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Child Item

Rescue 116 Crash at Blackrock, Co Mayo(Mod note in post 1)

sparrowcar

Contact lost just before 0100 off the west coast of Achill island on a rescue mission.
Search in progress including all available ships and Rescue 115.

Hopefully a positive outcome to this.

Please keep replies civil, and respectful of the crew and their families.

Please do not speculate as to any cause unless you have a factual basis to do so (and can back it up with information released to the public).

There will be zero tolerance for troublemakers or those that choose to ignore these guidelines.

There are other moderator messages in the thread, as a result of issues that have arisen, and we will be less forgiving going forward, due to the ongoing sensitivity of this incident

As per normal boards guidance, any comments on moderation are off topic and should be addressed directly to mods or cmods by PM. Any part of posts which are off topic in such a manner may be edited or removed, with possible sanction. Non news posts will be moved to the parallel R116 Non news and discussion thread

Should any new reports, updates or news stories come out, posts which can be boiled down to "I Told You So" or other triumphalism about previous commentary will result in significant punishment.

Any threadbans will carry over to any replacement thread should this approach 10,000 posts

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L1011

BoatMad wrote: »

what specific speculation are you referring to , I am genuinely perplexed

deductions are conclusions that are reached on the reasonable basis of the available information

Speculation is a conclusion based on little or no relevant available information

for example , we have reasonable deduce that the crew were not aware of the existence of the obstacle of Blackrock island along the line of the intended approach

I am not getting involved in a semantics debate here. Your "deductions" are going beyond what data we have. They are to stop. If you have issues with moderation, take it off thread rather than derailing it.

BoatMad

L1011 wrote: »

I am not getting involved in a semantics debate here. Your "deductions" are going beyond what data we have. They are to stop. If you have issues with moderation, take it off thread rather than derailing it.

therefore can we agree as to the facts

(a) the crew have admitted they had not been to black sod in a long time

(b) They decided to refuel in blacksod after initially deciding to refuel in sligo

(c) They selected the " operator route " ( approach to blacksoid bay south ) which consists of a series of preprogrammed waypoints leading to Blacksod LZ

(d) The report clearly states that the details of obstructions including BR were listed in the briefing notes and also available on certain pages of the map display. Th reports does not confirm nor deny that the crew accessed that information. But The report contains no evidence that the crew were aware of the existence of BR at the designated waypoint

(e) On reaching the arrival waypoint, a programmed decent to RA ( 2400 ) was undertaken , then a further decent under RA control using a SAR decent mode , to 200 feet and a programmed speed of 75 kts . Such a height is below the height of the light house and is close to the height of the island ( approx 70 metres )

(f) an autopilot commanded turn to the left, at about 1.5nM from waypoint near BR , to direct the aircraft onto the heading for the first approach waypoint, such waypoint being situated close to BR itself

(g) The aircraft proceeded , in an unchanged height and speed ) again this is in the report ) until a few seconds before actual impact, approx 55 seconds flying time from the start of the turn and consistent with the distance away and ground speed

(h) the rear crew member at approx 15 seconds before impact and 3 secs before impact called out for a course change , mentioning an unnamed island ahead, the report speculates on how he determined that information

(i) the course change was fed into the FMS and confirmed by the co-pilot, the FDR data suggests that the horizontal course change had not taken effect by the time of the second verbal warning

(f) The helicopter impacted a outbuilding near the lighthouse ( which was consistent with its programmed height ) whereupon significant tail damage occurred

(g) The out of control helicopter then impacted near the eastern end and then entered the water

(h) The commander of the aircraft was recovered approx 1 hour later in the water as a result of Rescue 118 directing a local lifeboat

(i) The height of the light is 282 feet above sea level , and flashes a white light with a period of 12seconds , or 5 flashes a minute and the White sector light covers the direction the Aircraft approaches the waypoint ( a red sector was elsewhere ). The white light has a stated range of 20 nM according to the commissioners of irish lights ( the red sector light has a range of 16 Nm ) , these are regarded as nominal ranges in clear conditions

homerjay2005

de biz wrote: »

The preliminary report confirms that R118 landed at Blacksod at approximately
22.28 hrs.

It would be interesting to see the track and vertical profile of their approach path.

wow, i never thought of that! its amazing, that given the level of issues being raised in this report, that this accident didnt happen before. if blackrock is missing off the maps, what else is missing also?

BoatMad

homerjay2005 wrote: »

wow, i never thought of that! its amazing, that given the level of issues being raised in this report, that this accident didnt happen before. if blackrock is missing off the maps, what else is missing also?

Blackrock is not missing off the maps and nobody but nobody puts their life in the hands of a GPS map solely

Gaoth Laidir

BoatMad wrote: »

and you seem to be entirely unaware of the power of a 16NM light especially 1 mile away from it . The loom in the cloud alone would have been extensive

to suggest it was invisible is ridiculous . it may not have been immediately obvious , but to someone that was aware it should have been there , it would have been most definitely obvious

Note that the aftercast for blackrock was

Visibility 2-3 km
Weather Mist and drizzle
Cloud Overcast with a cloud base of 300-400 ft

fog was not mentioned and the cloud base was certainly enough for the light to be visible

Boatmad, I think you fail to grasp the idea that surface visibility can be very different to flight visibility during scud running. Cloud base is not a perfectly solid surface, especially in misty conditions, which is what was present, even at the surface.

Storm 10

Anytime I saw Rescue 115 and 118 heading to Blacksod they flew along the Coastline , they land there a lot so we'll used to going in there

Gaoth Laidir

BoatMad wrote: »

therefore can we agree as to the facts

(a) the crew have admitted they had not been to black sod in a long time

(b) They decided to refuel in blacksod after initially deciding to refuel in sligo

(c) They selected the " operator route " ( approach to blacksoid bay south ) which consists of a series of preprogrammed waypoints leading to Blacksod LZ

(d) The report clearly states that the details of obstructions including BR were listed in the briefing notes and also available on certain pages of the map display. Th reports does not confirm nor deny that the crew accessed that information. But The report contains no evidence that the crew were aware of the existence of BR at the designated waypoint

(e) On reaching the arrival waypoint, a programmed decent to RA ( 2400 ) was undertaken , then a further decent under RA control using a SAR decent mode , to 200 feet and a programmed speed of 75 kts . Such a height is below the height of the light house and is close to the height of the island ( approx 70 metres )

(f) an autopilot commanded turn to the left, at about 1.5nM from waypoint near BR , to direct the aircraft onto the heading for the first approach waypoint, such waypoint being situated close to BR itself

(g) The aircraft proceeded , in an unchanged height and speed ) again this is in the report ) until a few seconds before actual impact, approx 55 seconds flying time from the start of the turn and consistent with the distance away and ground speed

(h) the rear crew member at approx 15 seconds before impact and 3 secs before impact called out for a course change , mentioning an unnamed island ahead, the report speculates on how he determined that information

(i) the course change was fed into the FMS and confirmed by the co-pilot, the FDR data suggests that the horizontal course change had not taken effect by the time of the second verbal warning

(f) The helicopter impacted a outbuilding near the lighthouse ( which was consistent with its programmed height ) whereupon significant tail damage occurred

(g) The out of control helicopter then impacted near the eastern end and then entered the water

(h) The commander of the aircraft was recovered approx 1 hour later in the water as a result of Rescue 118 directing a local lifeboat

(i) The height of the light is 282 feet above sea level , and flashes a white light with a period of 12seconds , or 5 flashes a minute and the White sector light covers the direction the Aircraft approaches the waypoint ( a red sector was elsewhere ). The white light has a stated range of 20 nM according to the commissioners of irish lights ( the red sector light has a range of 16 Nm ) , these are regarded as nominal ranges in clear conditions

But we're not talking clear conditions here.

Means Of Escape

BoatMad wrote: »

The sequence of what happened and the deductions that can be made are clear to see

(A) The crew departed Dublin , with an initial decision to refuel at Sligo airport
(B) They decided to change course and land and refuel at blacksod.
(C) The crew were unfamiliar with the approach to Blacksod having not attempted it for a " long" time
(D) For whatever reason the crew, clearly did not appraise themselves of the obstructions that existed on the designated approach route that was programmed into the FMS of the Heli , They did have access to that information , but there is clearly no evidence that they didi appraise themselves
(E) The Autopilot flew the course and then under autopilot began to transition down in steps to the radar altitude 2400 feet, whereupon a SAR mode level down was selected bringing the aircraft to 200 feet and 75knots airspeed ( with and intended 80knts ground speed ) .

We do not know why such a descent was selected

(F) The unfortunate occurrence was that the first waypoint on the approach to Blacksod from the south , using the preprogrammed route " The company or operator route " was close to Blackrock island.

(G) Hence the hellcopter was as a result of a crew decision , now flying low directly towards an obstacle that was higher then it

(H) A clear loss of situational awareness, meant the flying crew, never until,way too late, that they had put themselves into a dangerous position

This is what many posters have maintained since the report came out and indeed the week the crash happened however your high and mighty attitude like is quite irksome i.e. Comment about hitting ships at 200 feet -despite a pilot who flies copters from oil rigs for a living stating that 200 feet is not permitted by his company but you know better sailing boats .

faoiarvok

BoatMad wrote: »

(f) The helicopter impacted a outbuilding near the lighthouse ( which was consistent with its programmed height ) whereupon significant tail damage occurred

Correction, from the AAIU report:

In the final seconds, the helicopter pitched up rapidly,
impacted with terrain at the western end of Black Rock and departed from controlled
flight.

Tiles on the roof of the outhouse exhibited damage, consistent with
being struck by falling debris.

The AAIU believe damage to the outbuilding was caused by falling pieces of debris, not by the helicopter as a whole. They believe the impact point to be on the western face of the island.

BoatMad

Gaoth Laidir wrote: »

But we're not talking clear conditions here.

The aftercast describes mist and drizzle with a stated visibility of 2-3 Km ( poor visibility ) , from my experience on ships and yachts , that would not in any way render the light invisible at 1nM ( this is not speculation ) and certainly not invisible at 0.5 nM

Gaoth Laidir

BoatMad wrote: »

sorry , the period of the light is 12s , that is one ( or more flashes ) every 12 seconds, The light is sectored and has a range of 16Nm ( this is the surface range) This is a considerably powerful light compared to surface sea based lights

They were 1.5 nm away from the lighthouse when the turn began ,and it took over a minute to cover the distance to the lighthouse

Where did you get that from? With the call from the winchman commencing 26 seconds before impact, they were only 0.57 NM away from impact at that time. 13 seconds later the turn commenced but they were only about 0.28 NM (500 m) from impact.

the aspect of the lighthouse would have become visible as the Heli proceeded through its turn , gradually appearing own the left hand side of the aircraft

Nothing gradual about it. It all happened in a few seconds.

They then had anything from 50 seconds where the light would be visible , that upwards of 4 flashes , even if they had 30 seconds they would have seen 2-3 flashes

To suggest that at 200 feet , which is about 100 feet higher then the bridge of a big cargo vessel , at 1 mile out that a 16nM light was not visible is in my view simply ridiculous

Suggesting that it was visible when flying at 80 knots just under/in a 300-ft cloudbase, in already misty conditions, focused on instruments, with a strobe light is ridiculous.

Ive seen people at sea run into objects that were clearly there , because the automation told them , is was clear.

Again, sailing is very different to flying.

Means Of Escape

BoatMad wrote: »

Blackrock is not missing off the maps and nobody but nobody puts their life in the hands of a GPS map solely

Too many pilots ignore their instruments at their peril in fact a major contribution to accidents
Modern aircraft technology is quite sound and reliable and both pilots knew it and relied on it so much so the captain was interfacing with it in the final moments which would be correct procedure .
She couldn't have known that the obstacle was there and approaching it so quickly . SD and response to it takes time .
It would not have been an issue if they were 500 feet higher than they were .
This is the key element to the accident

faoiarvok

BoatMad wrote: »

(b) They decided to refuel in blacksod after initially deciding to refuel in sligo

From the report:

R116 departed for Sligo Airport, but they indicated to Dublin ATC that they were routing to either Sligo or Blacksod, and would decide which location to use while en route. At approximately 23.20 hrs, the R116 requested a routing to Blacksod from Dublin ATC, to refuel.

The crew did not initially decide to go to Sligo, then change their mind. They departed with their options open and decided on Blacksod while en route.

BoatMad

faoiarvok wrote: »

Correction, from the AAIU report:

The AAIU believe damage to the outbuilding was caused by falling pieces of debris, not by the helicopter as a whole. They believe the impact point to be on the western face of the island.

the only phrase used was

"The horizontal stabiliser was found on the rock, adjacent to an outhouse which was close to the lighthouse. Tiles on the roof of the outhouse exhibited damage, consistent with being struck by falling debris."

AT no point to my reading is the impact site mentioned as " face of the island " , this was actually a term used early on in the accident and is erroneous

TomOnBoard

BoatMad

faoiarvok wrote: »

From the report:

The crew did not initially decide to go to Sligo, then change their mind. They departed with their options open and decided on Blacksod while en route.

I think you are splitting hairs

the report states

"The helicopter initially routed towards Sligo on departure from Dublin. Following the completion of inflight fuel and time calculations, the destination was changed to Blacksod Lighthouse for an uplift of fuel prior to a planned routing towards the location of the SAR mission being conducted by R118."

[Deleted User]

BoatMad wrote: »

the only phrase used was

"The horizontal stabiliser was found on the rock, adjacent to an outhouse which was close to the lighthouse. Tiles on the roof of the outhouse exhibited damage, consistent with being struck by falling debris."

AT no point to my reading is the impact site mentioned as " face of the island " , this was actually a term used early on in the accident and is erroneous

Better than this though

(f) The helicopter impacted a outbuilding near the lighthouse ( which was consistent with its programmed height ) whereupon significant tail damage occurred

faoiarvok

BoatMad wrote: »

AT no point to my reading is the impact site mentioned as " face of the island " , this was actually a term used early on in the accident and is erroneous

What about the quote from the report?

In the final seconds, the helicopter pitched up rapidly,
impacted with terrain at the western end of Black Rock

You suggested that we agree to the facts. I think that's a good idea.

BoatMad

Means Of Escape wrote: »

Too many pilots ignore their instruments at their peril in fact a major contribution to accidents
Modern aircraft technology is quite sound and reliable and both pilots knew it and relied on it so much so the captain was interfacing with it in the final moments which would be correct procedure .
She couldn't have known that the obstacle was there and approaching it so quickly . SD and response to it takes time .
It would not have been an issue if they were 500 feet higher than they were .
This is the key element to the accident

This is not the case and I refer you to the you tube video " Children of the Magenta ". There are many documented cases of accidents occurring because pilots did not quickly regain manual control and resorted to FMS input instead

She couldn't have known that the obstacle was there

The report clearly states that two sources of information were present , the briefing notes page and the map information.

Clearly the commander was not aware of the island , however the report has not established whether the commander could have been aware of the island, it merely points out that such information was available to the pilots.

BoatMad

faoiarvok wrote: »

What about the quote from the report?

You suggested that we agree to the facts. I think that's a good idea.

yes impacted with terrain at the western end, i.e. it hit the ground near the outhouse . It did not run into the face of the western end

There is evidence that the helicopter was climbing on impact , whether this was controlled or uncontrolled was not deliberated upon at any length, its not clear that the cyclic ( or collective ) data refers to actual rotor pitch or commanded pitch

faoiarvok

BoatMad wrote: »

yes impacted with terrain at the western end, i.e. it hit the ground near the outhouse . It did not run into the face of the western end

There is evidence that the helicopter was climbing on impact , whether this was controlled or uncontrolled was not deliberated upon at any length, its not clear that the cyclic ( or collective ) data refers to actual rotor pitch or commanded pitch

OK, so basically the impact point is not yet publicly known, and I don't think we can agree on that item in your list of "facts", along with a couple others.

Can you elaborate on your source for a second impact on the eastern side of the island? Can't find any mention in the report.

Does anyone know what events the red and yellow lines on the FDR data in Appendix B of the report relate to? I'm guessing the red line is the moment of impact, as there appear to be sharp control movements in the seconds before, but I can't see any key to them in the report.

BoatMad

faoiarvok wrote: »

OK, so basically the impact point is not yet publicly known, and I don't think we can agree on that item in your list of "facts", along with a couple others.

I think we can safely assume that the report indicates contact was made adjacent to the outhouse at the western end of the rock

Can you elaborate on your source for a second impact on the eastern side of the island? Can't find any mention in the report.

apologies , that was from a comment elsewhere , the report mentioned several forms of debris recovered from non specific locations on the " rock "

Does anyone know what events the red and yellow lines on the FDR data in Appendix B of the report relate to? I'm guessing the red line is the moment of impact, as there appear to be sharp control movements in the seconds before, but I can't see any key to them in the report.

The report rather strangely does not elaborate at which point on the FDR/HUMS data where controlled flight was lost. The clear suggestion imparted by the lines is that the red one is where the report " believes" controlled flight ended and the yellow one is where reliable data collection ceased , but this is just my reading of the situation

it does synchronise the two graphs at this point "Just as the CVR rear crew channel recorded â€œCome right now come right COME RIGHTâ€, the HUMS data showed significant inputs on the cyclic and collective data parameters."

Means Of Escape

BoatMad wrote: »

This is not the case and I refer you to the you tube video " Children of the Magenta ". There are many documented cases of accidents occurring because pilots did not quickly regain manual control and resorted to FMS input instead

The report clearly states that two sources of information were present , the briefing notes page and the map information.

Clearly the commander was not aware of the island , however the report has not established whether the commander could have been aware of the island, it merely points out that such information was available to the pilots.

Yes the auto pilot should have been disengaged and the copter flown manually around the island
There was a significant delay in this
26 seconds from the initial warning from the wimchman
Does protocol require that a clarification be given by the winchman as to the danger he has alerted to before an action is taken or did he himself not fully realise the significance/ danger of the situation immediately upon seeing the outcrop because of SD ?

BoatMad

Means Of Escape wrote: »

Yes the auto pilot should have been disengaged and the copter flown manually around the island
There was a significant delay in this
26 seconds from the initial warning from the wimchman
Does protocol require that a clarification be given by the winchman as to the danger he has alerted to before an action is taken or did he himself not fully realise the significance/ danger of the situation immediately upon seeing the outcrop because of SD ?

protocol dictates that FMS based course input is cross checked as was evidenced on the CVR.

clearly the winch man realised that the initial warning was taking too long to result in a course change ( for whatever reason ) , we have no information as to why a decision was taken to effect a FMS course change as opposed to overriding the system and taking abrupt manual control ( which was clearly needed, i.e. an abrupt course change )

Its also clear that the last warning was given sadly virtually at the point of impact , and that at that point , the only control response recorded is rapid engine torque , and cyclic action , consistent with a helicopter climbing and confirmed by the baro altimeter while the RA shows the diminishing height consistent with the situation

faoiarvok

BoatMad wrote: »

The report rather strangely does not elaborate at which point on the FDR/HUMS data where controlled flight was lost. The clear suggestion imparted by the lines is that the red one is where the report " believes" controlled flight ended and the yellow one is where reliable data collection ceased , but this is just my reading of the situation

That's my assumption also.

From that then, the climb appears to be after the impact as stated in the report, with no climb shown up until after the red line, although there is cyclic and collective input just before it.

selectamatic

Means Of Escape wrote: »

Yes the auto pilot should have been disengaged and the copter flown manually around the island
There was a significant delay in this
26 seconds from the initial warning from the wimchman
Does protocol require that a clarification be given by the winchman as to the danger he has alerted to before an action is taken or did he himself not fully realise the significance/ danger of the situation immediately upon seeing the outcrop because of SD ?

Rad alt gave a warning of "altitude altitude" 26 seconds prior to impact. Captain Fitzpatrick said that's BLKMO itself it's a small little island. In actual fact they were passing over Carrickad and carrickduff at this point in time.

The rear crewmans warning came 13 seconds prior to impact with blackrock.

BoatMad

selectamatic wrote: »

Rad alt gave a warning of "altitude altitude" 26 seconds prior to impact. Captain Fitzpatrick said that's BLKMO itself it's a small little island. Ib actual fact they were passing over Carrickad and carrickduff at this point in time.
.

i think its not disputed that The pilot in charge knew ( or assumed ) that the waypoint was close to the islands mentioned, She clearly knew of their existence , if not their name, which makes it surprising that she was not aware ( or seemingly not aware ) of the existence of Blackrock.

Cloudio9

BoatMad wrote: »

iShe clearly knew of their existence , if not their name, which makes it surprising that she was not aware ( or seemingly not aware ) of the existence of Blackrock.

Is that clear? I think the report says she was monitoring a moving map display so was she just observing the islets on the moving map rather than having knowledge of them ? Is it known if Blackrock properly represented on the moving map ?

Also it says Capt Duffy was monitoring radar. It's confusing me that Blackrock was not also identifiable on his display

BoatMad

Cloudio9 wrote: »

Is that clear? I think the report says she was monitoring a moving map display so was she just observing the islets on the moving map rather than having knowledge of them ? Is it known if Blackrock properly represented on the moving map ?

Also it says Capt Duffy was monitoring radar. It's confusing me that Blackrock was not also identifiable on his display

well heres a confusing bit

"
Co-pilot (PM)
OK so small target at six miles eleven oâ€™clock Large
out to the right there"

can someone care to comment on " large out to the right there "

the commander responded

"Eh just a small little island... thatâ€™s B L M O itself"

I agree, it could have been a comment on the moving map, or something she personally knew , we will never know.

The comment is made in the report

"The helicopter was equipped with a EuroAvionics EuroNav 5 moving map display which had a number of maps/charts available for selection. The exact information in relation to Black Rock and Lighthouse varied from none, to detailed, depending on the selected map/chart."

my experience is this is typical of zoom levels on vector maps

ectoraige

Steve wrote: »

It's possible the approach hadn't been flown at night before in these meteorological conditions.

In particular, by a crew unfamiliar with the site. Once familiar with the route it's easier to confirm what you already know e.g. selecting the right mode on the moving display, double-checking the height of the lighthouse.