Most underrated turning point in the war?

I know it's a bit of a convoluted question, but what do you think is the most underrated turning point in the war? I am talking about military action, not political allegiances or developments.

Most people would argue that Stalingrad (it gets alot of air time) was the major turning point in the East. After all, Hitler had lost one of his best armies. Having said that though, Von Manstein's greatest achievement was stabilising the Eastern Front with the recapture of Kharkov.

For me though, the major turning point of the war was Kurksk. The Germans had some of their best Field Marshalls orchestrating the battle plan (Model, Manstein) and fielded their most modern armour (although unreliable from lack of testing). It was the last roll of the dice for an effective victory by the Wehrmacht in the East. After this, the initiative had passed to the Soviets. The Germans were constantly acting and assesing their forces to counter the Red Army.

This of course is just my humble opinion....but I'm right:D

FiSe

If we are talking military, then it would be the motley equipment of Wehrmacht...
Too many different guns, different ammo types, different manufacturers and subsuppliers and all the trouble connected with it, to get it to the frontline on time and to the right place.
And lack of heavy bomber/supply aircraft is another one.

Military action?
Too quick advance on the East without proper elimination of enemy forces left behind "for afterwards" which turned into havoc later and which was too fast for supplying through very bad /if any/ roads.

TerrorFirmer

Operation Bagration. The German's biggest defeat in the East but outside of Kursk and Stalingrad most people don't even know what it is.

After this disaster - the Germans lost an entire army group and were forced to withdraw the other army groups in a haphazard fashion and lost their foothold in the east entirely - Germany lost all chance of forcing any kind of a standoff in the east.

If the great Soviet offensive had been directed at army group south as predicted (and where all the amour went that was stripped from army group center, which caused its collapse) it may have worn itself out and the Germans would have been somewhat free to transfer divisions west to try and mount a decisive counter attack in Normandy.

Germany peaked at armor and aircraft production in mid to late 1944 - if Bagration had failed and the Wehrmacht hadn't lost such an irreplaceable amount of men (close to 500,000), a successful defense of the eastern frontier from the Baltic's downwards across Poland would have been feasible in terms of forcing terms. Outright victory would have been impossible.

mossym

El Alamein. if the allies hadn't have held, then they would have been booted otu of africa. without taking africa, sicily and the italy invasion would never have happapend, and hitler wouldn't have lost italy as an ally and been forced to keep valuable units in italy to stop the allies, thus keeping those units away from the western and eastern fronts. with the allies in italy, he also was veryworred about a mediterranean invasion.

and, if the allies had gotten kicked off of africa, i don't know how long stalin would have lasted before doing some deal with the germans. and freeing up the whole german army to go after britain, which was what hitler wanted in the first place.

if that deal had been done, none of the events you guys mentioned would even have happened

in another way, it was important for the american army in that it highlighted several of their makor shortcomings in battle, and allowed them to gain valuable experience to be used in france and italy.

mossym

actually, sorry, just reread the title, El Alamein probably isn't that underrated....

ojewriej

mossym wrote: »

actually, sorry, just reread the title, El Alamein probably isn't that underrated....

I think you have a point actually. General view of the war tends to focus on European events, forgetting that a lot of important stuff was going in other places as well. Whole African campaign was more important than people think, El Alamein was a culmination of it. I think it was Churchil who described Second battle of El Alamein as the End of the begining.


For me, I think it's a Ribbentrop - Molotov pact. II World War would be very different if Hitler wouldn't have a carte blanche from Soviets during first 2 years of it.

On second thought, it's not only RM pact, it's whole political situation during WWII, mainly how complex the relationship between the tree main Allies was. Some deals that were made are unreal, the way Stalin played his Allies shaped the look of Europe for the next 50 years.

Saabdub

The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 resulted in the British landing in Greece in the Spring of 1941. This potential threat to the southern flank of the proposed German invasion of Russia of May 1941 forced Germany to launch a Balkan campaign and put back the start of Barbarossa a crucial four weeks. This four weeks might have been decisive in the upcoming Russian campaign, allowing Germany to reach Moscow a month earlier.

Saabdub

delos

mossym wrote: »

and, if the allies had gotten kicked off of africa, i don't know how long stalin would have lasted before doing some deal with the germans. and freeing up the whole german army to go after britain, which was what hitler wanted in the first place.

Not too sure about the accuracy of this.... I'm pretty sure Hitler would have been far readier to deal with the West and expand his 'Greater Germany' eastwards. The fight between Hitler and Stalin (and their respective ideologies) was always going to go on until only one of them was left. If Poland hadn't got in the way and Germany had been able to invade the Soviet Union directly then I doubt very much that France and Britain would have intervened.

motherfunker

Malta is a very underrated turning point in the war, in fact I think it could be the actual turning point of the war. The island came within days of starvation and capiluation to the Germans, oil, flour, milk were all nearly exhuasted. They were suffering terrible bombardment by the Germans and Italians, suffering heavy casulties. The island was under complete naval and air siege, however the luftwaffe planes that were needed to uphold this siege were taken from Rommels forces in Africa around the time of Tobruk I think. I am sketchy on the exact details now, I read a book on it a few years ago and remember thinking how much of a turning point this was, how the allies came within days of things going very bad for them, if anyone can fill in the gaps in my story, please feel free. The day was saved when the allies managed to get a few ships in from a large convoy that the Germans had tried their hardest to sink, a few small ships got in with some basic supplies but the main ship to eventually limp into Valletta harbour was a US tanker called the Ohio, pictures in the book show the ships decks about 2 or 3 feet above the water, she was so close to sinking. She had to be lashed to 2 other ships to try to drag her into port, all the time under german air attack. One picture even shows the wreckage of a downed messerschmitt on her decks. This ship was the lifeline that saved Malta and the Allies, her cargo of oil gave the island the ability to defend herself again, the spitfires could fly again, the people could cook again(Malta has very little trees, not much wood for burning). If this ship had not made it, the island would have fallen anfd the course of the war would have changed dramatically.

motherfunker

Ruledbyjames wrote: »

For me though, the major turning point of the war was Kurksk. The Germans had some of their best Field Marshalls orchestrating the battle plan (Model, Manstein) and fielded their most modern armour (although unreliable from lack of testing). It was the last roll of the dice for an effective victory by the Wehrmacht in the East. After this, the initiative had passed to the Soviets. The Germans were constantly acting and assesing their forces to counter the Red Army.

The commonly misunderstood thing about Kursk is that it was never meant to be a major offensive, it was meant to be "a straightening of the line", most of the Generals wanted nothing to do with it, even Hitler was unsure. It ended up being one of those situations where it just got too big to stop. Even the Russians knew exactly what was happening, the sheer amount of landmines laid on the front line was frightning. Kursk was an unfortunate chain of events and another example of Hitlers bad military judgement.

mossym

delos wrote: »

Not too sure about the accuracy of this.... I'm pretty sure Hitler would have been far readier to deal with the West and expand his 'Greater Germany' eastwards. The fight between Hitler and Stalin (and their respective ideologies) was always going to go on until only one of them was left. If Poland hadn't got in the way and Germany had been able to invade the Soviet Union directly then I doubt very much that France and Britain would have intervened.

the invasion of europe was put in place quicker than the allies wanted simply because the allies were afraid that stalin would do a deal with the germans if they didn't launch a second front. the pressure stalin was putting on the US and england to launc the invasion was massive.

and hitler always wanted to invade england. he had detailed invasion plans in place to take it. the eastern front just didn't allow him to build up the units he needed.

TerrorFirmer

motherfunker wrote: »

The commonly misunderstood thing about Kursk is that it was never meant to be a major offensive, it was meant to be "a straightening of the line", most of the Generals wanted nothing to do with it, even Hitler was unsure. It ended up being one of those situations where it just got too big to stop. Even the Russians knew exactly what was happening, the sheer amount of landmines laid on the front line was frightning. Kursk was an unfortunate chain of events and another example of Hitlers bad military judgement.

Actually Hitler, out of character, expressed interest in a negotiated peace in 1943. But he believed no terms could be made until the German army scored another decisive victory and gained major leeway - Kursk. A rare moment of rationality for him.

motherfunker

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

Actually Hitler, out of character, expressed interest in a negotiated peace in 1943. But he believed no terms could be made until the German army scored another decisive victory and gained major leeway - Kursk. A rare moment of rationality for him.

Kursk was actually nothing to do with Hitler, he meerly approved it. The main aim of the Kursk battle was "to straighten the line", the German front line had a major bulge in it around the Kursk area, it increased the length of the German front line, needing more troops to defend it for little strategic advantage, it also put large numbers of troops at risk from a Russian attack. The aim was to straighten the line, reduce the front into a more managable section. I cannot remember the general who came up with the idea but this was his attempt to forge a reputation for himself and to go down in history as a great general. He was a Hitler ass licker or yes man. Most of the other generals wanted nothing to do with it, the start date was pushed further and further back, eliminating any advantages the germans may have had at the start. The plans were that well known the Russians were sitting waiting for them, they had reinforced the areas the germans were going to attack in and reduced the strengths in other areas. Hitler was warned about these developments but through his usual pig headedness he ignored his generals and listened to his yes men. Kursk was a disaster for Germany from the moment the first shell was fired, they never had a chance. Even for Hitler, I dont think it sounds like a moment of rationality to send hundreds of thousands of his best men and machines into a battle that has been lost before it even began, I think another massive hitler blunder would be more appropriate. If you read a detailed history of the battle and not just a generalised account of it, all these things are explained.

TerrorFirmer

Actually Kursk was to be a massive pincher envelopment - which had been up until now generally successful for the Wehrmacht - that would cut off almost 25% of Red Army manpower and the line would be straightened and then advanced if conditions allowed.

The alternative was Mainsteins plan to draw in the Red Army to the South by feigning a buckle and then encircle them and drive them into the sea. It was refused.

Kursk was indeed a disaster, but it's not as clear cut as "Kursk was a disaster for Germany from the moment the first shell was fired" - the Germans almost broke through in the South. While personally I don't think the breakthrough would have been big enough to roll up the Soviet line, for a while the Soviets were genuinely afraid that the Germans would turn the battle on them.

Most of the generals disproved of the plan and believed that they should concentrate of defending against the inevitable Soviet offensive or attack the salient as early as possible to, rationally, avoid attacking a heavily fortified zone as they had to do in July. Model wanted to wait to get armored strength up; is that who you're referring to?

to be honest I'm not sure off the top of my head who was precisely responsible for the planning of Kursk. by my comment above, I meant Hitler saw a victory at Kursk as the catalyst for a negotiated peace.

TelePaul

Probably the Battle of the Hurtgen forest though calling it a turning point would be some stretch. I do think it was significant in so far as it's potential for impatcing upon German success in the Bulge.

Dinter

With compliments to Terrorfirmer for naming it, the main turning point of the War as I see it occurred in the Demyansk pocket.

The successful German resistance led to the introduction of static defence as a policy into the Wehrmacht doctrine that immediately began to override their more established and successful tactics of manoeuvre. This leads directly to them aping the tried and failed tactics of their Western opponents and getting cut off, surrounded, divided and picked off by their enemies.

Even more importantly than that however, it allowed Hitler to see himself as more tactically aware than his generals and finally have an example he could use when “instructing” them.

Another turning point for me, but not too sure how overlooked it was, would be the declaration of war on America by Germany after Pearl Harbour.

Stupid, stupid, stupid treaty. . .

motherfunker

Terrorfirmer, I dont want to start any "who knows more" battles, I'm no expert on anything. I just happened to read a very detailed book on the battle of kursk that shed a very different light on the whole subject.
Yes it was meant to be a major offensive with great plans for a follow on offesive when they had tidied up the line, but these were the ravings of a glory hungry madman who wanted his place in history, none of it was actually based on fact or reality. The Russians were pushed very hard in places but that was becuase they had concentrated their forces where the main thrust of the attack was aimed, also this was due to the training and discipline of the Germans, the generals did not want to fight here but when they had to they gave it everything they had. The Russians were waiting, drawing the Germans in, waiting till they exhausted themselfs before launching their well prepaired counter strike.
I still agree with my comment that it was a disaster from the first shell, a competent military commander would never have gone ahead with it. Even Hitler agrees with me, this is a quote from a conversation between Guderian and Hitler.
"Was it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east that year at all? Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front? Perhaps more surprisingly Hitler replied: I know. The thought of it turns my stomach."

Kursk has also been largely overrated in history by the Russian propaganda machine, it was not such a turning point as was made out. German tank losses in Kursk made up only a small portion of the total losses for the whole of 1943, their tank strength was actually greater in December 1943 than in July 1943. Losses at kursk were no greater or less than other offensives that year.
If Kursk ever stood a chance of success I would agree to call it a major offensive, the Russians were given months to prepare a well defended killing ground, no one was ever going to get through.

motherfunker

Hi,
I hope that dident turn into another rant, it wasent meant to, sometimes when I start typing I cant stop, hopefully it is taken as a discussion and not me thinking I know everything.

TerrorFirmer

Hitler didn't like Gueridians/Mansteins plan of elastic defense because it did not offer to decisive victory which Germany needed in the east. It aimed at bleeding the Russians over long periods of time. If Germany had been solely fighting Russia this might have been feasible; by mid 1943 and the threat of invasion from the Western Allies Germany didn't have such a luxury in Hitlers eyes. The Eastern front was deadlocked, Germany was coming under increasing aerial bombardment, and the threat of Allied invasion was very real. Therefore Kursk was to be a decisive victory that would leave Germany in a position to force terms or at least a stalemate so crippling on the Soviets that Germany would have time to recuperate. The Germans knew the Russians were preparing defense in depth of the salient...hence why Hitler said his stomach turned at the thought of the battle - the outcome of the entire war was hanging in the balance at Kursk. It was Hitler himself who chose the plan to attack the salient.

German tank losses in Kursk made up only a small portion of the total losses for the whole of 1943, their tank strength was actually greater in December 1943 than in July 1943. Losses at kursk were no greater or less than other offensives that year.

Actually Germany had more armoured vehicles in late 1944 then it had at any other stage in the war; but there's much more to it then mere numbers. With every battle Germany was loosing vital manpower in terms of trained personal...tank crews, infantry, aircrews.... Also, Germany itself was coming under increasingly heavy air attack from the Western Allies, damaging rail and transport networks which made it harder to move reserves to the front.

Germany could afford, in a general sense, to loose the 6th army at Stalingrad, it could not really afford to loose the battle of Kursk - The Germany army didn't have enough resources to launch a third summer offensive, so had to settle for a decisive battle.. .and failure here meant the end of offensive capability for the Wehrmacht. After Kursk they lost the initiative and apart from a few local counter attacks in late 1943/early 1944 that were moderately successful they didn't regain their momentum and subsequently were annihilated in Summer 1944 (I've already mentioned how I think that was the most underrated turning point of the war without a doubt).

Of course I agree that no competent commander would have gone ahead with it, but it was a gamble Hitler took and lost. The alternative was the mobile defense plan, which again, would have been fine in war solely between Germany and the Soviet Union but when faced with invasion in Europe and locked in an air war over their own country, a long, drawn out war with the SU was not an appealing prospect for OKH.

motherfunker

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

With every battle Germany was loosing vital manpower in terms of trained personal...tank crews, infantry, aircrews....

Germany could afford, in a general sense, to loose the 6th army at Stalingrad, it could not really afford to loose the battle of Kursk -

I dont see how you can say they could afford to loose the 6th army, almost 1 million trained, battle hardned soilders. The eastern front was all down to numbers in my opinion, whoever could afford to loose the most men and machines would win, and they did.
Thinking only about morale, stalingrad was the death of the German army, or at least the begining of its death.

TerrorFirmer

The Sixth army lost about 350-400,000, the rest were Hungarian, Romanian, Italian etc.

Stalingrad is actually over-rated as a turning point, after Stalingrad the Germany army still had the means to win the war in Russia; after Kursk and especially after Operation Bagration, they did not. Bagration, in particular, the most important operation of the entire second world war, is completely unknown to most people because it occured so close to the Normandy landings and is not even featured in many general history textbooks. Which I think is a disgrace but that's another argument.

The loss of the sixth army was obviously a blow to the army, but it was a loss they could sustain....that besides, allowing the Sixth army to remain under siege in the city was probably the right choice. It allowed the Germans to reform and consolidate their forces for the following Spring counter offensive which they successfully stopped.

motherfunker

Allowing 400,000 men to remain under siege till they were all dead the right choice. Allright Adolf.

TerrorFirmer

I never said it was morally right; rather it was strategically sound.

You can't talk about 'right' on the Eastern Front in terms of morality. That's not how wars work sadly. If that was the context you always took in regards what was a 'right' decision, every single engagement in the entire war would be wrong.

kowloon

You two stop arguing.
Chuck Norris won the war on Omaha beach. Fact.

Fratton Fred

ojewriej wrote: »

I think it was Churchil who described Second battle of El Alamein as the End of the begining.

"This is not the end, it is not even the beginning of the end... but it is the end of the beginning" (Something like that anyway).

Two turning points for me, were Enigma and the the whole decoding of messages at Bletchley and of the course the capture of the decoding device itself.

And also the Royal Navy developing effective tactics against U Boat attacks. At one point, an attack by a German U Boat on an escorted convoy meant almost certain destruction of the U boat the RN had got that good at tracking and sinking them. Being able to keep supplies coming from North America and on to Russia was a huge victory for the allies.

motherfunker

I'm not just saying this now becuase of the Kursk thing ( we will have to agree to disagree on that) but I dont think Bagration was a turning point in the war, it was more a point of no return, I think the tide had swung in the Russians favour long before that, Kursk, Kuban, Kiev, the Crimea, after Bagration the Russians just kept on going. Had the Germans won it it could have been another turning point, but for the Russians it was just another victory on the way to Berlin.
As I said, I'm not making this point to be argumentative I just dont think it was a turning point.

Tenger

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

Actually Kursk was to be a massive pincher envelopment - which had been up until now generally successful for the Wehrmacht - that would cut off almost 25% of Red Army manpower and the line would be straightened and then advanced if conditions allowed.

Kursk was indeed a disaster, but it's not as clear cut as "Kursk was a disaster for Germany from the moment the first shell was fired" - the Germans almost broke through in the South. While personally I don't think the breakthrough would have been big enough to roll up the Soviet line, for a while the Soviets were genuinely afraid that the Germans would turn the battle on them.

Victory at Kursk would have been a moral boost for the Germans and set back the Soviet counter attack which led up to Operation Bagration. WHile the germans had lost Stalingrad and hte 6th army they were stoill very capable. However the Soviets knew the attack was coming and had 7 distinct lines of defences to absorb and repel the German panzers. So in a way it was lost before it began. This caused the hamstringing of German armour for the remainder of the war.

After this German armour no longer had the numbers and power it previously held. I think it was Kursk and the (later?) battles of Kharkov that turned the Panzers from an offensive arm into a defensive arm. The german did nearly break through the lines but the toll on their tank forces was strategicly a defeat. many of the German tanks knocked out were unsalvagable rather than destroyes,so they lost more than they should have.

A clear victory at Kursk with 'acceptable' losses would have bolstered the Germans and probably slowed the Soviets maybe even leading to a negoiated settlement. I believe that by late '43/early '44 assault guns(Stugs) began to outnumber turreted tanks(PzIVs,Panthers,Tigers) in the Wehrmacht. While these are still statistically 'tanks' they are not offensive tanks.

I agree with above that Op Bagration was not a really a turning point. I think at that stage the turning poin had been passed. And yes the declaration of was on the States was stupid pontless and stupid again. Did Adolf not remember the impact of the US in 1917?


Great WWII books: Red Storm on the Reich-Duffy, How the Allies Won-Richard Overy.

FiSe

Only quickly off topic here:
StuG's were used with great succsess in offensive role as well, from France onwards. But they were designed as an infantry support weapon, mobile artillery if you wish, which task was to destroy enemy pill boxes, bunkres and any armored/soft skinned vehicles in sight...
I think, that the main reason for massive use of these AFV's from the mid of the war was their quicker and cheaper production and easier maintenance in comparsion to the "real" tanks.
Sorry for that lesson


Just thinking... Maybe the most overlooked turning point was unsuccessful plot to assasinate Hitler? Without him and his out of reality orders could there be some chance for, perhaps not total victory, but some sort of negotiated peace?

ojewriej

FiSe wrote: »

Just thinking... Maybe the most overlooked turning point was unsuccessful plot to assasinate Hitler? Without him and his out of reality orders could there be some chance for, perhaps not total victory, but some sort of negotiated peace?

It didn't work, so it wasnn't a turning point. It belongs more to the What if thread - i think there is one on this forum.

And I have to agree with Fratton Fred - the importance of breaking Enigma. I would even put a date on that - 20 April 1940. Repetitive birthday messages sent to Hitler from all over the place were a final Straw allowing Allies to break the code. Because of that they were able to read all orders sent from Hitler to his generals, and from generals down practically straight away.

And you can't underestimate the importance of this kind of information, it gave Allies a major advantage.

motherfunker

I think I agree with you guys about enigma, never gave too much thought to it before, its effects were far and long reaching affecting probably every minor and major action after its discovery. Well done Fratton Fred, 1st prize.

silverharp

-not sealing up the Med. it always amazed me that the germans didn't take the middle east oil fields and finish off the British in North Africa, before taking on russia
- switching to city bombing in the battle of britain, the RAF were nearly beat and the change in tactics gave them time to rebuild.
- i'm open to correction on this but did stalin stir up trouble in the balkins that dragged the Gemans into Greece thus delaying the Russian operation.
- the lack of focus of the german navy, more Uboats and less Battleships would have been effective against Britain 39/41

Fratton Fred

silverharp wrote: »

- switching to city bombing in the battle of britain, the RAF were nearly beat and the change in tactics gave them time to rebuild.

That was a big one as well. So was the decision by the board of directors of Hawker to produce hurricane's, even though they had not been ordered by the Government. If they had not done so, there would have been a lot less aircraft available to the RAF during the Battle of Britain.

TerrorFirmer

Actually an interesting one is that Stalin desperately tried to make peace with the Germans in late 1941 through a mediator; had they accepted, they probably would have created an expansive empire/satellite empire similar to that of 1918 without actually loosing much in terms of either manpower or machinery. Ah, hindsight! Forget about failing to capture Moscow, Stalingrad, and what could have prevented such defeats....they could have won the war in 1941 before either battles took place.

TerrorFirmer

Actually just posted this, won't repaste it but link to it, hadn't thought about it but definitely an unappreciated turning point - the bombing of German oil refineries.

Tenger

FiSe wrote: »

Only quickly off topic here:
StuG's were used with great succsess in offensive role as well, from France onwards. But they were designed as an infantry support weapon, mobile artillery if you wish, ................I think, that the main reason for massive use of these AFV's from the mid of the war was their quicker and cheaper production and easier maintenance in comparsion to the "real" tanks................Sorry for that lesson

No need to apologise. I realise that Stugs were hugely successful in the hands of the German (Incidently I have read that Stug crew were technically artillery men so had black overall, which often got them mistaken for SS Panzer troops.) However IMO bulding Stugs are a strategicly(?) defensive weapons.As you said, designed for infantry support rather then the maneuvere warfare practised by the Panzer armies earlier in the war (Poland,France,Barbarossa) My favourite book on German panzers is PanzerKrieg by Peter McCarthy and Mike Synon.

Overall the opinion that the Enigma code was the turning point is probably most true and deserves the title. While many decisions/campaigns/victories (which are 'sexier' and more widely known) shortened the war, by breaking Enigma the Allies had a way to ensure they would eventually win the war. I suppose after their messages were being deciphered it was only a matter of time before Germany was beaten.

Incidently Wellingtons victory in the Iberian Pennisular was greatly assisted by the breaking of Napoleons cyphers used between Madrid and Paris. From this he realised that the 3 Franch forces in the region were not co-operating and was thus able to exploit their weaknesses and indecision to win against great odds.

DublinWriter

Ruledbyjames wrote: »

I know it's a bit of a convoluted question, but what do you think is the most underrated turning point in the war?

Without a doubt for me it was towards the end of the Battle of Britain.

The vastly superior Luftwaffe were in days of destroying most of the RAF bases in England when Hitler suddenly changed strategy to bombing major British cities instead.

This action gave the RAF crucial breathing-space to rebuild nearly all of their bombed out bases and to establish a heavy bomber wing.

I've heard many military historians state that had Hitler continued to bomb RAF bases for just another week then he would have shattered the RAF and it would have been relatively easy for him to implement operation SeaLion (the invasion of Britain).

Arguably another major turning point was operation Barbarossa. Had Hitler succeeded on the Western Front while the Soviet Union was still an ally then he could have poured all his military resources into an attack on the Eastern Front.

I think one of the most over-rated turning points was Stalingrad. By the time German forces reached the city, their supply-lines were stretched to non-existance. That, plus Hitler's refusal to issue his troops with winter clothing made the eventual outcome a foregone conclusion.

vorbis

um Stalingrad. Just because its mentioned a lot doesn't mean its wrong. World War 2 was won and lost on the eastern front. The west for the most part was a sideshow. I think we over estimate the importance of air power given how decisive it is today. At that time, tanks were the main currency.

The Germans had no battle even close to Stalingrad occur on the western front. The suffered a million casualties at Stalingrad. It shattered their offensive capabilities. Saying the german army was still ok afterwards is like saying a one legged man can still walk ok with crutches. Kursk delivered the final blow but the turning point was Stalingrad.

I understand the reasoning behind El Alamein and the Battle of britain but those arguments are based on what ifs. There was no what if at Stalingrad. The germans lost badly and were in retreat for the rest of the war.

DublinWriter

vorbis wrote: »

I understand the reasoning behind El Alamein and the Battle of britain but those arguments are based on what ifs. There was no what if at Stalingrad. The germans lost badly and were in retreat for the rest of the war.

Wrong. Hilter expressly refused to issue the Wehrmacht//Waffen SS with Winter fatigues at the commencement of Operation Barbarossa, mistakingly thinking that it would be a 'home by Xmas' campaign.

Had the Wehrmacht/Waffen SS (a) been given proper winter fatigues and (b) secured a proper supply chain by the Luftwaffe then the outcome at Stalingrad would have been a lot different.

motherfunker

I agree with Vorbis, I think it has become cool to say Stalingrad wasent the turning point of the war and find other more obscure areas and try to show their indepth knowledge of the conflict by describing in detail why they think this was the real turning point of the war. I dont think it was an underrated turning point as this thread is about and I still agree that enigma was the way the war was won, but as for a single turning point it has to be Stalingrad. The losses in both men and matriel were enormous, especially considering the combat experience these men had, they had fought since Poland, that cannot be taught to new recruits. The biggest blow however I feel was to the moral of the men, before this they had never known defeat, nor had any German soilder, now not only did they know defeat, they also knew they would be left to die by their leader. Although the Germans regained their composure slightly after this, they never again had the momentum or the drive they had before entering Stalingrad. Wars are won on the moral of the soilders fighting them, Stalingrad was the death of the German army moral but even more importantly it was the birth of the moral of the Russian army, this victory gave the Russians the belief in themselves that they could defeat the Germans and the germans now believed they could be beaten by the Russians.

Mahatma coat

I dunno about this lads most of the talk is about the war with germany, I think one of the overall turning points was the whole PNG Solomons campaign, if the Japanese had managed to establish footholds there then Australia, not Just Darwin and brisbane but Melbourne and Perth would have been within feasible strikin range. so for me Guadalcanal would be a turning point in the defense of Australia and the defeat of Japan, course nukes helpd too.

Tenger

Mahatma coat wrote: »

I dunno about this lads most of the talk is about the war with germany

While war against the Japanese for the USA was a hard slog,the USA was always going to win. Purely on industrial and economic factors they had the Japanese overshadowed. If their carriers had of been destroyed at Pearl Harbour it may have taken 2-3 more years. And perhaps japanese garrisons in Australia/Burma would have weakened the resistence elsewhwere.

Imagine a situation in 1945 where after VE day you have the battle hardened US/UK mechanised forces attacking up from SE Asia or the Soviets sweeping down from Siberia. The infantry heavy Japanese would have very little to stop them. The Japanese army never followed the same path of ground war as the European progtaganists.

In terms of the Pacific War I have to agree on the status of Midway as the turning point. From then on the US knew how to counter the Imperial Fleet (codebreaking),the Imperial Fleet was reduced in striking power(Lost 3 of 4 carriers involved I think?) and as for the Soviets in Stalingrad the US had won a major engagement and received a morale boost.

TerrorFirmer

Yeah it would have been utterly impossible for the war to end in the pacific with a Japanese occupation of the United States, so regardless of how the war went, victory would never be victory in the same sense as the outcome in the European theater.

I agree with Vorbis, I think it has become cool to say Stalingrad wasent the turning point of the war and find other more obscure areas and try to show their indepth knowledge of the conflict by describing in detail why they think this was the real turning point of the war. I dont think it was an underrated turning point as this thread is about and I still agree that enigma was the way the war was won, but as for a single turning point it has to be Stalingrad. The losses in both men and matriel were enormous, especially considering the combat experience these men had, they had fought since Poland, that cannot be taught to new recruits. The biggest blow however I feel was to the moral of the men, before this they had never known defeat, nor had any German soilder, now not only did they know defeat, they also knew they would be left to die by their leader. Although the Germans regained their composure slightly after this, they never again had the momentum or the drive they had before entering Stalingrad. Wars are won on the moral of the soilders fighting them, Stalingrad was the death of the German army moral but even more importantly it was the birth of the moral of the Russian army, this victory gave the Russians the belief in themselves that they could defeat the Germans and the germans now believed they could be beaten by the Russians.

I think we're sufficiently mature that we look beyond trying to be 'cool' in analyzing history. Stalingrad was extremely important, that could never be in doubt, of course.

The Germans had no battle even close to Stalingrad occur on the western front. The suffered a million casualties at Stalingrad. It shattered their offensive capabilities. Saying the german army was still ok afterwards is like saying a one legged man can still walk ok with crutches. Kursk delivered the final blow but the turning point was Stalingrad.

There was no what if at Stalingrad. The germans lost badly and were in retreat for the rest of the war.

Simply put after Stalingrad the Germany army still held the means to win the war in the East and it looked as if they could do so up until Kursk - everyone talks about Stalingrad as if it was the death knoll of the Wehrmacht - and nobody cares to mention, or in some cases, even knows, about the German counteroffensive under Manstein that drove the Soviets back in the Ukraine winning them considerable amounts of their territory back - incidentally creating the bulge that was to lead to Kursk. Also, no mention goes to to the abortive attempts up north to coincide with Stalingrad that were also stopped with disastrous Soviet casualties by Model. Again probably because people don't know about them.

If you honestly believe the German Army and its offensive capability was destroyed at Stalingrad then you need to read a few history books. Claiming the Germans were in steady retreat after Stalingrad and comparing it to a one legged man is not just silly, it's completely false and shows that you lack any sort of in depth knowledge of the Eastern Front.

The west for the most part was a sideshow. I think we over estimate the importance of air power given how decisive it is today.

Are you joking? Anyone who knows anything about the Second World War in any sort of detail would realize Air Power was one of the most decisive factors of the war.

1) D-Day would have failed without Allied Air superiority
2) Germany fuel output was reduced to 10% of its former output through Allied bombing possible by air superiority, grounding the Luftwaffe and completely destroying German armor offensive capability on both fronts, do you care to elaborate on how you feel this is 'over estimated' in its importance?

Tenger

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

Are you joking? Anyone who knows anything about the Second World War in any sort of detail would realize Air Power was one of the most decisive factors of the war.

1) D-Day would have failed without Allied Air superiority
2) Germany fuel output was reduced to 10% of its former output through Allied bombing possible by air superiority, grounding the Luftwaffe and completely destroying German armor offensive capability on both fronts, do you care to elaborate on how you feel this is 'over estimated' in its importance?

Absolutely. People think of airpower in terms of the actual damage from munitions. While the air-raids did not force capitulation (as originally envisioned by airpower theorists in the 1920s and 30s) the german response to the air raids (huge AA batteries,radar installations,keeping interceptors and night fighters over the Reich) lessened their offensive ability elsewhere.

The air attacks disrupted the German economy so much that in 1945 the Luftwaffe was unable to fly due to lack of fuel,tanks were unable to maneuvere,and troops had to travel long distance due to destroyed bridges. While Stalin may not have been happy with the Western concentration of air attacks in 1943-1944,without them the Luftwaffe may have been able to have more aircraft supporting the Eastern Front. The massive build-up of reserve forces for Operation Uranus (the counter attack that cut off Stalingrad)could have been spotted and planned for.Perhaps the Soviet attacks wouldn't have been so overwhelming with adequate CAS for the Wehrmacht.

In terms of D-Day I think there were only a handful of strafing runs on the beaches by the Luftwaffe. It was something tiny like that. The help that total air dominance must have given the Allied planners in the run up to the landings. To know that the support bombers will get to their target and that the boats would not get strafed on the run in.

As someone else pointed out the Ardennes offensive of Dec 1944 had an Allied fuel depot at Stavelot as its primary objective to allow the forces to get enough fuel to actually reach Antwerp(i think its was antwerp)

mossym

agredd on the airpower importance. and given that importance, it lends huge importance to the invasion of italy, which gave the allies airfields to use in range of the huge oil fields, as well as the factories that couldn't be reached from britain. if the italian campaign achieved nothing else(and it achieved more) it was worth it for that

jmayo

I believe one could look at the war as a series of very important turning points in each theatre.
For the West the Enigma codes cracking was massive. It was to help in future events such as the battle of EL Alamein for instance. Counteracting the U-boat threats was massive for supplies getting to Britain.

In the East, delaying the invasion was the first blunder, then getting bogged down at Stalingrad rather than reminaing mobile and heading south for the oil fields was huge mistake.

In the pacific the fact that the Japanese missed the carriers at Pearl and did not luanch another wave of attack were hugely influential.
Actually again due to code breakers Admiral Nimitz had prior knowledge that Midway was the target.
Midway was the beginning of the end for the Imperial Japanese Navy.
So maybe codebreakers really deserve the credit.

Belfast

The failure the Germans to make Peace with Stalin in late 1941 when Stalin offered Hitler terms.

Manic Moran

Bramble wrote: »

I realise that Stugs were hugely successful in the hands of the German (Incidently I have read that Stug crew were technically artillery men so had black overall, which often got them mistaken for SS Panzer troops.) However IMO bulding Stugs are a strategicly(?) defensive weapons.As you said, designed for infantry support rather then the maneuvere warfare practised by the Panzer armies earlier in the war (Poland,France,Barbarossa) My favourite book on German panzers is PanzerKrieg by Peter McCarthy and Mike Synon.

You are correct that all StuG crews were artillerymen, but I'm not sure about the uniform colours. You could be correct there as well.

However, I would argue that they are not necessarily defensive weapons. There's absolutely no reason that they cannot be used to support infantry in the offense: Combined Arms tactics -requires- the use of infantry, and the appropriate supporting arms.

NTM