Wanted to share some super disturbing things I've learned about the absolute monarchy called the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA.) This includes their confirmed involvement in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 but also includes all the additional shaddy stuff they've done over the past few decades; Jamal Khashoggi murder, the royal coup that removed all "America-friendly" Saudi royalty from office--they're probably dead now, human rights violations and the current and ongoing invasion of the Western world via acquisition by petro-bucks.
firstly, Saudi 9/11. This is a summary of why we know that Saudi Arabia financed 9/11. Most of us suspected it when we learned that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi's. Thanks to the OP for writing such a well researched summary:
*One of the many pregnant women falling to her death on 9/11
In short, yes, there is evidence to suggest that two Saudi intelligence assets, Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan, did aid and fund two of the alleged 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.
I’ll begin where FBI investigators allege these Saudi assets met the hijackers. According to the FBI, after hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar arrived in Los Angeles on February 1 2000, they were taken to a cafe by Mohamed Johar. According to a witness, he was tasked to take them to this cafe by an imam assigned to the Saudi consulate, Fahad al-Thumairy. At the cafe, they met with Omar al-Bayoumi, who had been waiting for them. al-Bayoumi approached them when they arrived, and they spoke for half an hour.[1] Bayoumi had been in close telephone and in-person contact with al-Thumairy, and immediately prior to visiting the cafe where he met al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, he was at a meeting at the Saudi Consulate, which was near the cafe.[2] The above facts led the FBI to suspect that the meeting between hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar and al-Bayoumi had been coordinated by al-Thumairy and possibly others at the Saudi Consulate.
al-Thumairy is a fascinating figure. He was an accredited diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles between 1996 and 2003, but lost his position in part because he was refused re-entry to the US by the State Department, who determined he may be connected with terrorist activity.[3] This determination was based on an FBI investigation which discovered he led a “radical Islamist faction” at the King Fahad Mosque. He also had telephone contacts with the family of two al Qaida militants, and individuals who are alleged to have assisted in a plot to bomb LAX in 1999. More relevant to this story, he received a phone call from an unidentified person in Malaysia shortly before hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar traveled from Malaysia to Los Angeles. The two hijackers had been in Malaysia attending a meeting with al Qaida operatives in early January 2000. These facts help support the FBI’s contention that al-Thumairy had al Qaida connections, and that he was in a position to arrange this meeting between hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, and al-Bayoumi at the cafe in Los Angeles in February 2000.[1]
Moving on to al-Bayoumi, after he met with the hijackers al Hazmi and al Mihdhar at the cafe, he quickly provided them with support. He secured them an apartment next to his, served as a guarantor on their lease, and provided them with more than $1500 for two months of rent. More significantly, he helped arrange classes at flight school for the pair.[5]
Bayoumi was being paid by Saudi aviation services firm Dallah Avco [5], in an arrangement ProPublica characterized as “being paid surreptitiously by the Saudi Defense Ministry.”[1] Before hijackers al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi arrived in the US he was paid $500 a month, but after they arrived this increased to $3,700.[5] A source told the FBI that Bayoumi was a “ghost employee” of Dallah Avco who was “being paid for doing nothing.”[6] Bayoumi was also receiving large sums of money, totaling in the tens of thousands of dollars, from Haifa bint Faisal, wife of Saudi Ambassador to the US Prince Bandar.[4] On one occasion, Bayoumi received a check from Prince Bandar’s account directly.[7]
Bayoumi left the U.S. in July 2001,[4] but not long after, his friend Osama Basnan moved into his apartment building, which as noted also housed al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. The FBI felt this “could indicate [Basnan] succeeded Omar al Bayoumi and may be undertaking activities on behalf of the Government of Saudi Arabia.”[8] Basnan seemed to sympathize with the alleged hijackers: After 9/11, Basnan reportedly “celebrated the heroes of September 11” and talked about “what a wonderful, glorious day it had been.”[4]
The FBI’s investigation revealed that Basnan had received more than $74,000 in cashier’s checks from Bandar’s wife between February 1999 and May 2002. On one occasion, Basnan received $15,000 directly from Prince Bandar.[7]
In April 2002, Basnan met with an unknown “high Saudi prince who has responsibilities for intelligence matters”[4] and who was part of a Saudi royal entourage which had arrived in Texas to conduct meetings with Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld. This prince provided Basnan with “a significant amount of cash.”[9] The above facts strongly suggest that Basnan was an agent of Saudi intelligence.
The above facts can lead one to safely conclude that al-Bayoumi and Basnan aided and funded alleged hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. They are also strongly suggestive of the fact that al-Bayoumi and Basnan were assets in some form or another of Saudi intelligence, although the nature of this relationship is unclear.
Sources:
[1] Tim Golden and Sebastian Rotella, “Long-Secret FBI Report Reveals New Connections Between 9/11 Hijackers and Saudi Religious Officials in U.S.,” ProPublica, September 12, 2021.
[2] Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 515
[3] Kean and Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 515
[4] Michael Isikoff, “The Saudi Money Trail,” Newsweek, December 1, 2001.
[5] John Duffy and Ray Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark: The CIA, NSA, and the Crimes of the War on Terror (New York: Hot Books, 2018), pp111, 112.
[6] Judicial Watch, “FBI Documents Raise Additional Questions About Saudi and al-Aulaqi Connections to 9/11 Attacks,” February 12, 2014,
[7] Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 154.
[8] Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 112.
[9] Duffy and Nowosielski, The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark, 150.