Jet Airways 7 approaches

smurfjed

A Jet Airways Boeing 737-800, registration VT-JFA performing flight 9W-555 (dep Aug 17th) from Doha (Qatar) to Kochin (India) with 142 passengers and 8 crew, was on approach to Kochin and went around three times due to weather. Following the third go-around the crew declared fuel emergency and diverted to Thiruvananthapuram (in India often also referred to as short "Trivandrum"), located about 95nm south of Kochin, where the aircraft again needed to go around three times before managing a safe landing on the fourth approach.

On Aug 21st 2015 India's Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) reported the aircraft landed with just 270kg/600lbs of fuel left, where the required minimum fuel reserve would have been around 1500kg/3300lbs. The aircraft had gone around 3 times in Kochin due to bad weather, the crew then decided to divert to Trivandrum, which had poor weather conditions, too, and managed a landing there only on the 4th attempt. Both pilots have been suspended pending investigation. The DGCA reported they are looking into the airline's fueling policy as well as into the weather reports and why the crew diverted to Trivandrum.

600 lbs of fuel, any idea how long that would last in a 737-800?

PinOnTheRight

Not long at all... if they'd had gone around again there wouldn't be enough to complete a circuit and land.

pepe the prawn

Jaysus. Depends on the landing mass, but estimating around 46,000 kg, 270kg at sea level would last around 8 minutes at a holding pattern power setting. I'd say one good squirt of TOGA power for a minute or two and it was fumes after that

tayto lover

Excuse my ignorance but how is that the pilot's fault?
Is the fuelling policy not a management issue?

pepe the prawn

tayto lover wrote: »

Excuse my ignorance but how is that the pilot's fault?
Is the fuelling policy not a management issue?

The man/woman sitting in the left seat has the final say on the fuel uplift. Detailed and rigorous pre flight planning should have highlighted the weather issues both at the destination and the alternate. This is reason enough to carry extra fuel. the commander has discretion to carry additional fuel if he or she sees fit, in this case owing to significant weather. Yes some companys will exert pressure to carry as little as possible but the man up front has final say, it is the crew who carries the expectations and trust of the passengers on their shoulders.

MoeJay

Airline management will tell you regardless of any corporate policy in relation to fuel, the final decision rests with the pilot in command who decides how much to take. And the rules will say the same.

Many airlines have specific guidance about multiple approaches; the risk of an incident increases with each attempt. The danger of "get-it-in-itis" cannot be underestimated!

Locker10a

tayto lover wrote: »

Excuse my ignorance but how is that the pilot's fault?
Is the fuelling policy not a management issue?

While there may well be management pressure on flight crews in the background it's still not an excuse for going around 3 times! and allowing the fuel to almost Run out

smurfjed

Metars Kochin:
VOCI 180230Z 09004KT 2000 BR BKN006 SCT015 24/22 Q1009 BECMG 2500 BR
VOCI 180200Z 09003KT 1800 BR BKN004 SCT015 24/22 Q1009 BECMG 2000 BR
VOCI 180130Z 00000KT 1800 BR BKN004 SCT015 24/22 Q1008 TEMPO 1000 FG
VOCI 180100Z 00000KT 1800 BR BKN004 SCT015 24/22 Q1008 NOSIG
VOCI 180030Z 00000KT 2000 BR SCT006 SCT015 24/22 Q1007 TEMPO VIS 1500 BR
VOCI 180000Z 00000KT 3000 BR SCT006 SCT015 24/22 Q1007 TEMPO VIS 2000 BR
VOCI 172300Z 00000KT 3500 HZ FEW015 SCT080 25/22 Q1007 BECMG 3000 BR
VOCI 172230Z 00000KT 3500 HZ FEW015 SCT080 25/22 Q1007 NOSIG
VOCI 172130Z 00000KT 3500 HZ FEW015 SCT080 25/22 Q1007 NOSIG
VOCI 172100Z 00000KT 3500 HZ FEW015 SCT080 25/23 Q1007 NOSIG
VOCI 171930Z VRB03KT 3500 HZ SCT015 BKN080 26/23 Q1008 NOSIG

Metars Trivandrum:
VOTV 180440Z 27005KT 5000 HZ FEW020 29/24 Q1009 NOSIG
VOTV 180410Z 27005KT 4000 HZ FEW015 SCT090 28/24 Q1009 BECMG 5000
VOTV 180340Z 27005KT 4000 HZ FEW015 SCT090 29/24 Q1009 NOSIG
VOTV 180310Z 25006KT 3000 HZ FEW015 SCT090 27/23 Q1009 NOSIG
VOTV 180140Z 23004KT 2000 BR FEW015 SCT090 26/23 Q1008 NOSIG
VOTV 180040Z 29003KT 3000 HZ FEW015 SCT090 25/23 Q1007 NOSIG
VOTV 180010Z 28004KT 3000 HZ FEW015 SCT090 25/23 Q1007 NOSIG
VOTV 172310Z 30003KT 3500 HZ FEW015 SCT090 25/23 Q1007 NOSIG
VOTV 172210Z 27003KT 3500 HZ FEW015 SCT080 25/23 Q1006 NO

I don't know what type of approaches were available.

Cessna_Pilot

pepe the prawn wrote: »

Jaysus. Depends on the landing mass, but estimating around 46,000 kg, 270kg at sea level would last around 8 minutes at a holding pattern power setting. I'd say one good squirt of TOGA power for a minute or two and it was fumes after that

Landing weight of a 738 is going to be fair bit more than 46 tonnes!

endacl

Layman question...

If the situation arose that the pilot couldn't make a safe landing on the last attempt, for whatever reason, and was aware that the fuel reserve is clearly too low for another go around, what's the protocol? Try to drop her anyway and hope for the best, I presume? Kind of like trying to control a crash in a car if the brakes have failed, and running it into a ditch, rather than hoping the road is long and clear enough to roll to a stop?

pepe the prawn

Cessna_Pilot wrote: »

Landing weight of a 738 is going to be fair bit more than 46 tonnes!

maybe around the 60 mark? i only pulled that figure out of a CAPS

PinOnTheRight

pepe the prawn wrote: »

maybe around the 60 mark? i only pulled that figure out of a CAPS

As a ballpark figure, OEW of 42,000kg. Throw in the 8 crew onboard, 142 passengers and a few bags (since people like to carry the kitchen sink) so add another rough estimated 13,000kg, so 55,000kg.

Oh...nearly got, that 300kg of fuel still in the tanks. So making a final approach at around 55,300kgs.

If the situation arose that the pilot couldn't make a safe landing on the last attempt, for whatever reason, and was aware that the fuel reserve is clearly too low for another go around, what's the protocol?

I'm not sure they teach any protocol for this. All the teaching is about not getting into the situation in the first place. A controlled ditching/landing as best as possible. If the engines flame out on the go-around, you'd be mad to attempt a turn back to the field.

Irish Steve

endacl wrote: »

Layman question...

If the situation arose that the pilot couldn't make a safe landing on the last attempt, for whatever reason, and was aware that the fuel reserve is clearly too low for another go around, what's the protocol? Try to drop her anyway and hope for the best, I presume? Kind of like trying to control a crash in a car if the brakes have failed, and running it into a ditch, rather than hoping the road is long and clear enough to roll to a stop?

In theory, it should never have got to this point 6 missed approaches is way over the number that would normally be expected or fuelled for, especially at airfields that have ILS approach systems, which should have been available at both airports. the standard in Europe would be that after 2 misses, go somewhere else.

If the weather conditions at both the destination and the first alternate were marginal enough that getting in to either of them was uncertain, then extra fuel to go somewhere else would (in my book) be essential.

If there are no alternatives left, then the best worst option, if that makes sense, is to try and get it on the runway, or at least on the airfield. in as controlled a manner as possible on the basis that there are emergency services of some sort that should be able to provide assistance pretty rapidly, and there should not be anything too solid in the area that you're aiming for, given that aircraft are normally expected to land close to that point.

I always remember a comment made to me by an old instructor at one stage when discussing night flying in singles. "If the engine fails, don't turn the landing light on until 100 Ft above ground. If you don't like what you see, turn it off again". Wry dry humour, but it had some truth in it, if things have gone that badly wrong, there's very little you can do about it at that stage.

A no fuel landing in a heavy jet is a bad outcome, the only redeeming feature being that there should not be a significant fire if it's not a good landing.

Tenger

endacl wrote: »

.....If the situation arose that the pilot couldn't make a safe landing on the last attempt, for whatever reason, and was aware that the fuel reserve is clearly too low for another go around, what's the protocol? Try to drop her anyway and hope for the best, I presume? ........

As above the training and decision making is all orientated towards not getting into that situation ever.
Hence why every flight plan will have multiple diversion options and info on the weather conditions and fuel required for each of them.

JCX BXC

I'm surprised the daily mail/Irish equivalent hasnt copped onto this! They made a big deal about 1 random touch and go at DUB.

duskyjoe

endacl wrote: »

Layman question...

If the situation arose that the pilot couldn't make a safe landing on the last attempt, for whatever reason, and was aware that the fuel reserve is clearly too low for another go around, what's the protocol? Try to drop her anyway and hope for the best, I presume? Kind of like trying to control a crash in a car if the brakes have failed, and running it into a ditch, rather than hoping the road is long and clear enough to roll to a stop?

The bottom line as a commander , you should never expose yourself to a situation that happened above. Most airlines operate a policy of a maximum of two missed approaches .....if the weather does not improve by 100% for the third approach a diversion is mandatory. Likewise the cardinal rule in aviation is thou shall not land less than final reserve fuel which equates to 30mins flying time. These numb skulls appear to have broken every rule in the book and are lucky not to have lost the aircraft. Sorry to be so direct but them is the facts.

eatmyshorts

duskyjoe wrote: »

. These numb skulls appear to have broken every rule in the book and are lucky not to have lost the aircraft. Sorry to be so direct but them is the facts.

I've operated into both Cochin and Trivandrum. Both are absolute ****holes of places. I'll reserve judgement until the official report.

bkehoe

tayto lover wrote: »

Excuse my ignorance but how is that the pilot's fault?
Is the fuelling policy not a management issue?

The bottom line as a commander , you should never expose yourself to a situation that happened above. Most airlines operate a policy of a maximum of two missed approaches

Obviously the pilots took a LOT of extra fuel above what was in his (or her) flight plan if they had enough to do 6 go arounds as well as a diversion to an airfield requiring more fuel than the one nominated in the flight plan. I don't think there is any issue with fuel policy here. The METARs for both airfields that I've seen don't seem like anything I'd be especially concerned about, but obviously I haven't seen the TAFs available to the pilots when planning, but the amount of approaches conducted are proof to me anyway that there was probably an extra 1 - 1.5 tonnes on board arriving at dest which is a lot. I'd estimate 400 - 500kg burn for a go around, radar vectored downwind and approach. I believe there was no radar here, so they were doing a full procedural go around and approach; not fuel efficient!

It sounds like a sh**y day where the swiss cheese holes were all in alignment. ILS U/S at both airfields. Questionable weather forecasting and reporting. If there is insufficient fuel to divert to another alternate after already diverting then the 2 approaches rule is irrelevant.

At the end of the day the commander has the authority to do whatever is required in his or her judgement to ensure the safety of the aircraft. So if this is an auto land on a CAT I only runway in FG (which the aircraft will do just fine), descending below MDA when fuel is insufficient for another go-around, etc, it's all legal if it can be justified. I suspect 'no go-around' was briefed on the last approach. They were probably being bombarded with flickering fuel pump pressure warning lights, overheating hydraulic pumps, etc.