NAMA - figures are not adding up

ei.sdraob · 13-03-2010 3:29pm #1

the previous thread on NAMA seriously gone off-topic

in this thread i want to raise some questions for @Scofflaw and some other pro-NAMA "optimists" (for a lack of a better name)

my questions are based on this excellent article here > http://www.ronanlyons.com/2010/03/09/elephant-in-the-room-namas-yield-problem-hasnt-gone-away/

1. @Scofflaw you previously claimed prices only :rolleyes: need to go up 10% in 10 years in order for NAMA to break even, the figure is actually 25% based on current 50% drop, and prices are still falling the more they fall the larger the rebound will have to be in 10 years

2. as Ronan has shown in his article, the yields being claimed by NAMA are wildly optimistic, this sums it up

3. there is 10 years worth of supply of commercial property in Dublin alone 1million sqm, rent yields are gonna go only one way, down (and that aint a bad thing considering amount of business closing)

4. empties, empties everywhere, there are more empties than there is rented property

5. UK property has resumed its downward falls, with NI falling the most

please please NAMA "believers" explain to us how do you expect prices to go up by 25% in 10 years assuming the falls stop today??

NAMA is a sham :mad: and thank you Ronan for excellent article

dynamick · 13-03-2010 5:55pm

The suggestion that NAMA would make a profit was only made because this was required by Eurostat in order to classify NAMA bonds as not being included in the national debt figures.

NAMA is most unlikely to break even but then this is not its true purpose. NAMA is designed to prevent the main banks from going into liquidation. Yes the cost will probably be in the billions and will be borne by the taxpayer.

If you don't like NAMA, then you should propose an alternative, although you are a little late now.

ei.sdraob · 13-03-2010 6:07pm

dynamick wrote: »

The suggestion that NAMA would make a profit was only made because this was required by Eurostat in order to classify NAMA bonds as not being included in the national debt figures.

NAMA is most unlikely to break even but then this is not its true purpose. NAMA is designed to prevent the main banks from going into liquidation. Yes the cost will probably be in the billions and will be borne by the taxpayer.

If you don't like NAMA, then you should propose an alternative, although you are a little late now.

for NAMA to break even we would need a 25% rise in prices in next decade, that's assuming there are no more falls

let me say it again, 25% rise

it will not break even and we will endup giving the money to banks directly anyways, so why bother with whole thing in first place

and yes i proposed alternatives and so did many people, theres no lack of alternatives

hell even if its too late for an alternative the least they can do is put up more realistic valuations and yields, and release more information to the public

SkepticOne · 13-03-2010 6:10pm

dynamick wrote: »

NAMA is most unlikely to break even but then this is not its true purpose. NAMA is designed to prevent the main banks from going into liquidation. Yes the cost will probably be in the billions and will be borne by the taxpayer.

Why then the 10 or more years of NAMA operations? Why are we hanging on to all these assets of deteriorating value? The only rationale is that it is hoped to make a return at the end of 10 years, and if that doesn't work, 15 years.

Unfortunately once it is sold to the public as a great investment, that expectation is then placed upon those running NAMA even if that was not the original intention.

It would have been far better if a single purpose for NAMA were set out at the beginning, i.e., to clear the banks of toxic assets. This additional goal, created to con the public into believing it is an investment, will end up costing the country dearly.

ei.sdraob · 13-03-2010 6:14pm

SkepticOne wrote: »

Why then the 10 or more years of NAMA operations? Why are we hanging on to all these assets of deteriorating value? The only rationale is that it is hoped to make a return at the end of 10 years, and if that doesn't work, 15 years.

Unfortunately once it is sold to the public as a great investment, that expectation is then placed upon those running NAMA even if that was not the original intention.

It would have been far better if a single purpose for NAMA were set out at the beginning, i.e., to clear the banks of toxic assets. This additional goal, created to con the public into believing it is an investment, will end up costing the country dearly.

i think Fianna Fail realize that by the time NAMA is exposed/shown to be a failure in 10 years time

they wont be around, and the people who thought up of this monstrosity be tanning on a sandy beach collection a fat public pension, laughing their heads of

its their way of avoiding making "tough" decisions

dynamick · 13-03-2010 6:53pm

ei.sdraob wrote: »

for NAMA to break even we would need a 25% rise in prices in next decade, that's assuming there are no more falls

Um, yes as I said, I agree. Ronan Lyons is great at visualisation and clear presentation.

ei.sdraob wrote: »

we will endup giving the money to banks directly anyways, so why bother with whole thing in first place

EU state aid rules preclude us from giving money directly to the banks. Ireland was instructed by the commission and the ECB to save the banks and the terms of NAMA were essentially dictated by those organisations along with the IMF. It is designed in such a way to be technically compliant with EU law.

ei.sdraob wrote: »

and yes i proposed alternatives and so did many people, theres no lack of alternatives

Which one did you like best?

ei.sdraob wrote: »

hell even if its too late for an alternative the least they can do is put up more realistic valuations and yields, and release more information to the public

I agree that transparency is important when so much public money is at stake. The valuations are not that important. If the loans are valued at market rate then we'll just need to recapitalise the banks by that much more. The valuations are not based on a discount to book value, but rather a premium to market value of 15%. So a loan 100% secured on assets with a market value of 1m will be bought at 1.15m.

SkepticOne wrote: »

Why then the 10 or more years of NAMA operations? Why are we hanging on to all these assets of deteriorating value? The only rationale is that it is hoped to make a return at the end of 10 years, and if that doesn't work, 15 years.

The reason for running NAMA over 10 years is to avoid dumping the entire portfolio on the market in one go, leading to a shock so severe that the banks would go into liquidation.

SkepticOne wrote: »

Unfortunately once it is sold to the public as a great investment, that expectation is then placed upon those running NAMA even if that was not the original intention.

They're well paid and I'm sure they couldn't care less about their public perception.

SkepticOne wrote: »

It would have been far better if a single purpose for NAMA were set out at the beginning, i.e., to clear the banks of toxic assets.

As I said they had to say it was designed to make a profit to keep the NAMA bonds off the national debt. This was a Eurostat requirement. The European System of Accounts defines what types of body can be classified as public or private and when debt is counted as public or private debt.

http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/ESA95/en/een00126.htm

The idea of keeping NAMA debt off the national accounts is to lower the cost of borrowing.

SkepticOne · 13-03-2010 7:10pm

dynamick wrote: »

The reason for running NAMA over 10 years is to avoid dumping the entire portfolio on the market in one go, leading to a shock so severe that the banks would go into liquidation.

But in the world market for rubbish loans, the Irish developer loans can't make up a huge proportion. It would not be so bad if NAMA were required to fully dispose of everything within the 10 year period but as far as I know that is not the case. Therefore the safest thing for those running NAMA will simply be to hold on to the loans, roll up as much interest as possible (an interest holiday for the early years is built into the business plan), then when the developers go bust, hold on to the underlying property. The goal will be to avoid crystallizing a loss rather than act in the country's best interest.

oppenheimer1 · 14-03-2010 12:39am

ei.sdraob wrote: »

i think Fianna Fail realize that by the time NAMA is exposed/shown to be a failure in 10 years time

they wont be around, and the people who thought up of this monstrosity be tanning on a sandy beach collection a fat public pension, laughing their heads of

its their way of avoiding making "tough" decisions

Why ten years? NAMA can run for an indefinite period of time.

ei.sdraob · 14-03-2010 12:42am

oppenheimer1 wrote: »

Why ten years? NAMA can run for an indefinite period of time.

10 years is what we were told it would run for

the banks could also be in limbo for indefinite amount of time

Scofflaw · 14-03-2010 12:48am

ei.sdraob wrote: »

for NAMA to break even we would need a 25% rise in prices in next decade, that's assuming there are no more falls

let me say it again, 25% rise

Over a decade - not in the next year or two. That's a 2.5% annual rise per decade (yes, it actually is!) - or, if we assume prices continue to drop until 2013, then we need a 6.5% annual rise in property prices for the next 6 years.

Those are not in any way bizarre figures. They do assume an Irish economic recovery, as opposed to Japan-style years of deflation, that's all.

ei.sdraob wrote: »

it will not break even and we will endup giving the money to banks directly anyways, so why bother with whole thing in first place

and yes i proposed alternatives and so did many people, theres no lack of alternatives

hell even if its too late for an alternative the least they can do is put up more realistic valuations and yields, and release more information to the public

Whatever we do with NAMA we wind up giving money to the banks directly - and the lower the valuations, the more money we directly give the banks.

But looking solely at the valuations is pretty meaningless. What the State is buying isn't property, but loans. Only if the debtors are terminally unable to service their loans does the valuation of the property really come into play.

Not only that, but if NAMA loses money, there is a clawback mechanism to take the loss out of the banks' profits, because after all, this is their mess that's being cleaned up.

I'm not a fan of NAMA - it would certainly have been better not to be in a position where such a thing was in any sense required. Nor am I particularly optimistic about NAMA. I'm only involved in the debate because, as so often with anything complex, the sheer level of misunderstanding and misinformation about NAMA is horrific.

Any proposed alternative is not - realistically - going to happen now, but it's still interesting to speculate on what else could have been done, and in what way it would have been better than NAMA. However, to propose something better than NAMA, people need to be better than the real NAMA, not the confused straw NAMA that has been created by public incomprehension.

NAMA has the following elements:

1. valuation of loans and assets
2. transfer of performing loans and assets
3. long-term management of loans and assets for maximum return
4. clawback of any NAMA losses from bank profits

Step 1 is the tricky bit, but a low valuation of NAMA assets has the automatic corollary of the State putting more money directly into the banks. A high valuation of NAMA assets increases the risk of NAMA making a loss - which is then taken out of the banks' profits by added taxation.

To me, the main risk here is political - that NAMA will make a loss, but the government will not choose to take the losses out of the banks' profits. Aside from that, there is a slighter risk that banks involved will go out of business.

Where is the monumentally bad thing that NAMA is supposed to be in all that, exactly?

puzzled,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw · 14-03-2010 12:50am

SkepticOne wrote: »

But in the world market for rubbish loans, the Irish developer loans can't make up a huge proportion. It would not be so bad if NAMA were required to fully dispose of everything within the 10 year period but as far as I know that is not the case. Therefore the safest thing for those running NAMA will simply be to hold on to the loans, roll up as much interest as possible (an interest holiday for the early years is built into the business plan), then when the developers go bust, hold on to the underlying property. The goal will be to avoid crystallizing a loss rather than act in the country's best interest.

That is presumably a possibility, but I'm not sure NAMA can run for ever - and why not crystallise the loss and take the money from the banks? That's part of the mechanism, after all.

cordially,
Scofflaw

oppenheimer1 · 14-03-2010 12:51am

SkepticOne wrote: »

But in the world market for rubbish loans, the Irish developer loans can't make up a huge proportion. It would not be so bad if NAMA were required to fully dispose of everything within the 10 year period but as far as I know that is not the case. Therefore the safest thing for those running NAMA will simply be to hold on to the loans, roll up as much interest as possible (an interest holiday for the early years is built into the business plan), then when the developers go bust, hold on to the underlying property. The goal will be to avoid crystallizing a loss rather than act in the country's best interest.

Say a developer builds houses at a cost of €300k per unit but aims to sell them for €325k he borrows 80% of the build cost to finance the project. The developer then gets into financial trouble after some time and cannot repay his loans, but has 50k paid off. House prices tumble to half their expected value to €162.5k. Loan of 240k-50k=190. The house is worth 85% of the remaining value of the loan, and NAMA makes back 88c in the euro for its loan. Not exactly a disasterous return. And with NAMA controlling supply they will be able to control price, and the longer they hold the asset the more pressure they will be able to exert on developers to pay up.

ei.sdraob · 14-03-2010 1:06am

Scofflaw wrote: »

if we assume prices continue to drop until 2013, then we need a 6.5% annual rise in property prices for the next 6 years.

6.5% per year :eek:

come on, seriously?

ECBs target is 2% inflation, the house prices would have to rise 3x above inflation target year on year for 6 years :eek: theres a name for that < asset bubble, weve just been thru one

do you expect some magic increase in productivity in 3 years? an enormous oil find?? we will still be running budget deficits in 2 years and be lucky if can even reach the EUs limit

NAMA is a giant bet that there will be another asset bubble within a decade, while ignoring the huge oversupply and continuing falls

ei.sdraob · 14-03-2010 1:08am

Scofflaw wrote: »

Not only that, but if NAMA loses money, there is a clawback mechanism to take the loss out of the banks' profits, because after all, this is their mess that's being cleaned up.

weve been thru this

the banks are bust, there nothing to "claw back" except maybe the money that we already gave them, tho that's probably long gone to warmer shores

oppenheimer1 · 14-03-2010 1:10am

ei.sdraob wrote: »

weve been thru this

the banks are bust, there nothing to "claw back" except the money that we already gave them, and that's long gone to warmer shores

The banks are still generating an operating profit. With the bad loans dealt with they will be quite healthy.

ei.sdraob · 14-03-2010 1:13am

Scofflaw wrote: »

Where is the monumentally bad thing that NAMA is supposed to be in all that, exactly?

the banks have failed

no amount of paper shuffling will change this

we either:

1. let them fail
2. take over them

or combination of above

in the end its quite likely that one of the banks will fall and the other ones nationalized altogether and merged

and while we at it we spend a few billions (yes see admin cost section of the plan, which is rather large) on paying some bozos in order to run their new quango

ei.sdraob · 14-03-2010 1:14am

oppenheimer1 wrote: »

The banks are still generating an operating profit. With the bad loans dealt with they will be quite healthy.

and when exactly will these bad loans be "dealt with" ?

oppenheimer1 · 14-03-2010 1:20am

ei.sdraob wrote: »

and when exactly will these bad loans be "dealt with" ?

Aren't the development loans both good and bad being transferred to NAMA? So to answer your question, in the next year.

ei.sdraob · 14-03-2010 1:25am

oppenheimer1 wrote: »

Aren't the development loans both good and bad being transferred to NAMA? So to answer your question, in the next year.

yes banks will be profitable again next year and the credit will flow free and we can resume selling houses to one another as they will rise by 25% in next decade

dunsandin · 14-03-2010 1:33am

I absolutely love the way you dismiss Japans years in the doldrums as a fate we could never sink to Scofflaw, it is so optimistic and full of hope, bless....
How indeed could anybody relate Japans property bubble and subsequent crash, public bailout of banks and its dismal outcome for the taxpayer to our own current situation. It is light years away from our own rosy future, no doubt about it. Japan Inc Vs Irl Inc - no contest, our economic dynamo beats the japs any day, I Think.....What was it that someone said about people not learning the lessons of history?

Scofflaw · 14-03-2010 1:40am

ei.sdraob wrote: »

6.5% per year :eek:

come on, seriously?

ECBs target is 2% inflation, the house prices would have to rise 3x above inflation target year on year for 6 years :eek: theres a name for that < asset bubble, weve just been thru one

do you expect some magic increase in productivity in 3 years? an enormous oil find?? we will still be running budget deficits in 2 years and be lucky if can even reach the EUs limit

NAMA is a giant bet that there will be another asset bubble within a decade, while ignoring the huge oversupply and continuing falls

An asset bubble is not required. Here are annual Irish house price changes (%) since 1976:

Year|New Houses|Second-hand
1976|23.31|
1977|17|
1978|24.89|
1979|20.17|24.96
1980|25.15|21.68
1981|12.32|3.05
1982|5.71|9.73
1983|-2.06|15.84
1984|3.84|19.18
1985|4.92|24.17
1986|1.39|28.83
1987|6.54|13.86
1988|5.66|11.73
1989|14.75|11.92
1990|4.76|-0.71
1991|5.57|6.77
1992|0.43|2.36
1993|0.55|1.85
1994|7.52|13.01
1995|7.07|13.8
1996|14.5|14.31
1997|21.79|7.68
1998|21.3|0.22
1999|16.43|-3.62
2000|13.83|-2.51
2001|0.64|0.19
2002|14.19|3
2003|13.93|4.15
2004|11.28|2.53
2005|9.48|5.11
2006|9.04|2.54
2007|0.4|1.2
2008|-10.28|-0.2

Those aren't some kind of cumulative figures - they're the yearly changes, based on the CSO quarterly house price index.

You can get the necessary house price rise for NAMA from 1980-1985, or from 1985 to halfway through 1989. Those weren't exactly stellar years for the Irish economy.

The bubble rises were double-digit annual rises - in some cases the entire NAMA rise within 5 quarters, not 5 years. To get a 25% house price rise in 5 years has been possible at virtually any point since 1976.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw · 14-03-2010 1:45am

dunsandin wrote: »

I absolutely love the way you dismiss Japans years in the doldrums as a fate we could never sink to Scofflaw, it is so optimistic and full of hope, bless....
How indeed could anybody relate Japans property bubble and subsequent crash, public bailout of banks and its dismal outcome for the taxpayer to our own current situation. It is light years away from our own rosy future, no doubt about it. Japan Inc Vs Irl Inc - no contest, our economic dynamo beats the japs any day, I Think.....What was it that someone said about people not learning the lessons of history?

I haven't seen an argument that ties the two together, that's all. There have been how many house price crashes in the world over the last 30-40 years? Lots, let us say - but our house price crash has to be the same as Japan's! Why? Why not the same as the late Eighties deregulatory bubble in the UK, say? Why Japan?

The answer, it seems to me, is drama, and the same mentality that gave us the view that our boom was unprecedentedly marvellous and would never end. Now the crash has started, our crash is unprecedently awful, and will never end.

The lessons of history are many, and you don't learn anything by picking them out of a hat.

cordially,
Scofflaw

johnnyskeleton · 14-03-2010 1:53am

Scofflaw wrote: »

Over a decade - not in the next year or two. That's a 2.5% annual rise per decade (yes, it actually is!) - or, if we assume prices continue to drop until 2013, then we need a 6.5% annual rise in property prices for the next 6 years.

Those are not in any way bizarre figures. They do assume an Irish economic recovery, as opposed to Japan-style years of deflation, that's all.

If you include the interest on those loans it would be an additional 4+%. So property prices need to go up by at least 6.5% per year for the next ten years now or, if prices continue to drop until 2013, perhaps 10.5% (this amount could increase if interest rates go up). This is notwithstanding the administrative costs of NAMA, which are reasonably significant.

Scofflaw wrote: »

But looking solely at the valuations is pretty meaningless. What the State is buying isn't property, but loans. Only if the debtors are terminally unable to service their loans does the valuation of the property really come into play.

Many of them are. One thing that is often overlooked is that development loans are typically of a very short duration e.g. 2-5 years. So most of them have probably become due by now but are not being paid off. Extending this for another 10 years does not make the loans any better.

Scofflaw wrote: »

Not only that, but if NAMA loses money, there is a clawback mechanism to take the loss out of the banks' profits, because after all, this is their mess that's being cleaned up.

Well that's all fine and good, but if it were actually true, then why have NAMA at all? Why not say to the banks that they must call in bad loans, and if this results in a loss the government would loan them money until they were back on their feet. That would be a much more accountable and rational way to dispose of the assets in question.

Scofflaw wrote: »

I'm not a fan of NAMA - it would certainly have been better not to be in a position where such a thing was in any sense required. Nor am I particularly optimistic about NAMA. I'm only involved in the debate because, as so often with anything complex, the sheer level of misunderstanding and misinformation about NAMA is horrific.

What do you mean by this? Specifically, where there is misunderstanding about NAMA is usually because the government have deliberately obfuscated parts of it.

QUOTE=Scofflaw;64900001]Any proposed alternative is not - realistically - going to happen now, but it's still interesting to speculate on what else could have been done, and in what way it would have been better than NAMA. However, to propose something better than NAMA, people need to be better than the real NAMA, not the confused straw NAMA that has been created by public incomprehension.[/quote]

Saying your version of NAMA is the real one does not make it so.

Scofflaw wrote: »

NAMA has the following elements:

1. valuation of loans and assets
2. transfer of performing loans and assets
3. long-term management of loans and assets for maximum return
4. clawback of any NAMA losses from bank profits

Step 1 is the tricky bit, but a low valuation of NAMA assets has the automatic corollary of the State putting more money directly into the banks. A high valuation of NAMA assets increases the risk of NAMA making a loss - which is then taken out of the banks' profits by added taxation.

To me, the main risk here is political - that NAMA will make a loss, but the government will not choose to take the losses out of the banks' profits. Aside from that, there is a slighter risk that banks involved will go out of business.

Where is the monumentally bad thing that NAMA is supposed to be in all that, exactly?

puzzled,
Scofflaw

You've identified it yourself - the government is taking the unnecessary risk of taking the assets, holding on to them for 10 years and then perhaps seeking indemnity for the losses from the banks which might (or might not) be able to pay these figures back. Why have NAMA at all, why not get the banks to call in the loans (come what may) and if the banks need recapitalisation money after that, the government can decide whether to give it to them or whether to let them fail.

But don't put the onus on NAMA's critics to say why it is bad, it is up to the government to justify it. So far, the reasons put forward justifying NAMA have turned out not to be true. It will not get the banks lending again nor will it rectify the banks' balance sheets.

dunsandin · 14-03-2010 2:05am

At the height of the boom, my properties were worth Ca. 5 million Scoff, I turned £45 into 250K in the 80's Uk Boom, I turned that into what I have now, and I fully expect to turn my 5 mil into 10 - 20 in the next boom - which will happen in the next 10-15 years. But I know that between that and now, there are years of pain in the Irish economy. I am only a fool,I know, and got lucky, but I think that we are simply recreating the Japanese scenario, and we credit ourselves with too much innovation.To suggest for one second that we posess a unique insight into the ressurection of a bust! Better folks than us have tried and failed, but like I said, I admire your optimism in regard to Nama, even if my little devil inside says that you are misguided. I know a steal when I see it, and nama looks like a steal, but not for the taxpayer. I should have sold up in 2006, but my kids were settled at their schools, so now I am stuck with the rest, paying for the booby scheme we call nama, and its spiv. I wonder how can we invest in the spv, or is that just for the insider spivs?

SkepticOne · 14-03-2010 2:12am

Scofflaw wrote: »

The bubble rises were double-digit annual rises - in some cases the entire NAMA rise within 5 quarters, not 5 years. To get a 25% house price rise in 5 years has been possible at virtually any point since 1976.

In real terms? I posted a graph on another thread showing that in inflation adjusted terms, house prices stayed at about 100,000 in today's money from 1970 until the current bubble began. We're not going to see the sort of inflation we saw in the 70's whilst we're in the Euro.

Scofflaw · 14-03-2010 2:19am

johnnyskeleton wrote: »

If you include the interest on those loans it would be an additional 4+%. So property prices need to go up by at least 6.5% per year for the next ten years now or, if prices continue to drop until 2013, perhaps 10.5% (this amount could increase if interest rates go up). This is notwithstanding the administrative costs of NAMA, which are reasonably significant.

No, the 6.5% is if we take a less than 10 year period, and assume further 5% annual falls until then. If we assumed a ten year period, then all that's needed is 2.5%. I'm not sure why the interest on the loans is relevant to a rise in the property asset value, though.

johnnyskeleton wrote: »

Many of them are. One thing that is often overlooked is that development loans are typically of a very short duration e.g. 2-5 years. So most of them have probably become due by now but are not being paid off. Extending this for another 10 years does not make the loans any better.

Loans that already can't be serviced aren't being taken into NAMA, though.

johnnyskeleton wrote: »

Well that's all fine and good, but if it were actually true, then why have NAMA at all? Why not say to the banks that they must call in bad loans, and if this results in a loss the government would loan them money until they were back on their feet. That would be a much more accountable and rational way to dispose of the assets in question.

Various reasons. First, because it has the potential to cause a complete collapse in the banking system. Second, because recapitalising the banks to that extent would involve nationalising them, which would run us into issues both with the EU and with prevailing economic paradigms. Third, the NAMA loans aren't good or bad - they are uncertain.

Bad loans - loans that have no hope of being repaid - aren't NAMA business. They're bank losses, pure and simple. Good loans aren't NAMA business either - they're bank assets, pure and simple. NAMA is taking the loans that introduce uncertainty into the banks' balance sheets, because nobody knows what they're really worth, or the underlying assets.

johnnyskeleton wrote: »

What do you mean by this? Specifically, where there is misunderstanding about NAMA is usually because the government have deliberately obfuscated parts of it.

Really? What has been deliberately obfuscated by the government, as opposed to misinterpreted by various media commentators - or obfuscated by people with particular agendas?

Genuine question!

johnnyskeleton wrote: »

Saying your version of NAMA is the real one does not make it so.

You're more than welcome to lay out yours!

johnnyskeleton wrote: »

You've identified it yourself - the government is taking the unnecessary risk of taking the assets, holding on to them for 10 years and then perhaps seeking indemnity for the losses from the banks which might (or might not) be able to pay these figures back. Why have NAMA at all, why not get the banks to call in the loans (come what may) and if the banks need recapitalisation money after that, the government can decide whether to give it to them or whether to let them fail.

Because it would be pretty stupid to call in loans that might be paid back over time, but cannot be paid back now if called in. That's like shooting the patient because you're not sure whether his prognosis is good or bad.

johnnyskeleton wrote: »

But don't put the onus on NAMA's critics to say why it is bad, it is up to the government to justify it. So far, the reasons put forward justifying NAMA have turned out not to be true. It will not get the banks lending again nor will it rectify the banks' balance sheets.

It removes the uncertainty. Removing the uncertainty allows inter-bank lending to move again. That won't start the banks lending again, but it is certainly a necessary precondition of them doing so. That's the point, and that's exactly why the government is taking on risk - because it's necessary to do so.

As for asking people to justify their opposition to NAMA - let's be clear about this. I'm not the government, nor a government spokesperson, nor a government apologist. I have no interest in NAMA bar that of the ordinary citizen. Nobody has to justify themselves to me if they don't want to, and I'm entirely happy to be persuaded one way or the other on the issue. I'm just not seeing the NAMA panic issue, so I'm asking what the big problem is supposed to be.

I don't see how we'll be "paying for NAMA for generations", I don't see how it's a "bank and developer bailout". As far as I can see its been structured to take toxic debt out of the Irish banking system with as little risk, and as little up-front cost, as possible. Even the money being used to buy the loans is being loaned to us by the ECB - and while that needs to be paid back, it's nowhere near as costly as bailing the banks out to the same degree with government-funded debt, quite aside from what that would do to our debt-GDP ratio.

Like I said, I'm open to persuasion, but I'm not persuaded by people milling about panicking.

cordially,
Scofflaw

SkepticOne · 14-03-2010 2:19am

Scofflaw wrote: »

I haven't seen an argument that ties the two together, that's all. There have been how many house price crashes in the world over the last 30-40 years? Lots, let us say - but our house price crash has to be the same as Japan's! Why? Why not the same as the late Eighties deregulatory bubble in the UK, say? Why Japan?

We're not going to see something as benign as the UK bubble (in fact we've already gone past it) because a) they controlled their own interest rates due to not being in the euro or the ERM and b) they did not have the massive oversupply that we have. We're plummeting at present even though ECB rates are at 1% and they are not going to get any lower. We've also got a much worse public finances problem and we can't raise money to stimulate the economy. Also higher unemployment.

dunsandin · 14-03-2010 2:24am

Scofflaw wrote: »

I haven't seen an argument that ties the two together, that's all. There have been how many house price crashes in the world over the last 30-40 years? Lots, let us say - but our house price crash has to be the same as Japan's! Why? Why not the same as the late Eighties deregulatory bubble in the UK, say? Why Japan?

Study your history. What ties us to Japan is the governmental responce - nothing else. Scoff, I am unnafected by the crash, have no axe to grind, and am impartial. I simply recognise history being repeated. And as a contractor in the industrial/multinational sector, I believe I have a fair grasp on how the economy is going.

Scofflaw · 14-03-2010 2:36am

SkepticOne wrote: »

We're not going to see something as benign as the UK bubble (in fact we've already gone past it) because a) they controlled their own interest rates due to not being in the euro or the ERM and b) they did not have the massive oversupply that we have. We're plummeting at present even though ECB rates are at 1% and they are not going to get any lower. We've also got a much worse public finances problem and we can't raise money to stimulate the economy. Also higher unemployment.

Again, though - and forgive me being cautious - but while the economy has absolutely undergone a vicious contraction, I don't see any real evidence that we're in some kind of economic freefall situation. What I see is people drawing a line extrapolated out from our current contraction as far into the future as they feel they can 'reasonably' do, and calling it our economic future. Two years ago people were doing exactly the same thing, and the chorus of doom now looks exactly like the chorus of boom then.

I was contrarian then, which is why I've stayed away from property since 2000, and while I borrowed, I've paid back as far as I could - and I can see myself becoming a contrarian now, too. It's bad all right, but it just doesn't look like the end of the world to me. I don't think that's optimism - I think it's the same realism that looked like pessimism a couple of years ago.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw · 14-03-2010 2:38am

dunsandin wrote: »

Scofflaw wrote: »

I haven't seen an argument that ties the two together, that's all. There have been how many house price crashes in the world over the last 30-40 years? Lots, let us say - but our house price crash has to be the same as Japan's! Why? Why not the same as the late Eighties deregulatory bubble in the UK, say? Why Japan?

Study your history. What ties us to Japan is the governmental responce - nothing else. Scoff, I am unnafected by the crash, have no axe to grind, and am impartial. I simply recognise history being repeated. And as a contractor in the industrial/multinational sector, I believe I have a fair grasp on how the economy is going.

All I can say is that if all of that is gospel truth, then Heaven help us all.

cordially,
Scofflaw

dunsandin · 14-03-2010 2:55am

If you name one multinational, or 1 major Irish industrial concern, I work for them, or have done at some point. When Lisbon was mooted, the boss of one of our largest employers told me that if lisbon was passed, They would be plannning their exit from Ireland. Their reason, tax harmonisation and the issue of country of sale tax repatriation. When H1N1 was kited as a major public concern, I laughed, because I had just put the finishing touch to the factory that makes the vaccine - lots of people making money, and their positions of influence simply stunk of possible hyperbole. I consider one of our largest developers a personal friend, and a man I greatly admire for his integrity and work ethic. He is a man of honour in the traditional sense, and has no bad intentions. L. Carrol is a close friend of my brother in law, and also is a man of his word and someone who is greatly respected in his indusry - he looked after his business partners as best he could. But they all ran away with themselves, and now ff has concocted nama as a solution to avoid the inevitable - a massive default and towering loss of value for the irish market, a transfer on an industrial scale of wealth from the public purse to the private sector. Not to recognize this is one of two things - naivety or involvement. Which applies in your case? It is one or the other.

NAMA - figures are not adding up

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