Dawkins vs Sartre/ existentialism vs biological determinism

roosh wrote: »

I know that there are well respected physicists out there, such as Sean Carroll, who wouldn't agree that determinism has been ruled out and I'm willing to make the leap that he is familiar with the arguments that you raise here and himself remains unconvinced.

Carroll thinks he can get Many Worlds to work despite 60 years of it not working. His first attempt to do so was in 2014, which was later shown to be invalid by Adrian Kent. Since then he hasn't published anything on it aside from an essay in 2018 whose contents are invalid because they contradict theorems in QFT.

He might be unconvinced, but the question is are his objections reasonable? Considering some of them have been disproven and others contradict properties of QFT on curved spacetime, like most I would say no they are not. Further they show a lack of understanding in the Foundations of QM. No surprise since he isn't an expert in the field.

I'm not sure, Smolin uses the term in Einstein's Unfinished revolution to mean those who say that QM is not about the fundamental nature of reality, but about our knoweldge of it.

Copenhagen falls under that heading as well.

If the flash of light at a detector screeen is caused by a "beable" colliding with the screen to manifest as a "photon" then we still have determinism. Given that we cannot use the term "physical" to describe a "beable" we should call it "unphysical". If the "beable" is of a different substance then we have substance or cartesian dualism, if it is of the same substance we have a form of monism. Either way, both scenarios are deterministic.

This analysis leaves out several positions like "substance monism-epistemic dualism" explored by many philosophers and physicists. The possibilities aren't only the simple ones you give here. I'd read d'Espagnat's book.

As d'Espagnat mentions in one example the underlying ontology could be monist and physical/matter is just a human characterisation of certain sections of the world. Thus everything could be one substance and yet not everything be physical, i.e. somethings are physical and others unphysical but without substance dualism.

Determinisitc/random are properties of mathematical models of phenomena. According to QM the underlying metaphysics behind the detector flashes is not modellable, thus isn't deterministic or random in a strict sense. Rather it is unmodellable.

So where does "my will" come into play, where does "your will" come in to play? I can see where there is freedom of outcome, but not freedom of will.

Did you read what I wrote? See here:

Quantum probability dictates the chances of the outcomes associated to a given observable once one is chosen. It does not dictate the choice of observable itself. Nothing physical does according to the theory.

As I said I am not taking about the outcomes of an observable, to which QM assigns probabilities, but the choice of observable, which QM does not model. Thus your choice of observable is not physically modeled either deterministically or probabilitistically.

Your choice of which observable to investigate (not the outcome of same) is "free".

roosh wrote: »

Would it not be fair to say that Copenhagen can fall under this heading? It's just that it appears that, when Copenhagen is probed, it necessitates anti-realism or one of the other interpretations you allude to.

I just read Smolin's book in order to explain this. Note that the terminology he uses is not really standard. Roughly speaking though Copenhagen is (using his terms) anti-realist, epistmologist and operationalist. It's more that for example Bohr cared more about the first part, Heisenberg cared more about the latter. "Care" in the sense of wrote more about. However both do acknowledge and mention the other points.

If the underlying ontology is monist then it can only be either physical or unphysical, with human characterisation not being representative of that underlying ontology.

No those are not the only possibilities, because as the last 100 years have shown us, you have to be very careful about the terminology. I think you are using "physical" in its everyday sense, as contrasted with "magical" as you said. Both of these categories (everyday) physical/magical are too vague and unspecified to discuss QM properly. Thus it is best to just drop them.

The underlying ontology might be monist with physical parts and unphysical parts without contradicting substance monism as physical/unphysical are epistemological categories not ontic ones.

It's best to just come away from the everyday notions and learn the proper terminology from d'Espagnat's book.

But, if it is unmodellable, that would mean that our models of the universe can never be complete

Yes.

but that is a comment on the limitations of scientific inquiry as opposed to a statement about the ontology of the universe.

It can be both. There is something about the ontology of the world that limits scientific inquiry.

So, there is an underlying metaphysics which gives rise to the detector flash. This means that it is determined by a prior state, even if it is to be argued that we cannot apply the conceptual label "physical" to that state. If we can't use the word state then we can say it is determined by the metaphysical nature of the system. It's still deterministic. It might not be how the word "deterministic" is used in a mathematical sense, but it is deterministic in the more general sense of being caused by the prior nature of the system.

This is applying Boolean logic to the underlying metaphysics. Which we already know cannot be true. I know this is hard to understand but QM actually prevents the logic (literally the way you are combining facts) involved in your argument. This is because QM has a non-Boolean structure, which is the feature behind all the no-go theorems like Bell and Kochen-Secker and PBR.

Human language has Boolean inference built into it, thus without learning QM it is very difficult to reason about quantum systems.

I did see what you wrote, but perhaps I didn't fully understand it. I am questioning why you have put free in inverted commas there. When we do this, we usually mean that it is not really what it purports to be. Was that your intention to imply that we call it "free will" but it isn't really free?

It means it's shorthand because I can't give a course in Non-Boolean probability theory. It's a technical notion being approximated by its closest term in everyday language.

If we're talking about free will and our choice of experiment, then there is no escaping the first-person perspective. When one pays close enough attention to the mind it is possible to question the degree to which our will is actually free. Indeed, it is possible to question the nature of "the self" to whom the will is supposed to belong, in the first place.

Through careful reflective, empirical observation, we can see that we are beholden to a form of psychological determinism. Our choice of experiment or observable isn't free, it isn't controlled by ourselves. Indeed, the very notion of "self" proves to be very elusive when subjected to scrutiny.

I would say that although that introspection shows a degree of constraint, I don't think it implies no choice. Such an absence of choice would contradict QM which is, in the ladder of science, supposed to bedrock other empirical theories.

For if we say that our choices are dictated by our neurons, and our neurons are dictated by biochemistry, biochemistry is dictated by quantum physics and we then find quantum physics requires those choices at the start of the chain we can't close the loop. We can't terminate in a fundamental cause.

QM presents this freedom as an unanalysable primitive in the theory. You can't use other empirical facts to contradict it if you accept QM as the basis of physics. Since if QM is the fundamental theory, then ultimately all other theories will refer back to this freedom in their chains of inference. Which leads into your next point.

Something occurred to me earlier, as my mind was processing all of the information from our discussion, the thought arose in my mind that when we talk about Free Will and the choice of observable, we are talking about an intrinsically first-person experience. Perhaps these no-go theorem's for QM are representative of the limitations of scientific empiricism and the need to embrace first-person empiricism and theory - namely meditation and Buddhist philosophy. I usually refer to it as spiritual empiricism because Buddhist philosophy and practice are "spiritual" practices grounded in first-person empiricism.

You will find it no surprise that many of the founders of QM (Bohr, Pauli, Oppenheimer) had many positive things to say about Eastern Philosophy for the reasons you mention here.
There is the strong implication that QM is very "first person". The only real disagreement within Copenhagen has always been how far to take this. With Bohr on one conservative end and QBists on the other more radical end. Bohr would have said that although the choice of observable is up to us, the resultant outcome is always a "global fact" accessible to all/a "shareable" experience. QBists however say exactly what you have said:

we are talking about an intrinsically first-person experience

and that the outcome being shareable need not always be true.

So QM says:

1. We are free to "prod" the world as we wish. Nothing determines that choice.
2. The world will then react back in some manner.
3. You can use quantum theory to compute the various chances of reacting back. These probabilities will depend on your previous knowledge and "proddings". The theory doesn't give fixed universal probabilities. Imagine a system of ten particles. Two people who have measured particles 1,2 and 3,4 respectively will have different probabilities for what particle 5 will do.

Note that points 1 and 3 are explicitly first-person/subjective. The only disagreement would be on whether point 2 is first person. Bohr would say the reaction back can be shown to all others or shared. QBists would say not necessarily.

Personally I side with Bohr, but this could be simple reticence on my part to fully dive into what the theory implies. The last five or so years have made the QBist position more plausible I would say.

I have to say I applaud the incisiveness of your observation here. I really do recommend getting a hold of d'Espagnat's book and "QBism" by Hans von Bayers. Also if possible "Atom and Void" by Robert Oppenheimer, especially the second last chapter.

I understand that it might be a bit difficult to jump back into this discussion from cold but I'll post a reply and see if we can go from there.

Fourier wrote: »

I just read Smolin's book in order to explain this. Note that the terminology he uses is not really standard. Roughly speaking though Copenhagen is (using his terms) anti-realist, epistmologist and operationalist. It's more that for example Bohr cared more about the first part, Heisenberg cared more about the latter. "Care" in the sense of wrote more about. However both do acknowledge and mention the other points.

Ah, I appreciate you going to that trouble.

Fourier wrote: »

roosh wrote: »

If the underlying ontology is monist then it can only be either physical or unphysical, with human characterisation not being representative of that underlying ontology.

No those are not the only possibilities, because as the last 100 years have shown us, you have to be very careful about the terminology. I think you are using "physical" in its everyday sense, as contrasted with "magical" as you said. Both of these categories (everyday) physical/magical are too vague and unspecified to discuss QM properly. Thus it is best to just drop them.

The underlying ontology might be monist with physical parts and unphysical parts without contradicting substance monism as physical/unphysical are epistemological categories not ontic ones.

It's best to just come away from the everyday notions and learn the proper terminology from d'Espagnat's book.

I wasn't able to get a copy of On Physics and Philosophy in ebook format bcos, unfortunately, it appears as though it isn't available in that format. I have been reading Veiled Reality as well as a few papers form d'Espagnat and I must say, thank you very much for the recommendation! His writing is very insightful, cogent, and direct. I'm certain I haven't fully grasped everything thus far, but hopefully enough to gain a more thorough understanding through discussing it.

I have heard d'Espagnat's position characterised as "monistic idealism" but, if my understanding is correct, the use of terms like "realism" and "idealism" can be misleading, as they can be interpreted in different ways. Realism often tends to be interpreted in the context of the inter-subjective agreement we have about the phenomena we observe, things like our desks, computers, trees, etc. In this context realism tells us that we arrive at this agreement because the objects themselves exist independently of us i.e. the phenomena are representative of the "things in themselves". On the other hand, idealism says either that the former is false or that we simply cannot determine it to be true. An issue that gets raised in relation to this notion of idealism is the question of how we can arrive at inter-subjective agreement in this case.

On the subject of inter-subjective agreement, quantum mechanics seems to tell us that that the common sense notion of realism doesn't apply at the quantum level; particles cannot be said to have definite positions, yet inter-subjective agreement is still reached.

Am I correct in thinking that his "monistic idealism" is almost a hybrid of realism and idealism? The idea that there is an independent reality but we are restricted to our observations of it; that what we observe is not the "things in themselves" but shadows of them, to borrow from the Platonic interpretation. Essentially that there is a real, independent reality but we can only ever probe it through the veil of our sense perceptions. Would that be an any way accurate representation?

Fourier wrote: »

roosh wrote: »

So, there is an underlying metaphysics which gives rise to the detector flash. This means that it is determined by a prior state, even if it is to be argued that we cannot apply the conceptual label "physical" to that state. If we can't use the word state then we can say it is determined by the metaphysical nature of the system. It's still deterministic. It might not be how the word "deterministic" is used in a mathematical sense, but it is deterministic in the more general sense of being caused by the prior nature of the system.

This is applying Boolean logic to the underlying metaphysics. Which we already know cannot be true. I know this is hard to understand but QM actually prevents the logic (literally the way you are combining facts) involved in your argument. This is because QM has a non-Boolean structure, which is the feature behind all the no-go theorems like Bell and Kochen-Secker and PBR.

Human language has Boolean inference built into it, thus without learning QM it is very difficult to reason about quantum systems.


It means it's shorthand because I can't give a course in Non-Boolean probability theory. It's a technical notion being approximated by its closest term in everyday language.

Would you happen to have any suggestions for introductory resources to non-boolean logic?

I'm thinking that it should be possible, in the context of this discussion at least, to start from the ground up and define our terms as we go. I don't think we would need to get too intricate to get to the point that I am trying to make. Literally,

Utilising a Cartesian type deconstruction we can establish that, by virtue of our discussion here, there is such thing as language, which we use to try and communicate about our experience. Our experience itself establishes the fact that there is existence. We can use the term "thing" to refer to whatever can be said to exist. We don't need to define the criteria for existence or even identify what does exist. We can reason that, by virtue of our experience some "thing" exists. We also don't need to specify the nature of this "thing" that must exist. In this way, we can avoid using terms such as "physical" and "non-physical".

Developing our system of language, we can use the term Universe to refer to the totality of existence. That is, all of the things that can be said to exist are (or is) together labelled "the Universe". A consequence of this is that the Universe is only made of those things that exist and everywhere the Universe is, there must be some "thing" there.

If we apply this to our quantum system, where a particle/flash of light registers on a detector screen, we know that it must correspond to some "thing" because it is part of the Universe. It cannot correspond to no "thing" because the universe is only made up of "things" which exist. We can also know that, immediately prior to the "thing" hitting the screen, it must have been located elsewhere in the Universe. If it wasn't located elsewhere in the Universe, then it didn't exist. If it didn't exist, then it couldn't have interacted with the screen to give the flash of light. The flash of light must have been caused by some "thing" colliding with the screen. We would apply the term "determinism" to this sequence of events.

I'm not entirely sure if this might appear as though its applying boolean logic, but I would argue that it doesn't require logic at all. It is simply a matter of applying conceptual labels to our experience.

Fourier wrote: »

I would say that although that introspection shows a degree of constraint, I don't think it implies no choice. Such an absence of choice would contradict QM which is, in the ladder of science, supposed to bedrock other empirical theories.

For if we say that our choices are dictated by our neurons, and our neurons are dictated by biochemistry, biochemistry is dictated by quantum physics and we then find quantum physics requires those choices at the start of the chain we can't close the loop. We can't terminate in a fundamental cause.

QM presents this freedom as an unanalysable primitive in the theory. You can't use other empirical facts to contradict it if you accept QM as the basis of physics. Since if QM is the fundamental theory, then ultimately all other theories will refer back to this freedom in their chains of inference. Which leads into your next point.

To what extent does QM require, let's call it, human free will, as opposed to libertarian free will. Does it require a "will" that makes decisions or does it just require degrees of freedom when it comes to decision making? Compatibilists like Daniel Dennett argue in favour of a conceptualisaiton of free will based on degrees of freedom in decision making i.e. the outcome of a decision is open.

This notion of "free will" isn't really free will though because the decision is part of a deterministic causal chain. The outcome is however open - although it is hard to see where the degrees of freedom come in, in a deterministic chain, other than in terms of our ability to predict the outcome i.e. perceived degrees of freedom.

The indeterminism of QM would offer true degrees of freedom with regard to the outcome of decisions because they would not be part of a deterministic chain of causality. This would not, however, be free will because "the will" doesn't choose the random quantum event.


Unless....and I'm literally thinking out loud here....free will (whatever it might be made of) is fundamental and the choice of which measurement to make manifests itself as a seemingly-random, quantum event which appears as biochemistry at a certain level of inspection, appears as neuronal activity at another, which manifests as our actions at the macro level?

Fourier wrote: »

You will find it no surprise that many of the founders of QM (Bohr, Pauli, Oppenheimer) had many positive things to say about Eastern Philosophy for the reasons you mention here.
There is the strong implication that QM is very "first person". The only real disagreement within Copenhagen has always been how far to take this. With Bohr on one conservative end and QBists on the other more radical end. Bohr would have said that although the choice of observable is up to us, the resultant outcome is always a "global fact" accessible to all/a "shareable" experience. QBists however say exactly what you have said:

and that the outcome being shareable need not always be true.

Would it be correct to say that Bohr would have suggested that there would always be inter-subjective agreement on the outcome?

Without knowing the QBist position and basing it solely on what you've said here, would the QBist position be dangerously close to solipsism?

I have thought before that scientific investigation, or investigation of any kind, could just be the exploration of our own minds.

Fourier wrote: »

So QM says:

1. We are free to "prod" the world as we wish. Nothing determines that choice.
2. The world will then react back in some manner.
3. You can use quantum theory to compute the various chances of reacting back. These probabilities will depend on your previous knowledge and "proddings". The theory doesn't give fixed universal probabilities. Imagine a system of ten particles. Two people who have measured particles 1,2 and 3,4 respectively will have different probabilities for what particle 5 will do.

At what point do the predictions of QM start to become accurate, if they don't predict the outcomes of individual experiments?

I can see how the two people would calculate different probabilities (I think) but the probability of what particle 5 will do would be close to meaningless would it not?

I'm still inclined to think that, although QM is indeterministic, the Universe itself is, at a fundamental level, deterministic because a particle which hits a detector screen cannot come from nothing. Some "thing" must collide with the detector screen i.e. it must be caused by an antecedent thing, whatever its ontological nature.

Fourier wrote: »

Note that points 1 and 3 are explicitly first-person/subjective. The only disagreement would be on whether point 2 is first person. Bohr would say the reaction back can be shown to all others or shared. QBists would say not necessarily.

Personally I side with Bohr, but this could be simple reticence on my part to fully dive into what the theory implies. The last five or so years have made the QBist position more plausible I would say.

I have to say I applaud the incisiveness of your observation here. I really do recommend getting a hold of d'Espagnat's book and "QBism" by Hans von Bayers. Also if possible "Atom and Void" by Robert Oppenheimer, especially the second last chapter.

I must check out that book on QBism. Thanks for the recommendations!!

Fourier wrote: »

Particles don't have positions, not even indefinite ones. The effect a particle has on a measuring device has a position. That's the insight from the Kochen-Specker theorem.

I understand that particles don't have positions and that the effect a particle has on a measuring device has a position. The part I'm trying to get at is what happens prior the particle registering on the device. It seems that QM doesn't give us a complete picture of this and indeed, the no go theorems imply that no theory can give us this complete description. I don't think this means that we cannot deduce anything further however.

Fourier wrote: »

Introductory I don't think so. The basic text is Svozil, K.'s Quantum Logic, but it requires a good bit of mathematical knowledge.

Cheers. I'll see if I can get through some of it anyway. Sometimes books like that have even just a few sentences that offer a small insight for the non-mathematically inclined. Never sufficient for a full understanding of course, but helpful nonetheless.

Fourier wrote: »

Well it's an event, if you count that as a thing. The detection plate changed. Is a change in the detection plate a thing. Usually we say there are things, properties and events. I would say there was an event here where a property (the colour) of a thing (part of the detection plate) changed. I don't know if I'd refer to that event as a thing, no more than I'd refer to a car slowing down as a thing. The car is a thing, but I wouldn't say the slowing down was a thing.

OK, so, if we take the idea here that an event occurs and that event is the change in colour of a "thing" (part of the detection plate). We can question what causes this event occur i.e. what causes the change in colour. For the sake of simplicity, I would say that there are two possible causes:

• The "thing" (detection plate) changes colour spontaneously, without being caused by any other "thing"
• Some secondary "thing" collides with the detection plate

Could we proceed with that?

Fourier wrote: »

We don't know that as it is refuted by the Kochen-Specker theorem. Assuming there was some "thing" that previously had a location prior to hitting the screen leads to a contradiction with predictions in several experiments. You're assuming spatio-temporal location to be a fundamental physical property. It would seem it is not. We have various events in our devices. Trying to tie those events together into a "thing" is barred by Kochen-Specker.

Working on the two possible scenarios above we would either conclude that the detection plate spontaneously changes colour or that something collides with the detection plate causing it to change colour. In the former, the event occurs due to the internal dynamics of the detection plate.

Working on the second scenario:

• We know that there is existence.
• Anything which can be said to exist we call a "thing".
• The Universe is the name given to the collection of all "things".
• Everywhere the Universe is, there must be some "thing" there.
• IF the Universe is spatially extended, then we can refer to different parts of
  the Universe with the label "location"
• IF the change in colour of the detector plate doesn't spontaneously occur
  due to its own internal dynamics, then it must be caused by a secondary
  "thing" colliding with it.
• Immediately prior to colliding with the detector plate that secondary "thing"
  must have been somewhere in the Universe i.e. it must have had a
  location - well defined or otherwise.
• The event at the detector plate would therefore have an antecedent cause.

Fourier wrote: »

You're misunderstanding.

QM has two types of indeterminism.

The first type is the outcome of an experiment. So an experiment sets up the possibility of some type of event, some reaction in the device. There will be several possibilities. One will occur. Which one can only estimated probabilistically.

The second type is the choice of experiment, i.e. which type of device capable of what events. This isn't even probabilistic in QM, it's apparently not even analysable. It's outside the theory.

You're speaking as if the choice of experiment is the first type, i.e. a random quantum event.

Ah, I see. I was applying the experimental indeterminism to that of free will.

Is the experimental indeterminism dependent upon the freedom in the choice of experiment? Does superdeterminism negate the apparent indeterminacy of QM and remove the reliance on the notion of a free will which lies outside the the theory?

John Bell wrote:

There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.

Fourier wrote: »

It's not. Although that requires a proper knowledge of the mathematics to see.

Ah, OK. I was just speculating. I'll have to see if I can get a better understanding of it.

Fourier wrote: »

Running an experiment several times to verify the frequencies is one method.

But is there a minimum number of experiments that have to be run before they become significant. For example, if we calculate the probability distribution (is that the correct terminology) for a given set-up but we only "send" one particle to the screen, then our probabilistic prediction doesn't tell us much. How many particles would we have to "send" before the predictions being to correspond to observations?

That's probably a very garbled way of saying it, but hopefully you have an idea what I am asking.

Fourier wrote: »

It's very meaningful as it can be checked statistically.

Following on from the question above:
If you observe particles 1 and 2 and I observe 3 and 4, and we both calculate a different probability for particle 5, where I say there's a 20% probability the particle will land at position X on the screen, while you say there's a 40% probability. If the particle registers at X then which of our predictions is more accurate?

Fourier wrote: »

Then you are believing that in contradiction not only from QM and experiment, but also no-go theorems invalidating it logically in the face of basic experiments. I think it's more likely that QM describes reality but it just doesn't conform to gut intuitive categories of thought you hold.

Apologies, I can't remember if you've said something on this before but is superdeterminism a possibility?

Fourier wrote: »

You say you understand they don't have positions and yet engage in dealing with them as if they do immediately after. "Collide" is spatiotemporal terminology where the particle moves through locations to the location where the device is.

It might be more accurate to say that I understand that QM says they don't have positions.

The alternative to a particle moving through locations to collide/interact with the device at its location, giving rise to a change of colour on the detector, is that the change of colour event occurs spontaneously and is part of the inner dynamics of the detector screen, with no need to talk of particles at all - unless particles are exclusively those spontaneous events which cause detectors to change colour without interacting with anything else.


We can try to avoid the use of the term "particle" and use the very crude term "thing". If we can't use the word "location" then we can talk about a "place" within the universe.

Using this terminology we can say, immediately prior to interacting with the detector the "thing" must have been in some "place" within the universe. It must have moved from this "place" to the "place" where the detector screen was and interacted with it, to cause the detector screen to change colour. In this way, the change of colour on the detector is caused by an antecedent "thing".

If it didn't, then the change of colour was a spontaneous event within the detector screen which has no relation to the particle that we prepared as part of the experimental set-up.

Fourier wrote: »

They are related. One can prove that given freedom of choice you have the indeterminacy.

So, without this freedom of choice, there is no indeterminism?

Fourier wrote: »

In the same sense that Lamarkian theories negate Darwinian selection, i.e. if they were correct the other would be incorrect. They aren't correct so this isn't real worth wasting thought on.
Superdeterminism doesn't just involve negating free will but also requires the universe to essentially be designed to fool us. Superdeterminism is basically the statement that a bunch of accidental errors in equipment were built into the Big Bang which means that for instance our equipment makes us think quantum mechanics is true or general relativity is true. But superdeterminism doesn't just apply in physics it applies to all of science.
For example maybe bacteria aren't what make people sick, it just so happens that every time somebody used a microscope to look at the blood of somebody ill the microscope itself happened to be dirty with bacteria that systematically match symptoms by coincidence.
To me it's a silly desperate move to evade the conclusions of QM.
If superdeterminism were true the only rational conclusion to me would be the existence of a trickster demiurge. But this is silly nonsense we don't engage with in other sciences so I don't see a reason to bother with it in QM. It can be evoked for any scientific theory.

A first point on this, that I think sometimes gets overlooked, is the fact that superdeterminism is really just normal determinism taken to its logical conclusion.

I've heard this charge before, that if superdeterminism were true, then the Universe would have to be conspiring against us or fooling us into believing our theories are correct. I would simply see it as the limitations that exist in our exploration of the physical world. The predictions of QM remain accurate but rather than leading us to believe that the Universe is fundamentally indeterminate, our scientific theories tell us that such an indeterminate picture of the Universe is incomplete and that there are limitations to what we can observe. There is no conspiracy, just the consequences of determinism.

Obviously that is on the basis of my current understanding.

Fourier wrote: »

I do, but that's basically the science of statistics. How many experiments you need to run etc is part of detailed modelling.


It depends. Usually we'd have to run more tests and Bayesian update our probabilities which will begin to converge. Again though this really leading into a course in statistics.

Thanks, I kind of have an understanding of that. This point was more of a tangent to the point you made about two observers observing a different pair of particles and thereby calculating a different probability for particle #5. I was just thinking that in such a scenario, the calculated probability for that single test i.e. particle 5 would essentially be meaningless.

Fourier wrote: »

That's not the alternative, it's an alternative and one QM doesn't take. It's not part of the internal dynamics of the detector, nor does the particle collide with it. That's what QM says, it says it is neither of your alternatives.

We know that QM doesn't take that alternative and we know that QM doesn't (and can't) give a complete description of the Universe. The point is to try and see what we can deduce beyond QM, if anything. I know that the no-go theorems suggest that we can't deduce anything further but that doesn't prevent us from trying. There are still questions we can pose.

Fourier wrote: »

What's a "place" without a location. Place is just another word for location. So your following paragraph just reads like a rephrasing of the last one.

There seems to issues around the use of specific terminology because of how they are interpreted in scientific theories. I'm trying to avoid these issues by taking a Cartesian approach and starting from the ground up and applying labels to describe what we can hopefully take as brute facts, without relying on boolean logic.

I would agree that "place" is pretty much just a synonym for "location" but I am not trying to take QM as a starting point and, if you will alow the expression, reason down to reality, I am trying to start and brute, self-evident facts, apply labels to those facts and demonstrate the consequences.

Those brute facts are:

• There is experience.
• There is language.
• We use language to communicate about experience.
• We use the term "existence" to label the brute fact that there is experience.
• Whatever the nature of existence is, whether we can every truly know it or
  not, we use the term "reality" to describe it.
• Whatever can be said to exist we describe with the label "thing".
• The label "Universe" applies to the totality of "things" [which exist].
• We can describe the different areas of the Universe with the label "place".
• The Universe is made up only of "things" which exist, therefore at every
  place in the Universe there must be some "thing" there.

These are the brute facts that we can start with.

If we take the experiment in QM that we've been discussing, we can try to interpret it according to these brute facts. On the extreme end we can say that the experiments in QM do not represent reality at all, they tell us nothing at all about reality or how the Universe truly is. On the other hand, we can say that they are fully representative of reality. The instruments and particles, etc are the "things in themselves". In between, we can say that the objects in the experiments are our perception of the "things in themselves" and they do reveal something about reality.

According to QM itself, QM does not represent a complete description of reality. Using the above brute facts, we can see if it is possible to paint a fuller picture.

IF we consider the detector plate to be a "thing" which exists, or representative of a "thing" which exists, then we can analyse the event which is the change in colour on the detector and ask what causes this change of colour.

Given that the detector is in the Universe, it must be in a "place" in the Universe. Assuming that it stays in its place there should be no reason for it to change colour, unless there is something about the internal dynamics of the plate that causes this to spontaneously happen. If we rule this out, then we are left with the the alternative, which is that some "thing" must interact with the plate to cause it to change colour.


If some "thing" must interact with the plate to cuase it to change colour then we can talk about the moment when it changes colour and the moment prior to it changing colour. If it requires some "thing" to interact with it to change colour then prior to it changing colour that "thing" must not have been interacting with it and therefore not in the same place.

If this "thing" wasn't in the same place then it must have been in another place prior to interacting with the detector, given that it is somewhere in the Universe.

If it wasn't elsewhere in the Universe, then it didn't exist and if it didn't exist then it couldn't interact with the plate. This would mean that the change in colour must have occurred spontaneously as a result of the internal dynamics of the plate.

Fourier wrote: »

In Classical Mechanics one can show that conservation of angular momentum is a consequence of rotational symmetry, so one could say "without rotational symmetry there is no conservation of angular momentum". However this isn't a very interesting statement as Classical Mechanics and all the consequences of conservation of angular momentum seem to be true. It's the same here.

A key difference is that freedom of choice is very much open to question.

Fourier wrote: »

It's not. Provably so. Determinism doesn't imply superdeterminism so literally provably this is not the case. One can have deterministic dynamics that don't display superdeterminism (e.g. fluid mechanics) so I don't know where you are getting this from.

If the Universe is truly deterministic, then the chain of causality for any event stretches right back to the Big Bang. I might be mistaking that for superdeterminism.

Fourier wrote: »

This is just literally incorrect. I think you don't understand what superdeterminism is considering you think it is similar to determinism. It isn't. Having limitations in our exploration of the physical world has already being explored and it isn't enough to break Bell's and other inequalities. That's not what superdeterminism is.

I might be making incorrect inferences from what I've heard about superdeterminism including what Bell said about it:

John Bell wrote:

There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears.

People talk about superdeterminism implying that the results of experiments are effectively set at the Big Bang. If we take determinism to its logical conclusion then we the chain of causality for any event would stretch back to the Big Bang also.

Fourier wrote: »

We can describe the things and events of phenomenal experience with the concept of "place/location". QM shows that there are aspects of reality outside of phenomenal experience to which that does not apply. Hence your analysis of the detector that follows this sentence is not correct. Whatever affected the detector was not in the same place or in a different place. The whole concept of place is just N/A to it.

We're not starting from a position of phenomenal experience though, in that we are not talking about the content of experience, we are starting from the brute fact of experience itself. From there we build up to using the word "place" to describe areas of the universe. We are distinguishing this from the word "location" which we use to describe our phenomenal experience.

The important point is the cause of the event. If the detector plate changes colour then we have a situation where it was dark and then changed to a lighter colour (for the sake of argument). We can ask what caused this change in colour?

Am I right in saying that QM tells us the probability of the detector changing colour, at a given location?
Does it tell us why the detector changes location i.e. what causes this change in colour?

Fourier wrote: »

Is it though? It's a component of QM and QM matches experiment. I don't really see what's open to question here. It just seems to me that "open to question" really means "I will continue questioning it despite all evidence to the contrary since it seems difficult to conceive of" as is often the case when people discuss QM. Scientifically in QM there is no such open question. The theory has it as part of its structure and the theory is experimentally correct.

Its a foundation assumption in QM, not based on observation. The theory is experimentally correct, but the theory also tells us that it isn't a complete description of the Universe.

This quote from John Bell

There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will.

seems to suggest that the absence of free will is a distinct possibility and it leads to a different interpretation of QM, namely as a theory based on absolute determinism.

The very experience of free will is open to investigation through first person empiricism, by way of practices such as meditation, which involves cultivating awareness of the processes of the body, in particular mental processes. Paying such close attention to the process which gives rise to what appears to be "free will" or freedom of choice can cast serious doubt on how free that will is.

Fourier wrote: »

You are. That the chain of causality stretches back to the Big Bang has little to do with superdeterminism. That's true of any deterministic model. For example the motion of a perfect fluid in General Relativity is a deterministic model with causation going back to the Big Bang but it doesn't have superdeterminism.

Then the absolute determinism that Bell talks about might be more in line with what I am trying to get at.

Fourier wrote: »

I don't really get the distinction. "Place" and "location" are two words for the same thing. The Kochen-Specker theorem shows us electrons don't possess location/position as a property. These are not brute facts for all things in the universe, that's an inescapable aspect of the Kochen-Specker theorem. There are things which don't have a location or a position.

I'm trying to approach things from a different angle and trying to describe the point as I see it. There seems to be issues with using certain specific terms given how they are interpreted in scientific theories, so I am trying to elucidate my own thinking without tripping over those terms. I'm not so much trying to understand what QM says about the world, as I have a vague understanding of that - obviously far from complete. I am instead trying to elucidate the issue as I see it and why indeterminism seems to be an incomplete description of the world.

If we take the brute fact that there is a Universe which consists only of "things" that exist then, if there is more than one "thing" in the Universe they must be in different places within the Universe. If the Universe is a one single entity, then we can still talk about different "places". This isn't as a result of boolean logic this would be as a result of taking a Descartes like approach to thinking about reality and applying conceptual labels when we talk abstractly about reality.

Fourier wrote: »

It is due to the particle in some sense. No mechanism is described.

This is the critical point! In what sense is it due to the particle?

If we establish that the change in colour is caused "in some sense" by the particle then we can establish that prior to the change in colour the particle must have been "in some sense" somewhere in the Universe. Not on the basis of applying boolean logic but because of the brute facts that the Universe is made up only of things which exist and if the particle exists in any sense, then it must have been in the Universe and not interacting with the detector. We can legitimately ask, where was it? If the answer is, "nowhere in the Universe", then the particle simply does not exist and cannot interact with detector to cause it to change colour.

This might sound like Boolean logic, but if we imagine ourselves with a "God's-eye view" where we simply apply labels to the things which exist in the Universe, then we would label the particle as a "thing" and we would see it interact with another "thing". This interaction is what manifests as the phenomenon of the colour change. If the one "thing" doesn't interact with the other "thing" then there is no manifestation of the colour change.

Fourier wrote: »

It's not a foundational assumption of QM, it follows from QM's axioms. It's a theorem within QM.

In what sense is it "unanalysable" and "outside the theory" then?

Fourier wrote: »

The theory not being a complete description of the universe doesn't affect the content of this theorem. In fact they are related. It is the same structure, Non-Booleanity, that gives both the freedom of choice result and the inability to completely describe the world results.

Are you referring to the Conway-Specher theorem here?

Fourier wrote: »

This is the problem with reasoning about a theory you don't know. QM models the world as Non-Boolean. That leads to randomness, freedom of choice and inability to completely describe the world. So the lack of a total description is not something that can negate the free choice theorem since they are both reflections of a deeper experimentally verified structure. Only the refutation of that structure will do and thus far the logic of events seems to be non-Boolean so that is a no-go.

The experience of "free will" doesn't require logic, non-boolean or otherwise, to be investigated. It's experiential and can be investigated through first person empirical practice. When observed closely, the notion that we have of free will turns out to be much less certain than it seems.

Fourier wrote: »

More than this do you not see a common issue in all your threads and discussions of physics. You start with iron certainty about your own philosophical preconceptions. You then find physical theories that refute them. Instead of just going "oh well that was incorrect" you chase increasingly obscure philosophical rabbit holes gleamed from out of context quotes without learning the theory, looking for the barest glimmer of a stalemate that might at least make your intuitions not totally impossible despite no theory matching experimental evidence conforming to them.

Now is probably not a great time to mention that I was going to revisit one of those threads.

Fourier wrote: »

I've given you this advice before, but learning about physics from out of context quotes from a debate you don't know the general terms of is not helpful. I mentioned this to you before earlier in this thread and in another thread.


Bell is quoting in summary form an early form of the idea that would later be known as superdeterminism. The idea when fully worked out involves absolute determinism, but that is not all it involves. Superdeterminism is a very very special case of determinism, so it will involve absolute determinism, but there is more to it than that. The extra bits you seem to be unaware of is why it is considered ridiculous.

Absolute determinism of the style you are conceiving of cannot replicate the predictions of QM, to even have a slim chance you have to go further to superdeterminism.

What are the extra bits to absolute determinism?

Fourier wrote: »

Boolean logic is ultimately the statement that there is a God's eye view where you can apply labels. That's what's false. You think you are not using Boolean logic, but you are. Deep down it is part of human intuition, part of how we combine truths and mentally frame them. Unfortunately it is not correct for all of reality.

I'm replying to this first bcos I think it underpins much of what we are talking about.

The God's-eye view might have caused more confusion than clarity bcos it might be give rise to the impression that we can view the Universe at a more fundamental level and see "things in themselves" much like how we perceive the world around us on a phenomenological level, just at a more fundamental level of reality. That wasn't the intention.

I think the Zen Buddhist saying applies here, "the finger pointing to the moon, is not the moon". We can interpret this to mean that the conceptual labels that we apply to the world are not the "things in themselves". Reality is beyond conceptualisation and beyond imagination. We can however use conceptual labels to "point" in the direction of the underlying reality.

As per the brute facts that we started with:
There is experience and there is language. This is self evident. The "experience" is an example of how we apply conceptual labels. Experience itself is not conceptual and no amount of words can ever capture what experience is. But we still apply a conceptual label to this brute fact.

We also apply the label "exist". We can move froward from here and say that there is existence. Not on the basis of boolean logic but bcos we are using language to label brute facts. We can go further and say that whatever it is that exists we can apply the label "thing". We don't need to specify what it is that actually exists, or even define the criteria for existence, we can simply say that whatever it is, we will call it "thing". This allows us to attempt to discuss it further, it allow us to try to use the finger to point to the moon.

Fourier wrote: »

No because position and location are not fundamental properties things must possess. It's like saying everything must exist with different flavours or musical themes. Some objects don't carry sound, some things have no flavour. For somethings the concept of position is N/A.

No, see above. We can't establish this any more than we can say the particle "must have" had a musical background.

To be honest I have said several times at this point that particles don't have a position. You keep saying back "they must" despite the fact that this contradicts experiment via the Kochen-Specker theorem.

The issue is that I am not explaining what I mean clearly enough. There might be an issue with the inadequacy of language in this regard coupled with the pre-existing interpretations. How I am perceiving your use of the the terms "place" and "location" is I think you are using them in the sense of defining position relative to co-ordinate system or relative to objects in phenomenological experience. Am I correct in that?

That is not how I intend to use it however. I accept that such notions do not apply at a fundamental level. I am trying to use the terms in a much broader way to mean being in the Universe or a part of the Universe. In this sense, if something exists it is located in the Universe or it is part of the Universe.

We might say that propositions such as in don't apply because of how we generally tend to use them, but in the absence of a more specific term, we have to use it to point to what is meant. In this case, something which exists is in the Universe or part of the Universe.

Fourier wrote: »

The theory provides no mechanism for its occurrence but its existence is a consequence of the axioms.

It may be a consequence of the axioms but free will is an experiential phenomenon (or noumenon) and as such, it is open to investigation.

Fourier wrote: »

This isn't relevant to the point. It's a consequence of QM. You might feel it is less true when you sit down and meditate, others report the opposite but so what. When I sit and observe the world I don't see Lorentzian geometry, but Lorentzian geometry is true.

Free will, if it is true, is open to investigation through first person empirical practice.

What is the process by which this "free will" is exercised? How does an experimenter freely choosing the settings in an experiment?

Are you familiar with work in the field of psychology pertaining to a phenomenon called priming? Priming is an example of how choices that we believe we freely make are subconsciously affected by the outside environment unbeknownst to us. Metnalists such as Derren Brown and Keith Barry trade on their ability to influence people's seemingly free choices. What appears to be them reading their audiences mind is actually the result of suggestive manipulation to influence the audience member to give the answer they are directing them towards.

Fourier wrote: »

Quantum Theory has freedom of choice as a basic consequence of its Non-Boolean nature. That non-Boolean nature is experimentally verified. I think this is just another form of your "gut" overriding external evidence.

Free will is, supposedly something that we all possess and exercise on a regular basis. As such, it is open to investigation.

Fourier wrote: »

Superdeterminism you mean?

Yes, sorry, what are the extra bits that need to be added to absolute determinism to give us superdeterminism?

Fourier wrote: »

It is due to the particle in some sense. No mechanism is described.

I want to try to get back to this point because I think it got overlooked when you were challenging my "God's eye view" statement.

In what sense is the change in colour due or cause by the particle?

As I mentioned above you will have to provide actual evidence against what QM says. Such as showing an example of experimental settings being given ultimately by a deterministic mechanism. Or giving a reason why the paper:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.05684
is wrong.

Everything else you've said is just either "we can investigate it" to which the reply is "yes, we have and you seem to be wrong". Or "the following must be true" when it seems in fact it isn't.

You seem to have a massive problem with modern physics despite the wealth of experimental evidence in its favour and even in spite of no-go theorems and specific studies targeting your objections and showing them wrong.

Can I ask what motivates this? Do you not think at some point you'd just accept the world doesn't operate like your intuitions?

roosh wrote: »

I'm moving this from the bottom because I think it is critical to either my point, or my understanding the error in my thinking and I don't want it to get lost among the other points:


OK, so the change in colour on the detector plate would not occur without the particle. How does the particle cause this change in colour on the plate? What does the particle do to cause this change or how do the plate and the particle interact to cause the change in colour?

Quantum Theory doesn't give a mechanical account like you want since it seems not to be mechanical. The device has some degree of freedom which can become correlated with the particle. The event occurs when a property of the device has been what is called superselected, but superselection itself is not a mechanical process.

This would just seem to point to an incompleteness in the theory

In any theory. Remember this comes from the Bell inequality violating nature of Non-Boolean events which is just a fact. This isn't some deficiency in QM, no logical or mathematical account is going to be able to close this gap.

in our discussion on time you referred to the success of QFT as evidence for the validity of the Einsteinian interpretation of time. Am I correct in saying that this discussion on freedom of choice relates directly to QFT?

QFT is a quantum theory so it is present there as well.

I would suggest a potential issue with the paper is something that the authors themselves allude to.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.05684.pdf

I won't pursue this because you seem not to understand what they mean. I can only retain a hold on so many tangents without the posts getting too long. Priming doesn't really relate to the issue here. The people could be completely primed to the point where they are drugged into picking one option specifically and it wouldn't affect the point QM is making. It's not really going to be possible to discuss this here as you don't know what Contextuality is as this whole priming stuff doesn't matter in relation to it.

In a simplified form it does not matter if people can be primed or controlled, as long as there is freedom of choice in measurement settings. Priming as such removes choice in controlled conditions, but that doesn't imply its absence in general.

Thank you. This is another piece of information which will help me to do some research. I'll try and put this to a proponent of Superdeterminism and see what response they give.

Most people who talk about superdeterminism online are not physicists and don't fully understand the term. They usually think it is absolute determinism like you did.

I know that I might come across as a science denier but I wouldn't class myself as such. There are certain conclusions within scientific theories that I would question and challenge on the basis of reason and logic

But why? They have enormous amounts of evidence, the evidence matching predictions flow naturally from their assumptions. What's really the rational motivation here? I don't think there is one. Just like in the Relativity thread you seem to think the world simply "must" be a certain way and will look for any angle where by possibly that way isn't utterly disproven. You at least have to admit your case is way way weaker than the standard one. Considering the standard one has no logical flaws or evidential gaps to me there is no actual reason to question these conclusions except that you place your own gut intuition over scientific accounts. Which to me is a form of science denial.

roosh wrote: »

It's not that I want a mechanical account of what happens, I'm trying to get a handle one what QM tells us and what it doesn't tell us, to see if there are any inferences we can make.

So, the device becomes correlated with the particle and this causes the colour to change on the plate. Prior to becoming correlated does the particle exist in the Universe in some sense?

It depends on what you mean by in the universe. It is not in spacetime, which makes it difficult to discuss "prior" for the particle.

roosh wrote: »

And no logical or mathematical account is being proposed to close this gap by way of offering a description of free will.

Of course, as I said an explanation of free choice it is outside the theory. It's a gap you cannot close.

I'm being genuinely honest here, but this is a repeated pattern where you seem to have a problem following an argument. My entire point is that nothing is going to close the gap as it is due to the Non-Booleanity, to then turn around and say "no account is being proposed" as some kind of counterpoint is nonsensical as there being no account is the point. I noticed this by reading over discussions with Morbert where you seemed to not follow him at all. It is very tiresome to make precise points only for the other person to forget the point at one post's depth.

That's fair enough. I would contend that the issues I highlighted with the study remain:

• the authors point out their difficulty in ascertaining the cuase behind participants choices
• they pick very simplified substitutes for the variables in the QM experiment which I don't think is fully representative of the decision in which freedom of choice is in question.

"Simplified substitutes for the variables in QM"? Do you actually understand what the paper is doing? Do you know what contextuality is? This makes little sense to me. As I said this is not going to be productive since you seem to not grasp the actual theory here.

If, as you say, this whole priming stuff doesn't matter in relation to QM, then QM must have a very different notion of freedom of choice which is wholly unrelated to the notion of free will

It's not wholly unrelated, it's just that the existence of priming doesn't affect it.

I just question some of its unwritten assumptions and conclusions.

Why though? It's internally coherent and matches experiment. What's the reason for questioning these things? Outside of it just not matching your intuition/being a satisfying account what's the actual rational reason?

That same poster was, at the time at least, a proponent of the Block Universe, saying that it was a necessary conclusion of relativity - which I am inclined to agree. I know that you don't, and that is a point I would like to raise in that other thread. But, that poster was a staunch proponent of it and our discussion went into great depth and the issues as I see them, were not satisfactorily resolved - that issue is how such a block universe could not give rise to the observation of relative motion.

I've read Morbert's posts and this is quite a distortion of them. He said that the block universe is the cleanest representation of the formalism of relativity alone. I agree with him on that.

Your points that the block universe cannot give rise to relative motion are nonsensical. Sorry but they're just mathematically false. It's an example of the kind of thing where I don't understand how you are even reaching your conclusion.

There are further issues, as I raised, which I have never really received a satisfactory answer to, which is why I maintain the position I do.

The problem is I'm not sure what a satisfactory answer involves to you. I've had students ask me similar questions, raise a few objections and then within about half an hour at most "get it". You have taken ten years. Some of the stuff on the relativity thread is very difficult to understand genuinely especially the relative motion in the block universe stuff. I've shown it to a few people and even they cannot understand it.

Genuinely I think you just have a problem moving past your intuitions.

Here is my major issue and can you please answer it. Why don't you just learn the theories? Why do you start with philosophical prejudices and quote mining. Why not learn the theory and then discuss its philosophy. What you're doing is like trying to discuss flaws in compiler design without knowing how to program. You're claims of not needing to actual know about Non-Booleanity are just to be honest arrogant: "I can discuss and dismantle this stuff without knowing it".

Fourier wrote: »

It depends on what you mean by in the universe. It is not in spacetime, which makes it difficult to discuss "prior" for the particle.

As stated, "in the Universe" simply means that it exists in some sense and is part of the Universe. There is no need to refer to spacetime with respect to its basic existence.

I would contend that it must exist in some sense in the Universe because if it was completely non-existent then it couldn't correlate with anything.

Would you accept this?

Fourier wrote: »

Of course, as I said an explanation of free choice it is outside the theory. It's a gap you cannot close.

I'm being genuinely honest here, but this is a repeated pattern where you seem to have a problem following an argument. My entire point is that nothing is going to close the gap as it is due to the Non-Booleanity, to then turn around and say "no account is being proposed" as some kind of counterpoint is nonsensical as there being no account is the point. I noticed this by reading over discussions with Morbert where you seemed to not follow him at all. It is very tiresome to make precise points only for the other person to forget the point at one post's depth.

The point I was making is that I am not trying to close the gap, certainly not with a logical or mathematical account, so I'm not sure why you needed to state that.

I interpreted your statement to mean that you believed I was trying to close the gap using a logical account of free will. I would argue that the there can be no logical account because free will/freedom of choice doesn't exist - which is our point of contention.

Fourier wrote: »

"Simplified substitutes for the variables in QM"? Do you actually understand what the paper is doing? Do you know what contextuality is? This makes little sense to me. As I said this is not going to be productive since you seem to not grasp the actual theory here.

I'm interpreting the term contextuality from this part of the paper:
[quote=Snow Queen is Evil and Beautiful: Experimental Evidence for Probabilistic Contextuality in Human Choices[/quote]
It is commonplace to say that human behavior is context-dependent. What is usually meant by this is that one’s response to stimulus S (performance in task S) depends on other stimuli (tasks) S0. Asked to explain the meaning of LINE, one’sanswer will depend on whether the word is preceded by CHORUS or OPENING[/quote]

Which I believe sounds remarkably close to what is described in Thinking, fast and slow

“What is the first word that comes to your mind when you hear the word DAY?” The researchers tallied the frequency of responses, such as “night,” “sunny,” or “long.” In the 1980s, psychologists discovered that exposure to a word causes immediate and measurable changes in the ease with which many related words can be evoked. If you have recently seen or heard the word EAT, you are temporarily more likely to complete the word fragment SO_P as SOUP than as SOAP. The opposite would happen, of course, if you had just seen WASH. We call this a priming effect and say that the idea of EAT primes
the idea of SOUP, and that WASH primes SOAP

This, to my mind, appears like a very different aspect of priming - yes, that is what it appears they are testing, based on what they have outlined - which is not representative of the decision an experimenter would make when choosing the settings in an experiment. It sounds more like an issue pertaining to how certain words are interpreted or the propensity to recognise certain characteristics when subjects have been primed.

It appears to ignore all other and more significant manifestations of priming which results from every single aspect of our lives, from the family we are born into, the language we learn, the culture we grow up in, our education, our personal experiences, and myriad other influences from our everyday environment.

Fourier wrote: »

It's not wholly unrelated, it's just that the existence of priming doesn't affect it.

Priming affects the decisions people make without people realising it has affected them. That is, decisions they believe they have made freely have been directed by some priming factor in their environment, unbeknownst to them. In this respect it is very pertinent to the question of freedom of choice. Perhaps not the "freedom of choice" that QM incorporates but certainly the freedom of choice that people supposedly exercise when making decisions and choices.

This extends beyond matching the characters in a story with their characteristics and there is no "correct" answer.

I may not have fully understood the papers, but this is how it appears to me based on the similarities to cases I am familiar with.

Fourier wrote: »

Why though? It's internally coherent and matches experiment. What's the reason for questioning these things? Outside of it just not matching your intuition/being a satisfying account what's the actual rational reason?

With regard to relativity, the reasons have been alluded to here. With regard to free will, the incoherency of the concept and the absence of it upon investigation.

Fourier wrote: »

I've read Morbert's posts and this is quite a distortion of them. He said that the block universe is the cleanest representation of the formalism of relativity alone. I agree with him on that.

Have you read Morbert's posts from ca. 10 years ago.

Fourier wrote: »

Your points that the block universe cannot give rise to relative motion are nonsensical. Sorry but they're just mathematically false. It's an example of the kind of thing where I don't understand how you are even reaching your conclusion.

Mathematics can't rescue motion from the block Universe. It is a particular interpretation of the mathematics which leads to the concept of the block universe in the first place.

In the block universe, objects exist as worldlines, where all points on the worldline co-exist within the block structure and are equally real. This means, for you and I, what we consider as our "past" is still where it was and our future is already written, so to speak. All those moments from birth to death co-exist within the block structure. This is true for all objects in the Universe. The key issue is that all of these worldlines are frozen within the block. The worldlines do not move.

An analogy that is often used is that of a roll of movie film, where each moment exists as a frame on the roll of film. Every object could be represented in this way, including ourselves. Here is the issue:

Imagine putting yourself into one of those frames, one of those single moments on your worldline. What happens? The answer is nothing, because that moment is frozen on the worldline, just like all the other moments for everything in the Universe. There can be no relative motion in such a structure.

Mathematics cannot rescue this situation because we arrive at this structure by way of a particular interpretation of the mathematics.

Did you read Morbert's proposed solution to this?

Fourier wrote: »

The problem is I'm not sure what a satisfactory answer involves to you. I've had students ask me similar questions, raise a few objections and then within about half an hour at most "get it". You have taken ten years. Some of the stuff on the relativity thread is very difficult to understand genuinely especially the relative motion in the block universe stuff. I've shown it to a few people and even they cannot understand it.

Genuinely I think you just have a problem moving past your intuitions.

A satisfactory answer would be one that can account for relative motion in a block universe.

I think part of why it is difficult to understand is because it is completely counter-intuitive to anyone for whom relativity has become intuitive.

Morbert was certainly able to understand it as he attempted to formulate a solution to it, which sounded plausible but wasn't.

Fourier wrote: »

Here is my major issue and can you please answer it. Why don't you just learn the theories? Why do you start with philosophical prejudices and quote mining. Why not learn the theory and then discuss its philosophy. What you're doing is like trying to discuss flaws in compiler design without knowing how to program. You're claims of not needing to actual know about Non-Booleanity are just to be honest arrogant: "I can discuss and dismantle this stuff without knowing it".

I started where I started because of the sequence of events that lead me to where I was. My starting position was a reflection of the philosophical influences up to that point. I started a thread on here which brought me into contact with relativity. At the time, learning the theory in any formal sense wasn't an option and it hasn't really been a viable option in the meantime.

Believe it or not, I have learned an immense amount from all the discussions I've had, and from Morbert in particular, to the point where I feel I would be able to identify when someone is making the same mistake I was, with regard to length contraction and time dilation, and would possibly be able to explain where they are - where I was - going wrong.

As I said, I no longer argue against the self-consistency of relativity.

Fourier wrote: »

QM says that the choice of experimental settings ultimately cannot be explained. That's part of QM.

That we cannot explain how we arrive at a decision, on which experimental settings to choose does, not mean that WE freely choose those settings.

Fourier wrote: »

You want to ditch this and say the choice is predetermined.

We don't have to go that far yet. We can start by asking the question, how is the decision arrived at? I'm not asking you to quote QM on this because we know that QM says it cannot be explained, I'm asking you as an experimenter, what the process is, that leads you to choosing those settings. This we can drill down on and this we don't need QM to tell us what is and what isn't possible. You can observe this process within yourself and explain it, as far as you can.

Fourier wrote: »

From Bell's theorem we know that a deterministic account of certain multiparticle experiments must involve superdeterminism.

Are we considered multi-particle experiments? Can we not explore the notion of free will separately from QM and see if it still stands?

Fourier wrote: »

Thus the alternative to free choice is superdeterminism. There is no way out of that. You are either proposing free choice or superdeterminism.

A key aspect to the idea of free will and free choice is that we are the ones who make the decision i.e. the decision is a result of our will. What is the process by which such decisions are made? Again, I'm not asking for what QM says, because obviously QM says that it cannot be explained. But when you, as an experimenter, choose something, how do you go about making that decision?


We can use the simple experiment suggested earlier:

While paying attention to the process:
Think of a movie and post the name here.

Fourier wrote: »

Superdeterminism has several consequences with no evidence and requires ludicrous fine tuning and there is no working superdeterministic theory.

Could you suggest any resources on this (that I will inevitably butcher :pac:) just to try and get an idea of it. I've heard that backwards causality is one such aspect that gets cited, but I know that some superdeterminists dispute this.

Fourier wrote: »

Let me put this in a simpler way. Forget David Blane, Sam Harris and whoever and every other philosophical preconception.

I find Sam Harris to be a very cogent speaker on many issues, not least the subject of free will. He also comes at it from the first-person empirical approach and I find his explanation of the decision making process to be quite accurate.

With regard to Derren Brown and Keith Barry, if they do influence people in the way they claim to, then it certainly has repercussions for free will.

Fourier wrote: »

Yes it exists.

So, we have the detector plate prior to correlation with the particle and we have the plate post correlation which has changed colour.

Is the change in colour caused by the correlation with the particle?

Fourier wrote: »

This is very garbled. If freedom of choice doesn't exist then you should be able to close the gap by explaining how the experimental setting was arrived at.
QM says you won't be able to close that gap because of freedom of choice.

Do you see? The gap to be closed here is how the experimental setting gets chosen. QM says you can't do this due to freedom of choice. If you remove freedom of choice you should be able to explain the ultimate origin of the setting and close the gap.

Yes, but it doesn't require a logical or mathematical explanation. Ultimately, no conceptual explanation can account for what is experiential. Again, the finger pointing to the moon is not the moon. All that can be done is point in the direction of an experience so that it becomes a shared experience. Just as no logical or mathematical account can substitute for the experience of tasting honey.

Again, we can try that simple experiment:

While paying close attention to the process - think of a movie and post the name.

Fourier wrote: »

Yes.


Yes. And I cannot understand your objection


I guess I just don't see what's wrong with Morbert's answer. The 4D block is isomorphic to a foliation of 3D surfaces. That explains it for me.

Did you read his solution that relied on human consciousness to account for the apparent motion that we observe? Meaning that motion itself is just a fabrication of the mind?

The issue with this foliation of 3D surfaces is that these too are frozen in the block structure. The experience we have of "time advancing from moment to moment" does not happen in this structure.

Again, we can bring it back to a very simplified example of universe which consists solely of two objects moving relative to each other. Let's say that it's you and I. In this block Universe our worldlines are stretched out through the block with every moment of our lives on that worldline. Each of those moments are frozen, they do not move in the 4D structure. Our worldlines are at angles to each other.

This is where we can use the roll of film analogy. Our worldlines are stretched out through the block like a roll of film stretched out. Every moment on our worldline is represented as a frame on the roll of film - static and not moving.

Jump into one of those frames on the film, representing a moment in your life. You would be frozen in that moment. There would be no experience of aging and no experience of motion.

This can be foliated into a series of 3D slices but it doesn't change the fact that one each of those slices you and I are both frozen and unmoving.

Fourier wrote: »

Nobody has done so. Looking deep down enough will terminate in QM.

The path you're ultimately aiming for is that psychology or just personal introspection will contradict QM. This immediately implies (and you have no way out of this) that a human could be used in switch settings on an Aspect experiment to violate QM's correlation bounds.

I'll believe it when I see it. From experimental evidence, not from arguments from TV magicians or introspection or philosophical Aristotelian exhaustion techniques. Until then I believe QM more, not a possible future superdeterministic theory.

That's the beauty of it, you can see it. In fact, only you can see it for yourself. No one can reason it out because no amount of logic or mathematics can give rise to what is something that can only be experienced through first-person empiricism.

Buddhist philosophy has a lot to say on this and sets out first-person empirical practices for observing it.

Fourier wrote: »

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1355219804000048
https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.4119

Again,very much appreciated!

Fourier wrote: »

Let me just ask the basic question: Do you ultimately think the world is deterministic. Forget about Free Will and all that. Let's just take the basic point of determinism.

At the fundamental level of reality, the reality behind the veil to paraphrase d'Espagnat, I'm not sure concepts such as determinism and indeterminism apply.

Fourier wrote: »

It would not occur without the particle. If you mean that by "caused" then yes. But there is no spatiotemporal process.

How I would be inclined to talk about the change in colour being "caused", is to say that we have a detector plate which changes colour. Clearly we can identify a moment prior to the change in colour and after the change in colour. We don't need to assume that such spatiotemporal concepts apply to the particle at the fundamental level. We can focus on the change in colour of the plate - having established that the particle exists in some sense in the Universe.

For this event to occur, for the plate to change colour, something must happen to the plate. We don't need to be able to specify what that occurrence is and we don't need to provide a detailed description of the process, we can simply conclude that something must happen. The alternative is that nothing happens and the plate doesn't change colour. This term "something happens" (apart from being the name of an 80/90s pop band) is a place holder that we can use in contrast to the alternative (and lesser known pop band) "nothing happens".

Something happens and there is a change in the colour of the plate. We would say that this something happening causes the change in colour of the plate. Again, if nothing happens then there is no change in colour i.e. no change in colour is "caused".

So, with the change in colour of the plate, either it spontaneously changes colour by itself, owing to its internal dynamics or something else happens. We have established that it is not down to the internal dynamics of the plate itself, so we can focus on that something else.

You have said that the change in colour would not occur without the particle so we can ask, prior to the change in colour, does the particle exist in some sense? Again, we don't need to apply spatiotemporal concepts to the particle, we can ask this question in reference to the receptor plate. Observing the detector plate prior to the change in colour we can ask "does the particle exist in some sense?"

We can ask that question at various moments throughout the experiment to coincide with other events. We can ask it prior to switching on the machine that generates the particle, we can ask it after the machine is switched on, and we can ask it at various intervals throughout the process until the plate changes colour.

The answer will either be yes or no.


So, imagining a moment immediately prior to the plate changing colour, does the particle exist in some sense?

Fourier wrote: »

What are you talking about? I'm talking about the experimental setting, like a polarizer sheet in an Aspect experiment being set to 120 degrees. I'm not sure what that has to do with tasting honey.

Ultimately, we are talking about a first-person, subjective experience - the decision about which setting to use in the experiment. There is no possible mathematical or logical account that can be given for this.

Tasting honey is another first-person subjective experience. There is no possible mathematical or logical account that can be given for this. The only way that this can be explored or tested is through first-person empirical investigation. The same is true for free will.

Fourier wrote: »

The embedding isn't frozen though, it has a continuous parameter that varies.

Before we get onto this particular parameter and how its variance gives rise to relative motion in a frozen block structure, am I correct in saying that each embedding i.e. each 3D slice would have a fixed value for this parameter; that the variance in the parameter applies when we consider a number of points along the world line?

To try and clarify, if we take your worldline/worldtube and pick three different points along it, corresponding to different stages in your life. Does each point have its own value for this parameter with each of the three points having a different value, thus giving rise to this variance?

Fourier wrote: »

You're basically just giving Zeno's paradox. "How can things move if moments are frozen?"

There are certainly major similarities to Zeno's paradox of the Arrow. I can't say for sure that they are absolutely identical, but the block universe, with its static and unchanging worldlines, certainly seems to embody Zeno's paradox.

Fourier wrote: »

I will trust experiment over "beautiful" introspective philosophies. I think that might be the difficulty you have with physics. For you Experience > Evidence. If what you are saying is right you can use a human to violate QM's correlation inequality bounds. Nobody has demonstrated this, I don't believe it. No matter what meditative self-analysis you propose.

There are plenty of studies in the field of psychology, most notably behavioural and evolutionary psychology, which have major implications for the notion of freedom of choice. There is an abundance of evidence which points to how our environment dictates our choices and behaviour.

In fact, arguably, the only "evidence" in favour of free will is our own misguided perception about ourselves - bearing in mind that QM doesn't offer evidence of free will, it is established by way of logical necessity.

As the paper you cited identifies "with no additional information about the respondents, it is difficult to understand what could lead a person not to follow the simple instructions" i.e. to understand the choice they made.

Doesn't d'Espagnat talk about this in Veiled Reality? There is no getting away from the first-person subjective experience. The relative positions of the planets or that of a pointer on its dial, or that of the change in colour of a detector plate are all elements of our experience. In fact, first-person subjective experience is the only way in which knowledge can be acquired.

Fourier wrote: »

Then why do you think our choices are determined if things "behind the veil" don't have to be?

Because pretty much every aspect of our lives is determined by preceding causes.

We don't choose to be born, much less to be born as humans. We don't choose our sex. We don't choose the culture into which we are born or the language that we will speak. We don't choose to start school and become educated in specific subjects. By this time, the seeds are sown and much of the decisions we make in life will already be dictated by these prior conditions. But the causes don't stop there, we are continually being influenced by our environment in ways that we don't usually realise.

With regard to an experimenter choosing the settings in an experiment, this decision is preceded by the decision to enter this field of research, which is preceded by the decision to study physics, which is preceded by the subjects taken in school, which is preceded by being born, which is preceded by his parents procreating, which is preceded by....right back to the big bang.

EDIT: We can isolate any of these decision points and drill down into the causes the precede it.

The decision making process is very much open to empirical investigation. The problem with third party studies is that "with no additional information about the respondents, it is difficult to understand what could lead a person [to make the decision they made]". We can however make empirical observations of this process on a first-person basis and we have more information than anyone about what leads us to make the decisions we make, bearing in mind the influences stretch back to our childhood.