'German War Aims'

TerrorFirmer

I'm looking at question simply entitled 'What were Germanys war aims 1914-1918'.

I've drafted up a rough answer, but I'm not quite sure as to what I should be highlighting? How would you answer, what sort of aspects would you look at?

According to Bethmann Hollweg in September 1914, Germanys war aims were the establishment of security for the German Empire in west and east and to deliver a blow so crushing to France she would never recover. Simultaneously, Russia must be thrust back as far as possible from Germany's eastern frontier and her domination over the Balkans broken. This, however, was delivered while the war was already in full swing and remained optimisitc for Germany. Prior to the war, most beligerents had their own justifications for war.

World War One was the culmination of a a serious of events and tensions that had plagued Europe for decades. Almost every beligerent, including the smaller nations, had a reason to see the enemy coalition defeated. Continental politics shifted rapidly and often, conventional enemies found themselves allied to each other. One of the goals of the foreign policies of all the Great Powers in the years prior to the war was to maintain the 'Balance of Power' in Europe. This involved an elaborate and extensive network of alliances and agreements. For example, after the Franco-Prussian War Britain initially favored a strong Germany, as it helped to balance its traditional enemy, France. After Germany began its naval construction plans to rival that of Britain, this stance shifted. France, looking for an ally to balance the threat created by Germany, found it in Russia. In turn, Austria-Hungary, facing a threat from Russia, sought support from Germany. Therefore, by 1914, conflicts on a local level often spiralled inevitabely into international standoffs and the main beligerents saw impending war as an opportunity to establish their dominance and ruin their rivals. This was particularly true in the case of France and Germany.

The war, therefore, can be seen as an opportunity for the opposing nations. In the case of Germany, victory in a continental war would not only have established Germany as undisputed master of Europe and permanently destroyed local opposition, but opened up the possibilities of further expansion abroad through the seizing of beligerent colonies as well as expansion of Germans borders at the expense of other nations. The war initially went well for the German armies, who adopted a modified version of the Schliffen Plan to encirle Paris and the French armies as they do in 1871. However, the right wing was fatally weakened, and as a result, the French army was able to stop the German encirlement at the Marne, shattering Germans hope for a quick and decisive victory. They were now presented with the prospect of a lengthy two front war. German war aims, however, remained the same throughout the war - the pursuit of total rather then compromised victory. President Wilson of the United States offered to act as a medium for peace, but none of the beligerents took the effort seriously, believing that they must win the war rather then the peace. To this end, Germany launched several major offensives in the early stage of the war, such as the battle of Verdun, in order to acheive a decisive victory over the Entente. The historic rivalry and bitterness surrounding the memory of 1871 negated the notion of negociated peace for German and French alike.

With the failure of it's land campaign apparent, Germany turned to the seas, hoping to strangle Great Britiain through a submarine campaign. This was a tremendous gamble, for resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare risked drawing the United States into the war. These U-Boats proved successfully at first despite the entry of the United States into the war, almost strangling Great Britian economically. Ultimately, however, they were defeated through the adoption of convoy systems. This signalled the death knell for Germany, who was now fighting several powerful beligerents while her own allies floundered and in the case of Austria, survived only with German support.

Defeat however, remained an unthinkable possability for the German high command. Defeat not only meant defeat in an entirely military sense; but a total dismantlement of the entire German militant autocracy. In the east, with the defeat of Russia and the treaty of Brest-Liovstk in May 1918, the Germans actually acheived one of their initial goals - the total defeat of a major enemy and the establishment of a sattelite empire to act as a buffer against any future aggression. Had this occured sooner, the restrictions of the Allied blockade might have been somewhat negated and the direction of the war changed. As it was, however, the military situation was rapidly declining and the prospect of victory slipping away. Transferring divisions from the East, the high command opted to launch one great final offensive that would win them the war.

The Ludendorff offensive was launched in Spring 1918 and despite initial success, collasped due to a failure to seize vital objectives and a lack of reserves to hold the vastly extended front line. With it, collasped the German belief in victory on both the war and home front and subsequently, Germany was forced to bow to humiltating and crippling peace terms that reduced her to a shadow of her former self. The German war aims, uncompromising and harsh, made allowances for total victory only at the potential expense of all that politicains like Bismarck had striven to acheive. It was a gamble that had failed.

elpresdentde

great answer you done better then i would in that situation

i would add in a bit about how the Germans never felt they had achieved great power status in the minds of the rest of europe

i add that old quote about trying to bled the french white at Verdun

what about the raw materials that were needed to fuel the German industry to be suplied by the future colonies

the fact that this was the first total war well in sense napoleon

to be honest i talking bo****ks its a very thorough assessment of the aims of the German high command iv thought about it for about 10 Min's and i cant think of an aspect of war aims that you left out

brianthebard

Just a couple of thoughts;

- you moved straight from land battle to submarine battle, without considering the battle of jutland and its impact on Germany's navy and why it fought with u-boats from then on.

-you didn't mention Kaiser Wilhelm II, who was much more aggressive and interested in the greatness of Germany than his predecessor. Often Germany is protrayed as being drawn into the war through complex arrangements, and then all of a sudden developed a thirst for blood. Try and look for something in the decade or two before the war which suggests Germany had an semi-active interest in going to war before it happened?

-you could extend the paragraph about the defeat of Russia to take account of German gains of the Causcus oil fields and land to grow crops. A little more about why they weren't about to take advantage of this. By 1918 the whole country was involved in Clausowitz and Ludendorf's Total war, and production was increasing month on month (not 100% on that but you can check it out).

-this leads me onto another useful point, Clausowitz and Ludendorf became more important and integral to the war effort as it went on. Gaining popularity and influence meant that their war aims were taken more seriously. You could consider the possibility that this meant a change in direction for Germany? (see again Total war).

These are just a couple of points, I don't know what level you are studying at or what length the piece is supposed to be. There's nothing wrong with what you've written but I think you could go into more detail on the hows and whys of the situation.

jpm4

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

I'm looking at question simply entitled 'What were Germanys war aims 1914-1918'.

I've drafted up a rough answer, but I'm not quite sure as to what I should be highlighting? How would you answer, what sort of aspects would you look at?

Very good reading, a specific point and a general point:

"To this end, Germany launched several major offensives in the early stage of the war, such as the battle of Verdun, in order to acheive a decisive victory over the Entente"

I wouldn't say the above is really true regarding several major offenses (at least on the Western front), the only one they launched between the 1st Ypres and the spring Offensive was Verdun which was mid way through the war. I woulkdn't count the 2nd Ypres as a major offensive.

Second point - are you really sticking to the question you quoted here? After the first paragraph the rest seems to be a history of the war. I'd tie it back to the question asked a bit more perhaps.

TerrorFirmer

-you could extend the paragraph about the defeat of Russia to take account of German gains of the Causcus oil fields and land to grow crops. A little more about why they weren't about to take advantage of this. By 1918 the whole country was involved in Clausowitz and Ludendorf's Total war, and production was increasing month on month (not 100% on that but you can check it out).

See the problem is its about German 'War Aims'; what Germany saw as its ultimate goals from the war, not just the First World War, so it's hard to wrangle in any specific military events really - I only mentioned some minor details to reinforce the fact it was a bit of a 'do or die' campaign for the High Command. So the defeat in Russia, the only way that really fits is in its establishment of a satellite/buffer empire, one of their original aims. Speaking of which, I might add the Kiel mutiny on that note.

-this leads me onto another useful point, Clausowitz and Ludendorf became more important and integral to the war effort as it went on. Gaining popularity and influence meant that their war aims were taken more seriously. You could consider the possibility that this meant a change in direction for Germany? (see again Total war).

good idea, I'll look into this! - shifting war aims

jpm4 wrote:

I wouldn't say the above is really true regarding several major offenses (at least on the Western front), the only one they launched between the 1st Ypres and the spring Offensive was Verdun which was mid way through the war. I woulkdn't count the 2nd Ypres as a major offensive.

No you're very much right, I just wrote this off the top of my head in a rush, wasn't thinking it through perfectly.

Also - how would you interpet the question? German military war arms in the immediate conflict or a general overview on how Germany wanted the war to go, what their ultimate plans were and why? I choose the latter...

thanks to all!

Shutuplaura

I guess your whole answer depends on whether you see Germany as the sole agressor in the run up to the watr or not - Germany felt threatened by France and Britain. Germany couldn't understand fully why it wasn't accepted as a great power and was suspicious of France after 1871 and Britain after the early 1890's The importance of Austria Hungry as an ally even though it was one of the weakest great powers dates from this time and germanys wish to avoid being isolated in Europe. Of course the other point would be the Germany was an agressor, building a fleet it didn't require to challange the UK, chauvinistic posturing and all that carry on. Personally I'd see Germanys actions in the light of a fundanmental insecurity based on its recent rise as a power and its place in the wide plains of northern Europe. It acted agressively out of weakness, percieved more than real. The army acted agressively, as per standard German army doctrine and won a series of victories on both fronts, giving a falseimpression when Germany herself felt she was only acting in her defence. France had recently expanded its army and Britain its Navy. French conscrpts served an additional year in the army and its reservists had a greater obligation on leaving. Russian was also in the process of modernising its forces and all of these could be seen as agressive moves.

Undoubtly its war aims developed as time went on and ebbed and flowed with the fortunes of the war. I do believe that her initial war aims were fairly hazy and only after the first few months that any side gave it any serious thought - everyone assumed it would be a limited war over fairly quickly.

brianthebard

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

See the problem is its about German 'War Aims'; what Germany saw as its ultimate goals from the war, not just the First World War, so it's hard to wrangle in any specific military events really - I only mentioned some minor details to reinforce the fact it was a bit of a 'do or die' campaign for the High Command. So the defeat in Russia, the only way that really fits is in its establishment of a satellite/buffer empire, one of their original aims. Speaking of which, I might add the Kiel mutiny on that note.

I'm not exactly sure what you mean by the goals from the war, not just the WW1? Surely the gains in the east of the causcus region, with its rich oil fields and space for growing food would be seen as a decent aim? There may also have been a hope of combining the German empire with the Austro-hungarian empire and the creation of a super state. I don't know if that is the case of not, its up to you to research it. Also I don't think it was considered a do or die campaign by Clauseowitz and Ludendorff, afaik they felt they had more than a good chance. German war aims isn't something Ive done a lot of research on though so these ideas may not hold any water.

Shutuplaura

brianthebard wrote: »

I'm not exactly sure what you mean by the goals from the war, not just the WW1? Surely the gains in the east of the causcus region, with its rich oil fields and space for growing food would be seen as a decent aim? There may also have been a hope of combining the German empire with the Austro-hungarian empire and the creation of a super state. I don't know if that is the case of not, its up to you to research it. Also I don't think it was considered a do or die campaign by Clauseowitz and Ludendorff, afaik they felt they had more than a good chance. German war aims isn't something Ive done a lot of research on though so these ideas may not hold any water.

These became the de facto aims of the government during the war when they realised how badly Russia was crumbling, how weak Austro-Hungary was and how close they were to winning the war. At the time many believed that in early 1918 the Germans prectically had the war won. The Americans were not yet in Europe in strength and their fighting performance was seen as pretty poor anyway due to British 1915 style tactics (walking in lines towards the german positions etc, no defence in depth) The French were knackered and had been faltering since the failed offensives of 1917 and the British were showing increasing signs of weariness, perhaps exagerated by Lloyd George's refusal to release replacement to France to prevent Haig launching another premature offensive. The U-Boat campaign was going well and there was everything to play for. But earlier in the war every government released its war aims in the form of a coloured book, I thing the British was the Buff Book, not sure what the Germans was called.