Gary Doyle Order

JJJJNR

Can someone explain to me what a Gary Doyle order is, and does it apply to a case that has came to a conclusion ie after sentencing. Can such an application be effective in an appeal.

Tom Young

http://www.dppireland.ie/filestore/documents/Chapter_9_Disclosure.htm

See link:

Disclosure

General

9.1 The constitutional rights to a trial in due course of law and to fair procedures found in Articles 38.1 and 40.3 of the Constitution of Ireland place a duty on the prosecution to disclose to the defence all relevant evidence which is within its possession. That duty was stated by McCarthy J. in The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Tuite (Frewen 175) as follows:

"The Constitutional right to fair procedures demands that the prosecution be conducted fairly; it is the duty of the prosecution, whether adducing such evidence or not, where possible, to make available all relevant evidence, parol or otherwise, in its possession, so that if the prosecution does not adduce such evidence, the defence may, if it wishes, do so".

9.2 In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Special Criminal Court [1999] 1 IR 60, Carney J. (at p.76, in a passage subsequently approved by the Supreme Court at p.81) defined relevant material as evidence which "might help the defence case, help to disparage the prosecution case or give a lead to other evidence".

"the prosecution are under a duty to disclose to the defence any material which may be relevant to the case which could either help the defence or damage the prosecution and that if there is such material which is in their possession they are under a constitutional duty to make that available to the defence"- McKevitt v. Director of Public Prosecutions (Supreme Court, 18 March 2003, Keane C.J.).

9.3 The prosecution is therefore obliged to disclose to the defence all relevant evidence which is within its possession. A person charged with a criminal offence has a right to be furnished, firstly, with details of the prosecution evidence that is to be used at the trial, and secondly, with evidence in the prosecution's possession which the prosecution does not intend to use if that evidence could be relevant or could assist the defence. The extent of the duty to disclose is determined by concepts of constitutional justice, natural justice, fair procedures and due process of law as well as by statutory principles. The limits of this duty are not precisely delineated and depend upon the circumstances of each case. Further, the duty to disclose is an ongoing one and turns upon matters which are in issue at any time.

9.4 Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights also guarantees a person charged with a criminal offence the right to a fair hearing and:

"to be informed promptly in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him".

The Convention provides guidance concerning the minimum rights of accused persons as they are guaranteed throughout Europe and has been incorporated into Irish domestic law by the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003.

9.5 The precise scope of the duty to disclose differs as between cases which are triable summarily in the District Court and those triable on indictment and are discussed separately below at paragraph 9.6.

Summary Prosecutions

9.6 The scope of the duty of disclosure in summary prosecutions has been defined by the Supreme Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Gary Doyle [1994] 2 IR 286. In the light of that judgment the following principles should be observed by the prosecution:

there is no general duty on the prosecution in a summary case to furnish in advance the statements of intended witnesses whether or not there is a request for them from the defence. However, if there is some reason arising from the particular circumstances of a case why advance disclosure of the details of the case, whether by furnishing statements or otherwise, is necessary in the interest of justice, this should be done whether or not there is a request;
the test to be applied by a court on an application by the defence to be furnished pre-trial with the statements on which the prosecution case will proceed is whether "in the interests of justice on the facts of the particular case" this should be done (Gary Doyle's case, at p.301). The requirements of justice must be considered in relation to the seriousness of the charge and the consequences for the accused. Very minor cases may not require that statements be furnished. Complexity of the case is also a factor. Amongst the matters which the Supreme Court in Gary Doyle identified as possibly relevant to the court's decision were:
"(a) the seriousness of the charge;

(b) the importance of the statements or documents;

(c) the fact that the accused has already been adequately informed of the nature and substance of the accusation;

(d) the likelihood that there is no risk of injustice in failing to furnish the statements or documents in issue to the accused."

(Gary Doyle's case, at p.302);

in making a decision whether to furnish statements the prosecutor should have regard to the principles set out in Gary Doyle's case and referred to above;
a request for statements made by the defence should be considered in the context of the witnesses whom it is proposed to call at the trial and whether the Gary Doyle principles require disclosure. It is primarily a matter for the defence, when requesting statements in summary cases, to advance the reason or reasons why the accused considers that statements should be furnished. If the defence does not advance any adequate reason for disclosure, and the case does not appear to be one where the Gary Doyle principles require disclosure, then they need not be furnished without an order of the court;
statements or information not intended to be tendered at a summary trial should be furnished to the defence where it is necessary in the interest of justice. This should be done with or without a request. This includes statements or information which, even if the prosecutor does not regard them as reliable, might reasonably be regarded as of assistance to the defence;
while the Gary Doyle case arose from indictable offences which were being dealt with summarily, the principles set out in that case are applicable to all offences being tried summarily.

Carawaystick

From what you posted there Tom, would what Keane said in the McKevvit case in 2003 not supersede the Gary Doyle case from '94?

Tom Young

No.