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Rescue 116 Crash at Blackrock, Co Mayo(Mod note in post 1)

sparrowcar

Contact lost just before 0100 off the west coast of Achill island on a rescue mission.
Search in progress including all available ships and Rescue 115.

Hopefully a positive outcome to this.

Please keep replies civil, and respectful of the crew and their families.

Please do not speculate as to any cause unless you have a factual basis to do so (and can back it up with information released to the public).

There will be zero tolerance for troublemakers or those that choose to ignore these guidelines.

There are other moderator messages in the thread, as a result of issues that have arisen, and we will be less forgiving going forward, due to the ongoing sensitivity of this incident

As per normal boards guidance, any comments on moderation are off topic and should be addressed directly to mods or cmods by PM. Any part of posts which are off topic in such a manner may be edited or removed, with possible sanction. Non news posts will be moved to the parallel R116 Non news and discussion thread

Should any new reports, updates or news stories come out, posts which can be boiled down to "I Told You So" or other triumphalism about previous commentary will result in significant punishment.

Any threadbans will carry over to any replacement thread should this approach 10,000 posts

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TomOnBoard wrote:

Just in relation to the ongoing recovery operation, I note a few areas in the AAIU report that may be of relevance.

TomOnBoard wrote:

In all the items mentioned as having been located, no mention is made of the 2 seats with their 4-point safety harnesses of the winch crew................ I believe the silence in respect of those 2 seats is significant, and as we know that at least the Operator was in his position as demonstrated by the call outs to turn right, it is reasonable to conclude that he was strapped in his seat at the time.?............. , they are (or were) still in their seats in the vicinity of the crash site.

Interesting observation. If the crew were/are in their seats that would suggest they may be still on the seabed. I presume those seats are fairly heavy.

In relation to the damage described to the fuselage in the report, it must have been one hell of an impact on to the surface of the sea.

Heart breaking report in any case.
RIP R116.

wotswattage

irishgeo wrote: »

It was working. But with low cloud maybe they didn't see it or it was between flashes. The helicopter moves alot faster than the ships it was designed for.

And they were flying towards Blacksod which also has a lighthouse albeit with a different flashing pattern and a few miles farther past Blackrock. Someone might have seen a single flash and thought 'oh there's Blacksod...'

smurfjed

Having said that, my anticipation initially, in the absence of information about a standard company approach was that they would have been crossing Blackrock at about 3000 Ft, and then doing the equivalent of an ILS terminating at about 2 miles south of Blacksod, with a visual transition to land.

You have said this a couple of times and it has caused confusion, Elastico for one. While that procedure would work perfectly for RWY 16 in Dublin when they return to base, here you had a situation where a crew were going to a destination which they were unfamiliar, they elected to be conservative by descending below the OVERCAST cloud base and following a published company route at a relatively slow speed. They were cautious and getting prepared early in their approach.

[*]

The company routes unfortunately doesn't have, nor probably wasn't required to have limiting altitudes.
The EGPWS database didn't have the terrain, this certainly isn't the first time that this has happened, the 1st day that the new Athens airport opened was chaotic for this very reason.
The final report will take another year or so, then the court cases will begin, I would expect them to be in the USA as the helicopter was built there and their legal system is much more prepared for this type of court case.
This report really showed how these professionals operated, and for those of us who fly, or sail, camp at the bottom of the Cliffs of Moher, or even get transferred to a hospital, we owe them a debt of gratitude.

smurfjed

Maybe its also time for the Coast Guard to include the requirement for the service to have Night Vision Goggles and PAY the associated cost of acquisition and training.

PukkaStukka

who or what agency / group would be responsible for maintaining and updating the mapping and location data that is in question right now?

TomOnBoard

View Profile wrote: »

In relation to the damage described to the fuselage in the report, it must have been one hell of an impact on to the surface of the sea.

Bear in mind that, in addition to the tail wreckage, a damaged landing wheel rim was also found near the helipad. Both the right hand and front landing gear were found on or near the wreckage. One could safely conclude that the wheel found on top of the rock came from the left hand side, and it's location is well forward of the tail area. This, coupled with the repeated references to damage on the left hand side suggests that more than the tail came in contact with the rock up high.

murphaph

kerry cow wrote: »

Ya Blackrock with a lighthouse on top !!!!!

Lighthouses are not designed to aid the navigation of anything except shipping. Aircraft move much too fast relative to the period of the light's flash.

Shipping is also actively looking for the light as it's on their charts (with colour, period etc). It's not some hazard warning light that a ship's captain sees at the last-minute and uses to dodge an obstacle. They are predominantly navigation aids.

[Deleted User]

No, BLKMO is the start point of a pre defined route that takes the aircraft to Blacksod.

I think you need to re-read the report. BLKMO may way well be a predefined company waypoint, but:

Page 5 (or 6) states:

The helicopter then commenced a left turn onto a south easterly heading. During this time the helicopter speed was manually selected to 75 kts. The Commander then requested a "direct to BLKMO" selection on the helicopter's Flight Management System (FMS). Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data indicates that the helicopter commenced a left turn towards BLKMO.

and they through the statement important enough to put it in quotes.

ED E

They would have travelled more than 450m between pulses, not a lot of chance to see and avoid.

We've seen they descended to 200ft to drop below the cloud cover while the light on the lighthouse is at almost 300ft so may not have been at all visible until the very last moment.

faoiarvok

Tow wrote: »

I think you need to re-read the report. BLKMO may way well be a predefined company waypoint, but:

Page 5 (or 6) states:

Going direct to the start point of a route does not change that waypoint to an end point for the route.

If you listen to LiveATC, you will hear aircraft "cleared direct [waypoint]" all day long. The aircraft will fly directly to that waypoint, then continue to the next planned waypoint in their route.

Means Of Escape

Irish Steve wrote: »

They would have been concentrating on instruments, because they were flying on instruments, in a place where their (incorrect) information told them there was nothing to worry about. Flying at night, over water, at low level, and in and out of cloud, that's the time when you are very dependent on your instruments, because there's nothing out of the window that will help you fly the aircraft, and in those weather conditions, the outside view may well cause more problems than it solves.

The other aspect is that it's very hard to work out what distance from you a lighthouse actually is, unless you can see more than one light, and then use a chart to compare the angles to get a position. In that area, at that time of night, and in that weather, they would not have seen much if they had looked out of the window.

They were following protocol and by the book so the fault is not with the crew

200ft approach level is too low even in daylight hours .
No margin for error or adequate height for evasive/emergency manoeuvres
Coupled with the fact that the island wasn't on their system gave them little chance .

That approach height will be the first to be reviewed and changed
Utter madness and totally illogical .

Storm 10

Guys just listened to the Pat Kenny show on Newstalk about Rescue 116, Kevin Byrne ex Air Corps was on and they went through the whole incident, it really explains what happened in a very simple to understand format given what is in the report, I would urge you to down load the podcast and listen it was excellent

smurfjed

That approach height will be the first to be reviewed and changed
Utter madness and totally illogical .

Then please give another method for a rescue helicopter to transition from IFR to VFR with an overcast cloud base of 300 feet?

Field east

Steve wrote: »

SOP for 'an approach like this' was descend to 200ft RA, it's in the report.

I have all the report but may have misssed / did not understand some bits , hence the following:-
Please excuse my ignorance , but what does SOP and RA stand for? Also , the distance between Blackrock and Blackrock fueling point , which was the R116 destination is circa 10Km. So at what point , between the above two locations, and going from Blackrock and Blacksod, was R116 programmed reach the 200ft level. And what altitude was it programmed to descend from?

Another point which baffles me. A diagram shows the flight path of R116 from Dublin to where it crashed - using a white line over the geography of the area covered during its final half hour-approx- of flying time . When the crew left Dublin it said that it still had not decided whether it would refuel at Sligo or Blacksod. I assume therefor that it punched in the relevant information as to where it wanted to refuel on the way. BUT why did it fly generally past Blacksod by well over 10km out to sea and then double back to Blacksod with the intention of refuelling.? I assume that it did not know where R117 was so what was the point in attempting to go out to it . And also, did R116 have enough fuel on board to go out to R117- not knowing where it was- before it would eventually refuel at Blacksod.?

frostyjacks

smurfjed wrote: »

Maybe its also time for the Coast Guard to include the requirement for the service to have Night Vision Goggles and PAY the associated cost of acquisition and training.

The guy on the Pat Kenny show just now said one of the guys in the back could see the rock on an infrared camera. Sounds like just another second or two would've made the difference.

DOCARCH

smurfjed wrote: »

Maybe its also time for the Coast Guard to include the requirement for the service to have Night Vision Goggles and PAY the associated cost of acquisition and training.

The pilot/co-pilot could not fly the aircraft with night vision goggles on with the light from instruments, etc., in the cockpit....they would be blinded by the light!

smurfjed

The pilot/co-pilot could not fly the aircraft with night vision goggles on with the light from instruments, etc., in the cockpit.

Are you sure?

gctest50

DOCARCH wrote: »

The pilot/co-pilot could not fly the aircraft with night vision goggles on with the light from instruments, etc., in the cockpit....they would be blinded by the light!

Them electronics lads are quare clever, I'd say they thought of that

you need part number :

VS92-0837L-000-3 : Alternate Lighting

Each alternate lighting kit consists of filters to modify all cockpit & cabin lighting sources

smurfjed

1: SOP = Standard operating procedure as published by the company and/or manufacturer and approved by the authorities.
2: RA = Radar Altimeter - device that bounces a radio wave beneath the aircraft to give a real height radar than using barometric altimeters, more accurate and less chance of having an incorrect pressure.
3: The lateral route and the vertical route were controlled separately, unlike most aircraft where they would be controlled together based on published lateral and vertical routes.
4: The mission planning for these flights are extremely fluid, they hadn't established communications to discuss their joint plan, so elected to refuel and increase their operational time.
5: Look at the terrain along their route, would you agree that it makes more sense to descend to such a low altitude over water to avoid terrain.

Gaoth Laidir

Ffs would people please read both the report and the preceding pages of this thread before bringing up the same questions that have been answered umpteen times. If you're too lazy to do that then stop asking the questions.

roadmaster

DOCARCH wrote: »

The pilot/co-pilot could not fly the aircraft with night vision goggles on with the light from instruments, etc., in the cockpit....they would be blinded by the light!

That can't be true how do the air corps fly the 139's with night googles. ?

TomOnBoard

DOCARCH wrote: »

The pilot/co-pilot could not fly the aircraft with night vision goggles on with the light from instruments, etc., in the cockpit....they would be blinded by the light!

The EO/IR camera was used by the winch operator and identified the obstacle 13 seconds before the initial impact. That same display was available to the pilots if they had selected it. (Par 3.4)

DOCARCH

TomOnBoard wrote: »

The EO/IR camera was used by the winch operator and identified the obstacle 13 seconds before the initial impact. That same display was available to the pilots if they had selected it. (Par 3.4)

Yes....so no need for the pilots to wear/fly with night vision goggles (as others have suggested).

Field east

irishgeo wrote: »

I have a few questions.

Why is the RA different to the actual flying altitude?

Were flying a preprogrammed route flown loads of times before?

Is the BLKMO the small island they flew over but before Blackrock itself?

Shocking how quickly it went bad just over 13 seconds.

Could a person not just pull a stick for a turn rather than typing it into the computer?

I assume that SARS missions to ships, etc,etc, in that general area have been flown many times before , both day and night. And probably using the programmed flight path selected by R116 on that fateful mission. So, IMHO, its beyond belief that , over all this time nobody said, ' Jasu-, look at that big lump of rock out there. That was a bit too close for comfort' and bring their concern to an appropriate authority to reorder the flight pat a safer distance away from Blackrock.
Also, many/do all heli flights from Dublin take the same route asR116 did when planning to refuel at Blacksod before it's onward journey?

Storm 10

RTE RADIO 1 now Sean O Rourke show

arubex

DOCARCH wrote: »

The pilot/co-pilot could not fly the aircraft with night vision goggles on with the light from instruments, etc., in the cockpit....they would be blinded by the light!

The CHC S-92s have NVG-compatible cockpits, design guidelines for such compatibility have been available for decades. At least the RAF's Chinooks and RN Sea Kings were operating with NVGs in the Falklands in the mid-1980s when I had friends on tour there.

CHC's original intention was to introduce NVGs for the pilots within 18 months of service entry, but apparently the Coastguard did not fund it.

I don't know why that was expected to be the Coastguard's responsibility to fund when it's quite clearly a safety-of-flight issue which should fall on the operator. The Coastguard is satisfied with the radar and IIR for SAR, they don't need the NVGs for search.

smurfjed

Yes....so no need for the pilots to wear/fly with night vision goggles (as others have suggested).

Completely different things. NVG would also provide them with instrument readings to enable them to fly and view, rather than just focus on a screen

TomOnBoard

DOCARCH wrote: »

Yes....so no need for the pilots to wear/fly with night vision goggles (as others have suggested).

I couldn't comment on that. However, a number of technology capabilities were on the aircraft that, used in a different way and with complete data might have bought enough time for the rock to have been avoided. I'm saying that because it can be too easy to say "if they had this" or "if they had that" it wouldn't have happened, and that's not always completely true.

DOCARCH

arubex wrote: »

The CHC S-92s have NVG-compatible cockpits, design guidelines for such compatibility have been available for decades..

CHC's original intention was to introduce NVGs for the pilots within 18 months of service entry, but apparently the Coastguard did not fund it.

Fair enough....I was not aware of that.

Field east

coolhandspan wrote: »

Hi elastico, i value your opinion also, but why not at 200ft?? they were on a run in to balacksod according to extracts?

I would expect that a pilot would fly at a very safe altitude especially when approaching a coastline from the sea, especially because of, tall islands, stacks, tall ships, etc. The closer one goes to the coastline the higher the chances of meeting such. So why not fly at a height safely above all this and only decent when you have to.