roosh wrote: » In the first case you make a decision which has a causal effect on you i.e. you choose to move. In the second, I make a decision which has a causal effect on me i.e. I choose to move, and in the third we both choose to move.
Am I right in saying that, in each of these cases our individual decisions results in our experiencing acceleration? This acceleration tells us which one of us changes our state of motion. Acceleration itself is absolute, so presumably this would tell us which one of us, or which body, moves in an absolute sense?
Morbert wrote: » What is your argument for the "i.e." conclusions you present? A relationalist would reject them.
Morbert wrote: » In a physical sense, this kind of acceleration is absolute insofar as both you and I will agree on who has undergone or not undergone proper acceleration. Ontologically speaking, if you are a substantivalist, this acceleration is absolute and determined by the inertial structure of spacetime. If you are relationalist, this acceleration is just co-ordinate acceleration under a specific but unprivileged category of co-ordinate systems, and force is defined with respect to fields as extended objects, as opposed to fields as a distribution of properties across points in spacetime.
roosh wrote: » To my mind, it seems as though the relationalist is employing a mathematical device to describe a physical situation. This is, of course a very useful and very necessary process. But, it doesn't refute the claim that when you move your hand your hand is actually moving, or that when you and I are at rest relative to each other and you start walking, it is you that is actually moving.
It doesn't refute this because we can employ the co-ordinate reference frames in this case, in exactly the same manner. Essentially, what we mean when we say that a body has a co-ordinate velocity of zero is that it has a velocity of zero relative to itself, which of course is a tautology. It also means that it has a zero velocity relative to an imaginary set of co-ordinates that can be viewed as an extension of itself (or which can theoretically be constructed using real world instruments). Essentially, the physical motion between two bodies is prior to the mathematical description of it.
If we go back to the example of you and I at rest relative to each other. You makes the decision to move the muscles in your body in a process called walking. This causes you to experience acceleration. You experience this because you change your state of motion. You go from not moving, to moving.
We can apply the same line of reasoning to when you move your arm. When you are stock still your arm does not experience acceleration. Then you choose to move your arm and it undergoes acceleration, whereas the rest of your body does not. Why does your arm undergo acceleration but not your body? Because you chose to move it, not your body. That we can ascribe a zero co-ordinate velocity to your arm doesn't capture the fact that you chose to move your arm and not the rest of your body. This is why you experience acceleration around your arm, because if you didn't chose to move it (as opposed to your body), there would be no experience of acceleration.
Morbert wrote: » A relationalist would not necessarily disagree with motion as not "actual". Instead, they would argue that actual motion is not an intrinsic property. It is a a relational property. Your choice to move your hand results in a relational property, such that a insect crawling on your hand is free to regard itself as at rest.
Morbert wrote: » If you are a relationalist, a description of e.g. object X as moving and Y as at rest is not prior to the mathematical description. We can say that in a sense motion might be prior but if motion is a relational property then the language you have been using (e.g. "it is you that moves and not me") is not.
Morbert wrote: » What do you mean by change state of motion? Remember that while non-inertial motion might be absolute, inertial motion is easily understood as relational. You will e.g. experience acceleration whether you are changing from what you call "not moving" to "moving" or from "moving" to "not moving".
Morbert wrote: » Remember though, that a relationalist would say the acceleration you described here is acceleration according to a class of co-ordinate systems, and not an intrinsic property of the things these systems describe as accelerating. And, depending on the kind of relationalist they are, they would explain the dynamic affects of this acceleration with either an ontology that includes fields, or some machian relationalism.
roosh wrote: » An issue that I have with the relationalist position is statements like this, about the insect, because to say that the insect is free to regard itself as at rest is an absolute statement. Again, the question is relative to what is the insect at rest? In this case it is the arm. But, we can then investigate the situation where the insect chooses to walk along the arm and so it is no longer at rest relative to it. The contention is that, in this case, we can then conclude that either the insect or the arm moved in an absolute sense.
Would the change in my muscles not be an intrinsic property of my arm?
We are starting from the observation of relative rest, so we can ignore the very idea of "not moving". The relative motion just tells us that one of the two must be moving. It might have been the case that both moving to begin with. The one which undergoes acceleration must move. Even going from moving to not moving tells us that at least one of them must have been moving.
The physical sensation of undergoing acceleration is surely independent of any class of mathematical co-ordinate system? It must be intrinsic in some sense, no?
Morbert wrote: » A relationalist says there is a frame of reference that labels the insect as at rest, and there is a frame of reference that does not, and neither is more reflective of the underlying state of affairs. This is what I mean by saying the insect is free to regard itself as at rest.
Morbert wrote: » A relationalist would say the relative configuration of particles that make up your muscles has changed. A relative configuration would be characterised by a list of inter-particle distances, as opposed to a configuration, which is characterised by a list of positions in space.
Morbert wrote: » It doesn't say at least one must be moving. It says the distance between them changes, and that this distance, a relation between them, is primitive.
Morbert wrote: » Is the sensation frame-dependent description? No. It is independent in this sense. But it is intrinsic? A relationalist would explain this sensation with relative configurations, and not a substantival space.
roosh wrote: » My thinking is that the change in the configuration of particles is fundamental and comes prior to any quantification of that change; the basic fact that there is a change in the configuration would allow us to conclude that at least one of the particles must have moved. The absolutist position I'm advocating here, does not contradict the fact that the distance between them changes, it simply says that there are 3 possible reasons for why the distance changes: 1) Body A moves 2) Body B moves 3) Both bodies A and B move It seems as though the relationalist position can be boiled down to, the distance between the bodies changes because the bodies move relative to each other, which would be a tautology. My thinking is that a change in configuration would be explicable by one of the three scenarios above.
Morbert wrote: » If you are a relationalist, the changing distance is the primitive relational property. You are invoking 1) 2) or 3) as an explanation for changing distance, but it is the changing distance that is primitive and grounds the three equally valid descriptions. It is not the case that 1) 2) or 3) must be what is the case. Instead, the changing distance is what is the case, and 1) 2) and 3) are equivalent descriptions of what is the case.
roosh wrote: » 1) 2) and 3) aren't equivalent though, are they? In one case, I exercise my free will and make the choice to move, in another you exercise your free will, and in the third we both exercise our free will. They all give rise to the equivalent result, the changing distance, but each one has a different causal chain. My free will causes me to do something, not you. Just as your free will causes you to do something, not me.
Morbert wrote: » 1) 2) and 3) only assert motion of the bodies A and B. If we want we can write down three distinct states of affairs from a relationalist perspective: a) A chooses to reduce the distance between A and B b) B chooses to reduce the distance between A and B c) A and B choose to reduce the distance between A and B
Morbert wrote: » Then, for any given state of affairs, we can apply a discription corresponding to 1) 2) or 3). E.g. The description 2) (Body B moves) is compatible with the state of affairs a) (A chooses to reduce the distance between A and
roosh wrote: » To my mind, there is some information missing from these statements. Namely, how does A and/or B reduce/increase the distance between A and B? If A chooses to reduce the distance it means that A must choose to perform an action. A cannot choose for B to perform an action. That action is what we refer to as "moving". This would give us a situation where A chooses to move, with the result being relative motion between A and B. B also moves relative to A, although not by their own volition. This is distinct from the vice versa situation, and the one where both choose to increase/reduce the distance. We have three distinct and distinguishable situations which are not equivalent.
Again, the statement, "Body B moves", is an absolute statement, not a relationalist one.
Morbert wrote: » You are tacitly assuming the distance between A and B is not primitive, and must be explained in terms of something more primitive. A relationalist would reject this, and any association of action with absolute motion. E.g.
Morbert wrote: » If 1) 2) and 3) are interpreted as asserting absolute motion, then a relationalist would reject all three and instead identify a) b) or c) as the fundamental state of affairs.
roosh wrote: » It's not that the distance is not primitive, it's just that, to my mind, the change in distance requires an explanation that goes beyond the tautological statements of A moves relative to B and the vice versa that B moves relative to A. It's these statements which require the explanation. I'll address a) b) and c) below. As I mentioned, to my mind the statements a) b) and c) stop short of giving us an explanation for the observed relative motion. Let's look at a) a) A chooses to reduce the distance between A and B This begs the question, how does A's choice to reduce the distance between A and B? A's choice is a causal influence which sets off a causal chain. A's choice results in A taking action. It doesn't result in B taking action. The choice made by A is to move their legs and perform an action that is commonly referred to as "walking". So A walks, while B does not walk. To my mind, and I don't think this seems entirely unreasonable, A's walking action causes A to move. It doesn't cause B to move because A cannot control B's actions. Note, however, we still have room for the relationalist position here because A's action causes A to move relative to B and vice versa, B moves relative to A.
Morbert wrote: » What I don't understand is why you think the changing distance between A and B demands an explanation beyond A's or B's choices in a way that absolute substantivalist motion of A or B does not.
Morbert wrote: » On a fine-grained level, a relationalist would write down a relative configuration space encompassing the bodies and Brains of A and B, and evolve a state forward under the laws of physics. Depending on the initial conditions we would e.g. see the distances between potassium ions in A's brain change, followed by a change in the distance between A's legs followed by a change between A and B. This description is internally consistent. And we can 'explain' the evolution of these relational distances with our initial conditions and our laws of physics. The laws of physics have a nomological character that might not satisfy your explanatory demands, but this nomological character is just as present in a substantivalist account with a substantivalist configuration space.
roosh wrote: » The sentence I've highlighted in bold above is the key point, in my mind. A makes a choice which causes A's legs to move. A's choice doesn't cause B's legs to move. Therefore, A is the one who moves. B still moves relative to A, but A moves in an absolute sense, by virtue of their choice.
Let's think in terms of one person only for a moment and consider the process of joining hands together. Let's say that A is holding her hands a certain distance apart from each other. There are 3 ways in which A can join her hands together: 1) Choose to move the left hand towards the right. 2) Choose to move the right hand towards the left. 3) Choose to move both hands towards each other. In each of the three scenarios the hands move relative to each other but they are three distinct scenarios, in which one of the hands moves in an absolute sense (1 &2) or both move in an absolute sense (3), by virtue of the choice of A.
Morbert wrote: » This is a substantivalist account. A relationalist says A makes a choice which causes relative distances between A and B to change.
Morbert wrote: » You're running into the same problem here. A relationalist would say there are three ways: a) Choose to reduce the distance between the left and right hand and keep the distance between her right hand and her body fixed. b) Choose to reduce the distance between the left and right hand and keep the distance between her left hand and her body fixed. c) Choose to reduce the distance between the left and right hand and do not keep the distance between her body and her left or right hand fixed In all three cases distance is always a relational property whether it is between the hands or a hand and a body. What I asked in my last message is why you think 1) 2) or 3) is the more correct primitive description than a) b) or c)
roosh wrote: » But if we just take the relationalist account. To go from A makes a choice which causes relative distances between A and B to change skips over the part where A makes a choice to "walk". It is this walking, which is done by A and not B, which causes the distance between A and B to change. But if we just take the relationalist account. To go from A makes a choice which causes relative distances between A and B to change skips over the part where A makes a choice to "walk". It is this walking, which is done by A and not B, which causes the distance between A and B to change. Alternatively B could make the choice to walk, which would also result in a change of distance. In this instance it is B's walking which causes the change in distance. If neither A nor B walks, then there is no relative motion between A and B. In order for there to be relative motion between A and B, either A must walk or B must walk or both must walk. ... Yes, distance between two things is a relationalist property, but the cause of a change in distance, I am saying, requires absolute motion to explain it.
If we examine the statements a) b) and c) above. We can ask what would happen if she chose to keep the distance between both hands and her body fixed. The answer is of course, there would be no relative motion. Let's break it down further: So, she decides to keep the distance between her left hand and the body fixed. What is the result? Well, we don't know what she is doing with her right hand. Keeping her left hand fixed relative to her body is a partial explanation of the situation above, where there was no relative motion. We need to specify what she does with her right hand to know if there is relative motion or not.
Morbert wrote: » You are claiming any relationalist account must be explained by a substantivalist account. No academic believes this. If we are a substantivalist, absolute motion like acceleration follows from our physical theory and initial conditions. If we are a relationalist, all relative motion follows from our physical theory and initial conditions. We do not need to invoke any substantivalist notion of motion in the latter.
roosh wrote: » Not so much that it must be, rather that it appears to me to be an inescapable conclusion. The relationalist account, to my mind, seems to stop short of drawing all the possible conclusions form the situation at hand.
If you and I are at rest, relative to each other and I exercise my free will to start walking, then it is I who does the moving and not you. It might be possible to construct imaginary, mathematical reference frames to describe the situation where I am labeled as "at rest" but that just appears to be an abstraction, given the nature of mathematical reference frames.
Morbert wrote: » The problem is, to draw those conclusions you characterise as inescapable, you are implicitly relying on a set of assumptions about the kinds of things that exist in reality. To give sense to your decision to move your hand, your are implicitly invoking an ontology of your hand with a property 'motion' given sense by a substantive account of space. If you do not adopt this ontology, and instead adopt a relationalist ontology where relational properties are primitive and motion is a derivative of these properties, then the inescapable conclusions are the relationalist conclusions, not the substantivalist ones, as there is no sense of motion or space that exists divorced from your relations to other things.
roosh wrote: » Is the Block Universe an inescapable conclusion of the relationalist position? EDIT: Is the relativity of simultaneity an inescapable conclusion of the relationalist position?
Morbert wrote: » The block universe and relativity of simultaneity are not inescapable conclusions of the relationalist position. Relationalists are not substantivalist. They do not believe in a substantive sense of spacetime.
Morbert wrote: » If instead of invoking an ontology where motion is in some sense intrinsic to you, we invoke an ontology where the relational distances between you and other things are more fundamental, then your choice to walk imparts a change to the primitive relational properties, and not some non-existent intrinsic sense of motion.
roosh wrote: » Namely, that when you and I are at rest relative to each other, if neither of us moves then there will be no relative motion. Then, by your own free will, you decide to move your arm, or you decide to start walking. Your decision has a causal effect on you, not on me. If neither of us made a free choice to move then there would be no relative motion. So, by virtue of your decision there is a sense in which you have moved where I have not. This 'sense' in which you move but I don't is what I mean by 'absolute motion' because it is not necessarily relative to anything, because in the sense of relative motion, I move relative to you - so the relationalist position cannot capture this sense in which you are the one who moves.
I mistakenly assumed that the relationalist position necessitated Einsteinian relativity and therefore the relativity of simultaneity. I was taking this as an argument against the relationalist position because the relativity of simultaneity is incompatible with the notion of free will in quantum mechanics.
Morbert wrote: » The bit in bold is where an implicit ontology is smuggled in. A relationalist would say you have decided to induce a relative motion between your arm and other objects like your body etc. This is interpreted/described by you as you moving your arm. You on the other hand, assume the "moving of the arm" is the more fundamental ontic fact of the matter, and that the moving of the arm gives rise to relative descriptions of motion.
Morbert wrote: » I'm not sure I understand the last sentence here. Are you saying relativity of simultaneity, free will, and quantum mechanics cannot all be reconciled?
roosh wrote: » The reason being, if all the events on the worldtube of an observer co-exist in the overall structure of the universe, then the event that is the outcome of a decision co-exists with the event of making the decision, meaning that the outcome is pre-determined and there is only ever one possible outcome.
In the second scenario a conscious free choice is made to move the leg but not the arm, while in the third scenario a choice is made to move the arm but not the leg. Yes, in all cases we choose to induce relative motion between parts of our body but that would appear to be an incomplete description of nature. We induce relative motion because we consciously choosing to move specific parts of our body. We can determine this, as in the example above, by isolating different parts of the body and choosing to induce relative motion at one time but not at another.
How would you isolate different parts of the body? If you have a disembodied leg and nothing else, in what sense does it move?
