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Basis of morality

Scofflaw

I was thinking about this the other day, as a result of a thread on the Christianity forum. Insofar as I have a basis for a formal moral system, it goes something like this:

1. everything is real (assumption)

2. therefore, other people/organisms are real

3. there is no [EDIT]a priori[/EDIT] valid basis for determining superiority (assumption, but testable)

4. therefore, all organisms are equal

5. if all organisms are equal, it is incorrect to privilege the desires of one organism over another purely on the basis of which organism has them

6. it is likewise incorrect to treat organisms other than oneself as less real than oneself

7. it is therefore incorrect to treat other organisms as objects for the gratification of one's own desires without reference to theirs, with the incorrectness increasing in proportion to the extent you negate their desires

8. in cases where only some desires can be satisfied, one should aim for a solution that maximises the satisfaction of desire, while minimising the negation of desire (utilitarianism, in other words).

Some obvious corollaries:

1. the desires of all living organisms can be regarded as flowing from their continued life - therefore, killing another organism negates all their desires, and is the most incorrect action.

2. there are extenuating circumstances, such as not realising the other had desires that needed to be taken into account on any given occasion

3. and from the above, it should be clear that any action requiring the use of force against others necessarily entails incorrect action

4. it can be assumed that organisms will desire what is best for themselves - to make the best possible decisions (assumption)

5. it is possible for the organism's desires to become deranged through mental illness, parasitic activity and diseases - in these cases, one should operate as far as possible on the basis of the most probable non-deranged desires, or the best possible decisions for that organism

6. it is possible that an organism, through ignorance of facts, may come to decisions that are less optimal than decisions. If you withhold information that might alter their decision, you are ignoring their desire to make the best decisions

7. anything that tends to promote the objectificaiton of others is likely to lead to incorrect actions

[EDIT]
Corollaries arising from discussion:

1. organisms that are dependent on another organism for continued existence are enfeebled in their rights with respect to that other organism in proportion to the degree of their dependence.
[/EDIT]

Thoughts? Comments? Where are the gaping holes that I have failed to see?

cordially,
Scofflaw

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Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

That's a yes, then - you can't measure it, and you're simply hoping I'll agree.

More just acknowledging that uncertainty is present in any statement. I’d actually pretty much stick by what I said already, and avoid just repeating it again.

Scofflaw wrote:

Have you been operating on the assumption that I think the system I propose is a universal system? That it is right? That it is the only and exclusive system of morality?

I’m see myself as satisfied at the idea of this being purely a whim, if that’s what you intend it to be. All that brings me into the picture is if you want that whim to be in some way validated as reasonable by some others.

Scofflaw wrote:

I seem to have keep repeating this - the basis for equality is purely and simply that there is no good basis for inequality.

When I say a good basis, I mean an objective, measurable, repeatable basis. Your judgements of moral capacity are subjective, as are mine, so neither are trustworthy.

I don’t know if this is a doorway that might get somewhere. Earlier you accepted the need for tailoring of morality as some principles will simply be irrelevant to animals and others will have to be exercised on their behalf (For example, do I take this wounded animal to be put down, or let it live on in discomfort. Which option would it choose?). Do you see that tailoring as something that is objective or something that is a matter of subjective judgement?

(Where I’m getting to is you either feel that process of tailoring is objective, in which case there are objective reasons for saying animals are not equal – otherwise we would not be talking about tailoring. Alternatively, you feel the tailoring just has to be done on the basis of best judgement, like pretty much everything else, in which case the objective, measurable, repeatable standard is simply an unnecessary block on the operation of normal, common sense argument.)

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

More just acknowledging that uncertainty is present in any statement. I’d actually pretty much stick by what I said already, and avoid just repeating it again.

Mmm. When one says "uncertainty" I prefer to see something like +/-10%, rather than "it's entirely subjective and we have no way of measuring it really".

Schuhart wrote:

I’m see myself as satisfied at the idea of this being purely a whim, if that’s what you intend it to be. All that brings me into the picture is if you want that whim to be in some way validated as reasonable by some others.

I have a whim of iron. It's a good assault - the idea that "we know there's inequality, therefore it can't be right to say things are equal". Unfortunately it falls down, because there's no way of measuring the inequality.

So, from my point of view, treating everything equally is not whimsical - it is the necessary result of being unable to measure inequality.

Schuhart wrote:

I don’t know if this is a doorway that might get somewhere. Earlier you accepted the need for tailoring of morality as some principles will simply be irrelevant to animals and others will have to be exercised on their behalf (For example, do I take this wounded animal to be put down, or let it live on in discomfort. Which option would it choose?). Do you see that tailoring as something that is objective or something that is a matter of subjective judgement?

Hmm. First, that's "tailoring of rights" I agreed to, not "tailoring of morality".

I think in most cases I would assume rights apply unless they are objectively impossible in application. Obligations are something my system currently doesn't give to anyone but me, since it's my personal morality.

Schuhart wrote:

(Where I’m getting to is you either feel that process of tailoring is objective, in which case there are objective reasons for saying animals are not equal – otherwise we would not be talking about tailoring.

You have gone back to confusing dissimilar with unequal. Do you genuinely see there as being no difference between the two?

All rights apply to all organisms equally is the starting point. The right to life requires, I think, no tailoring. Let's take the "right to not have pain inflicted". Where we would "tailor" that right is where it is inapplicable - which is to say, to organisms that don't feel pain (objectively - start from the assumption that they do, and show a complete lack of response to 'painful' stimuli). Strictly speaking, we are not tailoring the right, nor are we taking it away - an organism that cannot feel pain exercises the right by virtue of its nature.

Schuhart wrote:

Alternatively, you feel the tailoring just has to be done on the basis of best judgement, like pretty much everything else, in which case the objective, measurable, repeatable standard is simply an unnecessary block on the operation of normal, common sense argument.)

Nope. I decry the use of "normal, common sense argument" - in virtually every circumstance it is a cover for prejudice and thoughtlessness (not a personal remark!).

So - do you understand the idea that if you can't measure inequality, it makes little sense to use it as a basis for something?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

When one says "uncertainty" I prefer to see something like +/-10%, rather than "it's entirely subjective and we have no way of measuring it really".

Which is simply a regular feature of this reality. We are put into situations where judgements are required on the basis of what seems reasonable.

If reality is just something I’m imagining, I’ll try to dream a more quantifiable one. In the meantime, I think we have to work with what we’ve got.

Scofflaw wrote:

I have a whim of iron. It's a good assault - the idea that "we know there's inequality, therefore it can't be right to say things are equal". Unfortunately it falls down, because there's no way of measuring the inequality.

Surely it calls for a response that suggests the inequality is negligible. That’s what we do, for the sake of argument, in the case of humans traditionally excluded.

Scofflaw wrote:

You have gone back to confusing dissimilar with unequal. Do you genuinely see there as being no difference between the two?

There would be a difference if they related to two different things. If I said ‘giraffes are different to us, they’re much taller, so they can’t be equal’ you would be right to say this was a dissimilarity that was irrelevant to their moral standing. If, however, you admit to differences that require tailoring of rights, that does sound to be something that means a dissimilarity that impacts on equality in the moral context – otherwise why tailor?

Scofflaw wrote:

Strictly speaking, we are not tailoring the right, nor are we taking it away - an organism that cannot feel pain exercises the right by virtue of its nature.

I think this is best addressed by picking a situation where tailoring is required. Try the wounded animal example – how do you deem whether the animal wants to live in pain or die? Is that objective or subjective?

Scofflaw wrote:

So - do you understand the idea that if you can't measure inequality, it makes little sense to use it as a basis for something?

No, because ultimately nothing in this field can be measured. All you’ve said is no valid statement can be formulated on anything. All we can do in the moral context is make reasonable judgements. And noticing that humans are capable of doing difficult stuff with their heads and animals can’t isn’t so utterly speculative that we need to be that worried about its quantification. Just picture a cheery Pat Shortt culchie type surveying the human intellect, comparing it to mice and giving a cheery shout of ‘thems people is loads smarter, Missus’. That’s actually a precise enough measurement for our purposes.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Which is simply a regular feature of this reality. We are put into situations where judgements are required on the basis of what seems reasonable.

It's a feature of those parts of the universe that are either (a) subjective, or (b) not yet scientifically studied.

That the universe has some characteristics which are not easily measurable is not a feature that requires us to use those characteristics in a way that better suits a quantifiable characteristic - particularly if there are alternatives.

And of course, "what seems reasonable" varies far too much from person to person for it to be useful.

Schuhart wrote:

If reality is just something I’m imagining, I’ll try to dream a more quantifiable one. In the meantime, I think we have to work with what we’ve got.Surely it calls for a response that suggests the inequality is negligible.

Er, no. It calls for a response that suggests it's not measurable. I'm not sure how you step from "can't measure it" to "it's negligible"?

Schuhart wrote:

That’s what we do, for the sake of argument, in the case of humans traditionally excluded.

I'm not certain exactly what that statement says!

Schuhart wrote:

Sofflaw wrote:

You have gone back to confusing dissimilar with unequal. Do you genuinely see there as being no difference between the two?

There would be a difference if they related to two different things. If I said ‘giraffes are different to us, they’re much taller, so they can’t be equal’ you would be right to say this was a dissimilarity that was irrelevant to their moral standing. If, however, you admit to differences that require tailoring of rights, that does sound to be something that means a dissimilarity that impacts on equality in the moral context – otherwise why tailor?

Ah. In other words, there are differences that are relevant, and differences that aren't. Sure - I accept that. Unfortunately, as I said earlier, what is measurable isn't relevant, and what is relevant isn't measurable.

Schuhart wrote:

I think this is best addressed by picking a situation where tailoring is required. Try the wounded animal example – how do you deem whether the animal wants to live in pain or die? Is that objective or subjective?

Again, that's already in there. The animal has the right to life, but may be in too much pain for that to be palatable. It is unable to tell us its preference, so we have to guess. Essentially, the Terry Schiavo case (persistent vegetative state) - but when it involves animals, it is usually resolved in favour of killing, because people ignore the animal's right to life.

Hmm. Actually, there's no tailoring involved here, either. The animal has a right to life, and we will resolve the issue depending on how seriously we take that, just as we would with a human.

Another issue, maybe? The concept of tailoring, I should point out, came in when you were talking about obligations, not rights.

Schuhart wrote:

And noticing that humans are capable of doing difficult stuff with their heads and animals can’t isn’t so utterly speculative that we need to be that worried about its quantification. Just picture a cheery Pat Shortt culchie type surveying the human intellect, comparing it to mice and giving a cheery shout of ‘thems people is loads smarter, Missus’. That’s actually a precise enough measurement for our purposes.

Except that's a measurement of intelligence...which I would consider irrelevant to morality. Try another one - one where Pat Short stands in a field and shouts "them people is loads more moral, Missus!". Curiously, that doesn't seem as easy, does it?

Schuhart wrote:

No, because ultimately nothing in this field can be measured. All you’ve said is no valid statement can be formulated on anything. All we can do in the moral context is make reasonable judgements.

Perhaps a brief summary is in order? This is mine, so it is likely one-sided:

1. there are clearly differences in moral capacity between organisms
2. those differences are probably relevant in a moral context
3. unfortunately, you can't measure them

Now, my solution to this is to say we have to treat them all equally. Your solution is to apply a mix of common sense, precedent, and argument.

You dismiss my solution as whimsical. I dismiss yours as prejudice and ignorance masquerading as reason.

Is that a fair picture of where we are so far?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

That the universe has some characteristics which are not easily measurable is not a feature that requires us to use those characteristics in a way that better suits a quantifiable characteristic - particularly if there are alternatives.

I’m not sure that’s right – we are simply called on to make decisions in situations where information is not available and may even be unobtainable.

Scofflaw wrote:

Er, no. It calls for a response that suggests it's not measurable. I'm not sure how you step from "can't measure it" to "it's negligible"?

There’s no measurement that reduces thing to a figure that can be compared. It requires a qualitative judgement based on known characteristics. In this context, its really not that difficult. Unfortunately, that judgement would suggest the difference in capacity between humans and animals is considerable. Put another way, I think you know that the moment you agree that ‘not precisely measureable’ doesn’t mean ‘no useful statement can be made’, you know your case is lost.

Scofflaw wrote:

I'm not certain exactly what that statement says!

It says that there’s no number that can be calculated that, for the sake of argument, tells us someone has a mental illness that means they cannot be trusted to look after their own affairs. You can’t say ‘oh, this person scores 49% percent on the sanity index, we have to keep them confined until they score 50% + again’. It simply requires a judgement being made that whatever inequality exists is or isn’t material.

Scofflaw wrote:

The concept of tailoring, I should point out, came in when you were talking about obligations, not rights.

I’m open to suggestions of inconsistency, but I did a quick look back and post 58 seemed to be where I started mentioning that mice would have trouble with obligations, some rights not applying and others required to be exercised on their behalf. I don’t see what’s changed.

Scofflaw wrote:

Hmm. Actually, there's no tailoring involved here, either. The animal has a right to life, and we will resolve the issue depending on how seriously we take that, just as we would with a human.

Does it involve exactly the same criteria in formulating your guess? Presumably you have to make a judgement as to whether, if they could communicate to you, the animal and person would feel they had a life worth living. Would you use the same factors to assess the good life for a person and a mouse? To what extent would you judge the importance of the ability to speak in assessing the mouse’s quality of life?

Scofflaw wrote:

Except that's a measurement of intelligence...which I would consider irrelevant to morality.

If we both agree morality only exists because humans evolved enough intelligence to invent it, how is intelligence irrelevant to morality?

Scofflaw wrote:

Perhaps a brief summary is in order?

Its not too bad, I’d see it more as:

1. there are clearly differences in moral capacity between organisms
2. those differences are very probably relevant in a moral context
3. unfortunately, you can't measure them precisely but reasonable statements can still be formulated. However, inevitably for moral questions, judgement is required.

Your judgement is we have to treat them all equally, if no relevant inequalities can be identified. Unfortunately, there are clear pointers that relevant inequalities exist.

My solution is to apply a mix of common sense, precedent, and argument.

I dismiss your solution as whimsical. You dismiss mine as prejudice and ignorance masquerading as reason.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I’m not sure that’s right – we are simply called on to make decisions in situations where information is not available and may even be unobtainable.

Yes, but we are not called on to either (a) try to erect a system of morality on that basis or (b) claim that such a thing is in any way systematic.

Schuhart wrote:

There’s no measurement that reduces thing to a figure that can be compared. It requires a qualitative judgement based on known characteristics. In this context, its really not that difficult. Unfortunately, that judgement would suggest the difference in capacity between humans and animals is considerable.

It certainly explains why they should not be called on to make moral judgements, but does not explain why they should have fewer rights.

Besides, to a racist, the difference in moral capacity between white and black is equally "obvious", and equally "considerable". Is there anything you can say to them other than "well, you're wrong, actually"?

The acceptance that there is no "measurement that reduces thing to a figure that can be compared" and that it "requires a qualitative judgement based on known characteristics" simply opens the door for poor judgements.

Schuhart wrote:

Put another way, I think you know that the moment you agree that ‘not precisely measureable’ doesn’t mean ‘no useful statement can be made’, you know your case is lost.

If only I'd said that, then. I don't think useful (i.e. usable) statements can be made - and that's essentially the difference here.

Schuhart wrote:

It says that there’s no number that can be calculated that, for the sake of argument, tells us someone has a mental illness that means they cannot be trusted to look after their own affairs. You can’t say ‘oh, this person scores 49% percent on the sanity index, we have to keep them confined until they score 50% + again’. It simply requires a judgement being made that whatever inequality exists is or isn’t material.

I believe that the basis of the test is actually whether they constitute a danger to themselves or others if released.

Schuhart wrote:

I’m open to suggestions of inconsistency, but I did a quick look back and post 58 seemed to be where I started mentioning that mice would have trouble with obligations, some rights not applying and others required to be exercised on their behalf. I don’t see what’s changed.

Sorry - trying to be helpful! I don't think my system as stated actually contains any obligations except that of accepting the rights of others. Can you come up with a right that actually needs to be tailored?

Schuhart wrote:

Does it involve exactly the same criteria in formulating your guess? Presumably you have to make a judgement as to whether, if they could communicate to you, the animal and person would feel they had a life worth living.

I imagine so.

Schuhart wrote:

Would you use the same factors to assess the good life for a person and a mouse?

Probably not. On the other hand, the same is true of humans.

Schuhart wrote:

To what extent would you judge the importance of the ability to speak in assessing the mouse’s quality of life?

Not at all important, I think. Is it important to someone dumb from birth? Is it more important to someone whose living depends on speaking? What about Trappist monks?

Schuhart wrote:

If we both agree morality only exists because humans evolved enough intelligence to invent it, how is intelligence irrelevant to morality?

Because it is necessary but not sufficient. Highly intelligent psychopaths?

Schuhart wrote:

Its not too bad, I’d see it more as:

1. there are clearly differences in moral capacity between organisms
2. those differences are very probably relevant in a moral context
3. unfortunately, you can't measure them precisely but reasonable statements can still be formulated. However, inevitably for moral questions, judgement is required.

Your judgement is we have to treat them all equally, if no relevant inequalities can be identified. Unfortunately, there are clear pointers that relevant inequalities exist.

My solution is to apply a mix of common sense, precedent, and argument.

I dismiss your solution as whimsical. You dismiss mine as prejudice and ignorance masquerading as reason.

Hmm. It's more slanted than mine, because you've included in the "things we agree on" things we haven't agreed. The statement "inevitably for moral questions, judgement is required" applies to the application of moral judgement (and is therefore tautological), but does not apply to having rights, for which no judgement is required whatsoever.

And this statement - "Unfortunately, there are clear pointers that relevant inequalities exist. " is a reprise of statements 1 & 2 , placed in a context that makes your argument seem more respectable - I call spin!

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Yes, but we are not called on to either (a) try to erect a system of morality on that basis or (b) claim that such a thing is in any way systematic.

Unfortunately, that’s exactly what we are called on to do. It’s a bugger, but I didn’t make the Universe, I just live in it. Unless I’m dreaming it all. But if it was a dream, I'd never have the wall that colour. Sorry, I did paint it that colour. Maybe it is all real after all.

Scofflaw wrote:

It certainly explains why they should not be called on to make moral judgements, but does not explain why they should have fewer rights.

Well, it does directly because many rights relevant to humans simply have no relevance to animals - like freedom to practice the religion of your choice. Other parts we can probably pursue in the context of tailoring.

Scofflaw wrote:

The acceptance that there is no "measurement that reduces thing to a figure that can be compared" and that it "requires a qualitative judgement based on known characteristics" simply opens the door for poor judgements.

Welcome to the human race, we've been so looking forward to having you.

Scofflaw wrote:

I don't think useful (i.e. usable) statements can be made - and that's essentially the difference here.

In the context, I’m afraid I see that as fence sitting.

Scofflaw wrote:

I believe that the basis of the test is actually whether they constitute a danger to themselves or others if released.

Which, I take it you agree, is just someone making a judgement. They don’t weigh you, measure your cranium and blood pressure and say ‘He’s a 1.03 factor risk to others and a 3.70 risk to himself. That’s no worse than a man with a skinful, he’s cleared for takeoff.’

Scofflaw wrote:

Can you come up with a right that actually needs to be tailored? …. Is it important to someone dumb from birth?

I’m just trying to judge the evasion level. Are you suggesting that you’d give the same weight to the lack of speech of a mouse as to a human born dumb?

Scofflaw wrote:

Because it is necessary but not sufficient. Highly intelligent psychopaths?

Not sufficient means irrelevant?

Scofflaw wrote:

I call spin!

Well the best way of making that spin evaporate is to fill in the yawning gap between ‘equal’ and ‘appropriate’. Unfortunately, a slide rule won’t help you do that.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Unfortunately, that’s exactly what we are called on to do. It’s a bugger, but I didn’t make the Universe, I just live in it. Unless I’m dreaming it all. But if it was a dream, I'd never have the wall that colour. Sorry, I did paint it that colour. Maybe it is all real after all.

Crikey. We are called on to make moral judgements in an imperfect universe, without having convenient measures. We are not called on to assign rights or build moral systems on the basis of the convenient measures we don't have.

Schuhart wrote:

Well, it does directly because many rights relevant to humans simply have no relevance to animals - like freedom to practice the religion of your choice.

Actually, that's just a concomitant of the right to live without undue interference - it is not a separate right. And the right to live without undue interference applies to animals as well.

Schuhart wrote:

Other parts we can probably pursue in the context of tailoring.

I'd like to do a couple of thought experiments, but I'll put them in separate posts.

Schuhart wrote:

Welcome to the human race, we've been so looking forward to having you.

Cheap.

Schuhart wrote:

Scofflaw wrote:

I don't think useful (i.e. usable) statements can be made - and that's essentially the difference here.

In the context, I’m afraid I see that as fence sitting.

An odd view. I'd accept it as fence-sitting if I simply said, "and so we must do nothing", which I don't - I say "and so we must assume equality, and go on from there".

Schuhart wrote:

Which, I take it you agree, is just someone making a judgement. They don’t weigh you, measure your cranium and blood pressure and say ‘He’s a 1.03 factor risk to others and a 3.70 risk to himself. That’s no worse than a man with a skinful, he’s cleared for takeoff.’

True. However, this is again the making of moral judgements in an imperfect world, and irrelevant to a moral system from which we can derive rights.

Schuhart wrote:

I’m just trying to judge the evasion level. Are you suggesting that you’d give the same weight to the lack of speech of a mouse as to a human born dumb?

When having to decide whether it was important to quality of life in the context of making a moral decision? Yes.

Schuhart wrote:

Not sufficient means irrelevant?

It means "therefore not useful". Since it possible to be highly intelligent and entirely devoid of moral capacity, it would be extremely silly to use intelligence as a stand-in for moral capacity.

Schuhart wrote:

Well the best way of making that spin evaporate is to fill in the yawning gap between ‘equal’ and ‘appropriate’. Unfortunately, a slide rule won’t help you do that.

Hmm. You mean that if I convince you I'm right, you'll stop acting as if you're right? Well, I think I can understand that without a slide rule. The only problem is I'm not 'right', as such, and neither are you, at least in any meaningful sense.

(I'm slightly worried we're both finding this rather exasperating, and will be rude to each other in consequence, which I would be sorry to see. The exasperation is not, I think, the result of either of us being stupid, so let's not treat each other as if we were.)

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

So. Thought-experiment 1. This has already been used in an abbreviated form, but I felt it wasn't followed properly, so I'd like to give it a whirl again.

Situation: somewhere like the Deep South of the US/apartheid South Africa. Society is deeply racist, holding blacks to be morally inferior to whites. Blacks have no rights in society, because they are not held to be morally capable. Indeed, they are not held to be fully human.

To do: argue why blacks should have rights equal to whites.

(I don't think this is a distortion of the historic position, or indeed the Stormfront position - if you have any conditions to add or change, please state them first)

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Crikey. We are called on to make moral judgements in an imperfect universe, without having convenient measures. We are not called on to assign rights or build moral systems on the basis of the convenient measures we don't have.

So just where do I find a morality cake that I can cut thick moral slices off so that I can weight them?

Quite possibly morality doesn’t exist at all. But if it does, it can only be created from what we have.

Scofflaw wrote:

When having to decide whether it was important to quality of life in the context of making a moral decision? Yes.

Can I suggest that this seems to take us back into the whim zone? Because you seem to be simply closing your eyes to humans being different and more complex beings with different and more complex lives. Why is that relevant? Because it pretty comprehensively undermines the idea that equality can be assumed. (Yes, we are talking about a dissimilarity being so great that asserting its doesn’t impact on equality is just whim.)

On this specific issue (which is, you’ll understand, only one illustration) you seem to be stepping past the pretty clear difference that a mouse without speech is nothing unusual. Hence, there is simply nothing to see there. A human without speech has something that obstructs a human life. That’s not to say that this individual feature will make you discard that person’s life in isolation – possible you’ll decide ‘lack of speech was a burden this person had to carry – that means they are entitled to an extra break now that another would not get’. But it simply has a different relevance in the case of a human.

I know you can simply say ‘but that can’t be measured’ in the sense of quantified. Unfortunately, faced with such a clear qualitative difference that passes the Pat Shortt test, I’ll see that as a kind of ‘get out of jail free card’ that doesn’t actually address the point.

Scofflaw wrote:

It means "therefore not useful". Since it possible to be highly intelligent and entirely devoid of moral capacity, it would be extremely silly to use intelligence as a stand-in for moral capacity.

Its possible, but relatively rare, to be a psychopath. Does that really suggest that it is not a useful measure? Surely it’s just not a measure that is always correct.

Scofflaw wrote:

The exasperation is not, I think, the result of either of us being stupid, so let's not treat each other as if we were.

You are, of course, right. And very, very smelly and ugly too.

Scofflaw wrote:

To do: argue why blacks should have rights equal to whites.

Simple. Illustrate that they are, in fact, human like the rest of us and are being unjustly treated. Possibly in a manner that subsequent generations see, ironically, as almost comically racist. (I’ve ‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin’ in mind here.)

Scofflaw

This will be the response to your post - I just wanted the second thought-experiment after it.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

Second Thought Experiment:

Situation: a child molester argues that because children are less morally capable than adults, they aren't fully human beings, and should not be accorded human rights. The younger the child, the more this is true, to the point where a baby is no different from an animal. He therefore claims he should be able to do as he likes with children, and that to prevent him exercising his preference for children is a denial of his rights.

To do: why is this wrong?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

To do: why is this wrong?

The child is a developing human, not the finished product, so we’re just temporarily exercising judgement that the child will ultimately exercise alone. (That old conundrum – is it alright to sleep with a twelve year old girl when she’s thirty).

Ultimately, if we trace it back far enough, this may cause us a moral problem. Never mind contraception, should people ride each other senseless to make sure every sperm has an equal chance of fertilising an egg? I invoke judgement again on this topic, and suggest there’s just an arbitrary threshold that we have to establish on some kind of qualitative assessment where we say ‘that’s got enough human life in it now to mean we should avoid interference’.

If we set an arbitrary period of x weeks within which abortion is permitted, you’ll appreciate there’s no real quantified way of doing that. It’s meaningless to say ‘that’s 43% of a human now’. We just have to make a judgement, with some kind of reasonable case that we can live with.

This is fun. I feel like the bomb in Dark Star.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

The child is a developing human, not the finished product, so we’re just temporarily exercising judgement that the child will ultimately exercise alone. (That old conundrum – is it alright to sleep with a twelve year old girl when she’s thirty).

Ultimately, if we trace it back far enough, this may cause us a moral problem. Never mind contraception, should people ride each other senseless to make sure every sperm has an equal chance of fertilising an egg? I invoke judgement again on this topic, and suggest there’s just an arbitrary threshold that we have to establish on some kind of qualitative assessment where we say ‘that’s got enough human life in it now to mean we should avoid interference’.

If we set an arbitrary period of x weeks within which abortion is permitted, you’ll appreciate there’s no real quantified way of doing that. It’s meaningless to say ‘that’s 43% of a human now’. We just have to make a judgement, with some kind of reasonable case that we can live with.

This is fun. I feel like the bomb in Dark Star.

Glad to be of service - since we seem to have opposing approaches to morality, we might as well get some use out of it, without having to deal with the usual theist nonsense.

Alas, all of your arbitrary exercises of judgement offer absolutely no way of preventing the next person from exercising their judgement in an entirely different way. This leaves us in a completely relativistic position, where one person's moral good is another's eveil, and there is no way of discriminating between them except personal preference.

Now, sadly I have meetings all afternoon, so I am unable to respond at the necessary length yet - but a couple of brief points:

Simple. Illustrate that they are, in fact, human like the rest of us and are being unjustly treated.

Too simple. You've merely asserted the equality of all humans without offering a justification for that assertion. Nor have you dealt with the definition of 'human'. I assume you mean the species humorously called H.sapiens, but one is at liberty to say that a biological definition is irrelevant in a moral context - and the racist will do exactly that.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Alas, all of your arbitrary exercises of judgement offer absolutely no way of preventing the next person from exercising their judgement in an entirely different way. This leaves us in a completely relativistic position, where one person's moral good is another's eveil, and there is no way of discriminating between them except personal preference.

This is simply the situation we are in, however I think to say no progress is possible is to confuse ‘completely’ with ‘largely’ or ‘to an extent’. There is no way of saying an advocate of slavery is 35% right and an abolitionist is 70% right, therefore we go with abolition. But that doesn’t mean we have to give equal weight to all views, as some cases simply make more sense than others. It’s a little like that ‘teapot orbiting the sun’ idea, except the subject matter is inherently less certain – at the end of the day, there either is a teapot or there isn’t. But maybe there is no morality.

Put another way, one person's moral good can be argued another's evil, and a strong influence in discriminating between them will be personal preference. At the same time I feel a pragmatic approach can actually reveal quite a bit. I’ve sometimes thought that progress might be made by simply taking some document with reasonable currency – say the UN Declaration of Human Rights – and posing the question ‘is there anything that anyone feels should be added or subtracted, and why’.

There is clearly still scope for error – but I see that as unavoidable. I frequently feel that line in the US Declaration of Independence ‘We hold these truths to be self evident; that all men are born equal and endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; and that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ catches the essential ethic very well (accepting the reference to ‘creator’ as a poetic flourish). But we know the ultimate irony that some of the subscribers to that Declaration owned slaves. At the same time, I don’t see ‘possibility for error’ meaning the same as ‘utterly pointless’.

Too simple. You've merely asserted the equality of all humans without offering a justification for that assertion. Nor have you dealt with the definition of 'human'.

You’ve only asked for how, putting ourselves back in the days of slavery, we might argue that blacks as a group get the same rights as whites.

If memory serves, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Tom shames a couple of heartless whites by forgiving them with his dying breath for the beating they’ve given him. However outdated her book looks now, I think we can guess the message she was trying to express – slaves could be more moral than the people owning them. I think the notion of equality flows from that observation quite naturally.

I honestly don’t think the definition of ‘human’ needs much delay. Pragmatically, does this ever cause a serious problem with, say, the issue of who to collect taxes from?

Scofflaw

bbbb

Schuhart wrote:

This is simply the situation we are in, however I think to say no progress is possible is to confuse ‘completely’ with ‘largely’ or ‘to an extent’. There is no way of saying an advocate of slavery is 35% right and an abolitionist is 70% right, therefore we go with abolition. But that doesn’t mean we have to give equal weight to all views, as some cases simply make more sense than others. It’s a little like that ‘teapot orbiting the sun’ idea, except the subject matter is inherently less certain – at the end of the day, there either is a teapot or there isn’t. But maybe there is no morality.

I was going to say "that's probably a separate question", but of course it isn't. If you think there is no morality, it makes a discussion of morality rather pointless.

Schuhart wrote:

Put another way, one person's moral good can be argued another's evil, and a strong influence in discriminating between them will be personal preference. At the same time I feel a pragmatic approach can actually reveal quite a bit. I’ve sometimes thought that progress might be made by simply taking some document with reasonable currency – say the UN Declaration of Human Rights – and posing the question ‘is there anything that anyone feels should be added or subtracted, and why’.

Sure. Any system can work.

Schuhart wrote:

There is clearly still scope for error – but I see that as unavoidable. I frequently feel that line in the US Declaration of Independence ‘We hold these truths to be self evident; that all men are born equal and endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; and that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ catches the essential ethic very well (accepting the reference to ‘creator’ as a poetic flourish). But we know the ultimate irony that some of the subscribers to that Declaration owned slaves.

Perhaps they used a different definition of 'men'. They probably weren't aware that one day Schuhart would say "I honestly don’t think the definition of ‘human’ needs much delay."

Schuhart wrote:

At the same time, I don’t see ‘possibility for error’ meaning the same as ‘utterly pointless’. You’ve only asked for how, putting ourselves back in the days of slavery, we might argue that blacks as a group get the same rights as whites.

Yes, I have. And as far as I can see, you haven't. All you done is say what you feel to be right, and said that's what is right. If I'm whimsical, what does that make you?

Schuhart wrote:

If memory serves, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Tom shames a couple of heartless whites by forgiving them with his dying breath for the beating they’ve given him. However outdated her book looks now, I think we can guess the message she was trying to express – slaves could be more moral than the people owning them. I think the notion of equality flows from that observation quite naturally.

Really? So the very large number of books showing blacks as brutish primitives can be discounted, because of a book that shows them as moral...?

Come on, that's just silly - you are simply letting your (liberal) prejudices dictate what you claim as 'natural'.

Schuhart wrote:

I honestly don’t think the definition of ‘human’ needs much delay. Pragmatically, does this ever cause a serious problem with, say, the issue of who to collect taxes from?

Well, yes. They didn't collect taxes from slaves, did they?

COme, Schuhart, you can do better than merely claiming that what you believe to be right is "naturally" right.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

If you think there is no morality, it makes a discussion of morality rather pointless.

tbh that’s why I’d put the disclaimer that my views are still a work in progress. Leaving aside any pretence of coherence for a moment, the feeling I have is that if ‘morality’ is to have real meaning there should be some feature that isn’t ultimately explicable by self interest or sentiment, i.e. some ‘value added’ that comes out of the process.

However, there’s a considerable shelf load of interesting-looking philosophy books that Kildare County Council have been kind enough to provide for lending through its public libraries. I want to get through them before trying to make some final conclusion, as I’m confident that I’m just reinventing quite a number of wheels.

Scofflaw wrote:

They probably weren't aware that one day Schuhart would say "I honestly don’t think the definition of ‘human’ needs much debate."

Indeed, and they likely would have regarded it as a bit presumptious for some bog hopping Irish Catholic to be offering them advice. I read an article a while back about how some of the American Revolutionaries were not even that pushed about democracy, feeling that they could replace the King by making Washington a dictator.

Scofflaw wrote:

Really? So the very large number of books showing blacks as brutish primitives can be discounted, because of a book that shows them as moral...?

In fairness, without overemphasising the influence of one book as it must have struck a chord with people’s experiences and thoughts to have been so successful, that seems to have been what happened. It presented a truth about the nature of slavery that contributed to convincing people that it was just wrong. Potentially, there's room for optimism there that a sensible idea can convince people. But the tragedy or irony in the situation is that the book was so popular that it is held responsible for promoting that ‘Uncle Tom’ image – i.e. the view it projected was liberal in the context of a society that permitted slavery, but reactionary in a society that had left all that behind.

Scofflaw wrote:

Well, yes. They didn't collect taxes from slaves, did they?

Indeed, but now that we’ve recognised that error is there any obvious omission left? I await the publication of ‘Mister Fluffy’s Kennel’.

Scofflaw wrote:

COme, Schuhart, you can do better than merely claiming that what you believe to be right is "naturally" right.

Indeed, if it was only my fancy you would be right. I’m just suggesting that there is a space where useful discussion can take place that doesn’t have absolute certainty (which, if we want to be utterly pedantic, applies to everything as absolutely nothing is absolutely certain) but is short of wild speculation (such as claiming I’ve been chosen by Zeus to restore his cult on Earth).

George Bernard Shaw comes to mind again. Once we admit that some element of doubt pervades everything, it’s just a matter of how much doubt we’re willing to tolerate. There’s a line I like in David Hume’s ‘Dialogues on Natural Religion’ where a sceptic is challenged that if he really doubts the idea of cause and effect, would he plan to leave the room by the window instead of the stairs. I’m not suggesting wild fancy. I am suggesting its possible to discount unreasonable doubts. The extent of ‘unreasonable’ might itself be a matter for discussion – but (cough) it’s a certainty that some uncertainty will always remain. You know that even in your own position you can't assert extending equality is right, just that you choose to ignore any doubts that have to be judged and not quantified. Without putting words in you mouth, I'm sure you'll appreciate that amounts to making a judgement that unquantifiable doubts can be discounted.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

tbh that’s why I’d put the disclaimer that my views are still a work in progress. Leaving aside any pretence of coherence for a moment, the feeling I have is that if ‘morality’ is to have real meaning there should be some feature that isn’t ultimately explicable by self interest or sentiment, i.e. some ‘value added’ that comes out of the process.

Well, another thread, then - what is morality? perhaps.

Schuhart wrote:

However, there’s a considerable shelf load of interesting-looking philosophy books that Kildare County Council have been kind enough to provide for lending through its public libraries. I want to get through them before trying to make some final conclusion, as I’m confident that I’m just reinventing quite a number of wheels.

Actually, I think you may have shot all the way to post-modernism.

Schuhart wrote:

In fairness, without overemphasising the influence of one book as it must have struck a chord with people’s experiences and thoughts to have been so successful, that seems to have been what happened. It presented a truth about the nature of slavery that contributed to convincing people that it was just wrong. Potentially, there's room for optimism there that a sensible idea can convince people. But the tragedy or irony in the situation is that the book was so popular that it is held responsible for promoting that ‘Uncle Tom’ image – i.e. the view it projected was liberal in the context of a society that permitted slavery, but reactionary in a society that had left all that behind.

It may have been all that you claim, but persuading people by sentiment and fiction is essentially just marketing.

A fictional black who forgives his white persecutors tells us nothing at all about the world, unfortunately. What it tells us is that the author chose to represent such a character. So, it no more proves that blacks are fully morally capable than JRR Tolkien tells us that people who come from the East are evil, and for the same reason - it's fiction.

That you have chosen to use a fictional work as one mainstay of your argument demonstrates the incoherence and weakness of your claims, and that you have picked, of all the possible fictional works of the period, just one that agrees with you, rather neatly demonstrates that your methods are are, as I claim they are, 'prejudice masquerading as reason and common-sense'.

Schuhart wrote:

Indeed, but now that we’ve recognised that error is there any obvious omission left? I await the publication of ‘Mister Fluffy’s Kennel’.

Which is to say that we should accept that blacks are morally equal to whites because this is what we now "know to be the case".

This is, if anything, an even worse argument. If we back-apply it, it tells us that at the time of slavery, we should have accepted that blacks were morally inferior because that was what was then "known to be the case".

Appalling.

Schuhart wrote:

Indeed, if it was only my fancy you would be right.

Schuhart, that is all it is. The best you can say is that it is a fancy shared by many others - but that is conformity, not morality. Such an argument should lead us to accept theism ("five billion people can't be wrong!"), racism, ignorance, superstition, and folly of every kind.

Frankly, I'm disappointed.

Schuhart wrote:

I’m just suggesting that there is a space where useful discussion can take place that doesn’t have absolute certainty (which, if we want to be utterly pedantic, applies to everything as absolutely nothing is absolutely certain) but is short of wild speculation (such as claiming I’ve been chosen by Zeus to restore his cult on Earth).

George Bernard Shaw comes to mind again. Once we admit that some element of doubt pervades everything, it’s just a matter of how much doubt we’re willing to tolerate.

Doubt I am willing to tolerate - but it is not an excuse to exercise our prejudices, which is what you're making of it.

Schuhart wrote:

There’s a line I like in David Hume’s ‘Dialogues on Natural Religion’ where a sceptic is challenged that if he really doubts the idea of cause and effect, would he plan to leave the room by the window instead of the stairs. I’m not suggesting wild fancy. I am suggesting its possible to discount unreasonable doubts.

Not when there is nothing to take their place. So far, all your 'exercises of judgement and common sense' have turned out to be merely 'exercises of prejudice'. Your prejudices may be liberal, but they are no less prejudices for that.

Schuhart wrote:

The extent of ‘unreasonable’ might itself be a matter for discussion – but (cough) it’s a certainty that some uncertainty will always remain. You know that even in your own position you can't assert extending equality is right, just that you choose to ignore any doubts that have to be judged and not quantified. Without putting words in you mouth, I'm sure you'll appreciate that amounts to making a judgement that unquantifiable doubts can be discounted.

That they cannot be discounted is rather the point. The assertion of equality is not a statement about reality (i.e. that things really are equal), it is a statement that because the measures that we should use to judge moral status are totally unquantifiable, we should treat every organism equitably. Anything else turns out to just be an exercise in prejudice, as you have demonstrated rather well.

disappointed, and slightly appalled,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Well, another thread, then - what is morality? perhaps.

Ultimately, perhaps. I've an intention of posting up something any time I come across a book I think is particularly interesting.

Scofflaw wrote:

It may have been all that you claim, but persuading people by sentiment and fiction is essentially just marketing.

Is there any reason for rolling back this particular piece of marketing? Boil it into its essentials. How do we argue against slavery? By proposing that slaves are people too. Which was done successfully by people at the time. I'm mentioning Uncle Tom's Cabin because it has a high enough profile to survive into this time. I don't doubt purely factual works and discussions also circulated.

Scofflaw wrote:

If we back-apply it, it tells us that at the time of slavery, we should have accepted that blacks were morally inferior because that was what was then "known to be the case".

No, it simply pragmatically asks if you see something wrong with the current situation. Is there?

Scofflaw wrote:

Doubt I am willing to tolerate - but it is not an excuse to exercise our prejudices, which is what you're making of it.

But you do appreciate that once you admit doubt at all, Mr Shaw will be asking how much he has to pay for your company for the evening.

Scofflaw wrote:

So far, all your 'exercises of judgement and common sense' have turned out to be merely 'exercises of prejudice'.

That's not what I see. How do you determine when an exercise of judgement becomes prejudice?

Scofflaw wrote:

The assertion of equality is not a statement about reality (i.e. that things really are equal), it is a statement that because the measures that we should use to judge moral status are totally unquantifiable, we should treat every organism equitably.

Which, you'll understand, must means that you are making the judgement that what is quantifiable (number of organisms = 1) outweighs what isn't quantifiable, (some organisms being more equal than others, to quote a phrase) otherwise your position makes no sense. You hardly conscious decide 'I'll go with quantity, even if I strongly suspect that qualitative assessment suggests its ludicrous'.

Otherwise, it's a bureaucrat's approach to morality, that says "I don't care if this is right or wrong, so long as I have a piece of paper that shows I'm not going beyond what's absolutely certain".

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Is there any reason for rolling back this particular piece of marketing? Boil it into its essentials. How do we argue against slavery? By proposing that slaves are people too. Which was done successfully by people at the time. I'm mentioning Uncle Tom's Cabin because it has a high enough profile to survive into this time. I don't doubt purely factual works and discussions also circulated.

Actually, the main thrust of the anti-slavery movement came from those who saw all men as equal, because they could not be shown to be otherwise. A whimsical approach, or so I'm told.

Schuhart wrote:

No, it simply pragmatically asks if you see something wrong with the current situation. Is there?

I didn't ask you whether you thought the current situation was right or not - I asked how you would argue that ethnic group X is equal to ethnic group Y in the face of someone who claims they're not.

Your response appears to have been to shrug and say "it's obvious, isn't it". That indicates either that you don't consider the question important (in which case, why bother answering), or you don't have an answer except that you think it's right (and other people agree with you).

I think it's right, myself, but I think so because I presume equality unless it can be disproved. You claim this is silly, but seem unable to provide an alternative method for reaching what seems to both of us an obvious conclusion other than gut feeling.

Schuhart wrote:

But you do appreciate that once you admit doubt at all, Mr Shaw will be asking how much he has to pay for your company for the evening.

That's actually your problem, not mine. I don't have to doubt that everyone should be treated equally (or equitably), because that position is founded on the ineradicability of doubt.

Schuhart wrote:

That's not what I see. How do you determine when an exercise of judgement becomes prejudice?

Essentially, when the justification of a decision is that it "feels" or "seems" right, prejudice will be involved.

My problem with what you're saying here is that you don't seem to be able to offer any way of getting beyond the use of such subjective discrimination - and also that appear willing to believe that there is no way of getting beyond it.

The latter belief is arguable, of course, but so far your only argument for it has been "things aren't equal, so we can't pretend they are". That might be a good argument if only you applied it, but you don't. Allow me to demonstrate:

1. Human beings clearly vary in their moral capacity, but you wish to treat them all as equal.

2. To do so, you claim that only "gross" differences in moral capacity are of relevance, which thus distinguishes humans from animals, but not humans from each other.

3. If someone else (a racist, say), says that the deficiencies in moral capacity of ethnic group X are so large that they should not be treated equally to other human beings, you say "well, we know he's wrong".

4. How do we know he's wrong? Because all humans are equal - we said so back in point 2 - there are no gross differences.

At this point, it becomes clear that "no gross differences" is meaningless - a mere statement of faith. There is no measure except subjective judgement - and yours differs from that of the racist on exactly this important point. Who is right? We cannot tell, apparently.

I'm sure you feel a bit misrepresented here, so feel free to clarify - but consider: are the mentally handicapped equal? Does a psychopathic individual have the same rights (assume they've never done anything)?

And once again, to clarify the question: how do you, Schuhart, know that all ethnic groups are equal? How can you demonstrate it to someone who disagrees?

Schuhart wrote:

Which, you'll understand, must means that you are making the judgement that what is quantifiable (number of organisms = 1) outweighs what isn't quantifiable, (some organisms being more equal than others, to quote a phrase) otherwise your position makes no sense. You hardly conscious decide 'I'll go with quantity, even if I strongly suspect that qualitative assessment suggests its ludicrous'.

Yes, I think I said so. However, the cellular basis to life gives a certain amount of leeway. It's not purely quantitative: if you need to compare bacteria with humans, you should consider that the bacterium is a single cell, but the difference between two multicellular life-forms should not be settled by counting cells.

Schuhart wrote:

Otherwise, it's a bureaucrat's approach to morality, that says "I don't care if this is right or wrong, so long as I have a piece of paper that shows I'm not going beyond what's absolutely certain".

Actually, the bureaucratic approach is to go with what's sanctioned by official position or customary usage. It's a scientist's approach to not go beyond what is certain.

Schuhart, I can see what you're saying. It's not unreasonable on the face of it, but it leads rapidly to an inability to make any moral judgement except on the basis of our feelings, which is a castle built on even shakier foundations than the theist's. It's not about whether we get things 'right', it's about whether we can tell others how to do so other than by simply doing what we tell them.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Actually, the main thrust of the anti-slavery movement came from those who saw all men as equal, because they could not be shown to be otherwise. A whimsical approach, or so I'm told.

In fairness, you’ll appreciate the problem doesn’t really arise when saying ‘I can’t see any reason why one man can’t claim the same rights and obligations as another’. The problem arises when you extend that to organisms that are so different that it is no longer evident that we’re talking about the same thing.

Consider one of those ‘burning building’ scenarios, where there’s just enough time to go into one room and pull an unconscious person to safety or another room and pull an unconscious mouse to safety. Consider the justification of ‘Both organisms are single parents with four children. However, the human children will be taken into care on the death of their parent where the mice will just be left to die in the wild. Given the knock-on impact of the deaths of four more entities, the clear choice has to be to save the mouse.’

I don’t doubt we could generate pages of posts arguing that scenario back and forth. But, in truth, is there any real need as the essential refutation is simply Pat Shortt giving us a chummy but painful dig in the ribs, followed by a hearty shout of ‘g’wan ya bollix, yer only having us on’. The qualitative gap between people and mice is simply too wide to ignore, and the link to slavery only works if you can actually illustrate an equation between blacks and animals rather than assume that qualitative gap can be ignored. I know it keeps coming back to this, but that’s really because it keeps coming back to this.

Scofflaw wrote:

Essentially, when the justification of a decision is that it "feels" or "seems" right, prejudice will be involved.

Which, you understand, means Hume’s sceptic is showing prejudice when he decides to leave the room by the stairs instead of the window. Every statement is now an act of prejudice, and we are simply back to making a qualitative judgement as to how much prejudice we can tolerate. I doubt if there is any way of getting beyond that, just a not unreasonable hope of being able to limit it. You seem to equate any doubt with total pointlessness. I’m not convinced that holds.

Scofflaw wrote:

It's not purely quantitative: if you need to compare bacteria with humans, you should consider that the bacterium is a single cell, but the difference between two multicellular life-forms should not be settled by counting cells.

I might have missed or not followed this. What’s the basis for the distinction between single and multicellular life and why the equation between all multicellular life?

Scofflaw wrote:

Actually, the bureaucratic approach is to go with what's sanctioned by official position or customary usage. It's a scientist's approach to not go beyond what is certain.

Just a speculation, but does this suggest that the scientist’s approach can’t guide us here? The scientist is presumably seeking a truth that exists, but needs to be discovered. That doesn’t apply here, hence the approach looks like a fear to accept responsibility.

Scofflaw wrote:

it leads rapidly to an inability to make any moral judgement except on the basis of our feelings, which is a castle built on even shakier foundations than the theist's. It's not about whether we get things 'right', it's about whether we can tell others how to do so other than by simply doing what we tell them.

I’d say I’m not even one tenth into the subject in enough depth to be making any statement here, but I’ll give some indication of what even puts me here – on the understanding that I’ll likely discover in the months ahead not only who’s wheels I’ve reinvented, but the wheels already invented that I haven’t even thought of.

I think by discounting theism we put ourselves in this space. Its just part and parcel of the life we’ve chosen. I suppose, like many of us, I have that sense of unease at seeing decent, reasonable people lost to scriptural literalism. I think that comes for many reasons – including, indeed, just the mental makeup of people who choose faith. But I think one question that seems to keep coming up is the matter of morals and purpose in the atheist outlook.

And, in fairness, it is something we’re pretty crap at because we do tend to blink back and say ‘what’s the problem’. I’m reading the Myth of Sisyphus at the moment, and I hope it improves because the opening seems to be all about finding a reason not to commit suicide when you accept there’s no God. Is this really a problem? My problem was accepting this means I not going to live for eternity – who’s going to kill themselves when they find life is a scarce resource? I think we need to do a bit more than this to suggest that there’s actually some kind of positive life on the other side of belief, and not just despair at an absurd life.

There are risks with this, and you are right to be sceptical. Indeed, a fair example of the danger is Marxism. Start with the best of intentions, and where do we end up.

Now, as we know, we are just here, this reality is just here, there’s no reason that we can discern for any of that to match up. If we cannot fill this space, then that’s what we have to report. Above all, I agree that our one core ‘self-evident’ ethic has to be truth, so far as we know it. If a nervous doubting theist asks ‘does leaving God behind not mean an absence of purpose and an absence of morality as I understand it’, maybe our hearty response should be ‘that’s pretty much it, Missus, sorry about that’ even as we watch them vanish up the street leaving their old religion behind and into the nearest place of worship with an unquestionably true interpretation of a holy book. I just wonder if it really has to be like that.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

In fairness, you’ll appreciate the problem doesn’t really arise when saying ‘I can’t see any reason why one man can’t claim the same rights and obligations as another’.

That is exactly where the problem arises. To the racist, this statement is nonsense.

Schuhart wrote:

The problem arises when you extend that to organisms that are so different that it is no longer evident that we’re talking about the same thing.

To the racist, it is evident that we are talking about different things when we are talking about blacks and whites.

You see the gap between men and animals as so large as to warrant discrimination - he sees the gap between black and white as so large as to warrant discrimination.

This is the fundamental problem. You cannot offer any reason why the racist is wrong, except that it is obvious to you that he is. Each of you is simply drawing an arbitrary line according to your prejudices, and claiming it to be so obvious as not to require further justification - and both of you are equally wrong, because equally unjustified.

cordially,
scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Each of you is simply drawing an arbitrary line according to your prejudices, and claiming it to be so obvious as not to require further justification - and both of you are equally wrong, because equally unjustified.

Not really the situation. The proof of the pudding is in the eating - we know there is no material difference between races, we even know at this stage that race is a contested concept. There simply is a vast qualitative difference between a removal of social divisions within human society and extending human rights to animals.

We have gone through some points that suggest that the difference is significant and even commented on how it cannot be sustained that these differences have no impact on the moral sphere - only that they cannot be quantified.

The choice is either accept the situation need that qualitative difference to be acknowledged or judging that non-quantifiable differences can be ignored. But extreme attachment to quantification seems to lead to a pretty bizarre moral landscape, which again suggest a need for qualitative thought. I know that pretty much leaves us where we came in, but that's hardly unusual for this place.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Not really the situation. The proof of the pudding is in the eating - we know there is no material difference between races, we even know at this stage that race is a contested concept.

You say that - and racists say the opposite. Don't just keep repeating it, prove it.

(I will keep asking until you do. You can either prove it, or admit that it is actually an unprovable claim, which in turn makes it a mere exercise of prejudice on both your parts.)

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

You say that - and racists say the opposite. Don't just keep repeating it, prove it.

What's your expectation for a proof that would satisfy David Duke, other than 'they just are people too. Like, they can get your daughter pregnant so you'll have a big black grandson, how's about that Dave.' (I'm not suggesting delivering this proof while he's in the middle of an Imperial Klonvocation).

But seriously, how lost in detail do we need to get? Where is the enormous leap in saying we take human society to be something partaken in by all humans? The point with slavery and subsequently women's sufferage is surely how the proof of the pudding was in the eating - both groups proved their ability to function in society and take on the rights and responsibilities that went with it. Is there really a need to revisit that just to avoid the need for more substantial reasons as to why human society should be extended to animals, even if they can't really participate?

Is it really necessary to get into depth about why we might extend the protection of human society to persons who get a bad throw of the dice, and why this isn't really the same thing as extending membership to a whole new species?

Even if this has you bouncing up and down saying 'yes, give a reason, loads of reasons', I simply wonder why? If you're not willing to follow the line of morality being a human invention, and animals only being capable of a status of objects on which it operates, what's the point? The difference is never going to be measurable because its not as if we can pull the morality bone out of a slave and say 'see, its 95% as big as a free man, but a dog's is only 30%'. The issue hinges on qualitative assessment.

From left field, I genuinely missed the distinction between single and multi-cell creatures. I don't know if there's anything in that to bring us anywhere, but if you've a mood to explain, what's that all about?

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

What's your expectation for a proof that would satisfy David Duke, other than 'they just are people too. Like, they can get your daughter pregnant so you'll have a big black grandson, how's about that Dave.' (I'm not suggesting delivering this proof while he's in the middle of an Imperial Klonvocation).

All that proves is that they are biologically part of the human species. It doesn't prove that the black man is morally equal to a white man. Mere biological compatibility wouldn't seem to be a 'moral' characteristic, after all.

Using your own terms - we're interested in material differences between races.

Schuhart wrote:

But seriously, how lost in detail do we need to get? Where is the enormous leap in saying we take human society to be something partaken in by all humans? The point with slavery and subsequently women's sufferage is surely how the proof of the pudding was in the eating - both groups proved their ability to function in society and take on the rights and responsibilities that went with it. Is there really a need to revisit that just to avoid the need for more substantial reasons as to why human society should be extended to animals, even if they can't really participate?

If you define 'participation' in such a way as to automatically exclude women, then what you apply to women applies to animals. There's the problem again, you see - an arbitrary "qualitative standard" is arbitrary.

Schuhart wrote:

Is it really necessary to get into depth about why we might extend the protection of human society to persons who get a bad throw of the dice, and why this isn't really the same thing as extending membership to a whole new species?

Yes, it is necessary. The necessity is that, if your dividing line is arbitrary, then it is no better than the next arbitrary dividing line, which may be that of a racist.

If there's no actual reason why we should exclude animals, except your judgement that they are incapable of taking part in human society (which judgement you then don't extend to children or the handicapped), then everyone is equally free to make such judgements as they think best - exclude women, blacks, sterilise the handicapped, whatever...or include pets, horses, and other useful animals that play a part...

What you're really saying when you say "extend the protection of human society to persons who get a bad throw of the dice" is that what is important is being human, and we will retro-fit any 'reasoning' necessary to justify that comfortable position. Clearly, animals cannot be included, because they're not human - but that's actually the only 'reason' you're offering.

Schuhart wrote:

Even if this has you bouncing up and down saying 'yes, give a reason, loads of reasons', I simply wonder why? If you're not willing to follow the line of morality being a human invention, and animals only being capable of a status of objects on which it operates, what's the point? The difference is never going to be measurable because its not as if we can pull the morality bone out of a slave and say 'see, its 95% as big as a free man, but a dog's is only 30%'. The issue hinges on qualitative assessment.

The issue does not need to hinge on qualitative assessment - we could simply use the basis of equality because we can't prove anything else. If you look, you'll find that's actually what you're doing in the case of humans: stating that they're equal because we can't find any material differences!

Schuhart wrote:

From left field, I genuinely missed the distinction between single and multi-cell creatures. I don't know if there's anything in that to bring us anywhere, but if you've a mood to explain, what's that all about?

Briefly, the basis for one life is, in the case of a single-celled creature, the single cell. If you ask me to compare one bacterium with one human, I would use the lower basis, which in this case is the single cell, so we count cells - mostly because the bacterium cannot be considered "multi-cellularly". When we compare two multicellular organisms, the basis in both cases is not the single cell, so it doesn't make sense to count cells.

So, er, once again: what proof can you offer that the racist is wrong? You must have some proof, after all, otherwise you'd hardly be persuaded of it, as you clearly are.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Briefly, the basis for one life is, in the case of a single-celled creature, the single cell. If you ask me to compare one bacterium with one human, I would use the lower basis, which in this case is the single cell, so we count cells - mostly because the bacterium cannot be considered "multi-cellularly". When we compare two multicellular organisms, the basis in both cases is not the single cell, so it doesn't make sense to count cells.

I just don't follow what's being said here. I understand you are saying some life forms simply have one cell, and others have more than one. I don't understand what significance you are drawing from this.

Scofflaw wrote:

So, er, once again: what proof can you offer that the racist is wrong? You must have some proof, after all, otherwise you'd hardly be persuaded of it, as you clearly are.

I’m not going to come up with anything new. Simply that people of all races are capable of taking on the rights and responsibilities of human society, which removes the basis for slavery. I’m not sure what proof you require. Do I have to list illustrative people of all races that have displayed a capacity to fulfil those rights and obligations? Do I link the wikipedia entry on race? Do I have to get into that stuff about cultural element in intelligence testing? What’s your expectation for substantiation (bearing in mind this is a discussion on boards and I’m hardly going to commission new research)?

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I just don't follow what's being said here. I understand you are saying some life forms simply have one cell, and others have more than one. I don't understand what significance you are drawing from this.

A bacterium is a single-celled organism. So, when we consider the life of a bacterium, we are considering the life of one cell. If you wish to compare the life of the bacterium against the life of a mouse (which consists of trillions of cells), it seems sensible to compare like to like - cell to cell.

When we are comparing one mouse with another, or with a human, it doesn't make sense to use this cellular basis, since we can compare like to like at a higher level.

It's something of a kludge, of course, but objective at least.

Schuhart wrote:

I’m not going to come up with anything new. Simply that people of all races are capable of taking on the rights and responsibilities of human society, which removes the basis for slavery.

Again, that's an assertion. Any assertion can be met with an equal and opposite counter-assertion.

Schuhart wrote:

I’m not sure what proof you require. Do I have to list illustrative people of all races that have displayed a capacity to fulfil those rights and obligations?

According to whom? Harriet Beecher Stowe? What of sub-Saharan Africa? Do you feel that the state of government there demonstrates such capacity?

No, such an illustrative list would prove little other than that the occasional black might have such a capacity, but the racist would usually just say that such people were actually guided and supported by white liberals trying to prove their point.

Schuhart wrote:

Do I link the wikipedia entry on race?

What!? That bastion of liberal bias! Did you not read the preamble to the Conservapedia?

Schuhart wrote:

Do I have to get into that stuff about cultural element in intelligence testing?

Slippery for a start, and irrelevant for a second.

Schuhart wrote:

What’s your expectation for substantiation (bearing in mind this is a discussion on boards and I’m hardly going to commission new research)?

Mostly, I'd like to see some basis for your judgement. Surely it's not all hearsay?

It seems to me, in any case, that you want to use the lack of relevant measurable differences between different members of the human race to argue their equality, but refuse to extend this argument any further than H. sap - despite the equal lack of relevant measurable differences between us and them.

You say that the differences are 'so large' that we don't need to measure them, but refuse to accept that, unmeasured, it is left up to the individual to decide just how large the differences really are - so that the racist can validly claim the difference between black and white is as large as you claim between man and mouse!

You're tailoring the measure to produce the result you want - which is discrimination between man and mouse. You're free to do so, but have to accept the racist on an equal footing. You can't have both - so which one is it to be?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

When we are comparing one mouse with another, or with a human, it doesn't make sense to use this cellular basis, since we can compare like to like at a higher level.

But where is that comparision leading us? What significance is drawn out of this? If a mouse has a million cells (which you'll understand is close enough to jazz for me) are you saying you'd sacrifice 999,999 single celled organisms to save one mouse, but only one double celled organism (assuming there is some double celled organism).

Scofflaw wrote:

Mostly, I'd like to see some basis for your judgement. Surely it's not all hearsay?

I take it is all hearsay, but is there any particular need to question it? (Bear in mind that my knowledge of most subjects is hearsay - I've probably read it in some book.) If I take the wikipedia article, it strikes me (as usual for wikipedia stuff) as a reasonable quick and dirty source of information that suggests, subject to the usual kind of qualifications that follow any field of human inquiry, that race does not mark a substantial division in human capabilities. I can't really see any reason for rejecting this material for our discussion, other than to avoid the need to produce a positive case for extending human rights to animals. (I don't doubt it could be alleged that people called 'Kevin' should be stripped of their rights, and I don't even have hearsay evidence to refute that. But is that really a problem for our discussion? Are we trying to make progress or frustrate it?)

Scofflaw wrote:

You say that the differences are 'so large' that we don't need to measure them, but refuse to accept that, unmeasured, it is left up to the individual to decide just how large the differences really are - so that the racist can validly claim the difference between black and white is as large as you claim between man and mouse!

I don't see this as holding, and again invoke Hume's sceptic taking the stairs and not the door. Judgement is simply an essential part of any statement, including one deciding that all qualitative statements are to be ignored and reliance placed solely on what can be quantified. Suggesting that differences within humanity are greater than differences between humanity and other species is simply unreasonable (for starters, ignoring that 'humanity' wouldn't be a concept unless a common identity was evident that is not shared by others).

As a matter of interest, just going back to the 'burning building' type scenario where the lives of multiple mice would be given precedence over one human. Is that outcome one that you are satisfied with, or does it give you a feeling that this is something that might have been left on the bunsen a bit too long and needs a second look?

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

But where is that comparision leading us? What significance is drawn out of this? If a mouse has a million cells (which you'll understand is close enough to jazz for me) are you saying you'd sacrifice 999,999 single celled organisms to save one mouse, but only one double celled organism (assuming there is some double celled organism).

Hmm. The border between single-celled and multicellular life is not quite so simple - and not anywhere near that level.

It might be worth considering complexity here - partly because less complex organisms can do things like regenerate, partly because they may not possess a nervous system. Complexity is not measurable in small degrees, but is in larger degrees.

Schuhart wrote:

I take it is all hearsay, but is there any particular need to question it? (Bear in mind that my knowledge of most subjects is hearsay - I've probably read it in some book.) If I take the wikipedia article, it strikes me (as usual for wikipedia stuff) as a reasonable quick and dirty source of information that suggests, subject to the usual kind of qualifications that follow any field of human inquiry, that race does not mark a substantial division in human capabilities.

I think we both accept that there aren't any measurements which show any objective 'material' differences between races. This leads you to say that all humans are equal.

To make the point again - given that there is exactly the same lack of evidence for objective 'material' differences between humans and other animals, why are you suddenly applying a different standard there? Why does that lack not imply equality between organisms, as it does between humans?

Schuhart wrote:

I can't really see any reason for rejecting this material for our discussion, other than to avoid the need to produce a positive case for extending human rights to animals.

I haven't argued that there is a positive case (yet). To require a 'positive case' implies that the default is not giving rights to animals - but what is the justification for that?

Schuhart wrote:

(I don't doubt it could be alleged that people called 'Kevin' should be stripped of their rights, and I don't even have hearsay evidence to refute that. But is that really a problem for our discussion? Are we trying to make progress or frustrate it?)

I'm trying to point up why it is more sensible to presume equality as I do than to presume inequality as you do - in both cases, I assume that we are trying to establish a basis for assigning rights, which in turn provide a basis for moral judgements.

Schuhart wrote:

I don't see this as holding, and again invoke Hume's sceptic taking the stairs and not the door.

Nah. Taking the window rather than the stairs will produce a measurable (and repeatable, given enough skeptics) result. Taking the window rather than the stairs is not a qualitative judgement.

If we assume that the window is a ground floor window, and it's as convenient to go through one as the other, then yes, it's just a matter of convention which one you take - indeed, one which I haven't always followed...

Schuhart wrote:

Judgement is simply an essential part of any statement, including one deciding that all qualitative statements are to be ignored and reliance placed solely on what can be quantified.

That is true. However, the choice to use subjective "qualitative judgements" rather than anything objective leads to the problem of being unable to deny the racist the validity of their racism.

Schuhart wrote:

Suggesting that differences within humanity are greater than differences between humanity and other species is simply unreasonable (for starters, ignoring that 'humanity' wouldn't be a concept unless a common identity was evident that is not shared by others).

"Simply unreasonable" don't cut no mustard here.Some people do make such claims, and you can't refute them.

Schuhart wrote:

As a matter of interest, just going back to the 'burning building' type scenario where the lives of multiple mice would be given precedence over one human. Is that outcome one that you are satisfied with, or does it give you a feeling that this is something that might have been left on the bunsen a bit too long and needs a second look?

Nah. I'm human - I'd rescue the human. I'm just not claiming it's the best moral decision (yet).

I suspect that I may be able to argue from a position of initial equality to produce inequality in this case, if I'm ever let...what I'm unwilling to do is simply assume it, as you're doing.

cordially,
Scofflaw