Does knowledge rely on how you derived it

wolfric

Ok so something's being bugging me for a bit. I'll give you a few examples but the basic idea is: If someone thinks they know something through false means but they turn out to be right did they know the answer?

Ok let's talk about a maths equation because it's probably the easiest and most commonly found. Let's say in a maths exam you make 2 mistakes and get the right answer and you say "I know the answer it is whatever." Do you actually know the answer?

So i broke down what the meaning of think vs know is. And all i could think of was whether the information was right. So on basic terms, you actually DO know something even if you're wrong but then i got thinking.

How do we know anything? We use essentially "algorithms" in our brains to predict things and we assume their "correctness" by those algorithms... for example i say "1,2,3,4, x) and you say 5. Could you therefore say that knowledge is based on the ability to predict accurately (leaving the philosophy of "do we really know anything or are we just asleep and 1 actually does = 2) and that we have not actually "aquired that knowledge".

My second last train of thought. Often in maths equations, we can "think" something to the best of our ability (such as the famous x^n+y^n=z^n does not have any real integer values over n=2) but we cannot know if. If we prove it mathematically but our theory is false... The answer we get in the end can only tell us whether we "know" it or not that we only "think" it's the right answer. We cannot know it until we get the right proof (thank you andrew wiles for that ability to know).

However... If my "theory" is right... then we cannot truly know if we know anything only that we think that we know (unless you conform to this ideal and then you think that you think you know everything but you could know that you think everything if it actually was true) sorry if that wasn't clear.

So back to my basic question (and this is probably been covered somewhere by someone before). Going on a simple scale... Does someone who a right answer to a question "know" the answer to the question is that answer if the reason that they think the answer is right is wrong. Does knowledge include how it was deduced.

Ideas?

Joe1919

I think you are talking about the 'Gettier' problem.

Farmer Franco is concerned about his prize cow, Daisy. In fact, he is so concerned that when his dairyman tells him that Daisy is in the field, happily grazing, he says he needs to know for certain. He doesn't want merely to have a 99 percent probability that Daisy is safe, he wants to be able to say that he knows Daisy is safe.
Farmer Franco goes out to the field and standing by the gate sees in the distance, behind some trees, a white and black shape that he recognizes as his favorite cow. He goes back to the dairy and tells his friend that he knows Daisy is in the field.
Yet, at this point, does Farmer Franco really know it?
The dairyman says he will check too, and goes to the field. There he finds Daisy, having a nap in a hollow, behind a bush, well out of sight of the gate. He also spots a large piece of black and white paper that has got caught in a tree.
Daisy is in the field, as Farmer Franco thought.

But was he right to say that he knew she was?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

Incidently, Berthram Russell anticipated this problem before Edmund Gettier.

Looking at your maths example, you can see that the crux of problem is the level of 'justification' necessary to distinguish between 'knowledge' and a 'lucky guess'.

Gary L

I think its fair to say we're fundamentally ignorant to the full scope of reality and thus what we consider to be definite knowledge and facts are in reality estimates and predictive theories. It's tied to the sense of self I think, the sense of certainty.

looksee

'The philosopher, Martin Cohen, who described this scenario originally [1], says that in this case the farmer:

believed the cow was safe;
had evidence that this was so (his belief was justified);
and it was true that his cow was safe.'

I do not speak the language of philosophy, and am having trouble following some of the argument, but surely the statement above is incorrect. The farmer did not have evidence that the cow was safe, he thought it was safe based on a distant view of something black and white. Therefore the statement that his belief was justified has to be qualified to - he thought his belief was justified. Just because he thought something, it didn't make it so.

The cow lying in the hollow might have been safe, or it might have broken its neck when it fell in, so the farmer could not have had 'knowledge' either way.

Or as my mum used to say when one of us said 'but I thought...' 'you know what thought did, followed a muck cart and thought it was a wedding'. Sorry, the philosphy is getting a bit homespun

Gary L

Yeah your right he didn't know. I think if you follow the logic, your never right if theres a chance your wrong. Since we obviously cant predict the future, or fully comprehend immediate reality with our five senses, it follows that if we think we 'know' then we must be wrong. Objectivity comes with letting go of certainty and hence seeking out opposing ideas so as to take the best guess, which is all we can do.

Joe1919

You might be interested in reading what Russell has to say in dealing with this problem.

'If a newspaper, by an intelligent anticipation, announces the result of a battle before any telegram giving the result has been received, it may by good fortune announce what afterwards turns out to be the right result, and it may produce belief in some of its less experienced readers. But in spite of the truth of their belief, they cannot be said to have knowledge. Thus it is clear that a true belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from a false belief...... But in fact 'knowledge' is not a precise conception: it merges into 'probable opinion', as we shall see more fully in the course of the present chapter. A very precise definition, therefore, should not be sought, since any such definition must be more or less misleading.......... Thus the greater part of what would commonly pass as knowledge is more or less probable opinion........ A body of individually probable opinions, if they are mutually coherent, become more probable than any one of them would be individually. It is in this way that many scientific hypotheses acquire their probability. They fit into a coherent system of probable opinions, and thus become more probable than they would be in isolation'.
http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus13.html

Take note also that we use the word 'certain' in two ways.
(a) perfect knowledge that has total security from error, or (b) the mental state of being without doubt.
The sceptic would say that (a) 'perfect knowledge that has total security from error' is unobtainable and that then leaves us only with (b) 'the mental state of being without doubt'.
So when we say we are 'certain', we are often only expressing a feeling.(mental state)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certainty

DarraghOSull

It is impossible to 'know' whether any process based on thought is correct. Thought is a linear process, which makes deductions. It's a bit like a simple mathematical equation: 2 + 3 = 5. Here, the syntax can be wrong, or the events can be wrong. In 'real' thought, the events we process are interpretations of the real world. We can only process our interpretation, our symbolism for, our judgement of a real person, occurance etc. There is always a built-in error there, as we are a certain distance removed from it.

So apart from thought, what can we 'know'? Well, we have emotions; are they reliable? Many people are constantly sad or angry without realising it, so I guess not.

Belief clearly is not 'knowledge'. If we need to believe in it, then we don't directly experience it. If we look at it, we all carry around a huge number of unfounded beliefs, but that's for another day!

So what's the closest thing to 'knowledge', the purest form? I think in order to gauge what's actually real, what's beyond interpretation, accepted belief, or faulty thought processes, we have to go right back to the beginning. What does EVERY person know, regardless of where and when they live? What's absolutely irrefutable?

When I'm hungry, I need food.
When I'm thirsty, I need water.
When I'm tired, I need sleep.

Start from there, throw everything else out, and build back up.

Cannibal Ox

wolfric wrote:

If someone thinks they know something through false means but they turn out to be right did they know the answer?

I think the question assumes there is an external truth that we can grasp through thought. But, you could argue, that (if there was) an external truth when we grasp it, it becomes subjective, and once it becomes subjective the means used to grasp it, and whether those means are false or true means, become a matter of interpretation and those means, and the truth of those means, become dependant and reliant for their truth on the relative power between the competing claims for truth.

So...an astronomer might claim the sun is at the center of the universe, but the Catholic Church might now also claim that the sun is at the center of the universe. Both claims attempt to grasp an assumed external truth, and their means and justification of those means are different, but because that external truth is interpreted by (fallible) subjective beings, they will never be able to grasp that external truth absolutely, and so the claims to truth aren't based on true or false means, but between the relative power between the two competing claims.

Maybe. I think I could have a better example, but I can't think of anything else now :pac: But what is interesting in that is that it comes to the same conclusion you do, but by different means. That:

wolfric wrote:

then we cannot truly know if we know anything only that we think that we know

Which if it is true creates a problem, because if you say that we cannot know anything but only think that we know, then you are saying that we do know something and that it is that we can only think that we know, and...and...and then...then...hmm...that doesn't make sense

Joe1919

DarraghOSull wrote: »

.... What's absolutely irrefutable?....
....Start from there, throw everything else out, and build back up.

Descartes tried this already.

'So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind........
Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakable'......Descartes.(meditations)

John Lockes response to Descarte is interesting. He basically states that we know enough to get bye.

'It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct.' John Locke

http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/locke/locke1/Book1a.html#EPISTLE TO THE READER

FionnMatthew

Jesus,

Not to shake everything up, but this certainly isn't the Gettier case.

Wolfric is asking for a clarification in the face of an outline of the standard analysis. The Gettier case only makes sense in the context of the standard analysis. This is much simpler than the Gettier case. The Gettier case is only likely to confuse.

The standard analysis of knowledge is the (putatively inadequate, but very popular) definition of knowledge that has endured the most popularity during the 20th century, and into the 21st.

The standard analysis: JTB; (J)ustified, (T)rue, (B)elief.

According to this definition, in order to be an item of knowledge, it must be a belief that is both true and justified.

The cases you have outlined are, by this definition, not knowledge, although they are accompanied by knowledge claims.

The person in your first example has a belief, which happens to be true, but the derivation by which s/he has arrived at it isn't a valid one, and the belief is therefore unjustified.

It's the same as making a lucky guess. These can't count.

So, yes, knowledge relies on how you derive it. That's what the justification condition for knowledge specifies.

Now, there's room for some complication. The person in your example believed they had adequate justification, because they believed they had done performed the correct calculations. So, by their best estimate, they were justified.

Standardly, we would say that they still weren't justified. They only thought they were justified. If we were to point out to them how their calculation was in error, they would (hopefully) revise their conviction that they had been justified. They would therefore realize that formerly, they did not know what they thought they knew, even though it so happened that the belief was true.

This, of course, imports an element of anxiety about whether we can ever know if we are justified in our beliefs. And so there are various theories of justificatory practice which come down on both sides of the divide. Some of them bring in objective criteria of justification, and some of them connect justification to best epistemological practice.

JTB isn't the only story to be told in epistemology, though.

The Gettier case, above, was raised by Gettier to challenge the standard analysis. He really screwed things up for JTB. He demonstrated, in a very succinct little paragraph of a paper, that you could have JTB which none of us would ever want to call knowledge. But the case Gettier raised, though simple and elegant, don't really apply to your question, and most epistemologists would claim that Gettier did not problematise the notion of justification in JTB - he only pointed out that JTB wasn't the whole story. For any workable definition of knowledge, most people's intuitions are going to demand that justification will play a big role.

The school of epistemology that I'd subscribe to would tell a different story entirely to the standard analysis, but I don't think it's a good time yet to introduce it. If the discussion proceeds in a promising direction, it might pay to rehearse some of the ideas.

davej

wolfric wrote: »

Ok so something's being bugging me for a bit. I'll give you a few examples but the basic idea is: If someone thinks they know something through false means but they turn out to be right did they know the answer?

Another classic example of this is Ptolemy's geocentric model of the solar system. Even though the model was incorrect, it allowed one to make broadly accurate predictions of the path of the "wandering" planets.

As for epistemological schools of thought, Kant covered it really.

davej

WinstonSmith

Joe1919 wrote: »

You might be interested in reading what Russell has to say in dealing with this problem.

'If a newspaper, by an intelligent anticipation, announces the result of a battle before any telegram giving the result has been received, it may by good fortune announce what afterwards turns out to be the right result, and it may produce belief in some of its less experienced readers. But in spite of the truth of their belief, they cannot be said to have knowledge. Thus it is clear that a true belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from a false belief...... But in fact 'knowledge' is not a precise conception: it merges into 'probable opinion', as we shall see more fully in the course of the present chapter. A very precise definition, therefore, should not be sought, since any such definition must be more or less misleading.......... Thus the greater part of what would commonly pass as knowledge is more or less probable opinion........ A body of individually probable opinions, if they are mutually coherent, become more probable than any one of them would be individually. It is in this way that many scientific hypotheses acquire their probability. They fit into a coherent system of probable opinions, and thus become more probable than they would be in isolation'.
http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus13.html

Take note also that we use the word 'certain' in two ways.
(a) perfect knowledge that has total security from error, or (b) the mental state of being without doubt.
The sceptic would say that (a) 'perfect knowledge that has total security from error' is unobtainable and that then leaves us only with (b) 'the mental state of being without doubt'.
So when we say we are 'certain', we are often only expressing a feeling.(mental state)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certainty

Is it just me or does this seem to suggest that there is an objective standard for truth. Truth can never be relative or subjective? To take the example of your newspaper, one may suppose they have the truth and whilst that truth may be true for them, on the larger scale of things, it does not conform to the onbjective standard for truth. I realise this is in danger of slipping into other areas of philosophy, but they seem to be inter-related here...

Joe1919

WinstonSmith wrote: »

Is it just me or does this seem to suggest that there is an objective standard for truth. Truth can never be relative or subjective? To take the example of your newspaper, one may suppose they have the truth and whilst that truth may be true for them, on the larger scale of things, it does not conform to the onbjective standard for truth. I realise this is in danger of slipping into other areas of philosophy, but they seem to be inter-related here...

I don't think there are any fully objective standards as such. The possibility of error is always present and so man has to set some standard on what is true and what is false. For example, in the case of a murder trial, the objective standard is whatever the twelve wise members of the jury decide or whatever our wise or just laws decide.
But all of these 'objective standards' are man made and judged by man and hence subject to the possibility of error.
It is man who sets the standards.

"The trail of the human serpent is over everything"

af_thefragile

Knowing and not doing is not knowing.

wolfric

af_thefragile wrote: »

Knowing and not doing is not knowing.

That's the first thing i haven't understood.

af_thefragile

wolfric wrote: »

That's the first thing i haven't understood.

If you know something but you've never practiced it or have done it, then you don't know it.
To be able to say you know something, you need to be able to do it.

Example you can't say you know how to draw unless you can do it right now.
You can't say you know how to change a tyre unless you've done it in the past and can do it again. If you've just read somewhere about how to change a tyre but have never actually changed one, you can't really say you know how to change a tyre.

Now these aren't the best examples cuz what I'm trying to convey is more relevant to the more significant aspects of life.

What's the use of knowing something when you're never gonna practice it and implement it in your life?
You can never say you've gained knowledge of something until you've done it. Just reading about it or hearing about it won't gain you much.
To lean to do something, you need to do it!


You might be the most talented musician in the world and all your knowledge is worthless if you don't implement it by composing some music. If you're not doing it, you don't know it.