German Defeat, 1918

TerrorFirmer

Writing an essay on this topic, finding it hard to squeeze it into 4,000 words as I'm supposed to do...think I'm currently about 5.5-6k. Any opinions on the following, what could be modified, change? It's based on a primary document( diary entry of Colonel von Thaer) and has to make reference to immediate effect and reaction too...

Albrecht Von Thaer’s diary entry gives a fascinating insight into the despair and shock suffered by most Germans, military and civilian alike, as they were presented with catastrophic defeat in 1918 and forced to come to terms with the unavoidable stigma that accompanied the loss. Despite his position as a Colonel meaning that von Thaer must have known of the state of the disintegrating German army prior to the peace negotiations and thus, of the impossibility of victory, his reactions to the news of surrender are no less shocked and disappointed for it. For four long years, the German people had suffered hardships at home, while the army bled itself white on the battlefields, allegedly in the heroic defence of their fatherland against foreign aggressors. Throughout these years, as they had in the years predating conflict, the German people continued to believe in themselves as cultural elite within Europe; representative of a nation whose power and fierce nationalism was loath to be in existence by the belligerents on the continent. Propaganda, even up to as late as October 1918, continued to reassure the population that final victory was both within grasp and inevitable. Therefore, defeat, when it came, was not only a tremendous shock and humiliation, but seen as a betrayal. The blame for the defeat however, came not to be pinned upon the monarchy or even those who had held power at the outbreak of the war – but those who attempted to hold Germany together in the turbulent years following the defeat through any means necessary. Thus, we must ask why Germany was decisively defeated in 1918, what were the implications of such a defeat at home and why were they so?

As early as 1916, despite the apparent deadlock on the western front, defeat was an unimaginable yet entirely realistic prospect for the German High Command. In the field, the German army was markedly superior to its adversaries, propping up its primary ally Austria Hungary, sending the Russian army and its weaker Italian ally into flight, and fighting the combined power of the French and British armies into stalemate. However, the geographical location of Germany had always meant that victory would have to be as a result of a swift and decisive campaign, as was the case in the Franco Prussian war several decades earlier. The military superiority of Germany would be offset by a lengthy campaign, owing to the inevitable blockade of the country and subsequent limits placed on essential materials. As the war continued, the Germans could only get weaker as the allied powers went from strength to strength. Unfortunately for both the German military and civilian body alike, this is exactly what happened and perhaps unsurprisingly, Germany was forced to concede defeat after four long years of war. Fiercely nationalistic and fully embracing the ideal that they were culturally superior to their European neighbours, the German nation continued to fight long after the tide turned against them. Often, if not in belief of final victory, Germans were encouraged by the ideal that Germany could never be defeated or its people ever subdued by a foreign power. By 1918, dreams of military glory and international prestige had been largely forgotten by German society who instead longed for two attributes devoid from every aspect of life, on both the war and home front: peace and bread. Defeat however, still came as a cultural shock, and most significantly, the conditions that followed were not only to radically change the face of Germany society as it had been known since unification, but to inspire an even greater surge of nationalism that ultimately resulted in the longer, and far bloodier, Second World War.

At the outbreak of war in 1914, the Germany army was far better prepared for a modern campaign then its European rivals. Equipped with far larger amounts of both heavy and light artillery as well as a local numerical superiority, they quickly pushed the French army and the British Expeditionary force to the Marne. The failure to break French Positions however, the ensuing construction of static defensive lines and the invasion of East Prussia however presented Germany with the nightmare scenario they had always strove to avoid: a two front war. While the Russian army did not present an immediately pressing threat to Germany’s military position, it did prove dangerous to Austria Hungary, Germany’s primary Ally. In the first few weeks of the war, an initial Austro-Hungarian advance drove deep into Russian territory, but owing to serious tactical error and a lack of reserves, it broke down at the massive cost of 500,000 casualties . Despite its immense size, the Austro-Hungarian Empire possessed only a small army in comparison to the other belligerents and was unable to sustain such casualties. It was said by Winston Churchill that Conrad had used up the heart of his army in a few short weeks. Throughout the war, owing to the Austro-Hungarian insistence on conducting campaigns beyond their means, the German army was actively involved in both assisting their efforts and preventing their total collapse alike. This was a serious drain on a county already fighting on two fronts and against a numerically superior enemy. Having to divert troops to secondary theatres only increased the likelihood of defeat. As early as November 1914, Falkenhayen had claimed that victory was beyond Germanys grasp in a war of attrition.

The economic situation in Germany throughout the war was seriously mismanaged and says much about why Germany the war. During the course of the war, Germany spent 83% of its total expenditure on military and a mere 2% on the civilian sector, in stark contrast with the respective figures of 62% and 16% in Britain . To pay for the increased expenditure, the government simply printed more money and circulation of money during the war rose a staggering 1000% , a clear indication of the economic problems that plagued Germany throughout the war. Despite being the most authoritarian war economy out of all the belligerents, it was also the worst. Both France and Britain developed economies that did not give into the interests of specific firms, whereas Germany’s war economy was run by the army and by industrialists – a disastrous mistake. In certain cases, so many shell factories were constructed as to leave an actual shortage of steel for shells themselves. German industrial output increased in the short term, but did so in the most inefficient manner possible - at the expense of both the civilian sector and future military requirements. With the military at the helm of the countries economy, vital maintenance and construction on communications networks were often neglected, further obstructing the manufacture of munitions as coal could not reach the factories. At sea, despite its considerable size, without decisively defeating the superior Royal Navy the German Navy could not hope to end the blockade of their country. Thus, within weeks of the outbreak of war, Germany was presented with an immediate disadvantage that only increased as the conflict progressed. The blockade made it impossible to secure a constant flow of materials essential to the war effort and foodstuff to feed the population. As early as 1905, Admiral Von Tirpitz had opened discussion on the potential difficulties Germany would face in the absence of a quick victory in any future conflict. Yet he was overruled by the army under Von Moltke, who simply asserted that the economy would prove 'a great source of endurance in the war'. While the issue was addressed again in 1912 by ministers, very little consideration was given to the means of actually breaking any blockade imposed on the country. During the war, the High Command gave the army priority over civilians in rationing foodstuffs, which made sense, but led to increasing unrest as it became clear that war was to be a lengthy one. In this regard, the Allied countries enjoyed a clear advantage, assuring that civilian life retained as high a standard as possible. As a side effect of the unrest in Germany and of strikes and protests that resulted, the productions of munitions slowed down and often left the army in short supply on many occasions. About 20% of the average Germans diet in the pre-war period was constituted of imported food, which clearly showcased the potential devastation a blockade would cause. Weekly consumption of meat fell from 2.3kg to a mere 0.3kg . Food shortages remained common throughout 1916, improving slightly in 1917 only to plummet to an all time low in the following summer, coinciding with the defeats on the western front. While the blockade may not have heavily impacted on the fighting efficiency of the Germany army, it had a major social and subsequently political impact on the country as a whole which in turn affected the army. People became critical of the government over the economic hardships they faced and anti-government demonstrations began to appear. On the 1st of May 1916, a small demonstration occurred in the centre of Berlin. It was led by Karl Liebknecht, who shouted ‘Down with the war! Down with the government!’ Although he was arrested and jailed, this event led to the first major political strike of the war within Germany. 50,000 workers went on strike during his trial, seriously disrupting work in over 40 munitions factories .

By November 1916, Germany’s situation was poor. The eastern and western fronts were stable, the former particularly so, but the long term prospects were bleak. Food shortages and riots were already becoming increasingly common, with military force necessary on occasion to quell civilian unrest. The failure to destroy the French at Verdun and the massive casualties that resulted meant the army was unable to amount offensive operations for several months and thus destined the country to endure another lengthy period of hardship under increasingly difficult conditions. As a shortage of shells became apparent at the front, so increasingly did the lack of basic foodstuffs at home. There were more then fifty recorded riots throughout Germany in 1916. During the battle of the Somme in July 1916, German soldiers experienced inferiority for the first time when they were continuously shelled from 2nd July until September by over 7 million British shells to which they had no answer. For the first time, the German economical situation was beginning to show an impact in the field and soldiers’ belief in their own countries superiority was shaken. They began to call the war a ‘battle of material’. By 1916, Britain was applying its industrial muscle far more effectively to the battlefield then Germany was, with the result that Germany no longer enjoyed the dominance in firepower it had held since 1914 until mid 1916. Owing to the blockade, the output of guns in Germany was limited by the output of powder for the shells, for which the German chemical industry relied heavily on imports. Thus, although alternative began to appear slowly, there was little point in having guns with nothing to fire from them. Only in October 1916 was the War Office created to deal with the problems, but Germany continued to experience difficulties in supply and production, even after introducing a longer working day. In late December 1916, Admiral von Holtzendorff warned Hindenburg that if war was to end with the general exhaustion of all parties, then it would be particularly disastrous for Germany. True to his predictions, by 1918, German industrial output had declined to 66% of the pre war figure, and was only likely to decrease even further as the war went on.

1917 brought some relief to Germany. Although the High Command had planned a year of gathering much need resources and remaining on the defensive, they had succeeded in knocking Russia out of the war, delivering a crushing blow to the Italians at Caparetto and rebuffing French and British advances on the western front. However, the Central powers had been dealt a serious blow by America’s entry into the war in April 1917. Germany’s effort to knock Britain out of the war by strangling her sea trade, risking American abandonment of neutrality, failed to diminish Britain’s fighting or industrial capacity in any significant way while yielding the worst possible results. America however, had already been viewed by the Central Powers as a belligerent, even if purely in economic terms. Although the American army was small and inexperienced, the potentially limitless industrial and manpower capability it offered the Entente meant that Germany now had limited time in which to force a decisive victory in Europe before American troops could arrive in France in significant numbers. However, in order to achieve this decisive victory, Germany had no alternative to risking a break with American and introducing unrestricted Submarine warfare. Otherwise, it was doomed to defeat in a war of attrition. If they could force a military victory on the field in late 1917 or early 1918, American involvement would become irrelevant. Interestingly, however, even at this desperate stage the Germans still chased only a victory decisively in their favour. In lieu of a negotiated peace at least establishing pre-war conditions to Europe, Germany was willing to gamble for victory, at the risk of total defeat. In his memorandum to Hindenburg on December 22nd 1916, Admiral von Holtzendorff stated:

I therefore conclude that unrestricted submarine warfare initiated soon enough to bring about peace before the world harvest in summer 1917....must hazard the consequences of a break with America, for no other choice remains to us....(it) is the right means for ending the war successfully. It is also the only means for reaching this goal....I do not see any possibility other than that of mutual exhaustion.

The defeat of Russia, too, was not as advantageous a situation as appearances suggested. The sheer size of the eastern front, combined with the smaller German forces available in comparison to the western theatre, meant it had been largely a war of manoeuvre in which German forces displayed a clear dominance. Yet, while troops were freed up for Ludendorff’s spring offensive of 1918, over one million more, compromising a full 50 divisions, remained in the east to enforce the draconian treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Ironically, the treat of Brest-Litovsk was far harsher then that imposed on Germany in the Treaty of Versaille, stripping Russia of 34 percent of her population, 32 percent of her agriculture, 85 percent of her sugar-beet land, 54 percent of industry, and a staggering 89 percent of her coal mines . As forces were built up in the west for Germany’s last offensive effort of the war, one German army marched into the Ukraine and another towards Dvinsk and Reval simultaneously to scare the Bolsheviks into accepting these terms. This division of forces to both fronts, unnecessary given the Bolsheviks total commitment to peace, weakened the western front at the crucial moment by denying Ludendorff adequate reserves desperately needed to exploit the breakthroughs in France that were to come in the following months. In March, the puppet regime set up by the Germans in the Ukraine collapsed. Despite the impending offensive in the west, Ludendorff ordered the country to be occupied. Incredibly, even long after the failure of the offensive in the west and with it the loss of hope in victory, German forces continued to pursue offensive operations. Over a week after Ludendorff declared that the war must be ended in August 1918, German forces were ordered against a small British force established in Baku, a fight that continued right until September of that year. Even two days before the Armistice, Ludendorff gathered together specialists to get oil flowing from Baku to cater for Germanys war needs. In so vigorously exploiting the situation in the east, the German High Command seriously compromised their effort in the west to achieve a decisive victory before American reinforcements could arrive in significant numbers. Of the fifty divisions stationed in the east, at least half of those could have been transferred to the western front and used as reserves to exploit the huge gaps torn in Allied lines. While a huge satellite empire in the east and a temporary influx of much need raw materials was achieved, it was only a temporary gain that was ultimately to amount to nothing. The treaty of Versaille in 1919 reversed the entire treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It is often an unconsidered fact that Hindenburg and Ludendorff were not only the leaders of the German army, but also the dictators of German foreign policy and the aggressive pursuit of policy in the east to the deprivation of the critical Western front was a major cause for defeat in 1918.

As with her Economy, as the war continued Germanys technological advances lagged behind those of her enemies, Britain in particular. While no single advancement in technology could claim to have decisively ended the war, a combination of superior Allied firepower and a better means to deliver it meant that from late 1917 onwards, Germany lay at an immense disadvantage on the battlefield. Although the tank had been involved in active service since 1916, it made its first large scale appearance at Cambrai on the 20th of November 1917. At a cost of minimal casualties, the British broke the German lines and forced a salient over 8km deep. Although tanks at this stage were not a decisive war winning weapon and wholly different to their successors in the Second World War, the effect on German morale was both devastating and irreparable. During the Cambrai offensive, German soldiers had abandoned both Trenches and weapons in terror. The German response to this new threat was almost as serious as the threat itself – they largely ignored them, believing them to be a sign of marital weakness. Thus, Germany built only 20 tanks in the course of the entire war, the first entering service in March 1918, in comparison to thousand of Allied tanks completed by the same date . The remainder of Germany’s tank force was reliant on captured British models, which they usually preferred to their own. Germany did try to introduce anti-tank rifles to the battlefield and initiated the practice of directing artillery fire over open sights, but it was not enough to redress the balance.

In March 1918, Ludendorff opened his spring offensive against the allied forces. The new tactics were novel, involving heavily armed groups of storm troopers infiltrating enemy lines, bypassing strongholds for the following infantry to destroy. In practice however, they were unsuccessful. Although they allowed for a rapid breach of Allied lines and gained Ludendorff more territory in five months then had previously been achieved by any belligerent in the preceding three years, it was a largely meaningless gain. The rapid nature of the advance meant that supporting Artillery could not keep up, and more importantly no targets of strategic importance were captured, meaning that by the end of his offensive operations, Ludendorff controlled a front that had almost doubled in size, but had fewer men to occupy it. The lack of reserves meant that while the German army had staged a remarkable coup, it could still not achieve a decisive breakthrough. And by the summer of 1918, it could ill bear high numbers of losses compared to its enemies who not only shared a larger man pool to draw from, but enjoyed the prospect of unlimited American reinforcements. By the outset of March 1918, both the Central powers and the Entente had 5 million men on which to call. However, Germany was outnumbered in every other conceivable way, not only by the steady influx of American soldiers, but by 14,000 to 18,500 Artillery pieces, 3670 aircraft to 4,500, and 10 to 800 armoured vehicles. In a war becoming increasingly mechanized, Germany had fallen far and irreparably behind. Nonetheless, even after his initial failures at high cost, Ludendorff planned to continue his operations in Flanders, but was pre-empted by a French counter offensive in July. Although it was unknown at the time, Germany would not go on the offensive again in the west.

Ludendorff’s offensive, failing to achieve the decisive breakthrough promised to the people of Germany, merely placed Germany’s forces into poorly defended salients that did not have adequate artillery cover or reserves. Thus, when the French attacked in July after the failed German push at Rheims, they were forced to concede almost all of their gains immediately. While the Germans managed to eventually stabilize the front against this attack in August, another offensive, this time by the British, was looming to the South of the Somme. Here the superiority of British munitions production was fully brought to bear. Using new advances in technology, such as sound pointing, British Artillery units were able to blanket German artillery positions in fire before an attack without prior ranging. This not only restored surprise to the battlefield, but destroyed Germany’s already failing ability to resist attack. The British success in combining different areas of attack such as artillery, tanks, guns and infantry meant that the condition of enemy moral was rendered unimportant and advances would now be made at moderate cost. On the 29th of September, the British fourth army was able to allocate 126 shells for every 500 yards of German trench per minute for eight continuous hours, to which the Germans had no recourse . By the time the infantry followed up the barrage, unsurprisingly there was little left to offer a coherent resistance. By October 8th, the allies had breached the Hindenburg line in several places and broken through to open country. Germany’s formidable defensive line had proved no obstacle for modern technology and advances in tactical thinking. For the next several weeks precipitating the armistice, the Allies made slow but steady advances, at modest costs. In September, Austria Hungary collapsed, her army in ruins and her empire fractured, and Bulgaria capitulated in the same month. The collapse of the Balkans meant that Germany was about to lose its main supplies of oil and food. The reserves had been used up, but U.S. troops kept arriving at the rate of 10,000 per day. Ludendorff, realising all was lost, was forced to recommend making peace on the 28th of September. ,

On the 8th of January, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States had outlined the countries war aims to congress in the form of fourteen points. The program seemed to suggest a leniency towards Germany, and thus was received warmly by the German people who appreciated its offer of a peace without major indemnities and saw Wilson as a man who could bring better times to a world weary of war. Initially, however, the German government rejected this proposal, in light on the improving military situation in early 1918. They believed that following the fourteen points and abandoning all occupied enemy territory would strip them of valuable pawns in any potential negotiated peace. The German Chancellor, Hertling, responded to Wilson’s statement, affirming that while the Reich concluded with the points laid down by the program, a negotiated peace could only be reached based upon points to which all nations agreed on. He called for Allied leaders to revise their plans. His reply was applauded in Germany, but largely ignored by Allied leaders. Ironically, this would have been Germany’s last chance to reach a peace restoring her to her pre war status. Around this time, a strike known as the Great Metal Workers Strike broke out in Berlin, demanding an immediate end to war based on the Bolshevik principles of no indemnities and no annexations. Although it was quelled by early February, it showed that a gradual shift towards the left was evident in Germans workforce. Disastrously, the government punished many strikers by drafting them into the army, which resulted in the spread of defeatist propaganda by these unwilling recruits. In August 1918, a fresh division reaching the front was greeted with cries of ‘Strike-breakers!’ and ‘You are prolonging the war!’ from soldiers being moved to the rear.

It is generally assumed that the devastation visited upon Germany during the Second World War and its total occupation was solely attributable to one man – Adolf Hitler. There is however more common ground between the respective governments in both conflicts then is often considered. Even in late 1918, the High Commands reaction to peace was a determination to continue the hopeless struggle rather then submit to humiliating peace terms. On the 29th September, Hindenburg and Ludendorff discussed at length the deterioration of the German army in the west and the necessity of an immediate armistice. They concluded that a peace based on Wilson’s fourteen points was acceptable, but also agreed that changes to the structure of the government had to be made in order to prevent disorder and revolution at home once the German people discovered the war was lost. Most importantly, they determined that should the Allied peace terms be deemed unacceptable, a last ditch struggle would have to be waged in the form of a people’s war. With the resignation of Hertling in late September, Prince Max of Baden was chosen to assume the chancellorship and lead a new government. It was beloved that the allies would look favourably on a new government rather then the old system that had held power throughout the war. This was largely seen positively by both left and right. Prince Max could be relied upon, as a relative of the Kaiser, to preserve the monarchical system within Germany and the Hohenzollern dynasty while still supporting both democratic ideals and a peaceful resolution to the conflict. On the 1st of October, he travelled to Berlin to assume his new post, carrying with him a rough outline of his proposed program for the country. Significantly, he too warned of Germany’s firm resolve to fight to the death if peace terms were dishonourable. He believed that the hasty call for an armistice, while technically sound, had weakened Germanys position and that the Allies must understand that Germany was willing to continue to war to the last man. In the program accepted on October 5th, Prince Max’s aversion to the annexationist policy of the High command was clearly emphasized, and he asserted that no German government would ever be formed without the support of the Reichstag. He declared that like Wilson, he too aspired to a lasting peace based upon the fourteen points but warned that if the Allies response was tainted by a desire to humiliate Germany the resumption of war would be considered. Even after acceding to Wilson’s demands for discussion on the application of the fourteen points to Germany, there was serious debate on the question of German force evacuating all occupied territory.

The bulk of the nation welcomed the news that an armistice had been requested, but significantly, believed the armistice would be based upon Wilson’s Fourteen Points that suggested a return to pre war conditions without major indemnities. The governments reply to Washington on October 12th, in which it promised to abandon all occupied territory, produced outcry among certain sections of the population. The conservative party announced that the surrender of German territory was incompatible with German honour. They stated there to be no compromise on this statement, and that the German people had a duty to defend their soil to the bitter end. . The High Command too realised the importance of maintaining unity within the country in order to avoid a worsening of the situation that poised a risk to an honourable peace. Thus, they felt inclined to give the people only two choices: Honourable peace or a fight to the finish. Wilson’s note of October 14th crushed any German hopes for a just and fair peace. It advocated that conditions of peace would be imposed by Allied military leaders and that any situation that did not guarantee overwhelming allied military superiority would not be considered. To the German people, this sparked a loss of belief in his good will. The Fourteen points was now markedly different from those presented earlier in the year. Even the social democrats, staunch supporters of peace, admitted that there were limits beyond which it was impossible to go. Prince Max referred to it as a ‘terrible document’, and from various groups within the country came demands that the humiliating negotiations be broken off and the nation readied for a last ditch stand. However, Prince Max replied to Wilson once more promising the suspension of submarine warfare and the evacuation of occupied territory. He did this despite Ludendorff’s protests and in the knowledge now that Germany would be military unable to resume hostilities. Germany had now entered too far into negotiations to turn back, and in such an action Prince Max would have faced the collapse of his government. Thus, by early 1919, despite massive protests and demonstrations in Germany that demanded an end to ‘Brutal Peace’, Germany had no other alternative to accepting terms laid down by the Allies, no matter how severe. On October 24th 1918, Hindenburg issued a manifesto to the armed forces. He attacked Wilson’s proposals, which he argued aimed to make Germany defenceless and unable to take up arms again.

Wilson’s reply can therefore be for us soldiers only the summons to keep resisting with all our strength. When our enemies realise that the German front is unbreakable, they will agree to conclude a peace that will safeguard the future of Germany.

Ludendorff supported this view, and spoke of the danger of Bolshevism, the increasing amount of demonstrations within the army and ultimately of the folly in placing hope in Wilson. Together with Hindenburg, he asked that the German army fight to the last man in order to secure a peace that would safeguard the German nation. This was in stark contrast to his demand for an armistice several weeks earlier and his previous convictions seriously undermined the credibility of his proposals. It was realised that at this late stage, the German people would not answer such a call and Ludendorff was forced to resign. Thus, by late October 1918, all hope for a reversal in Germany’s military position had clearly evaporated and the advocates of peace remained unchallenged in power to ensure hostilities did not resume. This was cemented by the revolution at Kiel in the same month, in which sailors mutinied when ordered to prepare for a last ditch battle against the British navy in the English Channel. Following these mutinies, revolution was set in motion and soon spread to major German cities, climaxing in the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the transferral of power from Prince Max to the leader of the social democrats, Friedrich Ebert. Bloody conflict was soon to sweep Germany as a result, when a Soviet republic was declared in Bavaria and only toppled with fierce fighting between Government troops supplemented by Freikorp units and the newly established Red Guard. While the German army almost ceased to exist as an entity, the Freikorp, paramilitary units created from old army units, were vital in preserving the new and infantile democratic regime in Germany. For many in the Freikorp, it was merely an extension of fighting from the war that had begun in the summer of 1914. As late as 1919, entire German armies, under the banner of the Freikorp, were embroiled in conflicts on the Eastern Front.

Despite the rapid decline of the Germany army in the West throughout 1918, defeat still came as a catastrophic and unexpected shock to most Germans. Albrecht Von Thaers diary entry, for example, shows an intense humiliation and disbelief in defeat, despite his position being one in which he surely would have known the direction the war had been going. In contrast to the unity of 1914, 1918 brought massive upheavals in their way of life amid social and economic crisis. For many, defeat was not framed by the defeat of the army on the field of battle, but by the collapse of social and government structure in Germany itself. More and more, people began to look at the Government as the cause for defeat. The memories of economic hardship and starvation were fuelled by the peaceful demobilisation of Germany’s armies, who, unlike the Second World War, were still largely intact at the end of the conflict and represented to the people a clear message that the defeat had originated elsewhere. Rather then face the truth of defeat, the German people could look in two directions; at the allies for imposing the Treaty of Versaille on them, and internally, at the revolutionary democratic government as those who had betrayed them. This 'Stab in the Back' theory, advocating that the government had betrayed both the army and the German people, would become hugely popular among many Germans who found it impossible to swallow defeat. To people like Adolf Hitler and many others, the German politicians who signed the armistice on November 11th would eventually become known as the ‘November Criminals’ and became the catalyst for an even longer and far more devastating conflict that erupted in 1939. While those that had held power in the war years were solely responsible for its outcome, it was those who resumed power in an attempt to save the country from ruin that were to take the brunt of discontent among the population. Perhaps, owing to the fierce nationalism of the German people, a belief in cultural superiority that did not wane even in defeat and the convenience of a political change over prior to the armistice, any other reaction was improbable.

Tommy T

Very interesting read. Well constructed and easy to follow.

However its not my area of expertise so i'd shy away from advising on editting..

brianthebard

I think the second paragraph about 1916 is either unnecessary or in the wrong place at the very least. In fact I think if you took all of the paragraphs on 1916 and halved them you'd be better off. The economy is important but I think you might have laboured the point a wee bit. If the question is about the defeat of Germany in 1918, and that is tied to the diary entry, then you have strayed off the point a good bit tbh. Try and cut down on the stuff before 1917, and focus in on what you've written on the actual defeat. Also I don't believe you have made any mention of the concept of total war, instigated by Ludendorf and Clauseowitz/Hindenberg(can't remember which). This is very important, because it explains why the civilians looked more and more to the government and army for support in 1918, and explains why they felt so personally aggrieved by the loss. Also did you mention the fact that the war never entered German territory? This is another reason why ordinary Germans, as well as this general, must have been surprised that an armistance was signed.

Tommy T

brianthebard wrote: »

I Also did you mention the fact that the war never entered German territory? This is another reason why ordinary Germans, as well as this general, must have been surprised that an armistance was signed.

Good point...

Victor

Just on the length, say things only once - you say "the German people continued to believe in themselves as cultural elite within Europe" and then "Fiercely nationalistic and fully embracing the ideal that they were culturally superior to their European neighbours". Don't use two words, when one will do.

"Food shortages remained common throughout 1916, improving slightly in 1917 only to plummet to an all time low in the following summer, coinciding with the defeats on the western front." are you saying food shortages plummeted in 1918 or food supplies plummeted?

Perhaps use shorter paragraphs and add some titles. Introduction, Outbreak of war, eoonomic Situation, etc.

Morlar

There was one part in particular that stood out for me :

'The blame for the defeat however, came not to be pinned upon the monarchy or even those who had held power at the outbreak of the war – but those who attempted to hold Germany together in the turbulent years following the defeat through any means necessary.'

This seems a bit convoluted and unclear - who are you saying 'got the blame' here exactly and why ?

Also as a means of underlining the sense of shock and disbelief that germans experienced (in addition to the point someone else mentioned that the fighting was on foreign soil) another point to re-inforce that may be the closeness the german army came to occupying paris (20km I believe).

Overall I would say its well written and worth another read at some point.

TerrorFirmer

Also as a means of underlining the sense of shock and disbelief that germans experienced (in addition to the point someone else mentioned that the fighting was on foreign soil) another point to re-inforce that may be the closeness the german army came to occupying paris (20km I believe).

Well, that happened long before the armistice and I already touched on the state of the German front line situation at the end of the spring offensives, so I thought that'd be sufficient.

Yeah I did reiterate some things too many times. I have to address that.

Good point about the economy but the essay being about defeat in 1918, many of the reasons that the Germany army lost the war can be traced back to 1915/1916. When you say 'Total war', what specific period are you talking about? (directed at brianthebard, not the person quoted). I'm generally quite poor in regard to knowledge about the economies of all the belligerents. I tend to study military events only...

Also I don't believe you have made any mention of the concept of total war

I did mention that the Army and industry took control of the war effort and gave overwhelming priority to military affairs to disastrous effect.

I completely forget to mention the context in which the armistice was signed, that's a pretty important point that slipped by me. Which is unlike me

I had 2 months to do this essay for this week and only started 2 days ago so it's mostly off the top of my head with the odd statistic thrown in...

I will definitely make some points more clear too.

Thanks for the help!