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stereotypes about the Red Army and Soviet Union

  • 20-08-2010 12:43pm
    #1
    Registered Users, Registered Users 2 Posts: 837 ✭✭✭


    Posted this up at another forum and be interested to see you guys opinions:

    David Glantz, in his paper American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II puts forth the theory that the following sterotypes prevailed about the Red Army and the Eastern Front. Do you agree and also do you think some of these still exist?

    Here is the link to the whole article: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/e-front.htm

    Here is a part of the paper dealing with the stereotypes. I'd be interested to read what people think:



    The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front and the negative perception of Soviet source materials have had an indelible impact on the American image of war on the Eastern Front. What has resulted in a series of gross judgments treated as truths regarding operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Army combat performance. The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme. Each lies someplace between the realm of myth and reality. In summary, a few of these judgments are as follows:

    - Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German operational aims.

    - Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority.

    - Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses.

    - Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal.

    - Soviet planning was rigid, and the execution of plans at every level was inflexible and unimaginative.

    - Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible.

    - The Soviets operated in two echelons, never cross attached units, and attacked along straight axes.

    - Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have ensured.

    - Hitler was the cause of virtually all German defeats. Army expertise produced earlier victories (a variation of the post World War I stab in the back. legend).

    - The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty.


Comments

  • Closed Accounts Posts: 9,273 ✭✭✭Morlar


    David Glantz, in his paper American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II puts forth the theory that the following sterotypes prevailed about the Red Army and the Eastern Front.

    Who says they are stereotypes ?

    Any general view is general, there are always exceptions but the general view can still be correct.
    Do you agree and also do you think some of these still exist?
    ..
    Here is the link to the whole article: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/e-front.htm
    Here is a part of the paper dealing with the stereotypes. I'd be interested to read what people think:

    The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front and the negative perception of Soviet source materials have had an indelible impact on the American image of war on the Eastern Front.

    I think you have to define 'source materials' here, do you mean propaganda materials or everything else ? Going on the presumption that the American military would take German wartime propaganda with at least a pinch of salt here, or does 'source materials' refer to post war published memoirs, unit and regimental histories and so on ?

    Sources which ended up in West Germany as opposed to East Germany or the Soviet Union had a lot more freedom from state censorship to publish - so straight off the bat postwar German sources are at an advantage over soviet ones in my estimation.
    What has resulted in a series of gross judgments treated as truths regarding operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Army combat performance. The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme. Each lies someplace between the realm of myth and reality. In summary, a few of these judgments are as follows:

    Before we get into that - does the author offer so much a shred of evidence that the following 'generalities' he seeks to shed doubt upon are in fact incorrect ?
    - Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German operational aims.

    Weather was a factor for the Wehrmacht in the war in the east - it did affect the fulfillment of German aims.
    - Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority.

    In a great many cases this is true.
    - Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses.

    Nothing is inexhaustible - the soviets did have truly vast, phenomenal reserves of manpower to draw upon in comparison with the Germans. They did have a tendency to throw men to the front. There are many multiple individual and disconnected accounts of German soldiers whose memoirs were subsequently published, or who were later interviewed by journalists for documentaries which would bear this out. The communist ideology did not favour the individual. Take a look at how the soviets treated their own men who were captured by the Germans, nevermind those who changed sides. I have seen Red Army commanders talk of how in one example, a unit had an impossible task, poorly equipped and poorly led and poorly armed they placed their unit's machine gun behind their own lines to shoot any retreating red army soldiers rather than place it at the front. Any argument that the soviet system favoured/cherished the individual would have a long way to go in my view.
    - Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal.

    I would not argue for or against this point. Overall I would estimate that political officers/Kommisars interfered rather than helped. Leadership was patchy following purges, leadership at the very top was ignorant and abysmal on many occassions.
    - Soviet planning was rigid, and the execution of plans at every level was inflexible and unimaginative.

    Would not argue for or against this. I would say there are likely examples where it was.
    - Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible.

    I would say in general yes.
    - The Soviets operated in two echelons, never cross attached units, and attacked along straight axes.

    Would not argue for or against.
    - Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have ensured.

    I would have thought it was a critical element. I would not go as far as to say without it defeat would surely have followed.
    - Hitler was the cause of virtually all German defeats. Army expertise produced earlier victories (a variation of the post World War I stab in the back. legend).

    I would not support that notion to begin with.
    - The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty.[/I][/B]

    Later war -

    capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, - absolutely. Also aclimatised to the conditions.

    fatalistic, - I don't see this as inaccurate from what I have read.

    dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), - to the point of being suicidal - at times yes.

    a master of infiltration and night fighting - absolutely, partisan fighting caused the Germans no end of trouble in Russia. Often single russians would stay behind the lines attacking sporadically and often at night. There are many anecdotal incidents of this I can recall from books and documentaries. Possibly the affect was exagerated due to the fear and horror it struck in the Germans.

    inflexible,
    unimaginative,
    emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty

    At times yes - not so much the men at the sharp end as much as the political officers /kommissars who sent the russian men to die.


  • Registered Users, Registered Users 2 Posts: 837 ✭✭✭Prefab Sprouter


    Morlar, at the end of the document is Glantz's endnotes where he publishes his sources. He is not writing this on a whim. I would also note that David Glantz is a fairly reputable historian who had fairly good access to the Soviet Archives. His work is not above reproach but amongst Eastern Front students he comes out fairly well. Here are his sources:



    Endnotes

    1. This view is drawn from a review of newspaper coverage of the war by the New York Times but, more important, by local newspapers as well. It is also based on ten year's experience in teaching and listening to a generation of postwar students at the U.S. Military Academy, The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.BACK

    2. Despite efforts by the Communist Parties of the United States and Great Britain to publicize the Soviet role in war.BACK

    3. Americans also believed, and still believe, the use of the atomic bomb in early August 1945 rendered Soviet operations in Manchuria superfluous.BACK

    4. H. Guderian, Panzer keader, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1957) First edition published in 1952.BACK

    5. F. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972) First edition published in 1956.BACK

    6. Ibid., 185-186, 209, 233-234, 292-304. Mellenthin did, however, note the tremendous improvements in Soviet armored capability during wartime and noted, "The extraordinary development of the Russian tank arm deserves the very careful attention of students of war."BACK

    7. Ibid., 175-185.BACK

    8. One of the few Soviet accounts of action along the Chir River is found in K. K. Rokossovsky, ea., Velikaya pobeda na Volge (The Great Victory on the Volga), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1960), 307-309. An indicator of reduced 1st Tank Corps strength is apparent from German situation maps, see Lagenkarte XXXXVIII Pz-Kps, 7.12.42 through 12.12.42.BACK

    9. Particularly in Mellenthin's brief account of operations in the Donbas in February 1943. The map and text provide incorrect positions for two divisions of II SS Panzer Corps.BACK

    10. E. von Manstein, Lost Victories, (Chicago, Ill: Henry Regnery, 1958).BACK

    11. Manstein cites force ration as being 8:1 in favor of the Soviets opposite Army Groups Don and B and 4:1 against Army Groups Center and North. Fremde Heeres 0st documents dated 1 April 1943 give the ratios of just over 2:1 against Army Groups South and A and 3:2 against Army Groups Center and North. The overall German estimate of Soviet superiority on that date was just under 2:1. See Fremde Heeres 0st Kraftegegenuberstellung: Stand 1.3.43.BACK

    12. For example, H. Schroter, Stalingrad, (London: Michael Joseph, 1958).BACK

    13. DA Pamphlet No. 20-232, Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal, (Department of the Army, October 1951), 36.BACK

    14. H. Reinhardt, "Russian Airborne Operations, "Foreign Military Studies MS No. P-116, Reproduced by the Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953.BACK

    15. DA Pamphlet No. 20-233, German Defensive Tactics Against Russian Break throughs, (Department of the Army, October 1951).BACK

    16. Ibid., 64-70. This article treated German defensive operations between Belgorod and Khar'kov from 5-23 August 1943 and subsequent delaying actions in late August and early September 1943 as a continuous delay, when, in fact, the Germans attempted to hold the Khar'kov area until forced to withdraw by heavy Russian attacks east and west of the city.BACK

    17. A. Werth, Russia at War 1941-1945, (New York: E. P. Dutton Co., 1964).BACK

    18. A. Clark, Barbarossa: The Russo-German Conflict 1941-1945, (London: Hutchinson, 1965).BACK

    19. E. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army,1968).BACK

    20. P. Carell, Hitler Moves East and Scorched Earth, (New York: Little, Brown, 1965, 1966).BACK

    21. A. Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-1945, (London: Arthur Barker, 1971); A. Seaton, The Battle of Moscow, (New York: Playboy Press, 1980), original edition 1971.BACK

    22. J. Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Political-Military History 1918-1941, (London: St. Martins, 1962).BACK

    23. J. Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany,(Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1984), First edition in 1975; J. Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War with Germany, (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1983).BACK

    24. General histories of the war included I. V. Anisimov, G. V. Kuz'min, Velikaya Otechestvennaya voina Sovetskovo Soyaza 1941-1945 gg (The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1952), and F. D. Vorobtev, V. M. Kravtsov, Pobedy Sovetskykh vooruzhennykh sil v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine 1941-1945 (The Victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1953). All were highly political, focused on the role of Stalin, and lacking in any useful military details. A notable exception was one monograph, V. P. Morozov, Zapadnee Voronezha (West of Voronezh), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1956), a work whose factual content and candor set the tone for subsequent studies published after 1958. During this apparently sterile period in terms of military details, substantial articles did appear in some Soviet military journals, in particular in the Journal of Armored and Mechanized Forces (Zhurnal Bronetankovykh I mekhanizirovannykh voisk), and in Military Thought (Voennaya Mysl'), but both of these journals were unavailable to the American reading public and historians as well.BACK

    25. Military History Journal (Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal) is the official organ of the Soviet Ministry of Defense.BACK

    26. S. P. Platonav, ea., Vtoraya miroveya voina 1939-1945 gg (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1958).BACK

    27. K. S. Rolganov, ea., Pazvitie taktiki Sovetskai Armii v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941-1945 gg) (The development of Soviet Army tactics during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945), (Moskva: Voenisdat, 1958). A companion book related the experiences of armored forces.BACK

    28. Among the front and army commanders who did not write memoirs, either because they died during wartime or in the immediate postwar period or because of other reasons were Vatutin (Voronexh and 1st Ukrainian Front commander who died in early 1944), Chernyakovsky (3rd Belorussian Front commander who died in February 1945), Bogdanov (2d Guards Tank Army), Rybalko (3rd Guards Tank Army), and Kravchenko (6th Guards Tank Army). Rotmistrov (5th Guards Tank Army) wrote half of his memoirs before death interrupted his work.BACK

    29. Among which are most of the armies which operated on secondary directions, in particular in 1944 and 1945.BACK

    30. These include operational studies by a single author or by a "collective" of authors or anthologies made up of made up of articles written by distinguished participants in the operation from all command and staff levels.BACK

    31. All of these highly technical studies have been periodically updated to include the results of subsequent research. Most are used in the Soviet military education system.BACK

    32. Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskovo Soyuza 1941-1945 (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945) in 6 volumes (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1960-1965).BACK

    33. Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voiny 1939-1945 (History of the Second World War 1939-1945) in 12 volumes (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1973-1982).BACK

    34. Stalin himself contributed to the military writings in the form of a short general history of the war. In the same period he established his claim as military theorist by enunciating 0a "permanent operating factors" which he claimed governed the conduct and outcome of war.BACK

    35. Recently Military History Journal has published several articles on mechanized forces in the border battles of 1941. Moskalenko was the first to cast light on details of the Khar'kov debacle in his work Na yugozapadnom napravlenii (On the eouthwest direction), (Moskva: Voenisdat, 1972). A. G. Yershov revealed details of the Donbas operation in his work Osvobazdenie Donbassa (The liberation of the Donbas), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1973), but cloaked the material on the Soviet February-March 1943 defeat in details concerning the Soviet victories in the same area later in the year. Characteristically bits and pieces of details about these operations are found in individual unit histories. It is left to the historian to fit the pieces together into a coherent whole.BACK

    36. Such as 3d, 3d Guards, 27th, 28th, 31st, 40th-49th, 52d, 53d, 60th, 70th, and other armies.BACK

    37. For example, the debate between Zhokov and Chuikov over the feasibility of Soviet forces advancing on Berlin in February 1945 at the end of the Vistula-Oder operation and the manner of Zhurkov's conduct of the penetration phase of the Berlin operation.BACK

    38. In Soviet studies involving airborne operations west of Moscow in early 1942 Soviet accounts contain German order of battle data unobtainable in German secondary accounts. See I. I. Lisov, Desantniki-vozdazhnye desanty (Airlanding troops --air landings), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1968).BACK

    39. For example, a German account of the seizure of Barvenkovo in the Donbas in February 1943 talks of the Germans using a ruse to frighten Soviet defenders from the city without a fight. In actuality, Soviet accounts and German records indicate it took several days of heavy fighting to expel Soviet forces from the city. Conversely, what the Soviets described as "heavy street fighting" to secure Khar'kov in August 1943 turned out to be lighter action against German stragglers left behind as the Germans deliberately abandoned the city (albeit against the orders of the German High Command).BACK

    40. This action is described in G. S. Zdanovich, Idem v nastuplenie (On the offensive), (Moskva: Voenixdat, 1980), 47-53.BACK

    41. Interview with Oberst (Formerly Lt.) Helmut Ritgen at the U.S. Army War College in March 1984. Both accounts of the action are confirmed by Lagenkarte XXXXVIII pz. kps, 29.12.42; Kriegs-Tagebuch, Gen. Kdo, XXXXVIII Panzer Korps, 28.12.42, 29.12.42.BACK

    42. For example, Fremde Heeres 0st (Foreign Armies East) assessed Soviet strength on the Eastern Front on 1 November 1944 to be 5.2 million men. Soviet sources claim the strength of their operating forces on the Eastern Front was 6 million men.BACK

    43. OKH (Army High Command) strength reports show roughly 2.1 million German soldiers on the Eastern Front on 1 November 1944 plus about 200,000 men in Allied forces. The Soviets claim they were opposed by 3.1 million -men. On January 1945 Soviet sources cite German armor strength at 4,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. German records show about 3,500 tanks and self-propelled guns. The Soviets credit the Germans with 28,500 guns and mortars while German records show a figure of 5,700. Similar discrepancies between Soviet and German data exist throughout the war.BACK

    44. For example, the Soviets claim they suffered 32,000 killed and wounded in Manchuria and have cited precise figures for some other operations or percentages of losses in particular units during specific operations. Similar figures are usually unobtainable for operations occurring earlier in the war. One can reach gross conclusions about losses from unit histories such as that of the 203rd Rifle Division which, by the end of the Middle Don operation, had losses which reduced the strength of rifle companies to 10-15 men each. In this case full TOE strength would have been 76 men, but most divisions began operations with from 40-60 men per company. Obviously, in this instance losses were high.BACK

    45. This includes extensive analysis of operations done within the context of the U.S. Army War College Art of War symposium which has completed a three year analysis of selected Eastern Front operations from late 1942 through 1945. New Ultra information and material from the Fremde Heeres 0st archives cast new light on the actual intelligence picture upon which Hitler and the Army High Command based their decisions. New German works by such historians as H. Boog, G. Ueberscharl and W. Wette are also challenging traditional views concerning the rationale for German strategic and operational decisions. Most of these works however, are not available in English.BACK


  • Registered Users, Registered Users 2 Posts: 837 ✭✭✭Prefab Sprouter


    Western sources may have been free from state censorship Morlar but when it comes to the Eastern Front even these can be seen to be somewhat skewed. Its very difficult to get a proper picture of the Eastern Front and perhaps we never will.
    What Western Sources would you recommend then as being above reproach when it comes to the Eastern Front?


  • Registered Users, Registered Users 2 Posts: 837 ✭✭✭Prefab Sprouter


    I would also agree with this part of the article where he talks about Guderian and Von Mellenthin's memoirs. I have read them both and agree with his assessment:

    If American wartime impressions of combat on the Eastern Front were vague and imprecise, there was some improvement in that picture during the first decade and a half after war ended. However, during that period a new tendency emerged that colored almost all future works describing events on the Eastern Front. That tendency was to view operations in the East through German eyes and virtually only German eyes. From 1945 to 1958 essentially all works written in English or translated into English about events on the Eastern Front were written by German authors, many of whom were veterans of combat in the East, works moreover, based solely on German sources.

    This German period of war historiography embraced two genre of works. The first included memoirs written during those years when it was both necessary and sensible to dissociate oneself from Hitler or Hitler's policies. Justifiable or not, the writers of these memoirs did just that and essentially laid blame on Hitler for most strategic, operational, and often tactical failures. Thus, an apologetic tone permeated these works. Officers who shared in the success of Hitler's armies refused to shoulder responsibility for the failures of the same armies. Only further research will judge the correctness of their views.

    The first of the postwar memoirs to appear in English was the by now classic work, Panzer Leader, by Heinz Guderian. Guderian's work, which casts considerable light on strategic and operational decisions while Guderian was a panzer group commander in 1941 and later when he became Chief of Staff in 1944, set the tone for future treatment by German generals of Hitler's leadership. Guderian laid at Hitler's feet principal responsibility for all failures of the German Army and for the dismantling of the German General Staff. The German General Staff was portrayed as both used and abused by Hitler throughout the war. Guderian's message was best conveyed by the chapter heading he chose for the section of the Polish War of 1939 which read, "The Beginning of the Disaster." As in most subsequent works, Guderian included little Soviet operational data.

    One of the most influential postwar German war critiques was General von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles published ln English in 1956. Mellenthin's work, an operational/tactical account of considerable merit, echoed the criticism of Hitler voiced by Guderian and showed how Hitler's adverse influence affected tactical operations. Beyond this, Mellenthin's work adopted a didactic approach in order to analyze operations and hence educate officers. Throughout the book are judgments concerning military principles and assessments of the nature of the Soviet fighting men and officers, most of which have been incorporated into the current "body of truth" about Soviet military capabilities. Hence, Mellenthin made such judgments as these: the Russian soldier is tenacious on defense, inflexible on offense, subject to panic when facing unforeseen eventualities, an excellent night fighter, a master of infiltra- tion, a resolute and implacable defender of bridgeheads, and neglectful of the value of human life. As was in the case of Guderian, Mellenthin's experiences against the Red Army encompassed the period before spring 1944 and reflected impressions acquired principally during years of German success.

    Mellenthln's work, written without benefit of archival materials, tended to treat tactical cases without fully describing their operational context. Opposing Soviet units, as in Guderian's work, were faceless. Mellenthin's classic account of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' operations along the Chir River after the encirclement of German 6th Army at Stalingrad stands as an example of the weaknesses of his book. In it he describes the brilliant operations of that panzer corps in fending off assaults by Soviet 5th Tank Army's units which included first the 1st Tank Corps and later 5th Mechanized Corps. On 7-8 December 1942, 11th Panzer Division parried a thrust of 1st Tank Corps at State Farm 79 while on 19 December, 11th Panzer checked the advance of 5th Mechanized Corps. Despite the vivid accounts of these tactical successes, Mellenthin only in passing describes the operational disaster that provided a context for these fleeting tactical successes. For, in fact, while Soviet 5th Tank Army occupied XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' attention, to the northwest Soviet forces overwhelmed and destroyed the Italian 8th Army and severely damaged Army Detachment Hollidt. Moreover, Mellenthin did not mention (probably because he did not know) that Soviet 1st Tank Corps had been in nearly continuous operation since 19 November and was under strength and worn down when it began its march across the Chir.


    He does have a point you know! He's not scorning their work. Merely stating that it gives one viewpoint and doesnt take into account all aspects.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 9,273 ✭✭✭Morlar


    Yes I did read that but it is very general and not related to the specific 'stereotypes' he bulleted in the section you quoted.

    As an example :
    The American view of the war reflected the circumstances surrounding U.S. involvement in the war as well as long term historical attitudes toward European politics in general.1
    =
    Endnotes

    1. This view is drawn from a review of newspaper coverage of the war by the New York Times but, more important, by local newspapers as well. It is also based on ten year's experience in teaching and listening to a generation of postwar students at the U.S. Military Academy, The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.BACK

    ie That source 1 does not relate to the points above instead to vague opinions within the lecture delivered.

    I think you could argue that multiple factors like the cold war, the way Stalin divided Europe after the war and the impression this left on their american former allies, and also things like common travel between West Germany and the west, also the day to day volume of books in German which got translated into English (as opposed to the numbers of books in Russian translated into English) all these factors could have skewed the perception slightly. However as to the specific points above it would be more interesting if the author presented evidence to back up his precise assertions.

    I would agree that overall it is an interesting article


    As an aside - in his review/synopsis of Alan Clark's Barbarossa;
    Alan Clark's survey account of the war in the East, entitled Barbarossa, contained more operational detail.18 However, it still lacked any solid body of Soviet data. Moreover Clark displayed a tendency others would adopt - that is to cover the first two years of war in detail but simply skim over events during the last two years of war. In fact, of the 506 page book, over 400 pages concern the earlier period. This reflected an often expressed judgment that there was little reason to study operations late in the war because the machinations of Hitler so perverted the ability of German commanders to conduct normal reasonable operations.

    There is mention of the fact that soviet data is not included, however there is no mention of whether or not it would have been possible for a british historian in the 1960's to access the soviet archvives in moscow. To the best of my knowledge they remained un-opened until the late 1980's (open to correction on that). You could argue that the lectures' intended audience 'Soviet-American collegium' in moscow, or where it was published ' published in the August 1987 issue of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Journal Voprosy Istorii [Questions of History]' may have known that but why raise that point without clarifying ?


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  • Closed Accounts Posts: 9,273 ✭✭✭Morlar


    Western sources may have been free from state censorship Morlar but when it comes to the Eastern Front even these can be seen to be somewhat skewed. Its very difficult to get a proper picture of the Eastern Front and perhaps we never will.
    What Western Sources would you recommend then as being above reproach when it comes to the Eastern Front?

    Another relevant factor in this discussion would be fact that unlike the 'Soviet - Communist' side the nazis did not remain in power until the 1980's.

    Can you imagine if they had ? Would you trust sources emanating from within a stifling, repressive, authoritarian political ideology relating to it's own wartime performance that led to countless millions of it's citizens & soldiers deaths ? Would you agree that this is politically relevant ? In the case of West Germany 1945- 1990 they were not in the grip of a repressive regime, the same cannot be said for Soviet Russia. Yes things thawed gradually but it was not total and it was not immediate, up till at least the late 1970's un-patriotic authors were still being banished to siberia. This was not the climate in which West Germany post-war sources operated.

    In the case of the soviet union with that much of it's own peoples blood on it's hands (as a result of the red army's wartime activities and performance) would you not agree that the stakes were very high for the communists ?

    Control of history is political. Repressing uncomfortable truths and supporting the enforcing of falsehoods that paint your side in a positive light are factors here for the soviet side more so than the postwar German side (ie sources) in my view.

    In that respect I would personally put more faith in a post-war German military memoirs/histories published from democratic west germany and translated into english to be peer reviewed around the world - I would trust those more than I would trust a paper in a soviet archive authored most likely in an enviornment of fear and authored to reflect a specific position and written for a purpose.

    Why would soviet state approved sources be more reliable than free ones from the west ?

    All of this is notwithstanding the fact that the greatest 'stereotype'/generalisation that springs to mind about the red army is about how it raped it's way across east europe/Germany and killed millions of prisoners in gulags of siberia. At least those are not disputed by Mr Glantz. Nor are they even mentioned strangely. The issue of independence of historians is extremely relevant here.

    Don't forget that at the time that lecture was delivered and article published the soviet union and it's historians (ie those present for the lecture) were still blaming the germans for Katyn.

    It goes without saying or should that the 'independent', post-regime russian military side of that conflict is largely missing.


  • Registered Users, Registered Users 2 Posts: 837 ✭✭✭Prefab Sprouter


    I would contend that because of the political nature of the last 60 years (Cold War) it is very hard to get a cold hard unbiased look at the whole conflict and this is the problem with studying the Eastern Front, Morlar. Soviet Writing tended to be inherantly anti-western, Lend Lease and its effects were downplayed, Soviet defence and successes were highlighted, German failures were talked about but Soviet ones were glossed over (so the Tractor Factory at Stalingrad would have merited mention, yet Operation Mars would have been glossed over).

    Equally so Western Historians tended to concentrate on certain campaigns but ignore others. Most works in the West tend to talk about the following:

    Start with Barbarossa:
    Initial invasions
    Envelopments at Minsk,Smolensk, Kiev
    Operation Typhoon
    Soviet counterstroke at Moscow

    Operation Blue
    Stalingrad itself
    Operation Uranus
    Mansteins Counterstroke at Kharkow
    Kursk
    Bagration
    Berlin


    Lets take Operation Barbarossa for example. To read Alan Clark and Guderian's work you would think that the Soviet Armies did absolutely nothing between June and October. There were continuous offensives by the Soviet Armies starting in July 1941 and continuing right on through to the Massed Counteroffensive at the gates of Moscow. And not just on the Western Front armies. the Northwest and Southwest Fronts also engaged in offensive operations, yet are largely ignored by Western Historians. Whether they succeeded or not is irrelevant (otherwise we would never study Stalingrad which was ultimately a failure!!), the fact is that they did actually happen. Yet Western Historians barely mention them because well it was in the middle of the Blitzkrieg.

    Most Western readers know that Romania fell to the Soviets but how many Western Histories go into detail about the actual operations that left 100,000 Germans captured and 98,000 killed?

    I'm not completely knocking Western Histories, they are extremely valuable and many are fine works. i am just trying to demonstrate that they may not show the whole story is all.

    I suppose I am trying to make the point that in order to properly study the Eastern Front one should read histories from all sides and not take any of it as being the complete truth. By reading a combination of all sides, a more complete picture can be identified.

    i am enjoying this discussion though!


  • Registered Users, Registered Users 2 Posts: 1,787 ✭✭✭xflyer


    The problem is of course the Soviet Union and it particular version of history which we have inherited. I remember back in the seventies when our school invited a Soviet cultural attache from the newly established Soviet embassy to give us a lecture on Soviet History. It was clear from the start that we in the audience either knew more of the history or at least had a more balanced view. The poor man sweated gallons as he had awkward question after awkward question thrown at him. That told us what we already knew. My school was quite progressive. We even had copies of Mein Kampf in the library, mostly unread. Imagine that now? And plenty of Marx too I might add.

    There is a tendency in the west to see the war in the East from the German point of view. After all, despite their excesses. They were like us. The Soviets seemed beyond the pale. This continues, it is wrong to assume that the Soviets simply threw their troops at the Germans and simply ground them to dust, while Hitler issued one insane order after another. There was a sophistication to their methods even if they had little regard for the lives of their soldiers. Incidentally the same could be said of the Americans. The Hurtgen forest being an example of men being spent as cannon fodder without much justification. It was also wrong to assume that the the allies simply out produced the Germans. There was a sophistication to the tactics. The well know Colonel Hans Von Luck pointed out that the Americans learned quickly from their setbacks and came back harder than ever. So it was with the Soviets.

    The notion that the Germans were superior soldiers who lost the war because of Hitler's vanity and allied superiority in materiel has some truth but it's not the full story. By the end of the war the allies were as good as any German formation.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 29,930 ✭✭✭✭TerrorFirmer


    - Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German operational aims.

    Not repeatedly but frequently and the winter of 1941 alone disrupted the possibility of a quick victory for Germany absolutely.
    Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority.

    Most large scale operations and campaigns, yes.
    - Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses.

    Not inexhaustible, but most certainly large enough that they could absorb losses like the disastrous encirclements and en masse surrenders on 1941 and 42 that Germany could never have.
    - Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal.

    Initially it was. After the purges most of the junior leaders had neither experience nor initiative.
    - Soviet planning was rigid, and the execution of plans at every level was inflexible and unimaginative.

    It was until about late 42/early 43, when Stalin gave stavka greater flexibility after victories like Stalingrad.
    - Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible.

    Neither, really. They used both - the mass certainly helped however. Not too sure on encirclement, not a big reader on the red army, though there certainly plenty of encirclements in operation bagration that reduced the entirety of army group center to rags.
    - The Soviets operated in two echelons, never cross attached units, and attacked along straight axes.

    This one I can't really comment on, for reasons mentioned above.
    - Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have ensured.

    Not so much collapse - more such a rapid offensive wouldn't have been possible without these items. The SU might not have collapsed because of it, but it certainly wouldn't have won the war so quickly without it.
    - Hitler was the cause of virtually all German defeats. Army expertise produced earlier victories (a variation of the post World War I stab in the back. legend).

    Absolutely true. His policy on the eastern front was basically total control, and he was an amateur tactician at best. He believed in head on battles rather than clever campaigns, in fighting to the last man rather than withdrawing, and other such antiquated practices. In particular, these policies were exclusively to blame for Stalingrad, in part Kursk, and the absolute disaster that was bagration and the rest of the war in the east from the Polish border to Berlin (the operation would have been devastating regardless, but it was sealed by Hitlers belief in standing fast rather than withdrawing).
    - The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty.

    Somewhat true. Can't comment on infiltration or night fighting but any account will atest to the sacrificial nature of a RA soldier in general. Unimaginative would extend to the tyrannical nature of communist yoke and also the purges of the 30's.


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