Was the Nazi War machine really that powerful?

tdv123 · 28-01-2014 6:05pm #1

They steamrolled over a few weaker countries some of which didn't put any resistance at all. & some success with their U-Boats in the Atlantic .

They had some early success against the Soviets but after Stalingrad in which the German 6th army was liquidated they were consistently on the retreat from the east & west.

riffmongous · 28-01-2014 9:19pm

Well you had one country fighting against the 4 largest empires/countries in the world, that's got to be considered powerful no matter how else you want to look at it

Fox_In_Socks · 28-01-2014 9:23pm

In many ways it was. The level of training for both officers and enlisted men was superior to almost all their enemies (bar British, maybe) in the late 30s/early 40s. The Soviets had been purged of competant leaders, the French were a rotten corps in many ways behind the Maginot line (though they were some of the better equipped forces), the British were and have always been a small army.

However, in terms of focus, it was all over the place. Instead of conquering western europe and then the USSR, they had to divert resources to North Africa, Yugoslavia and Greece. Instead of targeting airfields/conquering the air by targeting the RAF over Britain, they diverted resources to bombing British cities, which would ultimately come back to haunt them, with Britain serving as a aircraft carrier from 1943 onwards.

While major ground breaking technologies were developed/altered by the Germans during the war, (first jet fighter, first rocket fighter, V weapons), their enemies, especially the Soviets stuck to a certain limited amount of tried and tested weapons (aircraft, tanks, machine guns, assault rifles) that were the bread and butter of their forces. At one point the Germans were designed a 200 ton tank...the V 3-a sort of gigantic self propelled artillary launcher for bombing London never mind all the different guns, aircraft and transport devices.

Not to mention the considerable resources diverted away from the war and towards murdering captives such as Jews, gypsies, eastern prisoners of war. No nuclear bomb could be developed in time because the scientists involved had been hounded out of Europe. Of course if you have the top people such as Hitler interfering in your armed forces plans for war on a regular basis, then disasters like Stalingrad spring to mind.

His influence on the war machine was immense and not in a good way. He had different departments competing against each other...in that way it lowered the possibility of a coup, but also took focus away from achieving a victory. The idealogical failure of the Nazi war machine was considerable. If they had played their cards right, they could have had millions supporting them troops wise if they really wanted to end communism. Places like Ukraine, Belarus had no great love for the USSR after famines on the 20s. But instead of playing it cute, they brutalised the people out there and forced them to side with Stalin.

Tldr; the war was there's for the winning in many ways due to the quality and numbers of their forces training....though how long the peace after would have lasted is another hing.

Capt'n Midnight · 28-01-2014 9:31pm

Divide and conquer.

1/4 of the tanks used in the invasion of France came from Czechoslovakia, as were many of the guns used in the Atlantic Wall.

A lot of the transport used in the invasion of Russia came from France.

Could France + Czechoslovakia + Poland have beaten Germany ?

Manach · 28-01-2014 10:43pm

Offhand, the opponents that the Nazi faced were not inconsequential. The Poles may have antiqued arms but their pilots served above and beyond in the Battle of Britain, Various French units in the Maignot Line refused to surrender except when personally ordered to by the Defence minister and books have been written on the bravery of the Soviet infantry.
Saying that, based on my recent reading on a book on Von Mainstein, the Germans whilst still relying a great deal on hoofed transport grew out of a nucleas of 100,000 army. This allowed a common espirt d'corp and an excellent grasp of tactics from the squad to regimental level and beyond. But as other posters pointed out, they took on 4 large empires and geared their plans for a European war starting in 1942. Hence they lacked an appreciation of overall strategic planning with their high command no being able to communicate effectively with the various theatres of operation.

Judgement Day · 29-01-2014 12:05am

It was a damn close run thing, and if as much effort had gone into the development of an A-bomb as went into attacking Russia or exterminating the Jews, we would be living in the Third Reich today.

Manach · 29-01-2014 1:08am

Judgement Day wrote: »

development of an A-bomb

Rather ironically apparently the Nazi's were sceptical of the physics involved, as it was linked to "Jewish" science.

Capt'n Midnight · 29-01-2014 1:27am

Judgement Day wrote: »

It was a damn close run thing, and if as much effort had gone into the development of an A-bomb as went into attacking Russia or exterminating the Jews, we would be living in the Third Reich today.

eh yeah

The German A bomb project didn't get far, cubes on string vs the Americans figuring out density improvements through implosion. To produce plutonium the Americans had to build nuclear reactors. Otherwise you're relying on isotope separation to build a uranium bomb. A uranium bomb. Not two or three. One. Germany probably didn't have the spare power anyway. In the great scheme of things conventional bombing raids did more damage. Look at the Hamburg or Tokyo.

The B29 project cost more than the Manhattan project and Japan was defeated anyway. The A bomb didn't affect who was going to win the war. It's main effect was to allow South Korea to exist.

The main worry about the German nuclear program was the they would leave radioactive stuff as they retreated. But given Hitler's reluctance to use poison gas based on his WWI experience it's very likely he wouldn't have used radiation or biological weapons either, mainly because the other side had them too.

Yes they did develop very nasty nerve agents. Which would have been worse the A bombs. Probably best that the USA didn't have the option of nuking a Germany possessing sarin. http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/GodzillaThreshold

Reekwind · 29-01-2014 12:47pm

Fox_In_Socks wrote: »

His influence on the war machine was immense and not in a good way. He had different departments competing against each other...in that way it lowered the possibility of a coup, but also took focus away from achieving a victory

To play Devil's Advocate (almost literally): if it weren't for Hitler then the Wehrmacht would have still be slogging it out in Northern France as the German economy collapsed in '42. While he unquestionably made mistakes, Hitler's role in military matters was nowhere as malign as his generals claimed post-war. (If you listen exclusively to the latter, as many historians did, then you'd believe that the only thing stopping the mighty Wehrmacht was Hitler and the Russian winter.) A balanced appraisal of Hitler's military involvement has to concede that he was behind the Wehrmacht's greatest victories as well as its greatest defeats

The idealogical failure of the Nazi war machine was considerable. If they had played their cards right, they could have had millions supporting them troops wise if they really wanted to end communism. Places like Ukraine, Belarus had no great love for the USSR after famines on the 20s. But instead of playing it cute, they brutalised the people out there and forced them to side with Stalin

Much of the brutality that lay behind the various Nazi occupations was driven by necessity - the economy needed resources (human and material) and the Germans showed no compulsion about employing force to gain them. That would have been unlikely to change regardless of the Nazis' ideological make-up: the purpose of the Eastern conquests was to be bled dry to sustain the German war machine

Obviously there was a whole additional layer of atrocities that are directly attributable to the Nazis but that fundamental friction (the rapine nature of German conquest) was inherent in the whole enterprise. Nor did the Wehrmacht, as an institution, have a particularly good reputation for treating subject populations kindly, regardless of Nazi/SS encouragement

Tldr; the war was there's for the winning in many ways due to the quality and numbers of their forces training....though how long the peace after would have lasted is another hing.

To my mind Barbarossa was, for all practicable purposes, unwinnable. The campaign went about as well as could be expected and still fell short

Wurzelbert · 29-01-2014 1:25pm

the german war machine of the 3rd reich was all about quality and leadership rather than quantity, and they had learned a few of the lessons of the great war, more so than the winning side had.
at no point did germany have the industrial capacity to overwhelm the entire industrialised world (sans japan) in a prolonged war of attrition, and they knew it. the same applies to the overwhelming numerical superiority germany’s enemies always held.
only (too) late in the war were german industry and society really organised for an all-out war effort, and even then not all the way. for example german women never took over factory jobs in anything like the quantities women in the us or uk did. the relatively (and often deceivingly) high production figures of 44 were still not high enough and could only be achieved at the cost of quality, and what good are thousands of machines without fuel and the fully trained men to use them anyway.
so the only chance germany ever had (not unlike ww1) was to defeat its enemies in quick, sharp “blitzkrieg” campaigns, and that worked pretty well in 39/40, at least on land. the “battle of britain” was never really an all-out effort, and once they realised the brits wouldn’t just fold or “see reason”, they basically stopped it.
add to all that a number of other factors and some german blunders and miscalculations, and you end up in a war of attrition with most of the world against you, and the rest is history.
having said that, purely by the quality of its men, material and leadership, by its sheer fighting power and spirit, the german “nazi” military was without question the best major fighting force of the 20th century, in offense in the early war years just as well as in defense towards the end, and its military legacy lives on...

Reekwind · 29-01-2014 2:36pm

Wurzelbert wrote: »

for example german women never took over factory jobs in anything like the quantities women in the us or uk did.

Often overstated. German women were not mobilised for factory work on the scale of the UK or US because, unlike them, pre-war Germany already had a large number of female workers active in industry. For example, women comprised some 36% of the German workforce on the eve of war 1939, whereas Britain's wartime peak was 33%. (Harrison, Resource Mobilization for World War II)

tac foley · 30-01-2014 11:54am

Fox_In_Socks wrote: »

...with Britain serving as a aircraft carrier from 1943 onwards.

FiS - many thanks for your excellent post, however, please note that the US 8th Army Air Force arrived in UK in early 1942, not long after they joined the rest of us already fighting -

Quote - 'On 2 January 1942 the order activating the Eighth Air Force was signed and the headquarters was formed at Savannah GA., on 28 January. The War Department inWashington, D.C. announced that US ground forces were sent to Northern Ireland. On 8 January the activation of US Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI) was announced, and VIII Bomber Command (VIII BC) was established in England during February 1942. VIII BC was established at RAF Bomber Command Headquarters at High Wycombe on 22 February 1942.' End quote.

The large airfield on the hill outside the village where we live in UK became operational on 9 September 1942. The American are still there as I write this - in fact, one of them is stting here drinking my coffee and eating HIS muffins [Patrick says 'hi'].;)

tac

Wurzelbert · 30-01-2014 1:34pm

Reekwind wrote: »

Often overstated. German women were not mobilised for factory work on the scale of the UK or US because, unlike them, pre-war Germany already had a large number of female workers active in industry. For example, women comprised some 36% of the German workforce on the eve of war 1939, whereas Britain's wartime peak was 33%. (Harrison, Resource Mobilization for World War II)

mark harrison writes (c&p from his paper) “moreover, the hours of work of german workers, and the participation in work of german women, remained virtually unchanged in 1942 compared to 1939-a striking contrast to the british and soviet records of labour mobilization. overy in the times literary supplement (11 april 1986), p. 393 has pointed out that the share of women in the german working population on the eve of war was already higher (36 per cent) than britain’s wartime peak (33 per cent). it remains true, however, that employment of german women, both in the economy as a whole and in industry in particular, barely rose between 1939 and 1943; women contributed a mere fifth of the one million increase in the german working population between those years (see michalka, ed., weltmachtanspruch, pp. 389-90). in great britain, in contrast, between 1939 and 1943 the increase in female employment (2.2 million) was almost six times the increase in the total working population”

now let’s see...he quotes some guy from the times literary supplement from 1986 for the figures you mentioned. i’ll just assume mr. harrison did his homework on that data as i do not have the time to check all his sources, though it does seem a little thin by any scientific standards.
does harrison provide the necessary details in the actual book? without a detailed breakdown that 36/33 per cent statement is basically meaningless.
required would be details like the type of industry (strategic/armaments vs. other), female percentage of workforce in the different industries and percentage of overall female population working in each, taking into account non-german forced labour etc., and all that broken down by year (33-45). only then would we really be able to identify patterns and make solid statements on the mobilisation of women in germany in ww2.
i hope the book has it all, might check it out, been a while since i read up on that stuff myself.
it’s only a detail anyway, albeit an interesting one, and doesn’t change the fact that germany only later (too late) in the war really mobilised all-out, women or not...that was just a common example that came to mind...

addendum: this here is an interesting summary of the german war economy 39-45, unfortunately only in german but i assume a few around here can read german. the source is the dhm (deutsches historisches museum) in berlin, a great museum i can only recommend...

Reekwind · 30-01-2014 2:09pm

Wurzelbert wrote: »

now let’s see...he quotes some guy from the times literary supplement from 1986 for the figures you mentioned. i’ll just assume mr. harrison did his homework on that data as i do not have the time to check all his sources, though it does seem a little thin by any scientific standards.

He quotes Richard Overy: a man who has written one or two books on the war. The same claim is made in Tooze's Wages of Destruction (pretty much the definitive work on the Nazi economy)

I've no idea why you'd even bother to cast aspirations on Mark Harrison, one of the leading scholars of the economics of the war, insinuating that he fails to meet your "scientific standards"

Incidentally, Tooze's conclusions on the 'Total War' drive make interesting reading. He largely rejects the notion that Germany mobilised too late - arguing that the increases in production that came from '43 onwards were largely the product of new capital plant (laid down in the first year of war) coming on line and thus increasing industrial capacity

required would be details like the type of industry (strategic/armaments vs. other), female percentage of workforce in the different industries and percentage of overall female population working in each, taking into account non-german forced labour etc., and all that broken down by year (33-45). only then would we really be able to identify patterns and make solid statements on the mobilisation of women in germany in ww2

That's silly. Firstly because it's unnecessary for the purposes of international comparison. Trying to make such a comparison in detail, with all the hazards of comparing different categories from different bodies in different countries, is rarely a fulfilling past-time

Secondly, because it ignores the purpose of the headline figure: to illustrate the fact that Germany did not have some vast pool of labour that it failed to tap. Far from choosing not to mobilise women workers, Nazi Germany simply had far less room to do so than the other belligerent powers. That's not to say that it had completely exhausted the possibilities of female labour but it certainly outstripped the UK and USA in this regard.

Third, following on from the above, the Nazi regime did try to mobilise additional female workers from 1943 onwards but the relatively high levels already in industry meant that there was simply nowhere near enough to cover the shortfall. Unlike Britain and the US, there was only a very small pool of available labour from this area. Hence the turn to imported slave labour to alleviate the desperate labour shortage that bedevilled the Reich

And that's the key to all the above. The question is not what sectors women were employed in (as if you could take people out of shops or fields and still maintain a functioning economy) but the fact that there was simply no surplus labour available.

Finally, figures of a sort that you require do exist but they've been compiled by Richard Overy, a man whose opinion you don't seem to value. The exact balances I can't recall but his 'War and Economy in the Third Reich' does show a marked shift towards heavy industry: IIRC the number of women in the engineering/machining industry (alone) more than tripled over the war years, with a corresponding decrease in light industry

But really, I'm not sure why I've bothered with the above. You'll struggle to find a modern historian of the Nazi war economy who asserts that the Nazis missed a trick in mobilising female labour

Fratton Fred · 30-01-2014 3:03pm

tac foley wrote: »

The large airfield on the hill outside the village where we live in UK became operational on 9 September 1942. The American are still there as I write this - in fact, one of them is stting here drinking my coffee and eating HIS muffins [Patrick says 'hi'].;)

tac

So the Yanks are still "over here", are they stil "over paid" and "over sexed"?

Manach · 30-01-2014 3:14pm

Disgraceful. At that time of day he should be eating scones.

Slightly OT but related was I'd have had recommended an interesting book on the time of land lease era and US aid to the UK but not picked it up yet:
"Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America's Fight Over World War II, 1939-1941" by Lynne Olson. Supposed to give an insight in the political maneveuring behind the US economic assistance to the UK.

Jawgap · 30-01-2014 4:02pm

It's interesting to look at how the War progressed.

Germany started with inferior tanks and obsolescent aircraft but a superior command philosophy, much greater integration and a clear alignment between mission and methods.

As the war wore on, they developed technologically advanced weaponry but the loss of command experience, the ossification of their philosophy and the general deterioration of the systems undermined their efforts.

Meanwhile, the Allies developed improved technologies (though in many ways still inferior to their comparable German weapons) but found better ways to integrate, co-orindate and control them such that the whole was very much greater than the sum of its individual parts.

Yes, the Allies were better resourced, but from about 1943 onwards they just had a better way of making war and post-July 20 1944 they had a qualitatively superior way of campaigning (not just fighting).

Potatoeman · 30-01-2014 4:40pm

Jawgap wrote: »

It's interesting to look at how the War progressed.

Germany started with inferior tanks and obsolescent aircraft but a superior command philosophy, much greater integration and a clear alignment between mission and methods.

As the war wore on, they developed technologically advanced weaponry but the loss of command experience, the ossification of their philosophy and the general deterioration of the systems undermined their efforts.

Meanwhile, the Allies developed improved technologies (though in many ways still inferior to their comparable German weapons) but found better ways to integrate, co-orindate and control them such that the whole was very much greater than the sum of its individual parts.

Yes, the Allies were better resourced, but from about 1943 onwards they just had a better way of making war and post-July 20 1944 they had a qualitatively superior way of campaigning (not just fighting).

Its different advantages and disadvantages at different stages of the war that make any clear answer hard to justify. German tactics and training at the begining of the war earned them their reputation but code breakers and radar technology gave the allies a huge advantage later in the war.

Jawgap · 30-01-2014 4:47pm

Potatoeman wrote: »

Its different advantages and disadvantages at different stages of the war that make any clear answer hard to justify. German tactics and training at the begining of the war earned them their reputation but code breakers and radar technology gave the allies a huge advantage later in the war.

I would agree that codebreaking gave some advantages, but RADAR technology past about 1942 was about on a par - the Allies eventually caught up with the Germans! And the Germans still made great use of the technology for gun laying, while the Allies used it for blind bombing and both used it for aircraft and ship detection.

I would also submit that by about late 1943 the Allied soldier was, on a one to one basis, more than a match for his German counterpart - likewise the NCO and junior officer cadres. By that stage of the War, the Allied soldier had bested them in the desert, and carried out two major amphibious landings and fought them over a couple of mountain ranges.

Potatoeman · 30-01-2014 5:22pm

Jawgap wrote: »

I would agree that codebreaking gave some advantages, but RADAR technology past about 1942 was about on a par - the Allies eventually caught up with the Germans! And the Germans still made great use of the technology for gun laying, while the Allies used it for blind bombing and both used it for aircraft and ship detection.

I would also submit that by about late 1943 the Allied soldier was, on a one to one basis, more than a match for his German counterpart - likewise the NCO and junior officer cadres. By that stage of the War, the Allied soldier had bested them in the desert, and carried out two major amphibious landings and fought them over a couple of mountain ranges.

Yes they both had advantages at different stages of the war. The radar and code breaking though really tipped the scales in the atlantic.
The Germans nearing the end of the war had lost many seasoned commanders while the allies were growing theirs too.

Wurzelbert · 30-01-2014 9:24pm

Reekwind wrote: »

He quotes Richard Overy: a man who has written one or two books on the war. The same claim is made in Tooze's Wages of Destruction (pretty much the definitive work on the Nazi economy)

I've no idea why you'd even bother to cast aspirations on Mark Harrison, one of the leading scholars of the economics of the war, insinuating that he fails to meet your "scientific standards"

Incidentally, Tooze's conclusions on the 'Total War' drive make interesting reading. He largely rejects the notion that Germany mobilised too late - arguing that the increases in production that came from '43 onwards were largely the product of new capital plant (laid down in the first year of war) coming on line and thus increasing industrial capacity

That's silly. Firstly because it's unnecessary for the purposes of international comparison. Trying to make such a comparison in detail, with all the hazards of comparing different categories from different bodies in different countries, is rarely a fulfilling past-time

Secondly, because it ignores the purpose of the headline figure: to illustrate the fact that Germany did not have some vast pool of labour that it failed to tap. Far from choosing not to mobilise women workers, Nazi Germany simply had far less room to do so than the other belligerent powers. That's not to say that it had completely exhausted the possibilities of female labour but it certainly outstripped the UK and USA in this regard.

Third, following on from the above, the Nazi regime did try to mobilise additional female workers from 1943 onwards but the relatively high levels already in industry meant that there was simply nowhere near enough to cover the shortfall. Unlike Britain and the US, there was only a very small pool of available labour from this area. Hence the turn to imported slave labour to alleviate the desperate labour shortage that bedevilled the Reich

And that's the key to all the above. The question is not what sectors women were employed in (as if you could take people out of shops or fields and still maintain a functioning economy) but the fact that there was simply no surplus labour available.

Finally, figures of a sort that you require do exist but they've been compiled by Richard Overy, a man whose opinion you don't seem to value. The exact balances I can't recall but his 'War and Economy in the Third Reich' does show a marked shift towards heavy industry: IIRC the number of women in the engineering/machining industry (alone) more than tripled over the war years, with a corresponding decrease in light industry

But really, I'm not sure why I've bothered with the above. You'll struggle to find a modern historian of the Nazi war economy who asserts that the Nazis missed a trick in mobilising female labour

ah yes, richard overy, rings a bell now that you mention the first name...don’t always have the time to read through stuff properly when at work…
and btw, there is a whole world outside and beyond anglo-american historical science that you might consider tapping into at some stage, you might learn a thing or two...for starters, if you read german, i recommend you read the dhm article i posted. just a brief summary of the german war economy.

and in what way exactly the statement “the share of women in the german working population on the eve of war was already higher [...]” on its own tells us anything about how germany mobilised its women for the war effort still beats me…i thought this was about the mobilisation of human resources for the war and not about gender equality in the workplace…
according to the dhm, in september 1944 some 14.9 million german women were working altogether, only some 300k more than pre-war…do you really think all but 300k (available) german women were already working for the war effort before the war?

female workforce migration after the closing-down of most non-essential factories and shops from 1943 on is one factor in women’s mobilisation for the war effort, and there were still many women not really working at all in 1943 when measures to mobilise them were put into place, yet those measures were never enforced to the max with (too) many exceptions etc. to the end…not that it would have made a difference to the outcome of the war at that stage anyway…

addendum: according to the 1939 census there were about 31 million women between the ages of 16 and 70 living in the reich by 1944 and about 28 million between 18 and 65. so only roughly half of all women of working age were employed by 1944 altogether (as per the dhm). the dhm also states that the level of women employed during and for the war in ww2 was below the level of ww1.
unfortunately i still do not have a breakdown by type of industry and work.
considering a certain percentage of women being pregnant or having very small children, and a few sick and disabled ones, i am sure there would still have been a few million women who could have been mobilised in a nation fighting for its survival.
all this is basically also the info i got from all the german ladies of the war generation i personally knew and interviewed over the decades.

Capt'n Midnight · 30-01-2014 10:50pm

Potatoeman wrote: »

Its different advantages and disadvantages at different stages of the war that make any clear answer hard to justify. German tactics and training at the begining of the war earned them their reputation but code breakers and radar technology gave the allies a huge advantage later in the war.

What isn't mentioned much is that the Germans were probably as efficient in breaking the Allies weaker codes.

The Japanese had very weak codes, look at the battle of Midway or what happened to Yamamoto. And the American windtalkers used codewords as another layer.

Microwave Radar. The Germans had discovered the cavity magnetron too. The difference was they didn't use it because it wasn't stable. The transmitter frequency kept changing. The British worked around that by having the receiver tunable. In many other ways the allies won by having stuff that wasn't even second best. In other words they got stuff into the field rather than optimising it. The Russian T34 is a prime example. Yes it needed a better turret and yes it got one later but in 1942 they were driving them straight from the factory to the front without even painting them. But like Stalin said "Quantity has a quality of it's own" or something.

Reekwind · 01-02-2014 8:10pm

Wurzelbert wrote: »

and in what way exactly the statement “the share of women in the german working population on the eve of war was already higher [...]” on its own tell us anything about how germany mobilised its women for the war effort still beats me…i thought this was about the mobilisation of human resources for the war and not about gender equality in the workplace…

Rather obviously: because it meant that Germany had less reserves of underutilised female labour to make use of. Some 80% of the increase in the British workforce during the war came from tapping this previously little used labour pool. Germany, with more women in the workforce to begin with, could not follow suit. Surely that's not difficult to follow?

As for why we're discussing the topic at all: your statement that "german women never took over factory jobs in anything like the quantities women in the us or uk did" is simply wrong. Germany employed, in relative terms, far more women in industry than the US or UK

according to the dhm, in september 1944 some 14.9 million german women were working, only some 300k more than pre-war…do you really think all but 300k german women were already working for the war effort before the war?

The question was never "who is working for the war effort". Much of the female labour in all war countries went to replacing men conscripted into the army. Hence women became bus conductors, postal workers, administrators, bank workers, farmers, etc. That is, stepping into those vital roles needed to sustain the economy. The millions of women who entered the workforce in America, for example, didn't all become welders making planes.

And, as I noted above, for those women who were engaged in industry in 1939, there was a clear shift away from consumer industries and towards the producer industries. Even then, it comes with the caveat that such a orientation towards the war economy had begun long before 1939.

female workforce migration after the closing-down of most non-essential factories and shops from 1943 on is one factor in women’s mobilisation for the war effort, and there were still many women not really working at all in 1943 when measures to mobilise them were put into place, yet those measures were never enforced to the max with (too) many exceptions etc

Germany mobilised a higher percentage of its female population than any other major power, save the USSR. You can argue that it should have gone further (I disagree, see below) but you can certainly not hold this up as an example of Germany's failure to fully mobilise its economy

In absolute terms, even higher mobilisation rates would have produced little gain: Tooze reports Nazi estimates that an additional mobilisation drive could produce, at maximum and to the overall detriment of the economy, an additional 700k-1m worker, a fraction of the labour required. Compare with approx 15m foreign slave workers employed in the Reich during the war

Wibbs · 01-02-2014 8:17pm

Fox_In_Socks wrote: »

However, in terms of focus, it was all over the place. Instead of conquering western europe and then the USSR, they had to divert resources to North Africa, Yugoslavia and Greece.

I;d argue a little with the details of some of that FiS. A lot of their diversion tactics came from Italian fcukups that they felt bound to help their ally. Greece being a perfect example there. North Africa another example. What's impressive about the German war machine is how quickly they could mobilise and send huge amounts of men and materiel into a conflict. They got their stuff from France to Greece in little more than a weekend. This really rattled British observers at the time.

Instead of targeting airfields/conquering the air by targeting the RAF over Britain, they diverted resources to bombing British cities, which would ultimately come back to haunt them, with Britain serving as a aircraft carrier from 1943 onwards.

IMH their biggest error was fighting the battle of Britain in the first place. They simply had little chance of winning it. The luftwaffe was an extension of their ground forces, a tactical force, a mobile artillery of the air. It made blitzkrieg very successful. At that stage of the war they were pretty much unbeatable on land as the French and British forces found when they routed them. However the luftwaffe was never seen as a strategic force. Before they faced the channel, regulations had to be hastily torn up, like the order that single engined aircraft couldn't cross many miles of open water. They added life vests and rafts for the same reason. They simply hadn't thought enough ahead.

But let's imagine they continued to concentrate on UK airfields. This idea has gained currency since the war as a turning point for their campaign, I say shenanigans. Why? It takes a stupid amount of bombs to put an airfield of that time out of action. They were as the name suggests mostly glorified fields, few had metaled runways, which are easier to put out of action. Take out one and they can just move down the road remove some hedgerows and they're back in action. Depending on aircraft, all you need is 6-800 yards of clear rolling grass. The Germans knew this. They had been operating from just such cobbled together farmers fields in France. OK let's say they just concentrated on winning the fighter war in the air. Unlikely. Their fighters didn't have the range to roam about shooting down Hurricanes. Also the British contrary to popular were not fighting a foe who outnumbered them in the air. Yes the Germans had more bombers and the like, but they were equal on fighters, which was the type that mattered and they were building them in greater numbers than the Germans and losing less in the first place.

Even if they had won the air war outright in the south, that left the rest of te UK out of range of the luftwaffe, so they could continue the fight. Even then they didn't have enough ships to transport the German army across the channel, relying on cobbled together canal barges. Julius Caesar had a better invasion fleet.

What they should have done was ignore the UK. A few high ranking types thought this and that only Hitler bought Goerings BS(for a while) it may have been very different. After all they had already kicked their arse in France, they had already won the battle of the English channel by effectively closing off the channel ports through bombing and the channel itself through bombing and torpedo attacks. They were even flying missions up the Thames estuary causing mayhem. Leaving the UK cut off from mainland Europe and not wasting time, men and materiel on the Battle of Britain would have left them in a much better position. Of course the second they crossed into Russia all bets were off*. Which brings us to..

The idealogical failure of the Nazi war machine was considerable. If they had played their cards right, they could have had millions supporting them troops wise if they really wanted to end communism. Places like Ukraine, Belarus had no great love for the USSR after famines on the 20s. But instead of playing it cute, they brutalised the people out there and forced them to side with Stalin

I'd agree with this. Now I do take Reewind's "driven by necessity" point and how that helped screw up the chances of local help. Even so reading german guys stories about life on the ground, in the early stages the locals were only too pleased to help. They were quick to point out/hand up the local communist party head(usually schoolteachers). The locals were also surprised that the Germans were cool with, even encouraging them in resuming their then underground religious practices. While some German units(mostly infantry) tended to take what they wanted(as was common with all infantry back then. see Allied troops later on in Germany and elsewhere), others like Luftwaffe units who put down roots traded with the locals. It was certainly an opportunity missed in a big way.

As an aside it's also an attitude interesting for me in another way. The whole Nazi paraphernalia and thought had a real hard on for the Roman empire, yet they missed one vital thing that made Rome grow, namely getting locals on your side. More making locals "Romans" so long as they were swore allegiance to same. A Roman could be from anywhere, so long as they were faithful to Rome. Making Rome an aspiration rather than an enemy. The Nazi's shot their bolt there with the Jews and others they saw as "undesirables", but they could have made a philosophical exception for "white" Russia. It would have likely made a huge difference.

*though maybe not. Staling was hours away from running from Moscow with his tail between his legs, his special train was fired up and ready to steam away to the east. If the Germans had developed longer range strategic bombing to even a small degree, bombing Moscow at that point would have likely had him keep running

Wibbs · 01-02-2014 8:21pm

Interesting stuff Reekwind. I hadn't realised how dubious that oft quoted notion was.

Another area the Germans might have tightened up was in their continued production of non military commercial type industry. EG it was only towards the end of the war that the shops started to go bare of german made consumer goods and food rationing came late too. That was energy diverted that they could ill afford to waste.

beauf · 01-02-2014 8:39pm

The Battle of Britain is an interesting study. It wasn't as unbalanced as it initially appeared. UK had radar, an advanced system of reporting, fast repair of aircraft, and rotating pilot rest periods, and pilots and aircraft shot down could often be recovered and put back into the battle very fast. Even the aircraft were mostly ideally suited for the battle. The Germans were missing almost all of this, and were fighting a battle they weren't designed for.

Capt'n Midnight · 01-02-2014 9:42pm

beauf wrote: »

The Battle of Britain is an interesting study. It wasn't as unbalanced as it initially appeared. UK had radar, an advanced system of reporting, fast repair of aircraft, and rotating pilot rest periods, and pilots and aircraft shot down could often be recovered and put back into the battle very fast. Even the aircraft were mostly ideally suited for the battle. The Germans were missing almost all of this, and were fighting a battle they weren't designed for.

Spitfire was the better fighter. But what won the Battle of Britain was the easily repaired cloth coverings of the Hurricane.

Jawgap · 01-02-2014 9:59pm

Capt'n Midnight wrote: »

Spitfire was the better fighter. But what won the Battle of Britain was the easily repaired cloth coverings of the Hurricane.

Up to a point.....

Dowding's "penny packet" strategy - Park's implementation of it - Verney's day-to-day dispositions and of course the flying of the pilots were the main contributors to defeat being avoided.

The German's helped considerably - they failed to appreciate the system they were facing and changing their targeting policy changed in a haphazard way in a vain effort to try and figure out what they could hit that would be decisive.

In the end they never realised they needed to eliminate the Sector Station Control Rooms to hamstring 11 Group and food supplies / stockpiles to influence the political outlook of the government.

beauf · 01-02-2014 10:03pm

Capt'n Midnight wrote: »

Spitfire was the better fighter. But what won the Battle of Britain was the easily repaired cloth coverings of the Hurricane.

Are you overselling it a tad?

Figures maybe be very approx. But from a quick google it seems only the first 481 or so had fabric wings. After that they were metal skinned. Some of the older ones were also retro fitted with the metal skin wing. At the time of the Battle of Britain there were 1,715 hurricanes. Which suggest the vast majority were not fabric covered.

I thought the main advantage in repair was they were wooden, and also very strong, so took alot of damage, that could be repaired.

Open to correction.

Capt'n Midnight · 01-02-2014 10:08pm

Wibbs wrote: »

Another area the Germans might have tightened up was in their continued production of non military commercial type industry. EG it was only towards the end of the war that the shops started to go bare of german made consumer goods and food rationing came late too. That was energy diverted that they could ill afford to waste.

Even towards the end military equipment was built with all the trimmings and padding. The Russians in particular dispensed with anything non-essential.

Just a note. In the UK tank factories the fitters had files so if a piece didn't fit they could shave off a bit to make it fit. This speeded up production compared to the American system of sending the part back to remachined to the standard spec. But in the field this meant that the UK had awful problems making spare parts fit.

In terms of efficiency the Mosquito has to stand out. It was a two engined plane that could only carry half the bomb load of a four engined one. But it was twice as fast (compared to the Stirling anyway) because it didn't carry all the extra crew and gun turrets that the four engined ones did.

In a single night it could drop the same bomb load as the Stirling by simply making two trips. It only used half the engines. Less losses because it was a smaller faster target, and when it was lost there was a crew of two instead of seven.

http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-air-support/ww2-allied/mosquito.htm

It was said that the 2 man twin engined Mosquito could carry the same bomb load to Berlin as the 4 engined Flying Fortress with its crew of 11. It also did it quicker and used less fuel.

Using B17's and similar was just insane. Tens of thousands of aircrew died. The reason it was insane was because the military already knew how ineffective machine guns were against aircraft. Autocanon worked much better and had longer range. The German fighters could just stay out of range.
http://www.b17bomber.de/eng/details/verteidigung2.php

The Browning M 2 was the standard offensive/defensive weapon used by the US 8th Air Force. It weight 64lbs was 57 inches long, and fired 750 rounds per minute. Its effective range was 3,500 feet.

I can't find stats for bombers defence but overall the USAF was shooting about 12,700 rounds per plane shot down. 17 minutes of constant firing.
http://world-war-2.info/facts/

More US servicemen died in the Air Corps that the Marine Corps. While completing the required 30 missions, your chance of being killed was 71%. Not that bombers were helpless. A B-17 carried 4 tons of bombs and 1.5 tons of machine gun ammo. The US 8th Air Force shot down 6,098 fighter planes, 1 for every 12,700 shots fired.

As Reichmarschall Herman Goering put it "The British, who can afford aluminium better than we can, knock together a beautiful wooden aircraft that every piano factory over there is building, and they give it a speed which they have now increased yet again. What do you make of that?"

Capt'n Midnight · 01-02-2014 10:12pm

beauf wrote: »

Are you overselling it a tad?

Figures maybe be very approx. But from a quick google it seems only the first 481 or so had fabric wings. After that they were metal skinned. Some of the older ones were also retro fitted with the metal skin wing. At the time of the Battle of Britain there were 1,715 hurricanes. Which suggest the vast majority were not fabric covered.

I thought the main advantage in repair was they were wooden, and also very strong, so took alot of damage, that could be repaired.

Open to correction.

OK fair enough

But yeah mean time to repair was the critical factor

and they did shoot down more enemy aircraft than all the other defences put together during the Battle.

Jawgap · 01-02-2014 10:12pm

beauf wrote: »

Are you overselling it a tad?

Figures maybe be very approx. But from a quick google it seems only the first 481 or so had fabric wings. After that they were metal skinned. Some of the older ones were also retro fitted with the metal skin wing. At the time of the Battle of Britain there were 1,715 hurricanes. Which suggest the vast majority were not fabric covered.

I thought the main advantage in repair was they were wooden, and also very strong, so took alot of damage, that could be repaired.

Open to correction.

The Spit was a monocoque construction with a stressed skin - meaning it was strong, light but required specialist equipment and jigs to repair it when it was holed.

The Hurricane was less advanced and the 'skin' did not provide structural strength to the airframe. Making it easier to repair, less aerodynamic but very stable as a gun platform. It had a relatively low wing loading meaning it could turn tighter than even an Me109.

The Merlin engine was a great bit of kit but lacked fuel injection meaning it stalled during negative g manoeuvres - the Me109s with their fuel injection systems suffered no similar problems.

beauf · 01-02-2014 10:18pm

The fabric wings were replaced because of ballooning in a dive (I think) also "the metal skinned wings allowed a diving speed that was 80 mph (130 km/h) higher than the fabric-covered ones".

Jawgap · 01-02-2014 10:20pm

Capt'n Midnight wrote: »

OK fair enough

But yeah mean time to repair was the critical factor

and they did shoot down more enemy aircraft than all the other defences put together during the Battle.

That is true, but the critical battle was fighter -v- fighter.

Galland estimated that the Luftwaffe needed to score a 5:1 kill ratio to defeat Fighter Command and have enough force left to support the invasion. The Hurricane played its part and it was significant, but the Spit's contribution while quantitatively less, was qualitatively as important.

beauf · 01-02-2014 10:24pm

You have to wonder about the resources that the heavy bombers consumed. Might have been better used elsewhere. I like the point about the Mossie doing two trips for the same bomb load. Probably more accurate too. Sharkey Ward made a similar point about the Black buck raids in the Falklands. Harriers could have dropped the same tonnage for far less resources.

There always a lot of inter-service politics involved with Heavy Bombers.

beauf · 01-02-2014 10:27pm

Jawgap wrote: »

That is true, but the critical battle was fighter -v- fighter.

Galland estimated that the Luftwaffe needed to score a 5:1 kill ratio to defeat Fighter Command and have enough force left to support the invasion. The Hurricane played its part and it was significant, but the Spit's contribution while quantitatively less, was qualitatively as important.

As you say, the Germans realized they need air-superiority, and didn't achieve it.

Jawgap · 01-02-2014 10:28pm

beauf wrote: »

You have to wonder about the resources that the heavy bombers consumed. Might have been better used elsewhere. I like the point about the Mossie doing two trips for the same bomb load. Probably more accurate too. Sharkey Ward made a similar point about the Black buck raids in the Falklands. Harriers could have dropped the same tonnage for far less resources.

There always a lot of inter-service politics involved with Heavy Bombers.

Wouldn't have had the same psychological impact. Black Buck was as much about showing the Argies that the RAF could reach out and touch them if they wanted as it was about disabling the runway at Stanley.

If the Combined Bomber Offensive wasn't prosecuted all those fighters, flak gunners and 88s would have been off doing other things.

saabsaab · 01-02-2014 11:09pm

The damage to the British airforce was far greater than the damage inflicted on German war production and stiffened the German will to fight on. Although even a little damage and resources diverted from the war in Russia must have helped the Soviets it has been said that far more damage to the German war effort would have resulted from using Mosquito fast bombers for pinpoint industrial attacks only and abandoning the carpet bombing approach.

beauf · 01-02-2014 11:28pm

I would agree with more focus on tactical bombing. But not necessarily war production. As they managed to keep production up till quite late in the war, moving factories around and even underground.

Reekwind · 02-02-2014 12:42am

Wibbs wrote: »

I'd agree with this. Now I do take Reewind's "driven by necessity" point and how that helped screw up the chances of local help. Even so reading german guys stories about life on the ground, in the early stages the locals were only too pleased to help. They were quick to point out/hand up the local communist party head(usually schoolteachers). The locals were also surprised that the Germans were cool with, even encouraging them in resuming their then underground religious practices. While some German units(mostly infantry) tended to take what they wanted(as was common with all infantry back then. see Allied troops later on in Germany and elsewhere), others like Luftwaffe units who put down roots traded with the locals. It was certainly an opportunity missed in a big way

There's a great quote in Mark Mazower's Hitler's Empire from a Hungarian official to the effect that the occupying Germans never asked for anything, preferring to simply take it, and would only tolerate the the most supine of local governments.

This was why in every country under occupation, even those ruled by regimes eager to collaborate, German demands caused friction and gave rise to resistance of some sort. Partly this was the natural high-handedness of conquers but largely it was the German need for maximum exploitation to fuel the stuttering war economy at home. Vast amounts of resources, material and human, flowed into the Reich, generated by German arms in the occupied territories. It was pillaging on an unprecedented scale.

And that was the explicit rationale for the conquest of Russia and the Ukraine. Particularly so in the case of the latter, with its grain-producing tradition that would (in theory) satisfy the Reich's desperate need for bread. The Nazis didn't initially set out to starve Slaves, they only began to do so when it became clear that there wasn't enough food to satisfy both Germany and its eastern conquests. The latter would be stripped bare to feed German soldiers and workers.

In 1941 Stalin cannily, and cynically, noted that it would take up to six months for the Russian peasantry to wake up to the reality of German occupation. He wasn't wrong: the Nazis wanted the same thing the Soviets did (ie, grain) and were prepared to be equally brutal about extracting it. More so in fact.

So it's not a matter of unit level relations with the locals because the fundamental problem was economic, not simply racial superiority. (Obviously the latter turned a campaign of exploitation into one of genocide but that's almost by the by for our purposes.) Germany needed to get as much grain, in the Ukraine, as cheaply as it could to feed the Reich. Once the initial honeymoon period was over, that was inevitably going to create friction and resistance with the Soviet peasants

(Incidentally, Mazower also points out the similarities with German occupation during WW1: the overbearing presence of the military, racist laws that favoured Germans, the mobilisation of forced labour armies and, ultimately, the unrest that this generated in Poland and the Baltics)

(Second note, school teachers were rarely Communist Party members in the countryside. Most peasant teachers in the 1930s were the children of prosperous peasants or priests and thus occupied a very ambiguous role in the Soviet order. They certainly wouldn't have been local Party heads - teaching was a low status and low paid profession whereas heading a local Party apparatus would have been a well paid and full time job)

As an aside it's also an attitude interesting for me in another way. The whole Nazi paraphernalia and thought had a real hard on for the Roman empire, yet they missed one vital thing that made Rome grow, namely getting locals on your side. More making locals "Romans" so long as they were swore allegiance to same. A Roman could be from anywhere, so long as they were faithful to Rome. Making Rome an aspiration rather than an enemy. The Nazi's shot their bolt there with the Jews and others they saw as "undesirables", but they could have made a philosophical exception for "white" Russia. It would have likely made a huge difference.

Leaving aside the thorny question of Roman citizenship (and their habit of occasionally exterminating local cultures), the Nazis wouldn't have been Nazis if they didn't see the Slavs as inferior. And if they didn't think that, or weren't planning on stripping the East bare for the aggrandisement of Germany, then why bother with the war in the first place?

Both genocide and economic exploitation were inherent in the Nazi platform. Both mitigated against reaching any friendly relations with the locals

*though maybe not. Staling was hours away from running from Moscow with his tail between his legs, his special train was fired up and ready to steam away to the east. If the Germans had developed longer range strategic bombing to even a small degree, bombing Moscow at that point would have likely had him keep running

He also had quarters in the Metro system. If tanks at the gates of Moscow didn't have him running then it's unlikely that some additional bombs would have.

I say 'additional' because Moscow was bombed heavily during the war, from as early as July 1941 and all the way through Typhoon and beyond. Mind you, Moscow was as heavily fortified as any city in Europe and by all accounts its AA defences were very formidable.

Another area the Germans might have tightened up was in their continued production of non military commercial type industry. EG it was only towards the end of the war that the shops started to go bare of german made consumer goods and food rationing came late too. That was energy diverted that they could ill afford to waste.

The key area was food. Rationing was introduced in 1939 but was relatively generous for the first two years, when compared to the UK. Largely because the rest of Europe was being bled dry to provide for the Reich (see above).

In terms of other industry, keep in mind that Germany had effectively switched to a war economy by 1937 at the latest - the recovery of the 1930s was driven by the expansion of the war and producer industries. When war did break out the Reich Finance Ministry intentionally sought to depress consumer demand so as to finance the war through tapping people's saving accounts. This worked: according to Tooze German household consumption in 1941 was down approx 20% from the 1939 figure, as people had no choice but to save instead of spending (on non-existent consumer goods).

Now I don't know how this compares to the UK (it certainly didn't approach the sacrifices in the USSR... but that was a very different case) but we should be careful not to overstate the burdens in this area. The reality is that living standards in Germany fell continuously throughout the war years

Capt'n Midnight · 02-02-2014 3:03am

Jawgap wrote: »

Wouldn't have had the same psychological impact. Black Buck was as much about showing the Argies that the RAF could reach out and touch them if they wanted as it was about disabling the runway at Stanley.

They burned a lot of the remaining hours off the Vulcan airframes.

If the Combined Bomber Offensive wasn't prosecuted all those fighters, flak gunners and 88s would have been off doing other things.

They didn't need such pressure, just keep up the raids. Like a fleet in being. As long as the threat is there to bomb cities you have to provide a defence. On the other hand with the V2 there wasn't any point in patrolling the cities since you couldn't intercept them. Since the V2's were launched near enough the front line they didn't draw that many resources away from other things. And IIRC ground attack fighters chasing V2's were going for targets of opportunity too.

sawdoubters · 02-02-2014 3:22am

the winter stopped the germans in Russia

and for some strange reason the germans did not invade uk,they would have over run it,it was probably the royal family are german

then usa stepped in and dropped the nuclear bomb

http://bevinalexander.com/books/hitler-world-war-ii.htm

beauf · 02-02-2014 3:48am

Jawgap wrote: »

Wouldn't have had the same psychological impact. Black Buck was as much about showing the Argies that the RAF could reach out and touch them if they wanted as it was about disabling the runway at Stanley.

If the Combined Bomber Offensive wasn't prosecuted all those fighters, flak gunners and 88s would have been off doing other things.

What ever the intent the Black Buck achieved little. Remarkable effort that it was.

I wonder did the Bomber Offensive consume more resources than it tied down.

Reekwind · 02-02-2014 3:51am

sawdoubters wrote: »

the winter stopped the germans in Russia

And the millions of Soviet soldiers who died while bleeding the Wehrmacht dry on the road to Moscow needn't have bothered?

Typhoon failed not because of the mud or the rain but because the Germans were throwing depleted units at the end of their logistical tether against a foe whom they had completed underestimated.

Fox_In_Socks · 02-02-2014 4:49am

tac foley wrote: »

FiS - many thanks for your excellent post, however, please note that the US 8th Army Air Force arrived in UK in early 1942, not long after they joined the rest of us already fighting -

Apologies. What I meant was that it started to have a major impact on the civilian population in Germany from 43 onwards. Up to then, the average civilian had been spared carpet bombing. After 43, with gigantic resources been pumped into Britain, this was now becoming a norm.

Wibbs wrote: »

I;d argue a little with the details of some of that FiS. A lot of their diversion tactics came from Italian fcukups that they felt bound to help their ally. Greece being a perfect example there. North Africa another example. What's impressive about the German war machine is how quickly they could mobilise and send huge amounts of men and materiel into a conflict. They got their stuff from France to Greece in little more
than a weekend. This really rattled British observers at the time.

Oh definately. Those were political wars...the Reich had to be seen to be supporting it's Facist ally, but ultimately they were distractions. No oil/resources/enemies/threats in Greece, North Africa, Yugoslavia so no point in going there was my point. (No oil at least in the 40s, it was afterwards that Libya found major quantities). But a gigantic drain on resources was my point. How many hundreds of thousands had to surrender in North Africa? No navy to take them home...

IMH their biggest error was fighting the battle of Britain in the first place. They simply had little chance of winning it. The luftwaffe was an extension of their ground forces, a tactical force, a mobile artillery of the air. It made blitzkrieg very successful. At that stage of the war they were pretty much unbeatable on land as the French and British forces found when they routed them. However the luftwaffe was never seen as a strategic force. Before they faced the channel, regulations had to be hastily torn up, like the order that single engined aircraft couldn't cross many miles of open water. They added life vests and rafts for the same reason. They simply hadn't thought enough ahead.

But let's imagine they continued to concentrate on UK airfields. This idea has gained currency since the war as a turning point for their campaign, I say shenanigans. Why? It takes a stupid amount of bombs to put an airfield of that time out of action. They were as the name suggests mostly glorified fields, few had metaled runways, which are easier to put out of action. Take out one and they can just move down the road remove some hedgerows and they're back in action. Depending on aircraft, all you need is 6-800 yards of clear rolling grass. The Germans knew this. They had been operating from just such cobbled together farmers fields in France. OK let's say they just concentrated on winning the fighter war in the air. Unlikely. Their fighters didn't have the range to roam about shooting down Hurricanes. Also the British contrary to popular were not fighting a foe who outnumbered them in the air. Yes the Germans had more bombers and the like, but they were equal on fighters, which was the type that mattered and they were building them in greater numbers than the Germans and losing less in the first place.

Airfields and/or strategic factories. The means of aircraft production. I know they tried to target aircraft factories as best as they could, but if you are carpet bombing London or Coventry...are you really doing the best that you can? Rather than bombing civilians, you need to target actual relevant targets.

Even if they had won the air war outright in the south, that left the rest of te UK out of range of the luftwaffe, so they could continue the fight. Even then they didn't have enough ships to transport the German army across the channel, relying on cobbled together canal barges. Julius Caesar had a better invasion fleet.

No need for invasion fleet. The British navy would always have anniliated anything Germans could bring at that stage in the war. And the British army itself, though small, was formidable. The best bet the Germans could have done was to decimate the RAF enough before the USA could bring large amounts of material into the UK.

What they should have done was ignore the UK. A few high ranking types thought this and that only Hitler bought Goerings BS(for a while) it may have been very different. After all they had already kicked their arse in France, they had already won the battle of the English channel by effectively closing off the channel ports through bombing and the channel itself through bombing and torpedo attacks. They were even flying missions up the Thames estuary causing mayhem. Leaving the UK cut off from mainland Europe and not wasting time, men and materiel on the Battle of Britain would have left them in a much better position. Of course the second they crossed into Russia all bets were off*. Which brings us to..

I'd agree with this. Now I do take Reewind's "driven by necessity" point and how that helped screw up the chances of local help. Even so reading german guys stories about life on the ground, in the early stages the locals were only too pleased to help. They were quick to point out/hand up the local communist party head(usually schoolteachers). The locals were also surprised that the Germans were cool with, even encouraging them in resuming their then underground religious practices. While some German units(mostly infantry) tended to take what they wanted(as was common with all infantry back then. see Allied troops later on in Germany and elsewhere), others like Luftwaffe units who put down roots traded with the locals. It was certainly an opportunity missed in a big way.

As an aside it's also an attitude interesting for me in another way. The whole Nazi paraphernalia and thought had a real hard on for the Roman empire, yet they missed one vital thing that made Rome grow, namely getting locals on your side. More making locals "Romans" so long as they were swore allegiance to same. A Roman could be from anywhere, so long as they were faithful to Rome. Making Rome an aspiration rather than an enemy. The Nazi's shot their bolt there with the Jews and others they saw as "undesirables", but they could have made a philosophical exception for "white" Russia. It would have likely made a huge difference.

*though maybe not. Staling was hours away from running from Moscow with his tail between his legs, his special train was fired up and ready to steam away to the east. If the Germans had developed longer range strategic bombing to even a small degree, bombing Moscow at that point would have likely had him keep running

Jawgap · 02-02-2014 9:45am

saabsaab wrote: »

The damage to the British airforce was far greater than the damage inflicted on German war production and stiffened the German will to fight on. Although even a little damage and resources diverted from the war in Russia must have helped the Soviets it has been said that far more damage to the German war effort would have resulted from using Mosquito fast bombers for pinpoint industrial attacks only and abandoning the carpet bombing approach.

beauf wrote: »

I would agree with more focus on tactical bombing. But not necessarily war production. As they managed to keep production up till quite late in the war, moving factories around and even underground.

Accuracy in bombing in WWII was a function of altitude. The heavies were less accurate than the medium, light and fighter bombers because they bombed from higher altitudes. If they brought them down to lower altitudes like LeMay did in the Pacific when firebombing Japan, accuracy would have improved but so too would the casualty / loss rate.

Wonderful and all as the Mossie was it couldn't have carried a sufficient bomb load to have had an impact. The US Bombing Survey found after the war that hitting factories wasn't enough - to have a real impact you had to destroy machine tools, jigs, gauges etc. A Mossie could hit a factory with impressive accuracy but likely would not have destroyed the equipment in the factory.

The dispersal forced on German industry was not insignificant - it reduced efficiency and forced the Germans to burn more fuel and tie up more manpower to keep their production up. Every motorbike used to ferry parts between production sites was one less rider carrying messages on a front somewhere.

Capt'n Midnight wrote: »

They burned a lot of the remaining hours off the Vulcan airframes.

They didn't need such pressure, just keep up the raids. Like a fleet in being. As long as the threat is there to bomb cities you have to provide a defence. On the other hand with the V2 there wasn't any point in patrolling the cities since you couldn't intercept them. Since the V2's were launched near enough the front line they didn't draw that many resources away from other things. And IIRC ground attack fighters chasing V2's were going for targets of opportunity too.

The problem is that a battleship is a battleship and can't be used for much else beyond fighting other ships and shore bombardment. A fighter can be quickly converted to a fighter bomber and 88s and medium and light flak guns can be readily used to support ground troops - the existence of a bomber fleet would not have had the same impact on air defence as a navy would have on sea defence.

In Italy, the Allies once the air threat was sufficiently reduced converted their AA troops to infantry.

The V2 were 'uninterceptible' but were a wasteful weapon system when you consider the resources that had to be poured into their construction and operation. As with many things the Germans did, it was a far superior technology - but as the Allies found out your weapons don't have to be the best, they just have to be good enough.

beauf wrote: »

What ever the intent the Black Buck achieved little. Remarkable effort that it was.

I wonder did the Bomber Offensive consume more resources than it tied down.

The best thing about Black Buck was that the Yanks said it couldn't be done!

In respect of the CBO it probably didn't tie up as much as it consumed, but the Allies (really the Americans) could afford it. By Spring 1945 plans were already well advanced to convert 12th Air Force in Italy to B-28s and P-80 Shooting Stars - they didn't need to husband their resources the way the Germans did.

Capt'n Midnight · 02-02-2014 9:06pm

beauf wrote: »

What ever the intent the Black Buck achieved little. Remarkable effort that it was.

Still the longest bomber raid.

Technically the US has flown longer ones but not in harms way and nowhere near as far from a friendly airfield. http://www.barksdale.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4553

On Jan. 16-17, 1991, the 2nd Bomb Wing fired the opening shots of Operation DESERT STORM. Seven B-52Gs and crews executed what was then the longest combat mission in aviation history from Barksdale AFB to the Persian Gulf and launched conventional air-launched cruise missiles against strategic targets in Baghdad.

I wonder did the Bomber Offensive consume more resources than it tied down.

yes.

and it was known at the time.

Bomber Harris know that bombers didn't break the moral of Londoners.

Operations research at the time knew that bombers couldn't defend themselves effectively. Stripping a Lancaster of turrets and guns and gunners would give it an extra 50mph which would have reduced the loss rate, even if it hadn't there would have been less casualties. The stats on wounded are scary. Something like you were five times more likely to die than be wounded. Being a rear gunner was hazardous since one blind spot was directly underneath. It got to the stage where a DSO ( Distinguished Service Order ) was referred to as Dickie Shot Off. :eek:

beauf · 02-02-2014 9:33pm

Jawgap wrote: »

Accuracy in bombing in WWII was a function of altitude. The heavies were less accurate than the medium, light and fighter bombers because they bombed from higher altitudes.

If they brought them down to lower altitudes like LeMay did in the Pacific when firebombing Japan, accuracy would have improved but so too would the casualty / loss rate.....

What LeMay was doing was still area bombing if from low level, not tactical bombing. It was also firebombing cities which is as far from tactical bombing as you can get. It wasn't really that accurate either, a firestorm doesn't need to be.

Jawgap · 02-02-2014 9:57pm

beauf wrote: »

What LeMay was doing was still area bombing if from low level, not tactical bombing. It was also firebombing cities which is as far from tactical bombing as you can get. It wasn't really that accurate either, a firestorm doesn't need to be.

Yes, I know - the point I was making was accuracy is a function of altitude.

Tactical bombing was not as physically destructive as people think when it came to attacking forces in the field. The Operational Research Sections in the Desert Air Force, 2nd TAF and the various US Tactical Air Commands showed they had a much greater psychological and morale impact.

beauf · 02-02-2014 10:16pm

Can't argue with any of that.
I can't disagree with any of that. You have the clear example of the Falaise Pocket which a lot of amour was abandoned. The hit ratio of the A2G was over stated Most of the destroyed equipment was soft targets.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?p=429625&sid=00f47bf284dacd2b6ccc0d7313ff7ff1#p429625

it still was effective if not quite in the way intended.

Capt'n Midnight wrote: »

...

and it was known at the time.

Bomber Harris know that bombers didn't break the moral of Londoners....

The Blitz wasn't anything like the same scale as the Bombing of Germany. So doing the same thing on a vast scale might work.
We now know it didn't. I think it was partially a case of throwing good money after bad, thinking that would eventually work. Of course there were other reasons for doing it too. You could debate this forever.

Going back to the topic title. It hard to argue that the German War Machine wasn't powerful. Considering the ground it covered, the armies it smashed, and how long it took the combined effort of the largest countries with vast resources to defeat it.

Jawgap · 02-02-2014 10:21pm

Speer in his interview with the US Strategic Bombing Survey investigators said Hamburg put the fear of God in him. Area bombing (including the USAAF) drove morale down in the cities but not to the point where there was a push for surrendering.

He did, however, think that an moderate intensification of the bombing effort would have pushed civilian morale over the edge.

Was the Nazi War machine really that powerful?

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