Abortion Discussion, Part Trois

recedite wrote: »

Lets suppose for the sake of this discussion that human sentience and consciousness is not present at that stage.

Easily done given that EVERYTHING we currently know about human consciousness, sentience, and the pre-requisites of same tell us that this is the correct and safe assumption to make. I grant you our knowledge of same is limited and incomplete, but it is thus far not a case where some evidence points one way and some the other. There simply is NO basis at this time, other than a few posters attempts to conflate autonomic pain responses with consciousness, to think it is there.

recedite wrote: »

If you allow unrestricted abortion up to 16 weeks, do you then refuse all abortions after 16 weeks?

16 weeks is a safe enough number yes. That said if I woke up in a country tomorrow that allowed abortion-by-choice at 12 or 20 weeks I would not lose any sleep either. SOME line in the sand has to be drawn SOMEWHERE between conception and the age of reason where killing a "human" should be prevented.

So yes at SOME point I would say we draw a line on one side of which there is absolutely no problem with termination, and on the other side there is.

But the term "refuse ALL abortions" is a bit loaded. There are too many exceptions there. I believe in murder in self defence where murder is the only option for example. If a pregnancy is a significant threat on the life of a mother then I would advocate for her to be allowed attempt anything she can before, but eventually if necessary including, the nuclear option of killing what is killing her.

recedite wrote: »

What is your position on abortions after 16 weeks? Is it the same as murder? Maybe you avoid facing that pitfall by having no position at all

I think what I wrote about covers answering this question. But ON TOP OF (but not in place of) that answer I ALSO have a "no position at all" answer.

This is because my arguments here are from the perspective of arguing the question "Can we as a society OFFER abortion by choice, and if so in what form?". And I think, based on my arguments, we CAN offer abortion by choice in good conscience up to 12, 16, even 20 weeks. But 12 is enough and 16 more than enough as global statistics show.

So the "no position at all" kind of "dodge answer" to your question which i do not offer AS a dodge but PARALLEL to my other answer (lest I be accused falsely of dodge) is that all I am saying here to such people who want their abortion after whatever the cut off is "Sorry, that is just not a service we offer, be on your way".

So the discussion of whether abortion AFTER that point, achieved or attained another way, should be "murder" is certainly a conversation worth having but is..... I hope it fair to say......... tangential to what I am presenting. I am merely arguing the ethics of offering a particular service. If someone wants something outside the purview of the service offered, that is their problem not mine.

A completely off topic, but interesting, analogy would be to the people who actively (and often with good reason) want to have a perfectly healthy limb removed. It simply is not a service we offer in Ireland (though I think it should be if certain diagnostic technologies were ever achieved). So a person seeking limb removal is simply told "Sorry, we do not offer that service". But in many situations I think it a perfectly moral and ethical service to offer knowing, as i do, what the underlying cause of their condition likely is.

so TL;DR...... I think arguing the ethics of offering a particular service, and arguing the infractions or punishment of people who achieve that effect in another way, are both important but tangential issues. And my main, almost complete, focus in rhetoric is on the morality and ethics of offering abortion by choice, up to a cut off, at all.

recedite wrote: »

You may say you don't care about "potential" but imagine the following hypothetical scenario

Well I do and I do not. It certainly does seem to be the crux of the disagreements I have with the anti-abortion people on this matter. I mediate moral and ethical concern on present realities, while they do so on future potentials.

All things being equal I DO put "care" and stock in "potentials". In many cases I do. For example I admitted earlier in the thread (yesterday?) that in a burning building scenario with two kids identical in every way except one is mentally handicapped..... I would save the "normal" child every time. Not because I am thinking one has more of a right to life, I do not. But because I equivocate on their relative potentials in many ways.

But with abortion all things are NOT equal. Rather we have a sentient conscious agent TODAY (the pregnant woman) and a POTENTIAL one. And my moral and ethical concern is always towards an existing agent, and other agents only where possible and prudent.

So not only do I not see any basis for affording rights, or moral and ethical concern, to a 12 week old fetus......... I CERTAINLY do not see any basis for doing so RELATIVE to the concerns I have for the rights, ethics, and well being of the REAL woman making a REAL choice today.

Assigning rights is one thing, assigning them when they impinge on the rights, the choices and/or well being of another is quite a different thing.

recedite wrote: »

There are two subjects; a 15 year old boy and an 95 year old man. One of them is going to be killed, and you have to decide which.

I trust my paragraph about the handicapped child above answers this "scenario" which you offer. However your scenario is a weaker challange to me than my own one was.

Why? Because I would add to it that it would not only be "potential" I would mediate on in YOUR case but ALSO the fact that the older man has already had his turn at life. It would not just be potential but FAIRNESS I would be bringing into play there therefore.

So not so much the "unlived life still ahead of him." so much as the "already lived life behind the other him"

But yes, I do mediate SOME concern for potential. I would not deny it. It is the priority I place on it, rather, that is important.

@Absolam: this from me is just to advise you that while I will be reading the thread with interest, I won't be pursuing the debate any further with you. The Paras below from me are just answers and advisements for your attention.

Re somatic support as mentioned by you, I looked up the meaning and found it refers to the withdrawal of life support from a brain-dead person with no sentience, including pregnant women. That should be included as intervention.

As an unequivocal reply to the 2nd last question you put to me in your last post: [I'll put it thus; if you feel you can draw legal parallels between the destruction of unborn human life and the withdrawal of somatic support on the basis of consciousness and sentience as you have above, why is there no evidence in law or jurisprudence that these parallels exist?] my answer is in the link below, an irish High Court ruling involving a woman called N.P.

I am mindful that you put a question mark and wrote the word "and" between that question and your last one making them separate questions to avoid an accidental blurring of questions.

Re this question from you in your last post [It seems to follow reasonably well to me, though I admit I never brought up the chance of the brain dead getting an intervention so perhaps you just took it up wrong.] perhaps you could look back to your 2nd last post which has this question in it [And given the context of the statement, what corresponding interventions do you believe there are which would cause a person on somatic support to eventually breathe, eat, think, and procreate, of their own volition?] You can argue for whatever time you want that you meant differently in your references there to the brain dead and a person on somatic support and intervention, it's for others now to debate with you on the nuances of those references.

https://www.google.ie/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwi49p6FgujTAhUMBMAKHROcBrIQFghOMA. Y&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.staredecisishibernia.com%2Fwithdrawal-ongoing-somatic-support-pregnant-woman-authorised%2F&usg=AFQjCNEkl-
OCqtY4NShqXRKIZdcMK_gzaQ

recedite

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

SOME line in the sand has to be drawn SOMEWHERE between conception and the age of reason where killing a "human" should be prevented.
So yes at SOME point I would say we draw a line on one side of which there is absolutely no problem with termination, and on the other side there is.

The first problem with this is that, as you already said yourself, you have no idea where to draw this line, just that it is not within the first 12 weeks.

But apart from that, I don't agree with this very black and white approach. Its far too dismissive of the very large grey area. You can ignore the grey areas in your own mind, but real life legislators would have to come up with some kind of a policy for them.

You said before about this very black and white approach...

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

Therefore the fetus at 12 weeks to me is the moral equivalent of a rock or a table leg. Somewhat later in the developmental process however it becomes the moral equivalent of any human being be they "whole", mentally incapacitated, in a coma, asleep, or any other form the faculty of sentience and consciousness takes. And so I am not limited by the "trap" of wondering if "currently or permanently limited" instances of human consciousness should be afforded the same rights as any other.

But it turns out you also have a solution to the in between position, which is basically "the right to travel" for an abortion...

I ALSO have a "no position at all" answer...
So the "no position at all" kind of "dodge answer" to your question which i do not offer AS a dodge but PARALLEL to my other answer (lest I be accused falsely of dodge) is that all I am saying here to such people who want their abortion after whatever the cut off is "Sorry, that is just not a service we offer, be on your way".

How is that different to the longstanding position on abortion in Ireland? "We don't offer that service, but if you go to England.."
The only real difference is that your period of uncertainty starts at 12 weeks, whereas the traditional one started at conception. If there is doubt about personhood during this uncertainty period, then you give full human rights protection.

Personally, I would be more in favour of a graded protection, stepped up to a higher level every couple of weeks.

I would save the "normal" child every time. Not because I am thinking one has more of a right to life, I do not. But because I equivocate on their relative potentials in many ways.

But with abortion all things are NOT equal. Rather we have a sentient conscious agent TODAY (the pregnant woman) and a POTENTIAL one. And my moral and ethical concern is always towards an existing agent, and other agents only where possible and prudent.

Fair enough, that is an honest answer. So we both agree that human potential does come into any ethical discussion, though weighted to a much lesser degree than a human consciousness that is verifiably already present.

Assigning rights is one thing, assigning them when they impinge on the rights, the choices and/or well being of another is quite a different thing....

I believe in murder in self defence where murder is the only option for example. If a pregnancy is a significant threat on the life of a mother then I would advocate for her to be allowed attempt anything she can before, but eventually if necessary including, the nuclear option of killing what is killing her.

Again, this is completely in agreement with the current Irish legislation allowing termination where there is a threat to the mother's life.

recedite wrote: »

The first problem with this is that, as you already said yourself, you have no idea where to draw this line, just that it is not within the first 12 weeks.

But as I said, that is NOT a problem because the VAST majority of abortions happen WELL before where I think that line should fall. Pretty much every abortion by choice, well into the 9x% range, happen before week 16. My concerns that the entities consciousness may have come on line would not even BEGIN to kick in until 22 weeks at the EXTREME earliest, but more likely in the 24 to 26 area or a little beyond.

So the "problem" you talk of IS a problem sure, as ignorance is never a good thing. But it is not a problem for offering the abortion service that the VAST majority of people seem to ACTUALLY WANT.

If the demands on an abortion service were erring towards the "grey zone" on our biological ignorance you would actually have a point here, it would be a problem for my rhetoric. But the two are currently SO far apart that it simply is not the problem for my position you believe it to be.

recedite wrote: »

But apart from that, I don't agree with this very black and white approach. Its far too dismissive of the very large grey area. You can ignore the grey areas in your own mind, but real life legislators would have to come up with some kind of a policy for them.

Quite the opposite, I have ignored nothing of the sort. As you will see from what I just wrote above my position is HIGHLY cognizant of the grey area, what it is, where it is, and why it is not actually a problem. Quite simply the hugely VAST majority of people who seek choice based abortion fall no where NEAR the grey area.

recedite wrote: »

You said before about this very black and white approach... But it turns out you also have a solution to the in between position, which is basically "the right to travel" for an abortion...

That is not the solution or "my" solution at all. As I said, multiple times, I only mention it as an aside to my actual positions and to focus on it like it is in any way relevant to the rest is an error.

All I am arguing is what I think we can morally and ethically offer as a service. If the statistical VAST minority of people who come looking for the service "too late" want to travel that is THEIR business and THEIR solution. Not mine.

MY position is just to say to such people "Sorry, what you seek is not a service we offer here."

recedite wrote: »

How is that different to the longstanding position on abortion in Ireland? "We don't offer that service, but if you go to England.."

The difference would be that we would be offering a service that accommodates 95% or more of the people who actually seek choice based abortion. The difference would be such people would have a CHOICE to avail of a service locally rather than traveling. And the difference is people availing of it here will do so without the expense, effort and trauma of travel and without the pressures travel CAN put upon people to go through with an abortion despite second thoughts. No one availing of a local service will, for example, think "Well I have traveled all this way, I better go through with it as I can not afford to travel again if I go home and THEN decide I should have gone through with it".

Because there are few tragedies in this topic worse than the idea of any woman who has an abortion she does not want to, or seeks one and then in the end goes through with it despite misgivings because of external or contextual pressures.

recedite wrote: »

The only real difference is that your period of uncertainty starts at 12 weeks

I apologize profusely if I have failed to be clear here, just as I hope you will apologize if you have not been reading my text carefully enough, but I certainly attempted to be ABUNDENLTY CLEAR that my "period of certainty" in no way starts at 12 weeks but much later. It is the LACK of any uncertainty at 12 and 16 (and even 20 sure, but superfluous to requirements) that my position is based on, not the presence of it.

What is it, at 12 weeks, you think I have expressed some uncertainty about? Could you cite/quote me in fact so I can endeavor not to make again in the future, whatever textual error it was I made to lead you to this WAY OFF conclusion?

recedite wrote: »

Fair enough, that is an honest answer. So we both agree that human potential does come into any ethical discussion, though weighted to a much lesser degree than a human consciousness that is verifiably already present.

Yes, I would never ignore potential ENTIRELY, I just think its importance is so relatively small to the main issue of how, when and why we assign rights as to be functionally irrelevant to me.

aloyisious wrote: »

@Absolam: this from me is just to advise you that while I will be reading the thread with interest, I won't be pursuing the debate any further with you. The Paras below from me are just answers and advisements for your attention.

In like form (absent the commitment) then, I'll provide the below answers and advisements for your own.

aloyisious wrote: »

Re somatic support as mentioned by you, I looked up the meaning and found it refers to the withdrawal of life support from a brain-dead person with no sentience, including pregnant women. That should be included as intervention.

I'd wonder whether the meaning you looked up contained the term 'with no sentience' or if you added that yourself; since you haven't provided the link I guess we'll never know. Still, I'd agree that it does refer to the withdrawal of life support where artificial means are being used to maintain physical processes which will never again be maintained by the person themselves. Whether or not I'd include it as 'intervention' depends on the context; in the current context (what interventions do you believe there are which would cause a person on somatic support to eventually breathe, eat, think, and procreate, of their own volition?) I'd have to say it definitely should not be included, since it will not cause these things to happen.

aloyisious wrote: »

As an unequivocal reply to the 2nd last question you put to me in your last post: [I'll put it thus; if you feel you can draw legal parallels between the destruction of unborn human life and the withdrawal of somatic support on the basis of consciousness and sentience as you have above, why is there no evidence in law or jurisprudence that these parallels exist?] my answer is in the link below, an irish High Court ruling involving a woman called N.P.

That case unequivocally did not contain any such parallels though; the word sentience is never even mentioned in the judgement and the Judge made no mention of the consciousness of either the child or mother, or that a parallel of any sort ought to be drawn between the two acts we're discussing. In actual fact, the parallel that can be drawn from that case is quite apposite and relates to the second act; the Judge felt it was within the medical teams remit to decide in the best interests of the child to withdraw the life support being provided to the child through the mother if there was no realistic prospect of life. We can draw a ready parallel between that and the fact that somatic support support can be withdrawn from a person with no realistic prospect of life. The ready contrast to that judgement is the first act; abortion, by intervening and thereby killing an unborn person is not legally sanctioned, and euthanasia, also by intervening and thereby killing a born person is also not legally sanctioned. All without reference to either consciousness or sentience; it seems neither are necessary elements in human rights deliberations.

recedite

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

What is it, at 12 weeks, you think I have expressed some uncertainty about? Could you cite/quote me in fact so I can endeavor not to make again in the future, whatever textual error it was I made to lead you to this WAY OFF conclusion?

You have been quite certain that abortion should be permitted at any stage less than 12 weeks (and sometimes you mentioned 16 weeks) saying the foetus had no sentience and absolutely no right to independent life at that time. Despite that you said that human potential had some value, but apparently not in the above situation for some reason.

But most of the uncertainty in your stated position comes after this 12/16 week (slightly wavy) "line in the sand". You said that you would grant either full human rights, or no human rights. One or the other.
Are we to extrapolate from this that no abortion (except where the foetus threatened the life of the mother) would be permitted after the 12/16 week line in the sand? Lets say, for example the foetus was found to be malformed or even dying, at 20 weeks.

MrPudding

Absolam wrote: »

I certainly wouldn't dispute that mens rea is a significant component in many crimes, though I'd shy away from imagining that it's exclusively applicable to murder. For instance, absent mens rea the intentional destruction of unborn human life is simply the destruction of unborn human life; not a crime under the POLDPA.

Of course intention is an element of crimes other than murder (I don't believe I ever suggested it wasn't), but in this context you were suggesting that there were different penalties for different crimes where the end result (a person was dead), was the same. I mentioned intention because that is, essentially, the basis for the difference in the sentencing for the crimes you mention. The obvious isssue for your arguent being intention is present in both murder and destruction of an unborn human life (or person to you), yet the sentences are different.

Absolam wrote: »

It's not just intention or culpability that determines the crime though is it? Every form of unlawful killing has it's own particular circumstances that determine whether it's that crime, or another, which has been committed. Where one person intentionally kills another person that may be murder, but there's quite a bit more to it than simple intent. And as I pointed out earlier, the Criminal Justice Act does not mention the killing of a person at all... just like the POLDPA. In fact, if we take the examples I provided, we can see than the Criminal Justice Act 1990, the Infanticide Act 1949, and the Protection of Life During Pregancy Act 2013 all deal with the intentional (there's your mens rea) killing of other people, and none of them actually use the term kill a person. Evidently a person may intentionally kill an unborn person, an infant person, or a grown person, and be charged with different crimes without rising to murder; voluntary manslaughter, for instance, admits of intent (mens rea again) with exculpatory circumstances. So... someone might (intentionally) kill a person and be charged with an offence other than murder, because there are offences that better fit the act and circumstances.

OK, I think there are a couple of problems here, which I will try to set out, then tie it back to your main problem. First, infanticide isn't really an offence, it is more accurately described as a defence, specifically, a defence to murder. But for the defence of infanticide, a mother would be guilty of murder, specifically the murder of her child, that child being under the age of 12 months. So I don't think infanticise really helps you. The underlying crime is murder, the intentional kill of a child under 12 months.

Voluntary manslaughter is, by it's very definition, not murder. if it was, it would be called murder. So I am not sure how that help you. I have not said there aren't different possible offences with which one might be charged, were one to kill a person. I am saying that where a person intentionally kills another person, then that is usually murder, unless there is an available defence, which reduces it to a lessor offence.

So, for infanticide, voluntary manslaughter, diminished responsibility etc, you have an act that, but for the specific defences, would be murder.

This does not apply to the offence for the destruction of an unborn human life. The destruction is the act. There is no underlying act that a defence or mitigation is apply to to change the underlying act. So the issue in your argument is, the other examples you give can be murder, and indeed would be if the various defences didn't apply, but the destruction of an unborn human is not murder with a defence applied. it is, and alway will be, only the destruction of an unborn human life.

The point of all this being, the law does not see the unborn as a human in being, and therefore entitled to the full protection of the law, otherwise killing it would be murder in law, and it would not be necessary for there to be a separate offence, still committed intentionally, but not attracting the same punishment as murder.

Absolam wrote: »

Well, I wouldn't try to speak to quality of personhood; that's seems to be a new introduction and I've no idea how, or why, you'd measure it. Though it apears to me that argument claims an infant also does not have the same quality of personhood that other born persons enjoy, if it's mother can be convicted of infanticide rather than murder for intentionally causing it's death.
I'd be dubious about that.

There is a difference in the quality of personhood between the born and the unborn. I think this is pretty clear, from what I said above. I would not suggest there is a difference in quality (in the context of killing) between a person under the age of 12 months and a person over the age of 12 months. I think your problem here is you are seeing infanticide as an offence, rather than a defence. The killing of such an infant may very well be murder, but if the Infanticide act applies then it acts to reduce the charge. But for the application of the Infanticide Act, the underlying act would be murder, therefore there is not difference in quality of personhood between an infant and an adult.

MrP

A heads-up. I don't know how many of you are near a Sky-serviced TV or can get Sky Atlantic HD (channel 108 on Sky) on your computers. The channel is showing a new programme called Abortion:stories women tell. It's preamble reads: a thought-provoking look at the subject of abortion today, told through the stories of women struggling with unplanned pregnancies, abortion providers, clinic staff and activists.

MrPudding wrote: »

Of course intention is an element of crimes other than murder (I don't believe I ever suggested it wasn't), but in this context you were suggesting that there were different penalties for different crimes where the end result (a person was dead), was the same. I mentioned intention because that is, essentially, the basis for the difference in the sentencing for the crimes you mention. The obvious isssue for your arguent being intention is present in both murder and destruction of an unborn human life (or person to you), yet the sentences are different.

Actually, what I was suggesting was that there are many crimes which encompass intentionally killing a person and therefore require mens rea to be that particular crime (remember "your problem (with the comparison and examples) is with the mens rea"?), so mens rea is not a characteristic which distinguishes murder hence not a problem. The basis for the difference in sentencing remains that they are (obviously) different crimes.

MrPudding wrote: »

OK, I think there are a couple of problems here, which I will try to set out, then tie it back to your main problem. First, infanticide isn't really an offence, it is more accurately described as a defence, specifically, a defence to murder. But for the defence of infanticide, a mother would be guilty of murder, specifically the murder of her child, that child being under the age of 12 months. So I don't think infanticise really helps you. The underlying crime is murder, the intentional kill of a child under 12 months.

I think your problem here is the law. To wit:
" (3) A woman shall be guilty of felony, namely, infanticide ifâ€”
(a) by any wilful act or omission she causes the death of her child, being a child under the age of twelve months, and
(b) the circumstances are such that, but for this section, the act or omission would have amounted to murder, and
(c) at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the childand may for that offence be tried and punished as for manslaughter."
Infanticide is really an offense, as much as any other felony. The Act even categorically states that if the circumstances were different it would be murder, demonstrating that it is not murder. That in other circumstances someone might be charged with murder simply makes my point; it's not just intention or culpability that determines the crime, every form of unlawful killing has it's own particular circumstances that determine whether it's that crime, or another, which has been committed..

MrPudding wrote: »

Voluntary manslaughter is, by it's very definition, not murder. if it was, it would be called murder. So I am not sure how that help you. I have not said there aren't different possible offences with which one might be charged, were one to kill a person.

Sure, like infanticide it's not murder, that was my point; it is possible to kill a person and be charged with an offence other than murder, because there are offences that better fit the act and circumstances.

MrPudding wrote: »

I am saying that where a person intentionally kills another person, then that is usually murder, unless there is an available defence, which reduces it to a lessor offence. So, for infanticide, voluntary manslaughter, diminished responsibility etc, you have an act that, but for the specific defences, would be murder. This does not apply to the offence for the destruction of an unborn human life. The destruction is the act. There is no underlying act that a defence or mitigation is apply to to change the underlying act. So the issue in your argument is, the other examples you give can be murder, and indeed would be if the various defences didn't apply, but the destruction of an unborn human is not murder with a defence applied. it is, and alway will be, only the destruction of an unborn human life.

And I am saying it is only ever murder when the facts fit the crime of murder and not another offense. When the facts fit another offense, that is the crime, not murder. The DPP doesn't aim for murder and work their way down to a crime that fits; they prosecute for the crime they believe was committed, whether it's murder, infanticide, voluntary homicide, dangerous driving causing death etc etc. A Judge might disagree, and instruct a jury that they may not convict a person of a crime when the facts don't support it, but direct that they consider another crime which the facts do support (as in the preamble of the Infanticide Act), in both instances they're considering which offence actually fits the facts. If the only offence which fits the facts is the destruction of unborn human life, or infanticide, then that is the offence that will be prosecuted, not because the criminal had a good defense against murder, but because the criminal did not commit murder.

MrPudding wrote: »

The point of all this being, the law does not see the unborn as a human in being, and therefore entitled to the full protection of the law, otherwise killing it would be murder in law, and it would not be necessary for there to be a separate offence, still committed intentionally, but not attracting the same punishment as murder.

This seems to just circle back to the beginning; human beings are entitled to the full protection of the law (as it applies to them) but killing them is not always murder in law, there are separate offenses, still committed intentionally, and not attracting the same penalties as murder.

MrPudding wrote: »

There is a difference in the quality of personhood between the born and the unborn. I think this is pretty clear, from what I said above.

I don't think anything you said above even mentioned quality of personhood, so I don't know why you'd think it would make it clear. I'd say it's clear that it's your opinion there should be some notion of quality of personhood (whatever that might be) in order to justify your position, but there's nothing in law that even appears to consider the possibility.

MrPudding wrote: »

I would not suggest there is a difference in quality (in the context of killing) between a person under the age of 12 months and a person over the age of 12 months. I think your problem here is you are seeing infanticide as an offence, rather than a defence.

Except the fact that the Infanticide Act makes it an offence? It doesn't even include the word defence. That seems to be more your problem here....

MrPudding wrote: »

The killing of such an infant may very well be murder, but if the Infanticide act applies then it acts to reduce the charge. But for the application of the Infanticide Act, the underlying act would be murder, therefore there is not difference in quality of personhood between an infant and an adult.

That's not true though; it is not murder, it is infanticide, per the Act. What it would be were there no Infanticide Act is as open to question as what murder would be if there were no Criminal Justice Act, or the various other pieces of legislation that have defined unlawful killings over the centuries. We do know however that under the laws that do apply, infanticide is not murder, nor is the destruction of unborn human life, or voluntary manslaughter.

The idea of murder being the underlying act of all unlawful killing is more a matter of invention than law; the hard facts are that we have a number of offenses that deal with the intentional killing of other people and murder is just one of them. None of them mention quality of personhood because that's simply not a consideration, nor does the law need it to be. You might imagine that there is a crime of murder which can be reduced/excused/defended against in varying circumstances and therefore end up being a lesser crime, or you can imagine the opposite, that the crime depending on the circumstances is increasingly magnified/heinous/indefensible until it surpasses any other crime and becomes murder (or more accurately capital murder). Neither is necessarily true, they're both just points of view, but I'd suggest in a society that presumes innocence until guilt is proven, the latter is a more harmonious one. That all said, neither view precludes the unborn being a person in law.

If abortion (legality and illegality of same here) are covered by the 8th and by the POLDPA act, and it is not seen as murder but as destruction of the unborn [whether legally or illegally done] then where be the notion that an unlawful act of killing [with all that term directly carries] or even the unlawful act of murder, or of infanticide, have relevance to abortion philosophical debates as they [interesting though they be] are separate criminal acts listed in laws covering other definitions of death by another's hand? I know there is a blurring in the usage of the word killing when it comes to abortion as some people [due to deeply held POV's] see both as not dissimilar. However abortion [as an unlawful act] is listed within POLDPA and no other law in use here (AFAIK).

BTW, in respect of the life-taking debate, I think taking another's life is allowed for in law here when there is no other choice facing a person when it comes to defending one's own life, as in a house break-in. I know of one other lawful multi-scenario here, one faced by armed Gardai or Military here where the firing of live rounds is contained in orders, even down to preventing some-one from taking the weapon itself away from the lawful possession of the Garda or Military carrying it. Depending on an shooting incident's circumstances, the investigators might say there is no evidence of criminality in the firing, and no criminal charges are included, hence Mens Rea, nor the other constituent necessary for a criminal act charge, Actus Reus, would not apply.

I understand the relevance of sentience and consciousness [as might exist - stage of development wise - in a fetus] being a debating point on when it comes to decide on a cut-off point [in life stage terms] as to when an abortion should or should not go ahead [or even not considered in itself] as they are relative to the philosophical POV's of differing parties.

It would be interesting to find out if those two attributes are ever considered by the medical community here when it carries out abortions within the constraints of POLDPA. I specifically used ABORTION [lawful destruction of the unborn] as TERMINATIONS [by caesarian section or by early induction] are also allowed by POLDPA and there is blurring in usage of those two capitalized words. In the case of those last two procedures, the sentience and consciousness of the fetus is not a factor as it is being protectively delivered.

It goes without saying that abortion allows for protection of only the mother's [pregnant woman] life under its meaning in POLDPA, whereas termination allows for the protection of both the pregnant woman's and the unborn's lives. The act's title fits it's purpose.

MrPudding

Absolam wrote: »

Actually, what I was suggesting was that there are many crimes which encompass intentionally killing a person and therefore require mens rea to be that particular crime (remember "your problem (with the comparison and examples) is with the mens rea"?), so mens rea is not a characteristic which distinguishes murder hence not a problem. The basis for the difference in sentencing remains that they are (obviously) different crimes.
I think your problem here is the law. To wit:
" (3) A woman shall be guilty of felony, namely, infanticide if—
(a) by any wilful act or omission she causes the death of her child, being a child under the age of twelve months, and
(b) the circumstances are such that, but for this section, the act or omission would have amounted to murder, and
(c) at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the childand may for that offence be tried and punished as for manslaughter."
Infanticide is really an offense, as much as any other felony. The Act even categorically states that if the circumstances were different it would be murder, demonstrating that it is not murder. That in other circumstances someone might be charged with murder simply makes my point; it's not just intention or culpability that determines the crime, every form of unlawful killing has it's own particular circumstances that determine whether it's that crime, or another, which has been committed..
Sure, like infanticide it's not murder, that was my point; it is possible to kill a person and be charged with an offence other than murder, because there are offences that better fit the act and circumstances.
And I am saying it is only ever murder when the facts fit the crime of murder and not another offense. When the facts fit another offense, that is the crime, not murder. The DPP doesn't aim for murder and work their way down to a crime that fits; they prosecute for the crime they believe was committed, whether it's murder, infanticide, voluntary homicide, dangerous driving causing death etc etc. A Judge might disagree, and instruct a jury that they may not convict a person of a crime when the facts don't support it, but direct that they consider another crime which the facts do support (as in the preamble of the Infanticide Act), in both instances they're considering which offence actually fits the facts. If the only offence which fits the facts is the destruction of unborn human life, or infanticide, then that is the offence that will be prosecuted, not because the criminal had a good defense against murder, but because the criminal did not commit murder.

This seems to just circle back to the beginning; human beings are entitled to the full protection of the law (as it applies to them) but killing them is not always murder in law, there are separate offenses, still committed intentionally, and not attracting the same penalties as murder.

I don't think anything you said above even mentioned quality of personhood, so I don't know why you'd think it would make it clear. I'd say it's clear that it's your opinion there should be some notion of quality of personhood (whatever that might be) in order to justify your position, but there's nothing in law that even appears to consider the possibility.
Except the fact that the Infanticide Act makes it an offence? It doesn't even include the word defence. That seems to be more your problem here....
That's not true though; it is not murder, it is infanticide, per the Act. What it would be were there no Infanticide Act is as open to question as what murder would be if there were no Criminal Justice Act, or the various other pieces of legislation that have defined unlawful killings over the centuries. We do know however that under the laws that do apply, infanticide is not murder, nor is the destruction of unborn human life, or voluntary manslaughter.

The idea of murder being the underlying act of all unlawful killing is more a matter of invention than law; the hard facts are that we have a number of offenses that deal with the intentional killing of other people and murder is just one of them. None of them mention quality of personhood because that's simply not a consideration, nor does the law need it to be. You might imagine that there is a crime of murder which can be reduced/excused/defended against in varying circumstances and therefore end up being a lesser crime, or you can imagine the opposite, that the crime depending on the circumstances is increasingly magnified/heinous/indefensible until it surpasses any other crime and becomes murder (or more accurately capital murder). Neither is necessarily true, they're both just points of view, but I'd suggest in a society that presumes innocence until guilt is proven, the latter is a more harmonious one. That all said, neither view precludes the unborn being a person in law.

I am conscious that whilst this is very interesting for me it is probably a little off topic, and some might consider it a case of feeding something that should not be fed, so I will not engage further.

I will say one thing though... I will be contacting my criminal law lecturer, I am sure she will be devastated to learn that infanticide is not a defence. She teaches infanticide in the defences section of the homicide module. Perhaps you could PM me your email address which I can pass onto her so she can contact you for advice when she is rewriting the module.

MrP

recedite

MrPudding wrote: »

I will say one thing though... I will be contacting my criminal law lecturer, I am sure she will be devastated to learn that infanticide is not a defence. She teaches infanticide in the defences section of the homicide module.

Check with her whether she considers it "a defence" or just "a lesser charge". Plea bargaining and/or getting the client off on a lesser charge might be part of the brief of a defence lawyer.
But if successful, technically the client would still be convicted of an offence, albeit a lesser one.

MrPudding wrote: »

I am conscious that whilst this is very interesting for me it is probably a little off topic, and some might consider it a case of feeding something that should not be fed, so I will not engage further. I will say one thing though... I will be contacting my criminal law lecturer, I am sure she will be devastated to learn that infanticide is not a defence. She teaches infanticide in the defences section of the homicide module. Perhaps you could PM me your email address which I can pass onto her so she can contact you for advice when she is rewriting the module.

With all due deference to fallacious appeals to authority (as well as snide ad hominems), may I suggest you don't ask her if your actual assertion that "infanticide isn't really an offence, it is more accurately described as a defence" is correct? I wouldn't want to be a party to her deciding to reduce your grade on the module for missing (or attempting to avoid) the fact that just because it may be used as partial defence, it doesn't make it not really an offence.

Outlaw Pete

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

...the fetus in the 12-16 weeks window by which just about ALL abortions by choice are performed.........

What absolute nonsense.

In the states (for example) there are around 900,000 abortions annually and of them, roughly 5% (45,000) occur at 16-24 weeks and you're saying "just about all" abortions are carried out at below 16 weeks?? That's an awful lot of babies (sorry: "blobs of biological matter / clumps of cells") to be discounting, don't you think?

Now I know a portion of that 5% will have been carried out on medical grounds but enough to make your "just about all" remark a remotely accurate one? Not. A. Hope.

aloyisious wrote: »

If abortion are covered by the 8th and by the POLDPA act, and it is not seen as murder but as destruction of the unborn then where be the notion that an unlawful act of killing or even the unlawful act of murder, or of infanticide, have relevance to abortion philosophical debates as they are separate criminal acts listed in laws covering other definitions of death by another's hand?

If you go back to about here on the thread you can see where Volchitsa's assertion that 'there are no situations in which you can legally choose to harm one person because you think a different person deserves help' entered the idea of personhood (back) into the discussion, following which she claimed that none of the automatic consequences of killing a person apply to killing a fetus, which introduced the subject of the various penalties for killing people in different circumstances.

aloyisious wrote: »

BTW, in respect of the life-taking debate, I think taking another's life is allowed for in law here when there is no other choice facing a person when it comes to defending one's own life, as in a house break-in. I know of one other lawful multi-scenario here, one faced by armed Gardai or Military here where the firing of live rounds is contained in orders, even down to preventing some-one from taking the weapon itself away from the lawful possession of the Garda or Military carrying it. Depending on the incident circumstances, the investigators might say there is no evidence of criminality in the firing, and no criminal charges are included, hence Mens Rea, nor the other constituent necessary for a criminal act charge, Actus Reus, would not apply.

I'd agree that killing someone in self defence would likely result in a conviction for a crime other that murder, if a conviction at all. And of course Gardai and the Armed Forces may be empowered to legally use lethal force which, being legal, could not result in a prosecution for unlawful killing.

aloyisious wrote: »

It would be interesting to find out if those two attributes are ever considered by the medical community here when it carries out abortions within the constraints of POLDPA. I specifically used ABORTION [lawful destruction of the unborn] as TERMINATIONS [by caesarian section or by early induction] are also allowed by POLDPA and there is blurring in usage of those two capitalized words. In the case of those last two procedures, the sentience and consciousness of the fetus is not a factor as it is being protectively delivered.

I would suggest that since the POLDPA makes no provision for either consciousness or sentience, predicating any action on such considerations would place it outside what is legally permissible under the Act.

Pardon me if I tread carefully around and ignore a set of "rabbit-holes" and continue on my way uninterrupted.

Delirium

Outlaw Pete wrote: »

What absolute nonsense.

In the states (for example) there are around 900,000 abortions annually and of them, roughly 5% (45,000) occur at 16-24 weeks and you're saying "just about all" abortions are carried out at below 16 weeks?? That's an awful lot of babies (sorry: "blobs of biological matter / clumps of cells") to be discounting, don't you think?

Now I know a portion of that 5% will have been carried out on medical grounds but enough to make your "just about all" remark a remotely accurate one? Not. A. Hope.

In what world is 95% not "just about all"?

recedite wrote: »

You have been quite certain that abortion should be permitted at any stage less than 12 weeks (and sometimes you mentioned 16 weeks) saying the foetus had no sentience and absolutely no right to independent life at that time. Despite that you said that human potential had some value, but apparently not in the above situation for some reason.

It is not so much that I said it has no value in that situation, so much as I am saying that it's relative value to other concerns renders it insignificant. All other things being equal I would value it and cherish it.

But what we have in such situation is an ACTUAL real sentient agent with choices, concerns and well being..... and a blob of a fetus. And as such it is monumentally more concern I hold for that former agent, than the "potential" of the latter.

That is the difference you should include when parsing my text, and the meaning of my words may then be more clear to you.

recedite wrote: »

Are we to extrapolate from this that no abortion (except where the foetus threatened the life of the mother) would be permitted after the 12/16 week line in the sand? Lets say, for example the foetus was found to be malformed or even dying, at 20 weeks.

There are all kinds of exceptions, sure. If the life of one or both is already starkly in question then of course I would have no issue with abortions in those scenarios.

However despite me using the phrase a few times it seems I need to be explicit in the context I am speaking of as when I am talking about this "line in the sand" I am SOLELY and ONLY and EXPRESSLY talking about "abortion by choice".

I am NOT talking about abortions for medical reasons and other pressing concerns. I am entirely talking about offering a service of allowing people to ELECT to have an abortion for no other reason than their own choice to do so. So when you ask me about things like Fetal abnormalities, you are missing the point of what I have been writing.

Outlaw Pete wrote: »

What absolute nonsense.

What is? Your "pie chart" expressely proves my point?

95% is indeed "just about all". Your grasp on statistics seems vague at best. And as you yourself pointed out my text said "just about all of ABORTIONS BY CHOICE", and the remaining 5% would indeed carry a significant quantity of abortions that happened for reasons other than choice (medical necessity, Fetal abnormality, and so forth).

Or were you describing your own post with a preface of it being "absolute nonsense", because that would at least be accurate. As it would be for just about all your posts on this website related to this particular topic.

volchitsa

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

What is? Your "pie chart" expressely proves my point?

95% is indeed "just about all". Your grasp on statistics seems vague at best. And as you yourself pointed out my text said "just about all of ABORTIONS BY CHOICE", and the remaining 5% would indeed carry a significant quantity of abortions that happened for reasons other than choice (medical necessity, Fetal abnormality, and so forth).

Or were you describing your own post with a preface of it being "absolute nonsense", because that would at least be accurate. As it would be for just about all your posts on this website related to this particular topic.

Since fetal abnormalities are only identified as the fetus develops, it's unlikely that many if any would be clearly diagnosed before 12 weeks. Abnormalities which are so massive as to be obvious before that will usually cause a miscarriage.

The 2015 UK figures (last available, published in 2016) say 2% of all terminations were on grounds E, i.e. seriously disabled - FFA and disability can only be diagnosed later in pregnancy, sometimes very late. UK government | Updated Abortion Statistics 2015

It's pure dishonest pro life propaganda to imply that women may have late abortions because they might wake up one morning at around 20 weeks pregnancy and say "Stuff this. I want to wear that little black dress when I go clubbing this weekend, I need an abortion." That's just not what happens.

volchitsa wrote: »

Since fetal abnormalities are only identified as the fetus develops, it's unlikely that many if any would be clearly diagnosed before 12 weeks.

Indeed. But myself and Pete are speaking of the 5% of abortions that occur after 16 weeks as he believes that 95% of abortions does not constitute "just about all" abortions. So nothing to do with "before 12 weeks" at all.

So if 2% of those remaining abortions are happening due to "grounds E", and some more % due to some other complications on the health or well being of the mother. Then that 95% is pushed still further higher and what Pete's issue with "just about all" just that stückchen more opaque.

But further to him not making any sense, he misrepresented my words too. I said "Just about all abortions by choice" happen before week 16. He, as is normal for him, stripped off the last three words to modify my point from what I did say, into what I did not say.

volchitsa

The UK government figures I took that from don't have a number for 16 weeks, they cite termination rates before 10 weeks and before 13 weeks, i.e. end of 12 weeks. That's why I mentioned 12 weeks.

But yes, clearly that's the point : when 2% of the total terminations are on Grounds E, almost none of that 2% will take place before 15 or 16 weeks, and possibly many are much later, partly because mid-2nd trimester ending of pregnancy, whether by miscarriage or abortion, is likely to be higher risk for the woman than an induced birth closer to term, when the body is getting ready to give birth.

So if there's a doubt about a serious fetal abnormality, even if that were first seen around 12-13 weeks, it would be likely that e woman would be encouraged to wait, 1) to be sure of how serious the problem is and 2) then perhaps for her own health, since the termination would by then have become more complex.

And the three percent left may have other equally pressing reasons, who knows? A sudden deterioration in the mother's health, for instance, or - especially in the US - difficulties in accessing. an abortion provider.

rainbow kirby

volchitsa wrote: »

So if there's a doubt about a serious fetal abnormality, even if that were first seen around 12-13 weeks, it would be likely that e woman would be encouraged to wait, 1) to be sure of how serious the problem is and 2) then perhaps for her own health, since the termination would by then have become more complex.

There's currently a case on Mumsnet where a 44 year old woman with her second trisomy pregnancy in a year (diagnosed at 12 weeks) ended up having to go private for a TFMR because the NHS services were booked out for a month. The procedure is a lot simpler before 14 weeks than the wait would have made it.

volchitsa

rainbow kirby wrote: »

There's currently a case on Mumsnet where a 44 year old woman with her second trisomy pregnancy in a year (diagnosed at 12 weeks) ended up having to go private for a TFMR because the NHS services were booked out for a month. The procedure is a lot simpler before 14 weeks than the wait would have made it.

Right, and in her case it was her second such pregnancy, which meant she'd been through it before and made up her mind. Someone else may have needed time to think it through. Very sad though.

Also, a definitive diagnosis at 12 weeks is very recent, and I suspect not the norm, even for trisomies. Most abnormalities don't have a simple blood test, and are seen later on, as the fetus develops.

There's a case mentioned in today's Irish Times of a pregnant young girl being sectioned under the mental health act by a psychiatrist, because it was felt that while the girl was at risk of self-harm and suicide as a result of her pregnancy, this could be managed by treatment and terminating the pregnancy wea not the solution.

Two other psychiatrists disagreed with the assessment, one that the girl had no mental health illness, she could not be detained under the act, the second, her treating consultant adolescent psychiatrist. The court also heard from the young girl’s treating adolescent psychiatrist who had last seen her the day before the detention application. He was of the opinion that while the young girl remained agitated and angry, she did not suffer from an acute mental health disorder that warranted her detention under the Mental Health Act 2001, the agitation was because of her pregnancy. He said her mental health was difficult to ascertain on admission because both she and her mother had thought they were being transferred to Dublin for an abortion and she was very agitated when she found that she was being admitted to a mental health unit.

There is no mention in the I/T report of POLDPA being invoked or used in the case. The case was before the courts last year and is one of 22 cases covered by the Child Care Reporting Project published today.

http://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/girl-sectioned-after-psychiatrist-ruled-out-abortion-1.3116111

So... distraught pregnant teen neither mentally ill nor in need of abortion? Interesting to note that she was discharged because she no longer had a mental illness.

Delirium

Absolam wrote: »

So... distraught pregnant teen neither mentally ill nor in need of abortion? Interesting to note that she was discharged because she no longer had a mental illness.

A young girl was at risk of suicide because she was pregnant and couldn't have an abortion.

She qualifies for an abortion under current legislation. The girl figured she was being transferred to Dublin so the abortion could be performed.

Instead she was sectioned.

What's the point of having clauses in legislation for when abortion is availble to women if it's not going to be followed?

Delirium wrote: »

A young girl was at risk of suicide because she was pregnant and couldn't have an abortion.
She qualifies for an abortion under current legislation. The girl figured she was being transferred to Dublin so the abortion could be performed.

That seems to be at odds with the opinions of the psychiatrists; the report doesn't say any of them thought she qualified for an abortion under the legislation. In fact, from what has been reported, none of them thought so. Following the legislation, a panel of doctors would need to agree that abortion is the necessary course, and that agreement seems notably absent.

Delirium

Absolam wrote: »

That seems to be at odds with the opinions of the psychiatrists; the report doesn't say any of them thought she qualified for an abortion under the legislation. In fact, from what has been reported, none of them thought so. Following the legislation, a panel of doctors would need to agree that abortion is the necessary course, and that agreement seems notably absent.

From the article:

an order was made to detain the girl on the evidence of a psychiatrist who said that while the child was at risk of self-harm and suicide as a result of the pregnancy, “this could be managed by treatment and that termination of pregnancy was not the solution for all the child’s problems at this stage”.

So she was sectioned because she was deemed a risk of suicide due to the pregnancy on evidence of a psychiatrist.

The legislation for suicide and abortion is:

Three physicians must concur; an obstetrician, a psychiatrist with experience treating women during or after pregnancy, and another psychiatrist.[19] At least one of them should consult the woman's GP with her consent. The termination would be an elective procedure performed at an appropriate institution.

She was sectioned instead of this being followed.

This is why it's problematic to have clauses of when to allow for abortion instead of having easier access to abortion.