NuMarvel wrote: » This is more or less what I said about the X Case, so we agree on that part. They also found that the 8th could be used to prevent abortions overseas that wouldn't be legal here. Hence why we had the referendum on the 13th Amendment to overturn this finding. And you don't seem to be challenging me on that, so it looks you pretty much agree with my "confused interpretation".
recedite wrote: » Now that you have clarified, I do agree with you.
recedite wrote: » On the second point, I would say the 8th could have been used to support legislation designed to stop people travelling. But in the event, that never happened, because the subsequent amendment clarified that people did not want the right to travel interfered with.
recedite wrote: » So the 8th also supported that position, because what happens abroad is sufficiently outside the main constitutional issue to be open to interpretation for either position.
NuMarvel wrote: » No. The 8th didn't support any other position on the issue of travel. The Supreme Court judgement in the X Case was clear that the 8th could be used to stop girls or women going abroad for abortions that were illegal here. That is a plain and simple legal fact which isn't not open to any kind of interpretation. Especially one that suggests the 8th couldn't be used to restrict travel.
153. Such a right has been identified in The State (M.) v. The Attorney General [1979] I.R. 73 as one of the unenumerated rights, all of which enjoy the same guarantee as contained for those expressed in Article 40. If the purpose of exercising the right to travel is to avail of a service, lawful in its own location, but unlawful in Ireland, is the right curtailed or abolished because of that local illegality and/or because of the guarantee in the Amendment? If it were a matter of a balancing exercise, the scales could only tilt in one direction, the right to life of the unborn, assuming no threat to the life of the mother. In my view, it is not a question of balancing the right to travel against the right to life; it is a question as to whether or not an individual has a right to travel — which she has. It cannot, in my view, be curtailed because of a particular intent. If one travels from the jurisdiction of this State to another, one, temporarily, becomes subject to the laws of the other state. An agreement, commonly called a conspiracy, to go to another state to do something lawfully done there cannot, in my opinion, permit of a restraining order. Treason is thought to be the gravest of crimes. If I proclaim my intent to go to another country there to plot against the Government here, I may, by some extension of the law against sedition, be prosecuted and, consequently, subject to detention here, but I cannot be lawfully prevented from travelling to that other country there to plot the overthrow, since that would not be a crime in the other country. I go further. Even if it were a crime in the other country, if I proclaim my intent to explode a bomb or shoot an individual in another country, I cannot lawfully be prevented from leaving my own country for that purpose. 154. The reality is that each nation governs itself and enforces its own criminal law. A court in one state cannot enjoin an individual leaving it from wrongdoing outside it in another state or states. It follows that, insofar as it interferes with the right to travel, there is no jurisdiction to make such an order. In this context, I cannot disregard the fact that, whatever the exact numbers are, there is no doubt that in the eight years since the enactment of the Amendment, many thousands of Irish women have chosen to travel to England to have abortions; it is ironic that out of those many thousands, in one case of a girl of fourteen, victim of sexual abuse and statutory rape, in the care of loving parents who chose with her to embark on further trauma, having sought help from priest, doctor and gardaand with an outstanding sense of responsibility to the law of the land, should have the full panoply of the law brought to bear on them in their anguish. In short (1) The Attorney General acted properly in bringing the matter before the court. (2) The terms of the Eighth Amendment, now contained in Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3 contemplate lawful abortion within the State. (3) Despite the absence of regulating legislation, the judicial arm of government must seek to enforce the guarantee. (4) On the facts of this case, the mother is not to be prevented from having an abortion. (5)In any event, she cannot be lawfully prevented from leaving the State, whatever her purpose in doing so. (6) The failure of the legislature to provide for the regulation of Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3 has significantly added to the problem. 155. It was for these reasons that I agreed that the order of the High Court should be set aside.
recedite wrote: » Are you a SC judge then?
recedite wrote: » It was an appeal, so the "judgement" was to overrule the previous high court judgement preventing the girl from travelling. By a majority of the SC judges present. Different judges had slightly different interpretations as I said, but the net effect was that (in the absence of any specific legislation) it was not feasible for the court to interfere with her right to travel.
Loafing Oaf wrote: » I think you're being unfair to McGrath here, AFAIK he supports repeal of the 8th. He didn't say so specifically, but it looks to me like he is urging pro-lifers not to use those with Down Syndrome etc. for propaganda purposes.
NuMarvel wrote: » You're making this up as you go along. The fact that it was an appeal doesn't have any relevance...
recedite wrote: » To simplify matters, how about you quote the relevant bit of text which is "the judgement". The part where the SC says a woman does not have the right to travel to UK for an abortion because of the 8th amendment. Then we'll discuss that. Otherwise we'll just assume that the bit I quoted earlier is correct.
recedite wrote: » You have a lot of "ifs" in there. The reason you can't find what you are looking for is because it does not exist. The SC did not set out to make a judgement on the right to travel; their purpose was to either uphold or strike out the previous judgement preventing travel in the specific x case. They chose by majority verdict to strike it out. In the course of deciding that, the various judges put forward different interpretations of how the right to life of the unborn might clash with the general right to travel, EU rights, and the general undesirability of making unenforceable laws. Basically this left more questions unanswered than answered regarding travel, hence the subsequent amendment was put to the people to decide. The substantive question in that case was whether abortion was legal in Ireland if the prospective mother was suicidal, and that was answered definitively with a Yes.
Held by the Supreme Court (Finlay C.J., McCarthy, O'Flaherty and Egan JJ.: Hederman J. dissenting) in allowing the appeal and discharging the injunctions, 1, (Hederman J. concurring) that the Attorney General had properly exercised his duties in the performance of his office in bringing the matter before the High Court. 2. (Hederman J. concurring): That notwithstanding the absence of "laws" enacted by the Oireachtas, Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3 of the Constitution itself provided its own clear rule of law authorising the courts, as organs of the State, to defend and vindicate the constitutional rights guaranteed by the Article. 3. (Hederman J. concurring): That the Constitution requires that its provisions be interpreted harmoniously and that the rights thereby guaranteed be interpreted in concert. Where a conflict of rights in any case cannot be avoided, a changing hierarchy of rights was envisaged, headed generally by the right to life, the destruction of which right was irreversible. 4. (Hederman J. dissenting): That the true interpretation of Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3 of the Constitution required that termination of pregnancy was permissible only when it was established as a matter of probability that there was a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother if such termination were not effected. To prevent termination except in circumstances where there was a risk of immediate or inevitable death of the mother did not sufficiently vindicate the right to life of the mother. Per Hederman J. The evidence required to justify a termination of pregnancy must be of such a weight and cogency as to leave open no other conclusion but that the consequences of the continuance of the pregnancy will, to an extremely high degree of probability, cost the mother her life and medical evidence must be based on the most competent medical opinion available. In the instant case the evidence adduced fell short of this standard. 5. (Hederman J. dissenting): That the risks to the life of the mother which should be considered by the Court included a real and substantial risk that the mother might commit suicide. Per Finlay C.J., Hederman and Egan JJ.: That, notwithstanding the difficulties in proofs, supervision or enforcement and the likelihood of widespread evasion of any such injunctions, Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3 required the courts in proper cases and upon the exercise, as far as practicable, of their equitable discretion to restrain by injunction the removal of the unborn from the jurisdiction so that the right to life of the unborn might be defended and vindicated. Per O'Flaherty J.: An injunction restraining a woman from leaving the jurisdiction for the purpose of having an abortion would interfere to an unwarranted degree with the individual's freedom of movement and the authority of the family and the aspiration expressed in the Preamble to assure the dignity and freedom of the individual. Per Finlay C.J., Hederman and Egan JJ.: The right to travel simpliciter could not take precedence over the right to life. Per Hederman J.: The Court should decline to grant an injunction restraining the girl from leaving the country for the purpose of having an abortion because of the impossibility of enforcement; if the girl travelled out of the jurisdiction and had an abortion the matter could be dealt with by contempt of court proceedings on her return but the unborn life could not be restored. Per McCarthy J.: Injunctions should not be granted to restrain activity in another jurisdiction since the right to travel should not be curtailed because of a particular intention
5. (Hederman J. dissenting): That the risks to the life of the mother which should be considered by the Court included a real and substantial risk that the mother might commit suicide. Per Finlay C.J., Hederman and Egan JJ.: That, notwithstanding the difficulties in proofs, supervision or enforcement and the likelihood of widespread evasion of any such injunctions, Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3 required the courts in proper cases and upon the exercise, as far as practicable, of their equitable discretion to restrain by injunction the removal of the unborn from the jurisdiction so that the right to life of the unborn might be defended and vindicated. Per O'Flaherty J.: An injunction restraining a woman from leaving the jurisdiction for the purpose of having an abortion would interfere to an unwarranted degree with the individual's freedom of movement and the authority of the family and the aspiration expressed in the Preamble to assure the dignity and freedom of the individual. Per Finlay C.J., Hederman and Egan JJ.: The right to travel simpliciter could not take precedence over the right to life. Per Hederman J.: The Court should decline to grant an injunction restraining the girl from leaving the country for the purpose of having an abortion because of the impossibility of enforcement; if the girl travelled out of the jurisdiction and had an abortion the matter could be dealt with by contempt of court proceedings on her return but the unborn life could not be restored. Per McCarthy J.: Injunctions should not be granted to restrain activity in another jurisdiction since the right to travel should not be curtailed because of a particular intention
recedite wrote: » I can take the same piece of text and boldify alternative facts. Looks different now, doesn't it? As I say the different interpretations raised more questions than they answered, regarding travel.
aloyisious wrote: » I think part of the reasoning behind the SC decision on overturing the injunction was because a forseeable result in not doing so would be regular court and GS action to prevent women leaving the country for abortions, and a very strong chance that women would make a direct effort to stymie the ruling by making it clear publicly that they would be travelling abroad for abortions in spite of the law [and SPUC et al] leaving the Govt [politicians] and the justice system with an overload of cases and where to put the pregnant women defying the law. The judges [and others] saw the inevitable public backlash should prosecutions, jailings and/or enforced hospitalisations happen and told the politicians the mess was in their hands to solve, that court judgements in liue of failure by the legislature to provide laws would be rule by fiat. Ergo the referendums to try sort out the mess by the legislature.
NuMarvel wrote: » But they only overturned the injunction in the circumstances of Ms X. The court held that, in general, the 8th could be used to prevent travel. I'm sure the judges considered the other factors, especially that of public backlash because that's what was happening at the time of the X Case. But given the obligations the 8th puts on the state, including the courts, to respect, defend, and vindicate the unborn's right to life, those issues had to take second place.
PopePalpatine wrote: » Irish pro-lifers hire an English company to keep Irish abortions in England.
Loafing Oaf wrote: » I wonder are they going to deploy their usual trick of using unflattering photos of 'pro-abortion' politicians to make them look sinister and authoritarian. Difficult to pull that one off with Simon 'in-betweener' Harris...
PopePalpatine wrote: » I'm thinking there could be another angle for them, namely depicting the pro-choice male politicians as wimps getting bossed around by bossy women.
Hotblack Desiato wrote: » They'll wait for that SC judgement before committing, but I'm convinced that a simple deletion of the 8th isn't enough - repeal and replacement with a statement giving a positive right to abortion under conditions set by law is far preferable.