Result of Steward Inquiry

TOm Kelly

RESULT AND REASONS FOLLOWING DISCIPLINARY PANEL ENQUIRY.

CHAIRMAN OF PANEL - TIM CHARLTON QC


Robbie Fitzpatrick / Robert Winston / Luke Fletcher / Fran Ferris / Ian Nicholl / Kim Evans / Paul Glendenning /Joanne Roberts / Tegan Wilde


1. Between 10th and 22nd January 2007, the Disciplinary Panel of the HRA heard 9 days of evidence and argument about allegations that four licensed jockeys and five unlicensed individuals committed various breaches of the Rules of Racing. The four jockeys were Robert Fitzpatrick, Robert Winston, Luke Fletcher and Francis Ferris. The five unlicensed people were Ian Nicholl, Paul Glendenning, Kim Evans, Joanne Roberts and Tegan Wilde. In addition, the Panel was asked to consider the conduct of another unlicensed person, Edward Roberts, though he had not formally been notified of these proceedings.

2. The enquiry was concerned with the riding of the four jockeys in a total of 37 races between the 16th June 2003 and 29th February 2004, together with the associated betting activities. A list of the suspect races is annexed to these Reasons. It will be seen that Robert Fitzpatrick rode in just two of those races (Diamond Orchid at Ayr and Sergeant Slipper at Southwell), but he was additionally charged in relation to 25 of the other races because, it was alleged, he was engaged in passing information about the horses ridden by the other three jockeys in those races to Ian Nicholl, who was said to have used it for ******* betting purposes. Robert Winston rode in 21 of the races, Luke Fletcher rode in 11 (one of them being a race in which Robert Winston also rode) and Francis Ferris rode in four of the races. These are all identified in the annex.

The Charges

(a) Robert Fitzpatrick

3. For the two races in which he rode, for all of the 21 races in which Robert Winston rode, and for all of the four races in which Francis Ferris rode, Robert Fitzpatrick was said to be in breach of Rule 243 by passing information that was not publicly available (ie “inside information”) about the horses in question to Ian Nicholl for reward. There is an alternative charge against Robert Fitzpatrick in relation to each of these races that he was in breach of Rule 220(i) in that he assisted ******* betting by Ian Nicholl on these races by passing over “inside information” to him. It should be noted that this alternative charge only falls to be considered if the main allegation of breach of Rule 243 is not made out because no reward is proved. Robert Fitzpatrick is also alleged to be in breach of Rule 241(i)(b) by obstructing the Jockey Club’s investigation by failing to produce his mobile phone records for some three months, and thereafter disclosing an incomplete version of them. He faces further allegations of breaches of Rule 220(viii) and 220(vii)(b), as he is said to have sought to mislead Jockey Club investigators by his claims on a number of occasions that he only had a pay as you go phone when in fact he had a monthly contract. Finally, he is alleged to have told a series of lies, in breach of Rules 220(viii) or Rule 220(vii)(b), to Jockey Club investigators about the nature of his relationship with Ian Nicholl and with Robert Winston and Francis Ferris.

(b) Robert Winston

4. He is alleged to be in breach of Rule 243 by passing “inside information” to Robert Fitzpatrick in relation to each of the 21 horses that he rode in the suspect races, and he also faces an alternative charge of breach of Rule 220(i) - assisting Ian Nicholl’s ******* betting on his rides by passing “inside information” to Robert Fitzpatrick. Robert Winston faces charges of breaches of Rules 220(viii) and 220(vii)(b) through allegedly lying to investigators at interviews on 24 February 2004 (about whether he had spoken to anybody before his ride on TATWEER (IRE) at Lingfield on 17 December 2003 and on 13 January 2005, by denying that he gave any information to Robert Fitzpatrick about the horses he rode).

(c) Francis Ferris

5. He too is alleged to be in breach of Rule 243 in respect of the four suspect races in which he rode. In relation to the first two, he is said to have passed “inside information” about his rides to Robert Fitzpatrick for reward, and in relation to his second two rides, his is alleged to have passed “inside information” to one or both of Robert Fitzpatrick and Ian Nicholl. As with the other jockeys, Francis Ferris faces an alternative charge under Rule 220(i) of assisting ******* betting by Ian Nicholl in supplying information, a charge which only arises for consideration in the event that reward is not proved.

6. Ferris is also alleged to have misled investigators during interviews in March 2004 and December 2005, when he said that he did not know Ian Nicholl and was thereby in breach of Rule 220 (viii).

(d) Luke Fletcher

7. He is alleged to be in breach of Rule 243 in relation to 11 races in all, by passing “inside information” to Ian Nicholl for reward. Again, an alternative charge is made of breach of Rule 220(i) by assisting Ian Nichol in ******* betting practice on those 11 races by supplying “inside information”. He also faces allegations of breach of Rules 220(viii) and 220(vii)(b) by misleading investigators in a series of interviews between 1 March 2004 and 13 December 2005 in which he denied that he knew Ian Nicholl, denied that he had spoken with anybody other than the trainer or owner before riding Risk Free on 25 July 2003, denied that he knew who owned a mobile number subsequently demonstrated to belonged to Ian Nicholl, and denied generally passing information about his rides.

8. Luke Fletcher also faced the allegation that he was in breach of Rule 220(viii) by giving misleading answers in a number of interviews when he denied knowing Ian Nicholl, denied ever having been in contact with him, and denied knowing Ian Nicholl's phone numbers.

(e) Ian Nicholl

9. Mr Nicholl is said to have acted in breach of Rule 201(v) by engaging in ******* betting with the assistance of inside information, and in breach of Rule 220(ix) by causing the four jockeys to be in breach of Rule 243. He is further said to be liable to exclusion under Rule 2(v) for failing to cooperate with the Jockey Club investigation into his activities.

(f) Kim Evans, Paul Glendenning, Joanne Roberts and Tegan Wilde

10. It is contended that each of these individuals is liable to exclusion pursuant to Rules 2(v), 201(v) and 220(i), because they used Betfair accounts in their names to lay horses to lose with the benefit of inside information, or because they allowed Ian Nicholl to use those accounts for that purpose. Further, each of them is said to be liable to exclusion under Rule 2(v) for failing to cooperate with the Jockey Club investigation.


Rule 243
11. Before considering the cases made against the jockeys individually, it is necessary to set out the Panel's approach to Rule 243, because this is of general relevance for those individual cases.

12. The precursor of this Rule was introduced in 1990. In its present form, it bans jockeys and other licence or permit holders from selling “information about a horse which is not publicly available”. There are a number of important exceptions and refinements to that basic prohibition. First, it is perfectly in order for such information to be provided to the horse’s owner or his representative: that is of course part of what owners get from jockeys in return for riding fees or retainers and from trainers in return for training fees. Secondly, relatively small rewards from others are allowed so long as the information is not provided on a regular basis – benefits worth less than £100 are ignored. Thirdly there are the exceptions set out in Appendix N to the Rules – trainers and jockeys can pass on information for a reasonable commercial fee when doing press or broadcasting work, when speaking to sponsorship groups, and when engaging in other similar activities.

13. The Panel was urged on behalf of the jockeys to conclude that the phrase in the Rule “information about a horse” is intended to refer only to facts, and does not include opinions. Before considering those arguments, it is necessary to look at the matter from first principles. In the Panel’s view, the ordinary meaning of the word "information" in Rule 243 is wide enough to include both facts about a horse and views about its chances. There are sound reasons of principle for adopting this ordinary meaning of "information", so that the giving of opinions for reward is outlawed by Rule 243. Frequently, a jockey's or other licensed person's conclusion about the chances of a horse may be expressed in opinion form – for example "I don't think my horse has any chance of winning" – but that may be a view reached on the basis of many underlying matters unknown to the racing and betting public, such as a recent minor injury setback, or even (in an extreme case) the jockey's intention to ride to lose if he can do this without attracting attention to the ride. But even when the opinion is expressed on the basis of nothing more than an analysis of its form, which is publicly available, there remains an obvious problem. A jockey might receive sizeable payments for supplying such information privately if opinions are not caught by Rule 243. Many people may believe that it is worth paying for a jockey's opinion even if it is based only on publicly available form. But how will that be viewed by the betting public? It is a situation that is near impossible to regulate without a possibly lengthy enquiry to determine whether the jockey was in truth basing his opinion on public material such as the form book or whether it was based in whole or in part on other unpublicised matters. The difficulty in getting at the truth in such an enquiry is also obvious. It cannot be said that it is an unreasonable imposition on jockeys or other licence holders to stop them from selling privately their opinions about the chances of a horse for big rewards. So in principle the Panel concludes that it is sensible to interpret the Rule as banning the sale for substantial reward of both facts and opinions, unless this is done in one or other of the ways permitted by Appendix N.

14. A number of arguments were advanced to seek to persuade us to adopt a more restricted reading. It was pointed out that Appendix N, which establishes exceptions to the general prohibition, refers more than once to “information or opinions” – indicating, it was said, that “information” must consist of facts because it was being contrasted with opinion. But this fails to take proper account of the function of Appendix N, which is to state exceptions to the general prohibition in Rule 243, thereby permitting opinions to be given in certain circumstances. That indicates that opinions which do not fall within the exceptions cannot be passed on privately for material reward.

15. It was also suggested that the decision on the meaning of Rule 243 should be influenced by the current thinking of the “Inside Information” Panel of Enquiry. That Panel's Phase One Report of December 2005 has indicated that the majority of its members favour a restrictive definition of inside information that will exclude tips and other opinions. But this cannot help to influence a decision on what the current Rule means. Whatever might be the decisions reached about how Rules might be shaped for the future, the task for this Panel is to interpret and apply the Rules as they stand at present.

16. Finally, there was an argument based on the evidence given to us by John Blake, the Chief Executive of the Jockeys' Association, that the interpretation of Rule 243 which this Panel favours imposes unreasonable demands upon jockeys in their everyday contacts with friends and members of the public, including punters, who are naturally keen to learn their views about the prospects for their forthcoming rides. He pointed to the jockeys' general use of a "mantra", by which they express some doubts about chances without putting the inquirer off altogether. He went on to refer to the dangers of this sort of remark now that betting exchanges exist, because punters as well as bookmakers can now lay horses, so that the mantra expressing some doubt is open to misinterpretation. If the Panel's interpretation of Rule 243 was indeed placing jockeys in an impossible position, that would be a powerful argument for a narrower view of its scope. But that is simply not the case. So far as Rule 243 is concerned, jockeys are at liberty to continue to use their mantra, or to give more specific views of chances if they wish. What they cannot do is take a reward worth more than £100 for their information, or any reward at all if they are giving the information regularly. Rule 243 strikes not at the mere giving of information, but at the giving of information "for any material reward, gift, favour or benefit in kind".

17. It is however necessary to mention this warning to those who feel emboldened to embark on the giving out of information which is not publicly available. Firstly, if someone gambles heavily and successfully on the basis of that information, they run the risk of not being believed if they say they provided the information for free. Secondly, it may be that even the provision for free, of information that is not publicly available, involves a breach of the Rules of racing. That is what the alternative charges against the jockeys in this case allege – that even if it is not shown that rewards were received by them, they have assisted Ian Nicholl in the use of private information for a ******* betting purpose. As the Panel has concluded that there is adequate evidence to justify its finding that the jockeys in this case did receive rewards, it has not been necessary to reach a conclusion about whether the alternative charges are in theory capable of amounting to a Rule breach.



Ian Nicholl and his gambling on the 37 suspect races

18. This is the first alleged corruption case to have come before either the Jockey Club or the HRA in which the person said to have carried out ******* betting operations has appeared to give evidence. Though he was the subject of charges himself, Mr Nicholl refused to take part in the enquiry until he was persuaded by Robert Fitzpatrick to provide a statement and to give evidence. He did not acknowledge the letter which set out the charges against him, and because of his late decision to provide a statement, it did not prove possible to check out thoroughly everything that he said in it.

19. Mr Nicholl disowned any desire to defend his own conduct, and told the Panel that he was attending because he felt sorry for getting the jockeys into trouble. The Panel accepted that there was a degree of contrition which prompted his late decision to give evidence at the enquiry, but there were some fundamental problems with some of the evidence he gave which caused the Panel to view his story with caution and to seek corroboration for what he said before it could be accepted. Among these problems were:

1) Mr Nicholl flatly denied the detailed account of a conversation with him in September 2004 that was given by Robert King, a Jockey Club investigator. Mr King said that in that conversation Mr Nicholl had demanded money "to tell everything you need to know". His evidence was not challenged until Mr Nicholl gave evidence and simply accused Mr King of inventing the entire exchange. The Panel concluded that Mr King's detailed account, based upon contemporary notes, was truthful, and that Mr Nicholl was simply lying.

2) Mr Nicholl said that he was only able to read to a very limited extent. In fact, his reading ability was not as negligible as he maintained. He denied that he ever used a computer, for instance, yet transcripts of phone calls reveal that he did use one at the time he opened a Betfair account in his own name. And he was an enthusiastic sender and receiver of text messages, as his phone records and those of Robert Fitzpatrick and Luke Fletcher demonstrate. His downplaying of his reading ability was calculated, in the Panel's view, to bolster Fitzpatrick's story that many of his contacts with Mr Nicholl were to provide him with form information (ie publicly available information) that Mr Nicholl could not read for himself.

3) Mr Nicholl told the Panel another lie when he denied going to Fitzpatrick's stag party in August 2003, though he later said, oddly, that he had been there for a few drinks. This denial was designed to support false accounts given by Robert Fitzpatrick and Luke Fletcher to the investigators and to the Panel about whether Mr Nicholl had attended.

4) Mr Nicholl's explanations for why he came to be using the Betfair accounts of the other unlicensed individuals, and at the way in which he used them, were unconvincing. More detail about this appears below, but the true picture in the Panel's view is that Mr Nicholl was concerned to conceal his use of the accounts because he was using information improperly obtained from the jockeys.

20. Accordingly, the Panel was cautious in assessing what Mr Nicholl had to say about his gambling, in particular for the 37 suspect races.

21. Mr Nicholl held a bookmaking licence, and had worked in partnership with a Mr Trevor Hadfield for a short time at various racecourses in the Midlands. The partnership had come to an end some time before the period of the 37 suspect races, and Mr Nicholl retained the right to a number of the pitches, though he does not seem to have been using them by mid-2003. He painted a picture of himself as a rather wild gambler, habitually prepared to lay one-horse books. There is no doubt that he was a regular and heavy gambler, as Mr Button's record of his transactions with Mr Nicholl shows. But his lay betting of the horses ridden by the four jockeys in practically all the suspect races was of a much greater size (certainly in terms of liabilities risked).

22. From June 2003, (ie at the start of the period covered by the 37 suspect races), Mr Nicholl used accounts at Betfair in the names of the unlicensed persons subject to this enquiry to lay the horses ridden by the four jockeys. He also used accounts with various bookmakers (among them Mr Geoff Button and Mr Ronald Postlethwaite, who gave evidence to the enquiry). His story was that he had to use Betfair accounts in the names of others because he had no money of his own to fund his laying activities. His chief confederates who allowed him access to Betfair accounts were Mr Paul Glendenning and Mr Edward Roberts (and later Mr Trevor Hadfield). He had the user details for one of Mr Glendenning's accounts (pglend) and for Mr Hadfield's account, and placed the bets himself. For the other accounts, ie those controlled by Mr Roberts and a second Glendenning account, he seems to have told Mr Roberts and Mr Glendenning what amounts and prices to lay.

23. Though Mr Nicholl appears to have been a somewhat chaotic individual, the Panel does not accept that his use of these accounts was driven solely or mainly by shortage of cash. On the contrary, the Panel concludes that he was using them to seek to conceal his activities. It is highly significant that he had two Betfair accounts in his own name, one of them dormant since 2002 and the other which he stopped using in June 2003, the very month in which Betfair's memorandum of understanding came into force. Under the terms of this, Betfair agreed to disclose suspicious betting information to the Jockey Club with effect from the date of the memorandum. The significance of this was not lost on Mr Nicholl, the Panel concluded. There is little to corroborate Mr Nicholl's assertion that his own lack of cash was the reason why he used the accounts of others. Indeed, there are some features which contradict this. Notably, the pglend account, which Mr Nicholl personally operated, had a balance of £60,000 at the outset of the period disclosed by Betfair. Within a month, withdrawals in excess of £115,000 were made from this account. Though these withdrawals were probably controlled by Mr Glendenning, the Panel did not accept Mr Nicholl's evidence that he was unaware of what was owing to him from time to time, or that Mr Glendenning and Mr Roberts did not pay over to him anything other than token amounts. It seems also that Mr Nicholl had access at around the start of the period covered by the 37 suspect races to the proceeds of borrowings on or sales of property. He also owned bookmaking pitches, some of which were taken from him by Mr Button when, at a later stage, Mr Nicholl did run into cash flow problems after his substantial losses on Risk Free on 25 July 2003.

24. So the Panel concluded that the use of accounts in the name of others was primarily determined by Mr Nicholl's wish (and possibly also the wishes of Robert Fitzpatrick, Luke Fletcher, and Francis Ferris) to cover his tracks. It is significant also that he usually took care to withhold his phone number from Betfair when using the accounts of others, and that, of course, he pretended to be the true holder of the Hadfield and pglend accounts when he rang to place bets.

25. The size of the lay bets and the proportion they bore to the overall market made by Betfair on the 37 suspect races are matters of record and were not in dispute. What was in dispute was whether this gambling by Mr Nicholl showed that he was relying upon private information from the four jockeys.

26. There were a number of striking features about that gambling, over and above the fact that Mr Nicholl was arranging it through accounts in the names of others for concealment purposes. Though there were very occasional small bets on other horses in the 37 suspect races, Mr Nicholl was simply laying the rides of the four jockeys in those races. And he was doing this by frequently risking the whole amount available for betting in the accounts. Given that the jockeys’ rides in the suspect races were in the main mid-priced horses, typically starting at prices between 5/1 and 12/1, it will be appreciated that Mr Nicholl's commitment of all the resources available to him was for a relatively modest return. And as he was only laying one-horse in those races, rather than trying to make a balanced book, he was in effect putting all his available money on a long odds-on shot on a regular basis. This commitment to large potential liabilities was in contrast to the betting activity on the accounts in between the suspect races. For example, the accounts through which Mr Nicholl was operating risked a potential liability in the first of the suspect races (Luke Fletcher's ride on the appropriately named THE GAMBLER) of over £51,000. Over the next two days, before the second of the suspect races (Francis Ferris's ride of TOP OF THE CLASS (IRE)), there were 57 bets including 22 lay bets for an average lay liability of £398. TOP OF THE CLASS (IRE) was then laid for any liability of more than £49,000.

27. Another notable feature of his betting was that in many of the races he was prepared to lay the four jockeys' rides at win odds that were way in excess of the starting price -- often approaching double the SP. The average by which the prices laid by Mr Nicholl in the 37 races exceeded the official SP was 63%. This compares with Betfair's advertised experience of win odds being about 20% in excess of those offered by traditional bookmakers. Further, Mr Nicholl frequently laid the jockeys’ rides in the place market. There also, he was prepared to lay prices well above those available from traditional bookmakers. The average maximum price which Mr Nicholl laid in the place market was 5/1, whereas the average price offered by traditional bookmakers for these races was 15/8. And not only was Mr Nicholl prepared to lay generous place odds, it was often the case that he provided practically all of the lay side of the place market on Betfair. In eight cases, the accounts through which he was betting absorbed over 80% of the place market.

28. Mr Nicholl's betting activities become more striking still when one brings into the picture bets that he placed with various traditional bookmakers. Nothing was known about these until the witness statement of Mr Nicholl was served on the HRA in December 2006 by Mr Stewart-Moore, solicitor for three of the jockeys. A number of bookmakers were prepared to take sizeable lay bets from Mr Nicholl, and they used their Betfair accounts to hedge their potential liability to Mr Nicholl. Two of those bookmakers gave evidence -- Messrs Postlethwaite and Button. They described graphically how Mr Nicholl did business with them. For instance, Mr Nicholl was prepared to lay to Mr Postlethwaite one ride of Robert Winston's (BOND MOONLIGHT at Southwell) at odds of about 25/1, which Mr Postlethwaite hedged at just 18/1 with Betfair (and this despite the fact that Betfair prices will ordinarily exceed traditional bookmaker's prices by 15-20%). Mr Postlethwaite explained (and the Panel accepted) that he stopped doing business with Mr Nicholl when Mr Nicholl sought to lay a place bet on one horse at the same odds as were being offered against a win. That signalled to him that something was wrong. Of course, the fact that Mr Nicholl was also lay betting with bookmakers, who were then laying off with Betfair for a guaranteed profit, reinforces the point that Mr Nicholl was the dominant layer in the market.

29. Two related arguments were advanced on behalf of the jockeys to try to explain the betting history. Firstly, it was said that Mr Nicholl was betting as he did because he was a reckless character, addicted to gambling, rather than because he was receiving valuable inside information from the jockeys. Secondly, it was argued that it was necessary to look at Mr Nicholl's betting habits in certain other races where, it was said, he risked heavy lay liabilities without having the benefit of improper information from jockeys.

30. Having considered these points carefully, the Panel took the view that they do not contradict the obvious inferences that arise from the features of the history outlined above. Mr Nicholl may have been a rather wild gambler at this stage of his life, but he was not a simpleton, and it is likely that he was risking the large liabilities he undertook for relatively modest profits because he felt he had very good reason to do so – and better reason than he had for his other more modest betting. Of course, if it could be demonstrated that he ran similar large risks on races that are above suspicion, the conclusion might be different. That is the second argument referred to in the previous paragraph. There were 7 races ("the excluded races") run during the same time as the 37 suspect races on which Mr Nicholl risked substantial amounts with lay bets on the horses ridden by two other jockeys. As charges were not brought against these two jockeys in relation to these races, the Panel was asked to assume that the races were "straight", and to go on to conclude that high stakes lay betting by Mr Nicholl was not indicative of "*******" races. The Panel declined to make that assumption. It may well be that the performance of those other two jockeys deserves further close investigation in relation to these races. The Panel is aware that both jockeys are the subject of impending inquiries in relation to other races. There has been no investigation conducted about what if any information passed from those other two jockeys to Mr Nicholl. It may be that those races were "straight", the Panel refuses to proceed on the basis that they must have been. Further reliance was placed upon Mr Nicholl's unsuccessful lay bets on the Robert Winston ride in August 2004 on “Jedeydd”. Mr Nicholl said that he did this without receiving any information from any jockey. While the Panel accepted that it is most unlikely that Winston would have been providing any information at this stage, because he was under investigation by the Jockey Club, the full circumstances surrounding this have not been the subject of adequate exploration because the point arose late in the day from Mr Nicholl's witness statement. The Panel simply does not know what prompted Mr Nicholl to lay "Jedeydd", and declined to accept his story at face value.

31. Hence the Panel concluded that the picture revealed by Mr Nicholl's betting activities in relation to the 37 suspect races was indeed a most suspicious one. It showed a level of confidence in the likely (poor) performance of the mounts of the four jockeys which was wholly divorced from what the market prices were forecasting. That betting made it necessary to conduct a critical examination of the basis for Mr Nicholl's confidence. That involved looking at a number of matters -- the contacts between the jockeys and Mr Nicholl; how the jockeys have explained their conduct to investigators; and how the jockeys rode in the suspect races together with the results. It was then necessary to stand back and consider all the evidence in the round. The Panel's decisions on these questions are given below in relation to each of the four jockeys.



Robert Fitzpatrick

(a) Contacts

32. Before the beginning of the period covered by the suspect races, Mr Nicholl and Fitzpatrick were established friends. They used often to drink together at the same pub. They used sometimes to play golf and other games together. But as well as meetings during the period of the suspect races, Mr Nicholl and Fitzpatrick were in frequent and regular phone contact. There were more than 2300 mobile phone calls and texts exchanged between Mr Nicholl and Fitzpatrick during the period of the suspect races. (The number must be considerably in excess of 2300, because billing records are not available for the number Mr Nicholl was using in the last three months of the period). It is highly significant, in the Panel's view, that Fitzpatrick made more than twice the daily average number of calls to Mr Nicholl on days of suspect races. Similarly, Mr Nicholl was making twice as many contacts with Fitzpatrick on those days. The "timelines" that illustrate the chronology of calls between relevant parties (Mr Nicholl, the jockeys, Betfair, and the various Betfair account holders) demonstrate a revealing pattern. There are clusters of contacts between Fitzpatrick and Mr Nicholl, interspersed with calls by Mr Nicholl either to check on Betfair prices, or to place the lay bets or to arrange for the placing of lay bets by Mr Glendinning and Mr Roberts. These contacts take place both before and after suspect races, and the Panel concludes that they were detailed discussions about the prospects of horses ridden by the jockeys in the suspect races, leading on to the placing of bets, and later conversations or text messages about the results.

33. After charge letters and evidence of the phone contacts were sent the jockeys in August 2006, Fitzpatrick eventually admitted that he gave his opinions to Mr Nicholl about his own rides and that he passed on to Mr Nicholl views and opinions that he obtained from Winston and Ferris about their rides. This reference to the passing on of just "opinions" seems to have been lawyer inspired: it came after Mr Stewart Moore began to represent him. The Panel concludes that the information passed to Mr Nicholl by Fitzpatrick was more detailed and specific than the general expression of opinion which Fitzpatrick said (eventually) was all that he relayed. It is impossible to say exactly what passed between them on all these occasions, but, in the Panel's view, it was sufficiently specific to cause Mr Nicholl to embark upon his heavy lay betting. Fitzpatrick was not telling the truth to the Panel when he asserted that the many text messages between him and Mr Nicholl were simply exchanges of jokes, and that many of the calls with Mr Nicholl were social. Similarly, he was not telling the truth when he said that the heavy call and text traffic between himself and Robert Winston was almost entirely explained by personal discussions about Fitzpatrick's marriage difficulties and Winston's problems with his own girlfriend. Fitzpatrick was three times as likely to phone Winston on the day of suspect races, and Winston was on average twice as likely to phone Fitzpatrick on those days. Such a concentration of calls on suspect races days occurred because they were discussing prospects and results of Winston's rides, and not because of their personal problems.

34. The contacts between Winston and Fitzpatrick fit into the pattern revealed by the "timelines", and compel the conclusion that Winston was the source of information about his rides which Fitzpatrick passed on to Mr Nicholl, and which Mr Nicholl used for his lay betting. However, as explained in relation to Winston below, the Panel has decided that Winston did not undertake to "stop" his rides in the suspect races, so Fitzpatrick did not say (or ought not to have said) otherwise to Mr Nicholl when passing on Winston's information.

35. Fitzpatrick was also a route by which Francis Ferris passed information to Mr Nicholl, which was then used for lay betting. (Ferris also had direct contacts with Mr Nicholl). But in Ferris's case, the Panel concluded that he was a "non-trier” in two of the four suspect races in which he was involved, and that it was part of the information passed to Mr Nicholl through Fitzpatrick that Ferris would ride to ensure that the lay bets were successful, if this proved necessary and if it was possible to do so without attracting too much attention to himself.



(b) Explanations to investigators

36. The Panel's decisions about the nature and content of Fitzpatrick's contacts with Mr Nicholl, with Winston and with Ferris were bolstered by the view taken of Fitzpatrick's conduct when interviewed by Jockey Club investigators on a number of occasions in 2004-6, and of his active obstruction of the investigation.

37. When first interviewed on 18 May 2004, Fitzpatrick gave an account consisting almost entirely of lies. He pretended that he did not know Mr Nicholl. He pretended that the other jockeys were merely known to him as weighing room colleagues. He lied then and later about the supposed non-availability of his phone records.

38. But Fitzpatrick did not just stop at lying about his phone records. He actively obstructed the investigation by failing to produce them in response to a requirement to do so which was given to him on 24 April 2004. He pretended to have a "pay-as-you-go" mobile, and said that his phone company could not supply records. On the 30th June 2004, he simply refused to discuss his failure to provide phone records with Mr Philip Walker a Jockey Club investigator. When in July 2004 he produced a limited number of pages of telephone records, by producing them to Mr Ernest Jackson, a Weighing Room Security Officer, he made a crude attempt to bolster his lie about the nature of his mobile contract by leaving out pages that showed that he had a monthly contract.

39. In January 2006, Fitzpatrick volunteered to investigators a further statement which he had prepared with the assistance of Mr Blake of the Jockeys’ Association of Great Britain. This admitted that he had lied previously by misrepresenting his knowledge of Mr Nicholl, and explained that he had done so because he thought he might be in breach of a Rule of Racing which he imagined to exist which prevented jockeys from having bookmakers as friends. This explanation was itself contradicted by the written statement which Fitzpatrick provided to this enquiry, where he says that he feared being falsely accused of passing racing information to Mr Nicholl. Even if either of these explanations were true (and in the Panel's judgement, both explanations are additional lies), this would not explain why he also lied (as he clearly did at the outset of the investigations) about the nature of his friendship with Winston and Ferris. The true view is that, from the outset, Fitzpatrick was resorting to lies and obstructions to cover up his central involvement in a ******* betting operation.

(c) Rides in the suspect races.

40. Robert Fitzpatrick rode in just two of the suspect races where Ian Nicholl placed lay bets against his horse. These were race 16 (DIAMOND ORCHID (IRE) at Ayr) and race 37 (SERGEANT SLIPPER at Southwell). In neither case was it alleged that Fitzpatrick failed to try, and having studied the recordings of these races, the Panel accepts that in both cases there was absolutely nothing wrong with the effort he put in. Of itself, this does not automatically dispose of the suggestion that Fitzpatrick would have ridden to lose if that had been necessary. The Panel found that he would have doe so if occasion arose. But there is a freestanding reason for excluding the last race (SERGEANT SLIPPER) from the list of tainted races. This is that the race was run on 29 February 2004, which was five days after Robert Winston was first interviewed by Jockey Club investigators. This news will certainly have travelled fast to his friend Robert Fitzpatrick, and the Panel was persuaded that these two jockeys would thereafter have taken care to avoid any further giving of information to Mr Nicholl to inspire his lay betting. Interestingly, there is no evidence of telephone contacts between Mr Nicholl and Fitzpatrick before this race, and though SERGEANT SLIPPER was laid to lose on the Roberts account, this was for a relatively small sum.

(d) Conclusions

41. Considering the totality of all these matters, together with the betting history referred to earlier, the Panel was left in no doubt that Fitzpatrick organised the transmission to Mr Nicholl of inside information from Robert Winston and Francis Ferris, including (in the case of the latter) an indication that Ferris would do what he could to ensure the success of the lay bets. He also provided inside information about his own prospects on DIAMOND ORCHID (IRE).

42. As for payment for this information, this is necessarily a matter of inference. The Panel concluded that there must have been substantial payments to Fitzpatrick for the material he provided. It is impossible to say how much, or how payment was made. It may even have been the case that Fitzpatrick was sharing in the profits with Mr Nicholl. The sheer volume of phone contacts between Mr Nicholl and Fitzpatrick after suspect races is consistent with discussion about how the betting had gone, and Fitzpatrick's evidence to the Panel that he had no idea of the extent of Mr Nicholl's betting was a palpable lie.

43. Hence the Panel found that Fitzpatrick was in breach of Rule 243 in all but the last of the cases in which this was alleged against him. He was also in breach of Rule 241(i)(b), because of his active obstructions of the investigation, and in breach of Rule 220 (viii) because of the lies he told, all as alleged by the HRA.



Robert Winston

44. The Panel found Robert Winston's case to be the most difficult to resolve. In the end, mindful of the need to be sure of its findings given the seriousness of the charges, the Panel concluded that Robert Winston's involvement was of a less serious character than that of the other jockeys. Though it is clear that he, like the others, was in breach of Rule 243, the Panel stops short of holding that the information which he provided contained an explicit or implicit indication that he would ride to ensure the success of Mr Nicholl's lay betting. This conclusion will be explained by reference to the same three topics considered in the case of the other jockeys -- namely the nature of his contacts, the explanations he offered to investigators, and how he rode in the races together with their results.

(a) Contacts

45. The phone traffic between Robert Winston and Robert Fitzpatrick has already been referred to. Though Winston never had any direct contact with Mr Nicholl, the volume of calls between Winston and Fitzpatrick on and just before suspect race days was noticeably higher than on other occasions. As Mr Nicholl himself admitted that he received information from Fitzpatrick to the effect that Winston did not fancy particular rides because of the weight they were due to carry or because the ground might be unsuitable, the Panel rejected Winston's evidence that he had most given unspecific opinions about prospects. He gave information that was an amalgam of fact and opinion; the opinion being no doubt his conclusion about his chances on the basis of his own knowledge and experience which was clearly not publicly available information.

46. It is inescapable also that Winston knew that this information would be used for lay betting purposes by Mr Nicholl. Winston's evidence was that he had no idea that what he told Fitzpatrick would be passed on to Mr Nicholl. If that had been the case, Winston's behaviour towards Fitzpatrick when he found out that Fitzpatrick had indeed passed on information to Mr Nicholl that was used for betting purposes is inexplicable. Had he been betrayed in this way by his friend, one would expect a serious falling out between them. Yet nothing like this occurred: Winston said he simply asked Fitzpatrick what he had done and accepted his assurance that he had done nothing wrong. That did not ring true.

47. Like Fitzpatrick, Winston was unable to offer any sensible explanation for the content of his many calls and texts exchanged with Fitzpatrick. His suggestion that he was discussing his personal problems with his girlfriend could not in any event explain those calls for the first three months or so of the suspect race period, because he said those problems only emerged in about October 2003. And even from that date, discussion of those problems could not explain why the phone traffic between Fitzpatrick and Winston was heavier on and around suspect race days. The inevitable conclusion is that they were discussing prospects for Winston's rides and that, during discussions after suspect races, they were discussing how the betting conducted by Mr Nicholl had gone.

48. A further revealing pointer to Winston's knowledge that information he was supplying was being used for betting purposes comes from a 10 minute call which he made to Luke Fletcher on the day before race 35 (MADIBA). This was one of only two calls between the pair. Both of them had been racing at Lingfield on the day of the call. It was a conversation that took on a new significance when Mr Nicholl explained that his reason for laying MADIBA on 4 January 2004 was because Fletcher told him that he was confident of winning the race on the eventual favourite, "Make My Hay". The Panel concluded that Winston and Fletcher were discussing in some detail their respective prospects for that race. Winston's suggestions that he might have been discussing traffic in the Newark area, or perhaps that he lent his phone to another jockey in his car, smacked of desperate attempts to get away from the obvious explanation.

49. Potentially the most damning evidence against Winston was given by Trevor Hadfield, who was a former partner of Mr Nicholl in a bookmaking business. In August 2003, Mr Hadfield opened a Betfair account at the instigation of Mr Nicholl, and funded it with a payment of £3000. He gave Mr Nicholl’s his user details, and Mr Nicholl made frequent use of the account until Mr Hadfield stopped this in November 2003. He testified that he was told by Mr Nicholl that Robert Winston had been paid to stop two horses. One of these, according to Mr Hadfield, was in race 9 (DARK CHAMPION). His story was that he was surprised and upset to see that Mr Nicholl had successfully laid DARK CHAMPION to lose, that he spoke to Mr Nicholl to tell him that he wanted nothing to do with this, and that he was told that Winston had been paid to lose at this time (i.e. after the race). He said he paid out to Mr Nicholl his winnings on the transaction, and had told him not to use the account again. He could not remember the name of the other horse, but recalled that he was on holiday in Spain when he was told of this, and was further told how the horse would be ridden by Winston. He further remembered watching the race, noticing that Winston's horse drifted in the market from 7/2 to 10/1and duly lost, and seeing that it was ridden in the way he had been told it would be. Working back from the dates of his holiday, Mr Hadfield agreed with the Jockey Club investigator who was interviewing him that this ride must have been in race 10 (MYANNABANANA (IRE)).

50. Mr Hadfield also used this Betfair account to place win bets, and monitored how the balance moved. It emerged in cross-examination by Mr Monson on behalf of the jockeys that Mr Hadfield must have been aware of Mr Nicholl's continued use of the account for lay betting after the DARK CHAMPION race, yet it is evident that he allowed this to continue. It also emerged that MYANNABANANA (IRE) cannot have been the second of the two horses to which he referred, because the betting details do not fit and because his description of how the horse would be ridden cannot fairly be matched with the MYANNABANANA (IRE) race.

51. Because the Panel took the view that Mr Hadfield was fully aware of continuing lay betting transactions after the DARK CHAMPION race, despite his protestations to the contrary, it was not prepared to accept his evidence about being told that Winston had been paid to lose without corroboration. Curiously, corroboration of a sort was forthcoming from Mr Nicholl, who felt he might have said it "because I know what I am like when I have had a drink". The Panel concluded that he probably did say what Mr Hadfield remembered, but that of itself proves nothing against Winston. The critical question was whether it was true that Winston was paid to stop DARK CHAMPION and MYANNABANANA (IRE). Why should Mr Nicholl say this if it was untrue? Mr Nicholl was capable of saying anything which he felt might serve his purpose, and there was an undoubted "Walter Mitty” element to his character, as Mr Postlethwaite observed. The Panel decided to give Winston the benefit of the doubt in part because Mr Nicholl wanted continued use of Mr Hadfield's account, and was prepared to try to convince a nervous man that there was no danger to his money with an inflated boast. But the main reason for giving the benefit of the doubt is the view which the Panel took of Winston's riding (see below).

(b) Explanations to investigators

52. The allegations that Winston misled investigators during interviews are serious, but of a more limited scope than those levelled against Fitzpatrick and the other two jockeys. The Panel has concluded that he did lie to investigators in the two respects alleged. First, he was ********** when he denied speaking with anybody about the prospects of TATWEER (IRE) (IRE) in race 31. The phone records disclose that he had had conversations and exchanged texts with Robert Fitzpatrick, and these were contacts which fitted the pattern of the other suspect races. Secondly, he was not telling the truth at a later interview in January 2005 when he denied generally speaking with Fitzpatrick about prospects for his horses in the suspect races.

53. These untruths were serious. They helped to persuade the Panel that Winston was engaged in supplying inside information via Fitzpatrick, but they were not sufficient to demonstrate that he was involved in a pact to stop his horses in the suspect races.

(c) Rides in the suspect races

54. The HRA suggested that, in four of the 21 suspect races in which Robert Winston rode, analysis of the recordings showed that he was a non-trier. These were race 5 (FRIAR TUCK), race 9 (DARK CHAMPION), race 10 (MYANNABANANA (IRE)) and race 31 (TATWEER (IRE) (IRE)). None of these criticisms was made good, in the Panel's estimation. In addition, it is necessary to consider his ride in race 35 (MADIBA), on which he won, thereby losing for Mr Nicholl the major part of the profits he had made on earlier races.

55. In the FRIAR TUCK race, Winston was fractionally late out of the stalls, but his horse was agitated before the start. It was said that he had failed to seek to improve his position in the middle part of the race, but his horse was carried a considerable way to the right by another runner, and the Panel accepted the explanation that Winston was keen to keep his horse balanced. As Mr Tom O’Ryan (the expert race reader who gave evidence on behalf of the jockeys) observed, the horse's form in later races shows that Winston got the best out of it on the day. There was absolutely nothing wrong with his ride.

56. For the DARK CHAMPION race, the criticism faced by Winston was that he failed to make sufficient effort until it was too late to make a difference. This race may have been put forward as a non-trier because it was one of those mentioned by Mr Hadfield, but again it is clear that Winston's ride was perfectly alright. His horse was uncomfortable with the ground, and kept changing its legs at the point in the race where it was suggested he should have made more effort. There was nothing more he could have done.

57. In the MYANNABANANA (IRE) race, he was said to have induced the horse's slow start and to have taken it wide around the final bend. The Panel did not agree. He did nothing to cause the horse to be slow away, and did not go wide around the final bend. He was no more than two or three wide of the rail, a perfectly natural position to take up in order to avoid kickback.

58. For TATWEER (IRE) (IRE), Winston's riding was the subject of a stewards’ enquiry on the day, and he was found to be in breach of Rule 158. An appeal against this finding was dismissed. He was criticised for failing to make sufficient effort in the closing stages. The recording shows that his riding was perfectly acceptable up to the closing straight. He made every effort to maintain his position on the final bend, but was bumped, which effectively finished his challenge. The horse was well beaten by the time it came into the straight, and even if he had ridden more vigorously in the straight, he would not have done better than improving by one or two places from his eventual 11th place finish. In other words, the criticism made by the stewards on the day and upheld on appeal was that he failed to ride out into a better though still unplaced position. This does not demonstrate that he was party to a pact to ensure the success of Mr Nicholl's lay betting, because the success of those lay bets was already assured at the time in the race when his riding was criticised.

59. Finally, there is the important ride on MADIBA. Here, Winston rode powerfully from an unpromising draw to make sure that he was in the lead by the start of the first bend. Furthermore, he achieved this despite the fact that his right foot was knocked out of his iron as he left the stalls. He regained his footing and his balance while continuing to ride strongly to achieve the early lead. Thereafter, he was never headed. He continued to give a smooth ride to MADIBA and won easily. Luke Fletcher gave the favourite, "Make My Hay", a very vigorous ride (in contrast with his riding in the non-trier cases alleged against him), but was unable to mount a serious challenge. If ever there was an occasion to test whether Winston was prepared to stop horses in the suspect races this was it. He had an opportunity to do so when he lost his iron at the start, but instead he rode with skill and purpose. The Panel was in no doubt that both he and Fletcher provided inside information to Mr Nicholl about this race, and that their common judgement was that Fletcher's horse would win. Hence Mr Nicholl risked but lost over £64,000. Winston's conduct in the race shows that it was no part of the information he provided that he would ride to lose if necessary.

60. There is a further point that tells in Winston's favour in relation to his riding in the 21 suspect races. The HRA criticised just four of these, and the Panel has found that those criticisms do not withstand analysis. Given the odds at which Winston's rides in the 21 suspect races started (typically 5/1 to 12/1, though some were lower priced, such as DARK CHAMPION and MADIBA), one would expect statistically that if he had agreed to take action during a race to ensure success of the lay betting, there would be some clear examples of this from a sample size of 21 races. There were none.

(d) Conclusions

61. In the light of its decision that Robert Winston was supplying inside information to Mr Nicholl via Fitzpatrick, but that this did not include any indication that he would if necessary ride in a way designed to ensure the success of the lay betting, the Panel considered carefully whether it was right to conclude that Winston was receiving payment for his information. The Panel decided that he was being paid. The sheer scale of the operation, the pattern of regular phone contacts, the heavy betting by Mr Nicholl, and the false denials by Winston about the passing of information to Fitzpatrick and about his knowledge that that information was being used by Mr Nicholl have combined to persuade the Panel that he was receiving substantial payment. At the time of the suspect races, Winston was on an upward career path that might indicate that he was unlikely to risk that career with involvement in ******* betting. But he was also at that time a vulnerable character, who was drinking heavily, which led to a publicised falling out with at least one trainer. This vulnerability played its part in causing him to become involved in supplying inside information in breach of Rule 243. He was also in breach of Rule 220 (viii) in the respects alleged by the HRA.



Luke Fletcher

(a) Contacts

62. There was substantial phone traffic between Luke Fletcher and Ian Nicholl during the period of the suspect races, and this was heavier than usual on suspect race days. A total of 339 calls and texts were exchanged between them, according to the available telephone records. The actual number will have been much larger, because Fletcher did not disclose his records prior to October 2003, on the pretext that the phone was also used by his father, who refused permission for these to be disclosed, and because Mr Nicholl's records are not available for the period after mid November. Analysis of the available records shows that Fletcher made five times more calls on suspect race days than the average for other days disclosed, and that Mr Nicholl made substantially more calls to Fletcher on suspect race days than he did on other days.

63. Fletcher was unable to offer any serious explanation to the Panel about the content of this large number of calls and texts, beyond vague suggestions that he might occasionally have given his opinion about prospects for his rides to a man whom he said he thought at the time was an owner. He said that he knew Ian Nicholl only by his nickname "Pogo", and did not realise until a later stage that the two were one and the same person. (This was the explanation he gave to investigators during his interviews -- an explanation which the Panel determined to be a lie). Mr Nicholl was in fact a man who was known to Fletcher for some time before the period of the suspect races, and they met frequently. Mr Nicholl said he obtained Fletcher's telephone number from him on an occasion when they met in a pub, and both attended Robert Fitzpatrick's stag night in August 2003. If, as Fletcher said, he thought that "Pogo" was an owner from Paul Blockley's yard, then the extent of their phone contacts and their concentration around suspect race days is patently inexplicable. The obvious and true explanation is that Fletcher knew full well that "Pogo" was Ian Nicholl, and that he was passing him inside information about his rides.

64. Further, Fletcher's long conversation with Robert Winston on the day before the MADIBA race is significant. This was one of only two calls that had been traced between them. Fletcher was due to ride the favourite in that race, and the Panel concluded that they were discussing and evaluating their respective chances. Fletcher's only explanation about this call was to suggest that somebody else was using Winston's phone, picking up an idea that he had heard Winston give during his evidence.

(b) Explanations to investigators

65. Fletcher began his story to the investigators in March 2004 by denying any knowledge of Mr Nicholl. That is palpably untrue in the light of the phone records and the fact that they met frequently. Thereafter, Fletcher was driven during later interviews into more and more fanciful stories. He denied, quite falsely, having spoken with anybody other than the trainers or owners of SCONCED (USA) and RISK FREE before their races when the records show he was in contact with Mr Nicholl on both occasions. He pretended not to know who used the two Ian Nicholl phone numbers, despite their appearance on his phone bills some 82 times.

66. The only sensible inference from this sustained course of lying is that Fletcher was trying to cover up his involvement with Mr Nicholl because he was fully involved in supplying information to support Mr Nicholl's ******* betting.

(c) Rides in the suspect races

67. It was alleged by the HRA that in three of the 10 suspect races in which Mr Nicholl laid Luke Fletcher's rides to lose, the recordings show that he was taking steps during the race to ensure that those bets succeeded. (The 11th race in respect of which Fletcher was charged was the MADIBA race, where of course he rode the beaten favourite and Mr Nicholl laid MADIBA).

68. Having studied those recordings, the Panel concluded that in each instance Luke Fletcher did indeed take steps to make sure that his horses would not perform to the best of their ability, thus ensuring the success of the lay bets. But in order to form a balanced picture of Fletcher's actions, it was necessary also to consider his ride in race 8, RISK FREE, on which he won, thereby defeating Mr Nicholl's lay betting on that horse.

69. The first non-trier was in race 14, HOH’S BACK. The horse was standing askew in the stalls before they opened. It then missed the break. Just after the gate opened, Fletcher took a deliberate hard pull on the left rein, causing his horse to move further left after a stride or so. He then engaged in a curious form of stop start riding while at the back of the field -- first reaching the back markers and then restraining his horse from making further progress. Thereafter, he did not ride out until the final furlong when the horse had no chance. Though Fletcher reported that his horse had missed the break, the Panel concluded that he was responsible for this and caused further ground to be lost by the sharp left tug. The Panel was asked in relation to this as well as the other alleged non-triers to make allowance for the fact that Fletcher was a conditional jockey and that inexperience can lead to errors. The Panel accepted in principle that that could occur, but found that misjudgement was not the explanation for the series of peculiarities in this ride, because there were so many of them and because the other evidence about the betting and his contacts with Mr Nicholl showed that there was no innocent explanation.

70. In race 18, BLANDYS (IRE), his horse again missed the break. This was because he still had the blindfold on when the gate opened. He was therefore well adrift at the early stages of this seven furlong race. Thereafter, he made negligible efforts to improve but from time to time flapped his arms to give an impression of effort. Fletcher explained the late removal of the blindfold by suggesting that it had been tight on the bridle and that he could not remove it the first time he tried. The Panel again accepted that in principle such accidents can occur, but decided that there was no accident on this occasion. He did not begin to attempt to remove the blind until too late in any event, after the other runners were well out of the stalls, and the evidence about the betting and his contacts with Mr Nicholl again reinforced this conclusion.

71. In race 36, LARKY’S LOB, Fletcher was riding the 11/2 second favourite. The horse was again late out of the stalls, having been standing askew before the off. He made no attempt to recover from the slow start or to reach a challenging position. Despite this the horse did make progress in the final straight, but Fletcher delayed making any effort in the last furlong until it was too late to get a place. There was a Stewards’ Enquiry into this run, at which questions were asked about the sufficiency of the effort made, but having heard Fletcher's explanation, this was merely noted. In the light of the other races already referred to and of the other evidence about betting and contacts (which, of course, was not before the stewards on the day), the Panel concluded that this again was a clear instance of deliberate lack of effort.

72. Does Fletcher's winning ride in race 8, RISK FREE, revise the picture painted above? Once again, this horse was slowly into its stride and remained well adrift for some time after the start. Despite that, it made steady progress through the field though Fletcher never had to do much to achieve this. In the final furlong, a wide gap opened at which the horse went through to win comfortably. Fletcher went for his whip, but only delivered an airshot. This was a race which he could not help winning without taking steps to throw it away that would have been hopelessly obvious.

73. On analysis, therefore, his success in the RISK FREE race did not lead to a revision of the view taken of the non-triers races. The Panel decided that Fletcher's riding in those cases clearly demonstrated that part of the arrangement he made with Mr Nicholl for all his suspect races (save of course in the MADIBA race) was that he would ride to lose if that was necessary.

(d) Conclusions

74. Fletcher was in clear breach of Rule 243, because the Panel decided that he obviously received substantial payments for the information he supplied to Mr Nicholl. Indeed, it is apparent from the betting records that the Betfair accounts which Mr Nicholl controlled or influenced were frequently betting sometimes sizeable amounts to win on other rides of Fletcher. Though these bets were not as large as the lay bets in the suspect races, this feature lead the Panel to believe that Fletcher was possibly a partner of Mr Nicholl in his betting operations. Even if that is not so, the Panel was convinced that he received considerable payments for the information he provided in relation to the suspect races.

75. The Panel also decided that Fletcher was in breach of Rule 220 (viii) in all respects alleged by the HRA.

Francis Ferris

(a) Contacts

76. For the first of the suspect races in which Francis Ferris rode, race 2 TOP OF THE CLASS (IRE), there is no evidence of prior phone contact by him with either Fitzpatrick or Mr Nicholl. But that does not mean that there was no contact, because Ferris's phone records were not available. There was, however, the usual pattern of contacts between Fitzpatrick and Mr Nicholl before and after this race, with the commonly seen feature that Mr Nicholl began arranging substantial lay bets against Ferris's ride during and after his contacts with Fitzpatrick.

77. For the later races concerning Ferris, there are contacts between Ferris and Fitzpatrick and between Ferris and Mr Nicholl which again coincide with heavy lay betting. In the light of the fact that these three later races display the same classic pattern of contacts, the Panel concluded that they are likely to have occurred also in relation to race 2, and that the only reason they cannot to be seen is because of the lack of Ferris's phone records.

78. Fitzpatrick admitted that he passed on what he characterised as opinions about Ferris's rides, and these were based upon what Ferris had told him. Ferris himself admitted that he would discuss his rides with Fitzpatrick.

79. As Ferris's case was that he had never met Mr Nicholl and never knowingly spoken to him before he first saw him at this enquiry, Ferris faced an obvious difficulty in accounting for the content of the phone contacts which Mr Nicholl's records (themselves incomplete) show that they had. Ferris did suggest that a man whom he knew as "Pogo" had been in contact with him about getting a car for his girlfriend. And he also suggested that Mr Nicholl might have contacted him and pretended to be a press man, possibly Graham Green.

80. The Panel found this whole account to be incredible. Mr Nicholl himself accepted that he had met Ferris, probably before the