onto its name to indicate its deference to the First Committee. The First Committee was never found, because it did not exist. Gradually the terms “Second” and “Auxiliary” passed out of use, and members of the underground came to regard their organization as the legitimate underground, the Minsk branch of what they hoped would become a wider Communist resistance in occupied Byelorussia. It later turned out that the Byelorussian Communists had been right to worry about the consequences of acting without approval from the leaders of the Communist Party.

This Map is from 1943 and so not directly accurate to the events of 1941 however it may give an idea of the context (shaded areas are partisan held) :

Morlar

There is an interesting thread here with a composition on an Einsatzgruppen-EinsatzKommando unit , I post this as a sample Einsatzgruppen unit composition for reference and in order to give some context :


http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=76709&sid=2b618331615ed685a3dbe23e6b47eca6

Einsatzkommando 3 in Lithuania, 1941

Postby michael mills on 01 May 2005, 07:22


Einsatzkommando 3, which operated mainly in Lithuania, played the pivotal role in 1941 in the initiation of the wholesale extermination of entire local Jewish populations in the territories occupied after the commencement of Operation Barbarossa.

Its key role was made manifest on 15 and 16 August, when Lithuanian auxiliaries commanded by a handful of EK 3 officers liquidated 3,200 Jews, Jewesses and Jewish children at the temporary concentration camp which had been established near the northern Lithuanian town of Rokiskis. This was the first time that children were included in the slaughter, and also that women were killed in equal or greater numbers than men. It marked the shift from a "White Terror" against Jewish Bolshevism to a comprehensive elimination of the Jewish population of Lithuania apart from a small residue preserved in three ghettos.

EK 3 continued this program of general slaughter for the rest of August and until the end of the year, by which time the greater part of the Jewish population of Lithuania had been destroyed. The methodology of comprehensive destruction was progressively adopted by the other German security forces operating in the occupied Soviet territories.

EK 3 is also important because of the report prepared by its comander, Karl Jäger, in December 1941, listing all the executions of enemies (mainly Jews) carried out in its area of operation until that point. The so-called Jäger Report is a key document demonstrating the initiation and development of the program of destruction of human life that eventually became a standard feature of German rule in the occupied East.

My aim is to examine the actual structure of EK 3 with a view to analysing what that structure can tell us about the initial mission of the Einsatzkommando and the process by which that group of personnel became the managers of a huge extermination campaign.

According to Appendix 2, "Stärke der Kommandos", of the Stahlecker Report of 31 January 1942, EK 3 had the following personnel:

24 Gestapo officials
32 SS reservists
44 drivers
13 Criminal Police (Kripo) officers
9 SD officials
7 temporarily assigned personnel
3 radio operators
3 clerks (women)
2 administrators
2 communications staff

Total: 139 personnel.

The above structure suggests an operational breakdown into:

1. A headquarters group consisting of:

7 Gestapo / Kripo / SD officials
5 drivers
3 radio operators
3 clerks
2 administrators
2 communications staff

Total: 22 personnel

2. A mobile operational group, consisting of:

39 Gestapo / Kripo / SD officers
39 SS reservists and temporarily assigned personnel
39 drivers

Total: 117 personnel

It is apparent that the operational group was not intended to function as a single unit moving together, but as separate three-man teams, consisting of a Gestapo/Kripo/SD official, an SS reservist as assistant cum bodyguard, and a driver. Since each team had its own driver, it could operate independently, in an extremely mobile fashion.

The structure enabled the three-man teams to fan out quickly over the Einsatzkommando's area of responsibility, carrying out its mission.

It is obvious that each three-man team could not act on its own, but would have a command function, drawing on other German personnel at the various places where it went into action.

The small size of each operational team suggests that the function for which they were designed was not something on a large scale, but small-scale actions which could be accomplished by the three-man team with some assistance from other German forces at various localities.

Given the make up of the executive part of the teams, comprising Gestapo, Kripo, and SD officers, it is likely that they had two main functions:

1. An intelligence function, in particular the securing of Soviet archives and document collections captured by the advancing German forces. The high mobility of the teams would enable them to race to any area where valuable intelligence material was expected to be captured.

2. An anti-personnel action, consisting of the identification, arrest, interrogation and, as appropriate, liquidation of the more important enemy personnel, and also of suppressing any manifestations of ordinary crime such as looting.

Given the initial function of the Einsatzkommando suggested by its structure, one is prompted to ask how it could have moved to the role of managing destruction of human life on a very large scale. To answer that question, it is necessary to survey the development of the killings of population elements identified as pro-Soviet enemies, these being primarily Jews, from the beginning of the German invasion.

The first killings were carried out by members of the Lithuanian anti-Soviet resistance, primarily of the Lietuviu Aktivystu Frontas (LAF), which rose in revolt in Kaunas as soon as the Red Army and Soviet administration began its withdrawal on 21 June. The revolt was assisted by the mutiny of a major portion of the Lithuanian component of the Red forces, the 297th Territorial Corps.

By the evening of 23 June, the LAF insurgents had captured most of Kaunas, and instituted a massacre of Jewish collaborators with the Soviet regime which lasted until June 28. According to the Stahlecker Report, during that period the Lithuanian partisans killed 3,800 Jews in Kaunas and 1,200 in the smaller towns. Most probably the Jews killed were mostly male collaborators, although innocent bystanders might have fallen victim as well.

At the beginning, the number of Lithuanian anti-Soviet partisans was very large, up to 100,000 men according to the memorandum by Prapuolenis to von Renteln in the name of the LAF dated 23 September 1941. No doubt that included the soldiers who had deserted from the 297th Territorial Corps.

With such a large number of men, the entire Jewish population of Lithuanian could quickly have been liquidated. If each of the 100,000 men had killed just two Jews, the task would have been accomplished.

However, the German occupiers did not want a large Lithuanian armed force acting independently which could have formed the basis of a future claim to Lithuanian independence. Instead, the German administration began disarming the Lithuanian partisans, and recruiting a smaller number of them into new auxiliary police and army units, called "Battalions for the National Preservation of Work". By 28 June, the independent massacres carried out by the LAF had been halted by the Germans.

At the end of June, the number of armed Lithuanian partisans had fallen to 16,000 in formations under German control. On 28 June, Colonel Bobelis, the Lithuanian provisional military commander of Kaunas, issued two orders, probably under German direction. The first announced the disbanding and disarming of the partisans; the second was the call for all former officers and men of the Lithuanian Army to register for duty in the above-named Battalions.

It was the new Lithuanian battalions that carried out renewed executions of Jewish collaborationists, this time under German direction. These executions are called a "White Terror" by Michael McQueen in his essay "Nazi Policy toward the Jews in the Reichskommissariat Ostland, June-September 1941: From White Terror to Holocaust in Lithuania", in the book "Bitter Legacy".

The "White Terror" began with a series of executions on two days, 4 and 6 July 1941, at Fort VII outside Kaunas. Lithuanian units shot 2,977 Jews, all men except 47.

It is unknown how those men and a handful of women were selected. In the case of the Jewesses, it is likely that they were persons who had some sort of connection with the previous Soviet regime, perhaps as members of Komsomol or some similar organisation. In the case of the men, they may have been selected simply because they were of military age and potential members of the Red Army. Alternatively, they may all have been members of the Jewish intelligentsia; we just do not know.

The involvement of EK 3 in the management of a program of selective mass-killing that eventually became comprehensive began with the setting up of a "Rollkommando", a mobile squad, under Obersturmführer Hamann, a few days after EK 3 took over responsibility for Lithuania from EK 1b under Ehrlinger on 1 July.

The Rollkommando Hamann consisted of "eight to ten proven (SS) men", and an unknown number of Lithuanians. It is not known which members of EK 3 comprised the "proven men", but it is likely that they were Gestapo, Kripo or SD officials plus a small number of drivers (perhaps five officials and five drivers, but that can only be a surmise).

From 7 to 31 July, the Rollkommando scoured Lithuania, killing 4,400 persons, all adults, in a number of individual actions in different localities. The number of victims of each action varied from one to 288. The vast majority were Jews, with only some 184 being identified as Lithuanian or Russian Communists.

A significant feature of the liquidation actions by the Rollkommando was that almost every one involved a mix of Jews and non-Jewish Communists, for example at Marijampole on 14 July, where the victims were "21 Jews, one Russian and nine Lithuanian Communists", or in Kedainiai on 23 July, with "83 Jews, 12 Jewish women, 14 Russian Communists, 15 Lithuanian Communists, one Russian Politruk".

According to MacQueen, these killing actions were meant to set an example, to terrorise, and to demoralise any potential opposition. In other words, they were not yet part of the extermination of a population group.

MacQueen also provides some interesting information on why the number of Jews shot was so much higher than the number of Lithuanian and Russian victims. He says that one of the functions of the Lithuanian "Saugumas", the former Secret Police of independent Lithuania which had been re-formed as the "Litauische Abteilung" of the German Sicherheitspolizei, was to separate out the "honest Lithuanian youth duped by the Komsomol" from the doomed. Contemporary Lithuanian police records demonstrate that a more heavily implicated Lithuanian, for example a Komsomol activist, could expect about three months of forced labour as punishment.

That would mean that the small number of Lithuanian and Russian Communists shot by the Rollkomando would have been only the most heavily implicated, eg more senior political officials.

As MacQueen comments, for any Lithuanian Jew formerly associated with the Komsomol, the only punishment was death. That explains the large number of Jews shot.

In the first half of August, the scale of the operations increased. The Hamann Rollkommando perpetrated 10 actions between 1 and 14 August, claiming 4,788 victims. The number of Communists shot declined, but the pattern of exemplary actions remained.

As stated at the beginning of this post, there was a qualitative change in the middle of the month, signalling the move to extermination of a population group. In the latter half of August, including the Rokiskis action, over 33,000 persons were killed in Lithuanian, of which only about 1,000 were non-Jews, among them 544 mental patients.

By December, EK 3 listed 133,346 persons liquidated, the overwhelming majority Jews. Some had been killed by the mobile Rollkommando, great numbers by the stationary Schuma battalions at Kaunas and the Special Detachment at Vilnius, a further 3,050 across the border in Belorussia. Including the victims of the Lithunanian partisans in the first days in June, Jäger claimed 137,346 victims.

It is clear that the massive death-roll claimed by Jäger was really achieved by the Lithuanian auxiliaries, with EK 3 only performing a management or coordinating role. Only 10 personnel of the Einsatzkommando were involved in the management of the Hamann Rollkommando, and perhaps a similar number in the management of the stationary Lithunaina battalions at Kaunas and Vilnius. It is clear that most of the members of EK 3 were involved in activities other than the mass'liquidations.

Without the Lithuanians, the death-toll boasted of by Jäger in his Report could never have been achieved. That raises the question of how the relationship between EK 3 and the large number of Lithuanians who did the actual killing was achieved. For example, was the operational structure of a small number of Germans managing a much larger number of Lithuanians planned in advance, or was it something decided on on the spur of the moment?

It seems unlikely that the RSHA officials who planned the tasks and functions of the Einsatzgruppen, including EK 3, in the months leading up to Barbarossa could possibly have known that they would be able to call on the services of thousands of Lithuanians ready, willing and able to carry out the task of eliminating enemies of Germany.

It seems equally unlikely that the RSHA would have planned a structure of a few Germans commanding thousands of Lithuanians purely on the speculation that those of Lithuanian auxiliaries would indeed be available.

The actual course of events shows that the German occupiers were somewhat surprised and indeed somewhat embarrassed at the sudden appearance of about 100,000 armed Lithuanian anti-Soviet insurgents who began independently to massacre persons suspected of being Soviet collaborators, these being mainly Jews. In fact, the initial reaction of the German authorities was to suppress the Lithuanian insurgents, to disarm them and bring them under control.

As stated previously, the German authorities could easily have left the 100,000 insurgents to wipe out the Jewish population of Lithuania on their own. But they preferred not to allow that to happen, most probably because they did not want to leave a large, independent Lithuanian armed force in existence. When the German authorities did go over to recruiting the Lithuanian insurgents as auxiliaries, they drastically reduced the number of men under arms from 100,000 to only 16,000.

The above course of events suggests that the Germans did not enter Lithuania with a prepared plan to use Lithuanian personnel in a program of mass liquidation, but rather that they decided to do so when they observed the readiness of Lithuanians to kill members of population groups that the Germans also regarded as the enemy.

The actual structure of EK 3 also does not suggest a force tasked with carrying out mass liquidations, and indeed it was not able to carry out such a task without the Lithuanian input. That raises the question of the extent to which the actual liquidation program was an additional task taken on by EK 3 based on the realisation that a huge pool of Lithuanian activists was available that was ready and willing to carry out such a program.

If you read through the rest of the thread you will see an interesting back and forth discussion on the theories around EK unit composition. I believe the 100k Lithuanian anti-partisans figure is very, very high estimate, I'd be equally sceptical of some of the downward revisions later in the thread.

I think that is one of those 'we will never know' scenarios.

jonniebgood1

Morlar wrote: »

This work from a jewish author may also provide a little context to the events of Minsk:

Other than your own prejudices can you state any reason why the author being Jewish is worth mentioning?

Morlar

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

Other than your own prejudices can you state any reason why the author being Jewish is worth mentioning?

Any other author I referenced would likely be attacked and dismissed as being 'revisionist' so on that basis this author's ethnicity (given the subject matter) becomes relevant. Personally, in the normal run of things, I could care less.

I note that you have not addressed ANY of the points raised in the above posts in relation to the subject matter of this thread.

jonniebgood1

Morlar wrote: »

Any other author I referenced would likely be attacked and dismissed as being 'revisionist' so on that basis this author's ethnicity (given the subject matter) becomes relevant. Personally, in the normal run of things, I could care less.

I note that you have not addressed ANY of the points raised in the above posts in relation to the subject matter of this thread.

My apologies, I don't know what made me doubt your motives

Morlar wrote: »

...
The methodology used, the scope of it, which scholars from Israel, Russia and Germany were involved and for how long etc.

I would not be inclined to trust Israeli scholars on this subject, as there is a clear political motive in downgrading the numbers killed by stalin in order to elevate the numbers killed by Hitler, hence to enhance jewish victimhood which has been the political rockbed of the state of israel, .... http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/showthread.php?t=2056333635

I will come back to this thread when I have a chance as there is plenty of interesting tangents.

Morlar

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

My apologies, I don't know what made me doubt your motives

You are taking one reference, regarding a specific circumstance (on a different thread) and trying to blanket apply it to this thread out of context. You asked a loaded question about why I mentioned this authors ethnicity - which I have answered honestly & clearly.

Still no response to any of the points above ?

jonniebgood1

Morlar wrote: »

Still no response to any of the points above ?

I will read the points and sources again before I respond to them.

jonniebgood1

Morlar wrote: »

There is an interesting thread here with a composition on an Einsatzgruppen-EinsatzKommando unit , I post this as a sample Einsatzgruppen unit composition for reference and in order to give some context :

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=76709&sid=2b618331615ed685a3dbe23e6b47eca6

If you read through the rest of the thread you will see an interesting back and forth discussion on the theories around EK unit composition. I believe the 100k Lithuanian anti-partisans figure is very, very high estimate, I'd be equally sceptical of some of the downward revisions later in the thread.

I think that is one of those 'we will never know' scenarios.

Such a low number of personnel in the Einsatzkommando is interesting. How many of these units made up the group in Lithuania at that time?

A low number of personnel suggests less opposition or army support (Heer (Blaas)).

jonniebgood1

Morlar wrote: »

We seem to have moved from 19k killed in 1939 to September of 1941, 2 years into the war and the killing of 10k as an isolated event.

This basic information on the 707 may be useful :


http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=20967

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/Infanteriedivisionen/707ID.htm

&

http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=3975

So the 707th acted almost independently in terms of the army command structure. Given that what they were doing was not against what other parts of the army wanted they would not have had much objection from higher rank. To bring this back into the contect of this thread- Did they act in conjunction with any of the einsatzgruppen?

Tony EH

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

How were relations between the ordinary German soldiers and the ordinary members of the einsatzgruppen. I have read recently that the wehrmacht soldiers in some cases resented the relative comfort that the SS-Einsatzgruppen soldier had. This was specifically in relation to the kovno area in Lithuania. The einsatzgruppen did not have to endure the conditions on the front line and were usually posted well behind the front. A similar situation is referenced here in a book summary

Was this common? I thought they worked in unison so how widespread was this tye of feeling and did any hostilities arise from it? Does'nt seem to be much info on this.
Does anyone have any further information or sources on this?

There wasn't much "dispute" between regulars and the Einsatzkommando, for the simple reason that the vast majority of the Army, or the Waffen SS for that matter, wouldn’t have had any contact or real knowledge of them. I'd wager that the first time that a lot of German soldiers heard of the Einsatzgruppen was after the war had ended. They probably just figured that they were another part of the SD, or SS.

Also, aside from the more nefarious activities for which they are popularly known, much of the Einsatzgruppen's work involved rather boring intelligence gathering and administration. The average duty for an Einsatzgruppen member would have been very boring indeed and his frontline counter-part would have probably considered him nothing more than a REMF*, assuming he had any opinion on him at all.


*REMF - "Rear Echolon Mother F*ucker" Modern US Military slang for admin staff and rear area military personnel, who don't have any frontline experience or duties.

Tony EH

berettaman wrote: »

The Erickson guy that did the road to stalingrad is supposed to be doing a book on exactly how much the Higher Wehrmacht knew about what the Einsatzgruppen were up to. Should be good.

It'll be feckin amazing. John Erickson's been dead for nearly 10 years.

ejmaztec

Tony EH wrote: »

It'll be feckin amazing. John Erickson's been dead for nearly 10 years.

Perhaps he's using a ghost-writer?

berettaman

I said supposed because I was told that was what he was working on before he passed. It was supposed to be released in conjunction with the university where he worked- forget which one... Just passing on what I heard and I agree, despite the sarcasm, I am sure it would be amazing...

Morlar

As an FYI that same Professor John Erickson has been on TV a lot lately in the Bob Carruthers tv documentary series 'Weapons of War'. Also includes Stephen Walsh from Sandhurst. It is surprisingly good in my view. The 1hr episodes each on Army Group North, Army Group Centre and Army Group South were decently put together.

berettaman

Thanks for that Morlar, I will definitely keep an eye out for that.

Morlar

berettaman wrote: »

Thanks for that Morlar, I will definitely keep an eye out for that.

I have many of them recorded, & some are on youtube :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nUZjtGwvZeA

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lSaWxeV6mkQ

(I think it you watch one it should show the next segment afterwards - about 5 or 6 per episode)

I found a website once which listed off about 20-30 episode titles (can't seem to find it at the moment). I haven't been able to find much about it otherwise. Unfortunately they are not availble on dvd boxset to my knowledge.

berettaman

Morlar,
Thank you for the links, I will watch them with interest over the weekend.
B