Synopsis of the 2001 UK FMD Outbreak.

greysides

http://web.oie.int/boutique/extrait/10mansley483498.pdf


The 2001 foot-and-mouth disease [FMD] epidemic in Great Britain was
characterised by control using both traditional and novel methods,
some resulting from conclusions of mathematical models. 7 days before
the implementation of the novel controversial automatic pre-emptive
culling of all susceptible livestock on premises adjacent to infected
premises (the 'contiguous cull'), the spread of infection had already
been controlled by a combination of the traditional stamping out
policy with a national movement ban on livestock. A 2nd controversial
novel policy requiring the slaughter of sheep within 3 km [2 mi] of
premises on which disease had been confirmed (the 3-km cull) also
commenced after the peak of infection spread, was untargeted and took
several weeks to complete; serosurveillance of culled sheep detected
infection in only one flock, suggesting that cryptic infection of
sheep was not propagating the epidemic. Extensive post-epidemic
serological surveillance of sheep found only a small number of
seropositive animals in a very few flocks, suggesting that foot and
mouth disease may self-limit in extensive sheep populations. The
epidemic was finally brought to an end following the introduction of
enhanced agricultural movement restrictions and biosecurity measures.
A welfare culling scheme of unaffected animals was required to support
the prolonged national livestock movement ban. The models that
supported the contiguous culling policy were severely flawed, being
based on data from dissimilar epidemics; used inaccurate background
population data, and contained highly improbable biological
assumptions about the temporal and quantitative parameters of
infection and virus emission in infected herds and flocks.

5live

Hope its wet tomorrow and i will have a chance to read that. Thanks for that greysides

greysides

It's long but not overly difficult language.


A few quotes from the article:

The national livestock movement ban was a draconian
measure and its implementation so early in an outbreak
was without precedent in the history of FMD control in
Great Britain. It is without doubt that this single measure
played a pivotal role in reducing the scale of the epidemic
because the movement of infected animals is by far the
most common mechanism of FMD spread.

Theoretical, non-validated, disease models,
prepared by mathematicians with little knowledge of farm
husbandry practices and containing improbable veterinary
and virological assumptions, were widely publicised and
used to drive policy for the first time in a major disease
epidemic, despite the widespread concerns expressed by
veterinarians experienced in FMD control as to their
validity and applicability.

The models’
veterinary assumptions did not fit with either field or
experimental reality and represented a different (wholly
theoretical) virus, perhaps best dubbed the ‘Armageddon
virus’, given its ability to infect whole herds at once and be
excreted several days in advance of clinical manifestation,
maximally and indefinitely, unless the animals were killed.
The further assumption that this ‘Armageddon virus’
would then spread evenly and radially from the premises’
boundary, irrespective of the animals’ locations, produced
a self-fulfilling prophecy inevitably weighted towards
radial/contiguous culling being necessary to halt the spread
of infection.

The consequences of the contiguous cull policy were
severe. Not only were over a million animals culled on
more than 3,000 farms, but further problems were
generated, including:
– the diversion of scarce resources from the high-priority
tasks of IP and DC tracing and culling
– a huge increase in the number of carcasses awaiting
disposal
– an exponential increase in the movements of vehicles
and personnel engaged in the cull in the protection zones,
perhaps facilitating local spread
– reduced cooperation from farmers (sometimes leading
to a conscious or unconscious delay in reporting suspicion
for fear of the consequences on neighbours)
– a hugely demoralising effect on the British population in
general and among farmers in particular
– a major loss of epidemiological data.

Many lessons were learned from the experiences of the UK
2001 FMD epidemic that were tested all too soon when
FMD again struck the UK, in 2007. Not least among these
was the policy of employing the traditional, well established
methods of FMD control and eradication and
not using novel procedures, based on non-validated
mathematical models. This strategy proved to be correct
and the virus was relatively quickly eradicated.

JohnBoy

This was a very interesting blog being written by one of the slughter men, but it stopped abrubptly.

dark reading

http://cattlekiller.blogspot.com/

greysides

JohnBoy wrote: »

This was a very interesting blog being written by one of the slughter men, but it stopped abrubptly.

dark reading

http://cattlekiller.blogspot.com/

Thanks. An interesting read and insight into a job no one would want to do but which has to be done.

redzerologhlen

JohnBoy wrote: »

This was a very interesting blog being written by one of the slughter men, but it stopped abrubptly.

dark reading

http://cattlekiller.blogspot.com/

Interesting reading!!

8k2q1gfcz9s5d4

JohnBoy wrote: »

This was a very interesting blog being written by one of the slughter men, but it stopped abrubptly.

dark reading

http://cattlekiller.blogspot.com/

Animal holocaust. We were lucky here that id didnt spread, as far as i remember it was only louth that had a few cases. Never forget it, the country was on lockdown, and rightly so

flatout11

greysides wrote: »

http://web.oie.int/boutique/extrait/10mansley483498.pdf

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thanks greysides, its a interesting read