The Renee Descartes Appreciation Thread

RandomnoobIII

"I think therefore I am"

AhSureTisGrand

"Cogito ergo sum"
"Je pense donc je suis"

Now that's out of the way, what else did he do?

Odysseus

I much more perfer Lacan's spin on it "I think where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking".

philologos

That quote is only in any way profound when one reads through the argument he makes in the Meditations on First Philosophy. I think that the empirical view of reality alá Locke, Hume and Berkeley is much more effective than that of Cartesian rationalism, but you can't deny that Descartes is an excellent writer and an excellent thinker even if some of his conclusions might fall short from what they claim to be.

Morbert

"I think therefore I am"

Do I think?

Morbert

AhSureTisGrand wrote: »

"Cogito ergo sum"
"Je pense donc je suis"

Now that's out of the way, what else did he do?

His greatest and most insightful contribution to mankind are in his works of mathematics and physics. He developed algebraic representations of geometry. Every time a physicist or mathematician says "cartesian co-ordinates", they are referencing him.

His philosophy, while interesting, isn't really that amazing.

AhSureTisGrand

Morbert wrote: »

Do I think?

I think so

Morbert

AhSureTisGrand wrote: »

I think so

How do you know you think so?

AhSureTisGrand

Morbert wrote: »

How do you know you think so?

If I didn't know I thought so then I wouldn't think so

philologos

Morbert wrote: »

His philosophy, while interesting, isn't really that amazing.

Well it is interesting, but I find it doesn't do what it says on the tin. He starts off doubting everything, and in some cases uses jumps to get to where he wants to be. That's why you can't take any part of his Meditations on First Philosophy really in isolation, but you have to read it all.

Morbert

Jakkass wrote: »

Well it is interesting, but I find it doesn't do what it says on the tin. He starts off doubting everything, and in some cases uses jumps to get to where he wants to be. That's why you can't take any part of his Meditations on First Philosophy really in isolation, but you have to read it all.

The trouble is he doesn't doubt everything. "I doubt" is an assumption, and not necessarily true.

"I think therefore I am." should be changed to "I might think therefore I might be."

Morbert

AhSureTisGrand wrote: »

If I didn't know I thought so then I wouldn't think so

So if you don't know you "thought so" then you wouldn't think so. If the assumption "you know" is true, then you think so. If it is false then you might not think so. See the trouble? Regarding what exists, there will always be an assumption that might or might not be true.

philologos

Yes Morbert, but he claims to at least what has been derived from testimony and sense perception.

Morbert

Jakkass wrote: »

Yes Morbert, but he claims to at least what has been derived from testimony and sense perception.

So he can not say for certain that he exists.

AhSureTisGrand

Brain hurts...

philologos

Morbert wrote: »

So he can not say for certain that he exists.

There are gaping holes in Descartes argument, but it is still nonetheless interesting to see how he gets to where he wants to get to.

raah!

I have a book of his "Key philosophical ideas" waiting on my shelf for the summer time and thus far I've only read brief summaries. But could someone tell me what "I think therefore, I am" is't fully deductive.

I would imagine that the "I" in "I think" garauntees the "I am". In what sense can "I doubt" be not true? I always thought that he arrived at a rather firm axiomatic base. To doubt the assumption is to validate it, as far as I know. I've heard of him smuggling in the I before, but could someone show me the weakness of the "I doubt" part?

philologos

raah! wrote: »

I have a book of his "Key philosophical ideas" waiting on my shelf for the summer time and thus far I've only read brief summaries. But could someone tell me what "I think therefore, I am" is't fully deductive.

I would imagine that the "I" in "I think" garauntees the "I am". In what sense can "I doubt" be not true? I always thought that he arrived at a rather firm axiomatic base. To doubt the assumption is to validate it, as far as I know. I've heard of him smuggling in the I before, but could someone show me the weakness of the "I doubt" part?

Its a phrase in book 2 of his Meditations. He tries to prove that he exists in that even if he manages to doubt all things effectively that he is still in the doubting, he is still thinking, and it is in this thinking that he exists in so far that he is an existing being. It is in this book of the Meditations when he starts to note that an external body is not necessary in order to know, but one can know things out of pure reason.

Later in the book he uses the analogy of wax. We originally know wax from its hard texture, and we know it from its scent, but what happens when we put wax to fire? Doesn't it melt. All of its characteristics change, including its texture and scent, and more than likely its colour. If this is true, it cannot be by sense perception that we determine that the wax is what it is. It must be by reason.

I think it is a cleverly put argument, but there is a flaw in that we know that wax melts only by experience. If I didn't know what wax was, and if I didn't know that the wax had the propensity to melt, I may not assume that it is the same matter, or that it could be still referred to as wax. Empiricism seems more likely to be the reason why we call melted wax, wax as we do non-melted wax.

His argument depends on how we can possibly distinguish sense perception from rational thought, or can we at all? In the other books he generally reconstructs things such as the relationship between mind and body but it takes quite a long time to get to.

I may read it all again at some point because it does take careful reading to follow him.

L31mr0d

Descartes walks into a bar.

The bartender says, "Are you having a beer?"

Descartes says, "I think not..."

and ceases to exist.

philologos

At least when Descartes said we didn't exist it was only in the rhetorical sense, one should look up George Berkeley if you want to read someone who believed that we actually don't materially exist and not only believed it but had an excellent and irrefutable argument to back it up :pac:

Morbert

raah! wrote: »

I have a book of his "Key philosophical ideas" waiting on my shelf for the summer time and thus far I've only read brief summaries. But could someone tell me what "I think therefore, I am" is't fully deductive.

I would imagine that the "I" in "I think" garauntees the "I am". In what sense can "I doubt" be not true? I always thought that he arrived at a rather firm axiomatic base. To doubt the assumption is to validate it, as far as I know. I've heard of him smuggling in the I before, but could someone show me the weakness of the "I doubt" part?

"Doubting" is a verb, and is performed by something. An assumption may or may not be true, but this does not imply it is "doubted" by someone. The assumption "The sun will rise tomorrow" may be true or false even if there is nobody around to doubt the assumption.

raah!

But what i don't get is, if ,as you say, and as Descartes does, it takes a thing to doubt, Then if there is doubting there is a thing? Doesn't that support his thing? As far as my limited knowledge leands me to believe we could replace his "I think, with I doubt"

But why then can't we say that "I doubt" is of a firmer axiomatic grounding than say "the sun will rise"? Because we can doubt the latter, but not the former.

Regardless of any external absolute truths, can't we say that in terms of "certainty", his "I think therefore I am" is fairly certain, deductively certain even. And in terms of axioms, the "I doubt" is very good because it cannot be doubted.

Sorry, if you've already ironed this out, but I was always very impressed with him taking doubt as his foremost axiom.

Cannibal Ox

If he said, I doubt, therefore I am, he would always have to doubt I am to consistently maintain his position. But this isn't what he wants to do. He wants a position of absolute certainty rather then a speculative position of doubt, he wants I think.

His intention in the Meditations is to establish a method, comparable to science and maths, that can gain access to objective truth. He can't limit himself to speculation, he has to go the full way and claim he has found a position certainty.

Edit: And the problem with "I think" itself is the assumption that "I" contains absolutely everything in you that thinks and that you are absolutely conscious of those processes. That isn't quite as clear cut as Descartes would like.

Morbert

raah! wrote: »

But what i don't get is, if ,as you say, and as Descartes does, it takes a thing to doubt, Then if there is doubting there is a thing? Doesn't that support his thing? As far as my limited knowledge leands me to believe we could replace his "I think, with I doubt"

But why then can't we say that "I doubt" is of a firmer axiomatic grounding than say "the sun will rise"? Because we can doubt the latter, but not the former.

Regardless of any external absolute truths, can't we say that in terms of "certainty", his "I think therefore I am" is fairly certain, deductively certain even. And in terms of axioms, the "I doubt" is very good because it cannot be doubted.

Sorry, if you've already ironed this out, but I was always very impressed with him taking doubt as his foremost axiom.

We both agree that I cannot doubt the general claim "I doubt". But that does not imply "I doubt" is necessarily true. An axiomatic system where "I doubt" is false, can be just as consistent as an axiomatic system where "I doubt" is true, and either axiomatic system could be more 'real' than the other.

philologos

The problem for me isn't in the doubting, it is in what Descartes is trying to do next. Rebuild everything from doubt. He fails IMO from the first hurdle by assuming rationalism in how we understand wax.

RandolphEsq

I think that I am thinking. I know that I think that I am thinking. I think that I know that I think that I am thinking. I don't know if I know that I think that I know that I think that I am thinking. Therefore; I am hungry for some fried chicken.

raah!

Cannibal Ox wrote: »

If he said, I doubt, therefore I am, he would always have to doubt I am to consistently maintain his position. But this isn't what he wants to do. He wants a position of absolute certainty rather then a speculative position of doubt, he wants I think.

His intention in the Meditations is to establish a method, comparable to science and maths, that can gain access to objective truth. He can't limit himself to speculation, he has to go the full way and claim he has found a position certainty.

Edit: And the problem with "I think" itself is the assumption that "I" contains absolutely everything in you that thinks and that you are absolutely conscious of those processes. That isn't quite as clear cut as Descartes would like.

Well he could fairly easily travel from the "I doubt" to the "I think".

But your edit there is what I would like to know about. It was my undertanding that if I anything I am. Or even if it anythings, then it is.

Could we reduce it to "I think, therefore at the very least my thinking faculties are"? And is this in anyway an indicator of descartes rationalism in thinking that He is the part of him that thinks.

Are you saying that there is some aspect which isn't described by I that thinks?

Morbert wrote: »

We both agree that I cannot doubt the general claim "I doubt". But that does not imply "I doubt" is necessarily true. An axiomatic system where "I doubt" is false, can be just as consistent as an axiomatic system where "I doubt" is true, and either axiomatic system could be more 'real' than the other.

Well it does imply that it is necessarily more certain than any other axiomatic system. The "objective external truth" could only be evaluated through other axiomatic systems of which we could doubtful.

Jakkass wrote: »

The problem for me isn't in the doubting, it is in what Descartes is trying to do next. Rebuild everything from doubt. He fails IMO from the first hurdle by assuming rationalism in how we understand wax.

Yes I don't believe he achieved that goal in any sense whatsoever. But I always thought the starting point was fairly solid.

Morbert

raah! wrote: »

Well it does imply that it is necessarily more certain than any other axiomatic system. The "objective external truth" could only be evaluated through other axiomatic systems of which we could doubtful.

Again, by using the word "doubtful" you are implicitly assuming someone is doubting. I said "An axiomatic system where "I doubt" is false, can be just as consistent as an axiomatic system where "I doubt" is true, and either axiomatic system could be more 'real' than the other.". You have simply shown that it is logically inconsistent for me to doubt the axiom "I doubt". But you have not demonstrated that "I doubt" is necessarily true.

raah!

Well it's not possible to demonstrate that it's true, since it's the first step, and no reference can be made to anything else to justify it.

But it can be demonstrated that it is "more certain" than any other axiomatic system. If the first sentence is "I doubt" then I doubt is true, and it's an undoubtable first axiom. For any other system it is possible for us to doubt the first axiom. It is possible for us to possess uncertainties regarding them, they are therefore more uncertain. That is, they can be equally logically consistent, and certain internally, but with regard to doubting the axioms form without, the system starting with "I doubt" is the most certain of all.

Morbert

raah! wrote: »

Well it's not possible to demonstrate that it's true, since it's the first step, and no reference can be made to anything else to justify it.

Exactly. Metaphysical nihilism is the "solution" to much of philosophy.

But it can be demonstrated that it is "more certain" than any other axiomatic system. If the first sentence is "I doubt" then I doubt is true, and it's an undoubtable first axiom. For any other system it is possible for us to doubt the first axiom. It is possible for us to possess uncertainties regarding them, they are therefore more uncertain. That is, they can be equally logically consistent, and certain internally, but with regard to doubting the axioms form without, the system starting with "I doubt" is the most certain of all.

And in post #21 I pointed out that "undoubtable" does not mean necessarily true. It might be impossible to doubt something, but that something could still be false. If there is nobody around, the rising of the sun cannot be doubted, but it still might not be true. Similarly, "I doubt" cannot be doubted, as it would be logically inconsistent, but it still might not be true. So we can be certain that "I doubt" is undoubtable, but we cannot be certain it is true.

raah!

But can we not be more certain that it is true than we can be of something which we can doubt?

philologos

Morbert wrote: »

Exactly. Metaphysical nihilism is the "solution" to much of philosophy.

I wouldn't call it a solution in earnest. It is a solution only in so far as one doesn't have to exert oneself to think about those pesky metaphysical questions such as "Why is there something rather than nothing?" which urge us to look to the source of being itself or indeed to study the nature of being.

Morbert

Jakkass wrote: »

I wouldn't call it a solution in earnest. It is a solution only in so far as one doesn't have to exert oneself to think about those pesky metaphysical questions such as "Why is there something rather than nothing?" which urge us to look to the source of being itself or indeed to study the nature of being.

This is why I put solution in quotation marks. Nihilism is true in the purest sense of the word, but it is also next to useless.

Though with that said, it can help us explore the underpinnings of questions like "Why is there something rather than nothing?". If we can't even answer the philosophical question "Is there something?" then it could be a little ambitious to answer the question "Why is there something?". In fact, we don't even know if the question is answerable. Would you, for example, say there is an answer to the question "Why is there a God, rather than nothing?"

Morbert

raah! wrote: »

But can we not be more certain that it is true than we can be of something which we can doubt?

You would have to show that, if we cannot consistently doubt a premise, it is true, or is more likely to be true. The trouble is probably with the conflation of "not being certain" and "doubting" that is common in casual language.

philologos

Morbert wrote: »

Though with that said, it can help us explore the underpinnings of questions like "Why is there something rather than nothing?". If we can't even answer the philosophical question "Is there something?" then it could be a little ambitious to answer the question "Why is there something?". In fact, we don't even know if the question is answerable. Would you, for example, say there is an answer to the question "Why is there a God, rather than nothing?"

Good post.

I wouldn't think that most people would doubt that there is a something. René Descartes only does it initially in order that he might stumble through his Meditations in order to re-establish ourselves, our appendages, our senses, our external bodies and God.
George Berkeley is the only person I know of who doubts consistently the existence of the material objects of the world, in favour of the idea that God fully feeds our minds the sense perceptions that it deciphers.

The last question is what is way more interesting. I think there is some truth in what you are saying. I think the questions differ personally because the universe has a temporal nature, God at least in how He is claimed in most traditions doesn't have a temporal nature. All things which are temporal have a cause, and all things that are not don't. This is the reason why we can say why is there something rather than nothing in respect to the universe, and not why is there a God rather than nothing. It's an intriguing question to ask certainly, but I don't think it is answerable in the same way that placing this question in respect to the universe is.

Morbert

Jakkass wrote: »

The last question is what is way more interesting. I think there is some truth in what you are saying. I think the questions differ personally because the universe has a temporal nature, God at least in how He is claimed in most traditions doesn't have a temporal nature. All things which are temporal have a cause, and all things that are not don't. This is the reason why we can say why is there something rather than nothing in respect to the universe, and not why is there a God rather than nothing. It's an intriguing question to ask certainly, but I don't think it is answerable in the same way that placing this question in respect to the universe is.

As an aside: The question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is generally inferred as broader/deeper than questions like "What caused the universe?". The former implies there are at least two possible cases: One with nothing, and one with something (say, an atemporal causeless God), and is asking why the case with something should be true, and the other false.

Morbert

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMFPe-DwULM

One of my favourite youtube videos on the difficulties of "why" questions, by one of my favourite physicists.

raah!

Morbert wrote: »

You would have to show that, if we cannot consistently doubt a premise, it is true, or is more likely to be true. The trouble is probably with the conflation of "not being certain" and "doubting" that is common in casual language.

Ah yeah, I see the two points of disagrement here.

One was that I was indeed conflating "not being certain" and "being doubtfu". I think that while they might not mean exactly the same thing, there is definitely a relationship between the extent to which we are doubtful about something and the extent to which we are certain about it. I would be curious to hear an argument differentiating between degrees of doubt and degrees of uncertainty.

I think my main failure to understand you however stems from the fact that I only think things are 'true' insofar as we can justify or defend them. For example, to say that something does not correspond to 'reality' is often saying that it does not correspond to what you have observed. We cannot talk about truth or reality without proffering arguments to support this view of external truth or reality.

When viewed in this sense, Descartes "I doubt" is more likely to be true since whether or not something is true depends on whether or not we can justify it. And the "I doubt" is more free from doubt than other systems. While it is not positively justified, it is in a better dialectical position than other systems, and is therefore closer to the truth.

Morbert

raah! wrote: »

Ah yeah, I see the two points of disagrement here.

One was that I was indeed conflating "not being certain" and "being doubtfu". I think that while they might not mean exactly the same thing, there is definitely a relationship between the extent to which we are doubtful about something and the extent to which we are certain about it. I would be curious to hear an argument differentiating between degrees of doubt and degrees of uncertainty.

If you don't exist, you don't doubt things, but neither are you certain of them. So me not being able to doubt the statement "I doubt" is consistent with me not existing, and "I doubt" being false.

I think my main failure to understand you however stems from the fact that I only think things are 'true' insofar as we can justify or defend them. For example, to say that something does not correspond to 'reality' is often saying that it does not correspond to what you have observed. We cannot talk about truth or reality without proffering arguments to support this view of external truth or reality.

When viewed in this sense, Descartes "I doubt" is more likely to be true since whether or not something is true depends on whether or not we can justify it. And the "I doubt" is more free from doubt than other systems. While it is not positively justified, it is in a better dialectical position than other systems, and is therefore closer to the truth.

We can't justify it. It is an axiom, an assumption which is taken as true without justification. Showing that we cannot doubt it does not justify it.

raah!

Morbert wrote: »

If you don't exist, you don't doubt things, but neither are you certain of them. So me not being able to doubt the statement "I doubt" is consistent with me not existing, and "I doubt" being false.

Yes, but in this case the I doubt is linked to the existing, so that rules out these considerations.

We can't justify it. It is an axiom, an assumption which is taken as true without justification. Showing that we cannot doubt it does not justify it.

It's not so much justifying it as it is a case of its being less vulnerable than others. It's dialectically stronger not because we give any positive justification but because it is more immune from criticism. It might seem a ridiculous thing to say, but this is a case of its being "more self-evident" than other axioms.

Only very recently I used to think "how can something be more self evident than another?", and I think this in a way answers it. There are pre-axiomatic thought processes, and criticisms from other axiomatic systems.

Morbert

raah! wrote: »

Yes, but in this case the I doubt is linked to the existing, so that rules out these considerations.

I hate using logical fallacy slang, but that is a non-sequitur. Yes, the case is linked to existing insofar as there is an argument as follows: "I am doubting, therefore I am thinking, therefore I am."

I am saying "I am doubting" is a premise that may or may not be true, hence "I am" may or may not be true. You are saying since it cannot be consistently doubted, it is more likely to be true. I explained why this is not the case (i.e. there is no established implication between "I cannot doubt that I doubt" and "It is true that I doubt" or "It is true that I exist"), and you have said such considerations are "ruled out". Why are they ruled out? There are completely relevant considerations. You must consider the fact that, while it is inconsistent to say "I doubt that I doubt", it in no way implies "I doubt" is true, more likely to be true, or even "less vulnerable" to being false. And it in no way implies I exist. Why would we not consider this in this case?

It's not so much justifying it as it is a case of its being less vulnerable than others. It's dialectically stronger not because we give any positive justification but because it is more immune from criticism. It might seem a ridiculous thing to say, but this is a case of its being "more self-evident" than other axioms.

Only very recently I used to think "how can something be more self evident than another?", and I think this in a way answers it. There are pre-axiomatic thought processes, and criticisms from other axiomatic systems.

In post #38 you said you consider truth in terms of what can be justified or defended. You have justified that "I doubt" is not vulnerable to doubt. But you have not justified the claim that "I doubt" is more likely to be true. And I do not consider "I doubt" to be self-evident at all. In fact, the moral of the story behind nihilism is there is nothing self-evident about existence.

raah!

Morbert wrote: »

I hate using logical fallacy slang, but that is a non-sequitur. Yes, the case is linked to existing insofar as there is an argument as follows: "I am doubting, therefore I am thinking, therefore I am."

I am saying "I am doubting" is a premise that may or may not be true, hence "I am" may or may not be true. You are saying since it cannot be consistently doubted, it is more likely to be true. I explained why this is not the case (i.e. there is no established implication between "I cannot doubt that I doubt" and "It is true that I doubt" or "It is true that I exist"), and you have said such considerations are "ruled out". Why are they ruled out?

The considerations I was ruling out were the ones in which:

Morbert wrote: »

If you don't exist, you don't doubt things, but neither are you certain of them. So me not being able to doubt the statement "I doubt" is consistent with me not existing, and "I doubt" being false.

While this is certainly a case in which not being able to doubt something does not validate it, it can be fairly easily ruled out in our statement of "I doubt therefore I am". Since the latter statement is entailed by the former.

If we rule out the case of a non-existent thing not being able to doubt, then I think it is the case that not being able to doubt something makes it more true. Even if the person was crazy, for them, the truest statements would be the one's about which they had the least doubt.

There are completely relevant considerations. You must consider the fact that, while it is inconsistent to say "I doubt that I doubt", it in no way implies "I doubt" is true, more likely to be true, or even "less vulnerable" to being false. And it in no way implies I exist. Why would we not consider this in this case?

In post #38 you said you consider truth in terms of what can be justified or defended. You have justified that "I doubt" is not vulnerable to doubt. But you have not justified the claim that "I doubt" is more likely to be true. And I do not consider "I doubt" to be self-evident at all.

Perhaps I was not clear. If something cannot be doubted, then it is on a more certain footing than something which can. And since the 'truth' or 'realness' of any statement can only be evaluated using our cognitive faculities, statements we are more certain of are more true.

You could say "this person is sure that there is a dragon there, but it's an illusion", but it would still stand that for that person, the existence of the dragon is more true than it's non-existence since the person is sure of it's existence. If someone were to say "that's not true", they would be saying from their point of view. Every time anyone makes any statement about whether or not something is true, they will have to be doing it from their perspective, with their own degrees of certainty.

Again, for me, I see the truth of something for a person, resting solely on how sure they are of it, how well they are able to support it dialectically.

I don't understand how you could talk about a reality external from people. Even from a scientific perspective, where we approach closer to objectivity through moving from the individual to a group of people, things will still only be true or false from the communal axiomatic perspective of those people. In this sense, true just means "I'm very sure of this". Though perhaps this is not a correct view.

In fact, the moral of the story behind nihilism is there is nothing self-evident about existence.

Well I agree, but if we are operating within a system in which it is acceptable to go from an "I [verb]" to an "I am". Then the surest of all the "I [verb]" is the "I doubt" or the "I think". Of course, this is based on my earlier "not being able to doubt something makes it more true".

I am sorry if I have asked too many questions, it has been profitable to me however. I still don't know why the "I think" or the "I doubt" would not be self evident, as I said I suspect it's something to do with the whole shebang being smuggled in in the "I", but I guess I can read about this over the summer and perhaps rejoin the thread then :pac:

sponsoredwalk

The first three & a half chapters on Discourse on Method had a profound
impact on me. He basically, from my point of view, described both the
artistic & scientific perspective of reality in those short passages. I thought
it was so good that I still am able to overlook the fact that he defeated
himself in the second half of the book.

Necogitas ergo es?

For me this book is so profound because the first half would describe
the motivation of a scientists or artist but the second half is where the
philosophy should have ended & the evidence-based thinking begins.
From what I know this is the perspective of many philosophers of science
in a way but it really doesn't matter what they think, all you need to do
is read that portion of the book & think about it for this to make sense.

Morbert

raah! wrote: »

The considerations I was ruling out were the ones in which:

While this is certainly a case in which not being able to doubt something does not validate it, it can be fairly easily ruled out in our statement of "I doubt therefore I am". Since the latter statement is entailed by the former.

It is stated that *if* I doubt *then* I am. "I doubt" is undoubtable, but since we have already established that undoubtable does not mean necessarily true, we cannot say "I doubt" (and hence "I am") is necessarily true, and hence we cannot rule anything out. The only way we would be able to rule things out is if we made extra assumptions, which would defeat the whole purpose of the exercise.

If we rule out the case of a non-existent thing not being able to doubt, then I think it is the case that not being able to doubt something makes it more true. Even if the person was crazy, for them, the truest statements would be the one's about which they had the least doubt.

If something is necessarily true, it would be necessarily true for everyone. A chronically gullible/crazy person person might not be able to doubt any statement, and might operate under a set of axioms where any statement is considered true, but that does not mean any of those statements are true.

Perhaps I was not clear. If something cannot be doubted, then it is on a more certain footing than something which can. And since the 'truth' or 'realness' of any statement can only be evaluated using our cognitive faculities, statements we are more certain of are more true.

"I doubt" is not more certain though. I cannot doubt "I doubt" but I am not certain of it.

You could say "this person is sure that there is a dragon there, but it's an illusion", but it would still stand that for that person, the existence of the dragon is more true than it's non-existence since the person is sure of it's existence. If someone were to say "that's not true", they would be saying from their point of view. Every time anyone makes any statement about whether or not something is true, they will have to be doing it from their perspective, with their own degrees of certainty.

Again, for me, I see the truth of something for a person, resting solely on how sure they are of it, how well they are able to support it dialectically.

I don't understand how you could talk about a reality external from people. Even from a scientific perspective, where we approach closer to objectivity through moving from the individual to a group of people, things will still only be true or false from the communal axiomatic perspective of those people. In this sense, true just means "I'm very sure of this". Though perhaps this is not a correct view.

The statement "stands for that person" needs to unpacked. By saying "A dragon exists" is true for that person, we are really saying that the claim "There exists a dragon" follows from the particular set of axioms that person is operating under. It does not mean the existence of a dragon is necessarily true. If "I doubt" is an axiom of a system, then "I am" follows from that system, but might not be true.

Well I agree, but if we are operating within a system in which it is acceptable to go from an "I [verb]" to an "I am". Then the surest of all the "I [verb]" is the "I doubt" or the "I think". Of course, this is based on my earlier "not being able to doubt something makes it more true".

I am sorry if I have asked too many questions, it has been profitable to me however. I still don't know why the "I think" or the "I doubt" would not be self evident, as I said I suspect it's something to do with the whole shebang being smuggled in in the "I", but I guess I can read about this over the summer and perhaps rejoin the thread then :pac:

Ultimately, the problem is the argument "I think therefore I am" is an attempt to remove assumptions, so that we have a concrete foundation to build true statements upon, and hence know what it true and what isn't. Nihilists like myself hold that the assumption has merely been replaced with another assumption "I think" or, more specifically "I doubt". (I have to stress again that the undoubtable nature of the assumption does not make it any less of an assumption.) And if we are allowed to define what is true and what is false as what "stands for specific people", then there is really no point to "I think therefore I am". We might as well assume "I am" is true from the start. In fact, this is what most people do anyway.

nyarlothothep

Maybe trying to prove the truth of initial assumptions stems from a human need for certainty in the world with which to make judgements about it, for the purpose of action. Perhaps the experience of existence and things like enjoyment etc are enough in themselves without asking why these things are in a metaphysical sense, and I don't think that the inability to answer such question about them devalues our understanding of them or the experience of them, whether the experience is true or not isn't really important as truth is just another human construct to be certain about a probabilistic world rooted in perception. The fact that we do experience sentience makes it sufficiently real to us, we may not in a mechanistic sense be sentient but the experience would make us think otherwise. Asking why we are in an absolutist sense is I think impossible because it seems our thoughts are bound by the logic of reality if we we want to make coherent statements. Although I find it interesting that we can think of the existence of concepts like truth, perfection and certainty in the first place when they don't exist in the world.

CerebralCortex

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPrnfM5HtNg