Tales from the Trenches

tricky D

Tales from the Trenches - Tales of my Grandfather

Firstly, some background:
The BA was gearing up for war at least a month before the declaration (see letter below).
According to my dad, there was a real fear at the time that the Japanese would sweep through SE Asia and attack into East Africa.
The typed transcript is about ops in Somaliland which ended with a hasty withdrawal of the Allied forces.

Unfortunately, we have no records of exploits from Dec 42 (note the 'not disclosed' bit in the CV), though we are trying to get some records to corroborate the following. Basically, he went up the Burma trail in the Chindits and had dealings with Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-Shek. We don't know the exact nature of these dealings, but my dad, who isn't the type to over-egg this kind of stuff, says he knew Mao personally. We speculate that he was more on the political end of the Chindit function (***his CV mentions IAO - could this mean Information Activities Officer???***). We would love to find out the real story and match up the chronology, so any pointers and suggestions as to how to get further info would be great (for a sticky). (Nat Archives, Chindit Association). I reckon it would be a helluva story.

On with the story then, starting with the Somaliland stuff, then some scans of other related docs, some background docs, a few photos and lastly the piece of cloth they took up Burma with their 'message of welcome' (***I have no idea what it is called, anyone know?*** Also I had to break it in 2 for photobucket - I can attach the whole if anyone wants).


Enjoy!

DCM AUg 40 1/NRR

The month of August brings proud and painful memories for the Battalion. August, 1939, war was imminent, there was no calm before the storm:it was a relief when we heard that war had actually come. Then there were months of mostly work and tiredness, until August 1940 when the war came to us in earnest. Now in 1941 we have time to remember.

I want to recall here the deeds of four Africans of Northern Rhodesia whose bravery His Majesty saw fit to honour by the award of Distinguished Conduct Medals. Those deeds must be seen against the background of the war as it was at that stage, and in their local tactical setting in British Somaliland: it is proper also to remember the home background of the men who did these things, a background of greener gardens and pastures than that wind-swept, sand-swept land, a background of traditions more primitive but more dignified than the modern savagery that Mussolini's brave new minions brought when they introduced the Blitz to Africa.

After the French collapsed in Europe, there was some hope that French Somaliland might continue to fight on our side. But civil authorities and French Officers of troops in Jibuti over-ruled or deserted our fine fiery little General Legentilhomme, all except a handful. He became a General without any army for a time. And we, from being an outpost on the left flank of Jibuti, became the tiny centre against an Italian assault. Mussolini, confident that the Germans would succeed soon in the Battle of Britain, sought to stake his claim (as against them) to the overlordship of Africa by a cheap victory in that corner of the Continent. He won his victory: but it was not cheap: and Africa, instead of being his prize, has since become the forge and presage of his doom.

Look at British Somaliland from the enemy's point of view. The Ethiopian Highlands break up, steeply for the most part, after you enter Somaliland. There is only one good approach, through Harrar, Hargeisa and the Tug Argon Gap: thence, across the hot maritime plains the way lies fairly open to Berbera: perhaps to Aden and Arabia.


MAP OF SOMALILAND

The First Battalion of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (Commander Lt. Col. B.G. Lynn-Allen) had come to East Africa in 1939 to stand beside the K.A.R. and other East African forces. The forerunners of what was afterwards a "great trek", we were still, in the early months of 1940, an exception and a peculiarity . Italy was not yet in the war and France not yet out of the war. But since such and such things _might_ happen (thought the fall of France was then hardly even imagined) a battalion was required to occupy and improve the defences of the Tug Argon route, on the left flank, as I have said, of the French. So this battalion was sent, and landed on May 15th.

From one day to the next you would notice very little change on the faces of those hills in the Gap: our digging and fortifications followed the natural lines of the rocks, or imitated them. A remarkable variety of knowledge and experience in mining, farming, surveying and so on was available in the Battalion. By August we had, in a small way, quite a useful system of fortifications which brought some offensive surprises to the enemy.


MAP OF HILLS

Whilst the other Companies were working on Observation Hill, Mill Hill, Castle and King Hills, Black Hill, and Knobbly, "D" Company with some of the Camel Corps and Irregulars were given the task of reconnoitring the county in front around Hargeisa, of sending back information, and of raiding Italian outposts when it seemed opportune. If the enemy came in force they were to smack him and bring back word.

When the Italians attacked Hargeisa on the 5th August 1940, 510 L/Cpl. MWALEZA of "D" Company was in charge of an anti-tank rifle to the left of a road-block, the rest of the Company being somewhat further back and mostly on the right of the road. Those of the Italian tanks which got past Mwaleza's fire and past the road-block, then deployed, and some, moving against "D" Company's platoon on the left, thereby cut off the line of withdrawal which had been planned for him. There seemed to be little hope.

But Mwaleza is an Ila, from Lubwe village in Shaloba's country. These Ila are an independent race of people. They never in the past conquered any great empire in Africa: they were too fond of fighting each other: but anyone else from outside their beloved cattle and grazing-lands was fiercely repelled. Whilst herding and protecting the cattle, they are not afraid to go in with spears only against marauding lion: they are cheerful lovers of the chase: quite from an early age the boys join the men in herding and the hunt, and familiarise themselves with the bush. In all these jobs and pastimes, and in their hard rite of initiation, boys are taught to show no fear. Such was the training that now stood Mwaleza in good stead.

On his own initiative, in largely unknown country, and without the help of a compass or map he led his section in a wide circle round. He managed to find water for his men. They got through a number of advanced units of the enemy. Finally on the evening of the 7th of August he brought back his section complete, and three other men who he had collected on the way, to Battalion Headquarters. They had covered about sixty miles. Not a stich (sic) of their equipment was missing. In particular they brought back a weighty burden - the anti-tank rifle, and every round of ammunition which had not served his purpose: the Italians had for some time been offering rewards for the capture of one of these anti-tank Rifles and even for bullets.

The tribe which, relatively to its numbers in the Regiment, has the most distinguished itself during this war far, is the Ngoni. They are descendents of a body of Zulus who broke away from the main tribe during the last century: Southern Africa was getting too crowded they thought: so they came north. They were the last tribe in Northern Rhodesia to put up a fight against the British: "it was the M.Gs. that beat us", they say, "not the Europeans". Since then they have refused to be cowed by the European machine, as so many other tribes have been, into servility, imitation or decadence: they have mastered a great deal of European skill without losing their own proud hearts and proud traditions.

As the attacks on the Hills developed, and the Italians "infiltrated", communications between our widely spread positions, and also between Battalions Headquarters and our counter-attacking forces, became very difficult. 577 Pte. AMON, a Ngoni, again and again went forward to carry messages, although he knew the ground he was to cover was under heavy fire. He treated shot and shell with high disdain. On these journeys he saw frequent chances to snipe back, and disposed of many of the enemy, perhaps he exceeded his duties somewhat in this matter: but he always got his messages there and back.

On Monday the 12th of August, "Mill Hill", the hill least endowed by Nature for defence, fell after a gallant desperate resistance. With it were lost two of four guns of the East Africa Light Battery, who were our only artillery support. Thus, when the Italians placed their artillery within range of Observation Hill, no reply was possible. So they were able to put in extremely heavy shelling attacks on Observation Hill. They made it their business to put all the machine-guns on the Hill out of action. Our positions were also bombed from the air. The single Company ("B" Company) which, with supporting Mortars, M.Gs. and Light BAttery, was distributed over Black and Knobbly Hills, was highly successful in repulsing a number of assaults, and put at least a whole Brigade out of action. Castle and King Hills, though surrounded and battered, also held. But the position on our left (if this could be regarded as a front at all) was very precarious. The Hills had come to be at best a a number of "forward defended localities" with no depth of defence or main line behind.

The 1/1 K>A>R> and Punjabis had to be elsewhere to attend to the approaches through Sheikh and by various camel-tracks and through Zeila along the coast. A battalion of the Black Watch has arrived, but hey were being held in reserve to prevent a break-through. Reliable information was received that the Italian division which was attacking us was even being reinforced by another, and that more were ready to follow. That the enemy should be planning to cope with us on such a scale was a great compliment. In August, 1940 it would have been very unwise to remove forces of comparable size from Egypt or Kenya. On the 15th of August the order came to evacuate Somaliland.

Before and during the withdrawal two men of the Bemba tribe greatly distinguished themselves;78 Sgt. KAPATULA of Nkula's own village, an old soldier who among those who fought the Germans in the last war; and Cpl. MWAMBA from the village of his royal namesake.

The Bemba were and aggressors and slavers themselves in their time, their priest-kings gloried in showering the wealth they got from their neighbours onto their own clansmen and tribesmen. With the imposition of the British Peace, they have gone in for the pleasantly dangerous and lucrative trade of copper-mining rather then for the land. But three of four hundred miles from the Mines, the descendents of the royal Crocodile clan, Chitimukulu, Nkulu, Mwamba and Nkolemfumu still rule their ancestral country with some vestige of the old power and munificence. The Bemba still have a strong sense of the obligations of kinship, and of the responsibility that goes with authority.

Cpl. Mwamba, during all those days had been second in command under British Sergeant Finn of the Mortar Section on Observation Hill. A great deal of time was spent in observing in a very exposed post where he was frequently subject to enemy fire. As our machine-guns were, one after the other, put out of action, the Hill came more to depend on the work of this section. Attacks came in from all sides. The fire of the mortars was very accurate. "Our bombs did not fall on the ground but on men;" Africans say, "they came like locusts, layer upon layer; or like grass when the wind drives; it was beyond understanding." The order to withdraw came as a great disappointment to the mortar section. Mwamba, though tired, remained miraculously unhurt: his younger brother Mukuka, was wounded in both legs and unable to walk: Mwamba carried him, and protected him for the 30 or so miles until they reached the Black Watch.

Sgt. Kapatula was another who was very loathe to withdraw from the battle. Our forces were, as I have said, very thinly spread: Sgt. Kapatula was in charge of a lonely position where he had to use his own judgement to a large extent. The Italians and their Native troops during the whole of their assault showed real dash: Their fault if any was foolhardiness: they were far from being the demoralised crowd they became by 1941: the Eritreans were particularly brave. Kapatula and his Lewis Gun Section stopped some socially ferocious attacks. Even when the enemy had got past the wire in front of them, and all around them, they continued to fight. Finally he kept his section together and they fought their way out of encirclement and back; but for Kapatula's calmness and leadership his men would almost certainly have been killed or captured one by one. The section had inflicted a very heavy score of casualties on the Italians troops.

These were by no means the only acts of heroism and initiative incidental to our sad withdrawal. It is possible now to see those days in brighter perspective than we could a year ago. The Battalion had continued to fight through what was probably a heavier rain of fire and explosive than any other unit has had to sustain in the whole Somaliland - Ethiopian campaign, and heavier than any sustained by any other Black Battalion in any campaign. Moreover the handling given to the Italians in return prevented them from pursuing in fierce: the Black Watch stopped the only attempt at pursuit except for a few bombers. Further, their loses in Somaliland must have been one consideration which gave pause to any Italian plans seriously to invade Kenya and Uganda at a time when our total force there were far from being as strong as was generally supposed or as they later became. We had set going among the enemy a destructive rumour which contributed to their final demoralisation and defeat.

One other matter should not be forgotten and never will be forgotten by asikari. As they got back war-staine and tired, tired, tired, to the Black Watch, thwewy were given tea and food and every possible comfort: all ranks of the Black Watch - most of them of course, Scotsmen, but with some English and Irish, an some Southern Rhodesians - treated them as comrades of the line. Our asikari never cease enquiring about their fortunes since then - they would like to have them nearer: 'they showed mercy and generosity like really great chiefs.'

At Berbera units of the Navy were ready. So we came out of Berbera, Through Aden and Mombasa, back north; and were thus enabled to come up with the Italians again later on, as part of a larger strategy, and with a happier result.

- ends -

The brave honoured





Appointment to Rhodesia 1931






The war machine starts cranking up in Aug 1939 - a month early


Army Record of Service


Overall CV (quite colonial, but pls don't go there)


Photos


Having a smoke break


Old boys reunion (2nd from left)


Anyone know what this is known as???

Cato

Ill get round to reading this some day! cheers!:eek:

the_syco

At a guess, the last picture with a flag looks like a "I'm not your enemy, but if you help me, I can help you", in every language in the region.