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Free Will & Absolute Motion
Comments
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In the first case you make a decision which has a causal effect on you i.e. you choose to move. In the second, I make a decision which has a causal effect on me i.e. I choose to move, and in the third we both choose to move.
What is your argument for the "i.e." conclusions you present? A relationalist would reject them.Am I right in saying that, in each of these cases our individual decisions results in our experiencing acceleration? This acceleration tells us which one of us changes our state of motion. Acceleration itself is absolute, so presumably this would tell us which one of us, or which body, moves in an absolute sense?
In a physical sense, this kind of acceleration is absolute insofar as both you and I will agree on who has undergone or not undergone proper acceleration.
Ontologically speaking, if you are a substantivalist, this acceleration is absolute and determined by the inertial structure of spacetime. If you are relationalist, this acceleration is just co-ordinate acceleration under a specific but unprivileged category of co-ordinate systems, and force is defined with respect to fields as extended objects, as opposed to fields as a distribution of properties across points in spacetime.0 -
It might be worth stating from the outset that nothing I am saying here contradicts the use of co-ordinate reference frames. I'm simply suggesting that we can make deductions beyond what the co-ordinate reference frame picture tells us.
My reasoning is similar to to what I have mentioned already. If we start with the very simple scenario where you wave your arm. You make a free choice to move your arm and so, it is your arm that actually moves, not your body. You could alternatively choose to move your body instead of your arm. This would involve moving a different set of muscles. To me, this seems like a pretty fundamental truth; that it is your arm that moves, not your body.What is your argument for the "i.e." conclusions you present? A relationalist would reject them.
Where you and I are at rest relative to each other and you choose to move the muscles in your legs (and body) in a process we call walking, then, to my mind, it makes sense to say that it is you that moves not me. If you had not made such a choice then there would be no relative motion between us because I chose to not move my muscles in the process called walking. Your choice to move your muscles causes you to move, it doesn't cause me to move. It is your movement (and my lack of movement) which results in relative motion between us.
It would seem that the relationalist would deny that when you move your arm, your arm actually moves or that when you move the muscles in your body to walk, that you are actually moving.
They would seem to deny this by saying that all motion is a relational concept and that there is always a reference frame that labels the arm or you as having a co-ordinate velocity of zero. I didn't pick up on it the first time but it seems as though this is just a restatement of the same point made previously. We can see this when we ask, a velocity of zero relative to what? Calling it a co-ordinate velocity doesn't avoid this.
To my mind, it seems as though the relationalist is employing a mathematical device to describe a physical situation. This is, of course a very useful and very necessary process. But, it doesn't refute the claim that when you move your hand your hand is actually moving, or that when you and I are at rest relative to each other and you start walking, it is you that is actually moving.
It doesn't refute this because we can employ the co-ordinate reference frames in this case, in exactly the same manner. Essentially, what we mean when we say that a body has a co-ordinate velocity of zero is that it has a velocity of zero relative to itself, which of course is a tautology. It also means that it has a zero velocity relative to an imaginary set of co-ordinates that can be viewed as an extension of itself (or which can theoretically be constructed using real world instruments).
Essentially, the physical motion between two bodies is prior to the mathematical description of it.
If we go back to the example of you and I at rest relative to each other. You makes the decision to move the muscles in your body in a process called walking. This causes you to experience acceleration. You experience this because you change your state of motion. You go from not moving, to moving.In a physical sense, this kind of acceleration is absolute insofar as both you and I will agree on who has undergone or not undergone proper acceleration.
Ontologically speaking, if you are a substantivalist, this acceleration is absolute and determined by the inertial structure of spacetime. If you are relationalist, this acceleration is just co-ordinate acceleration under a specific but unprivileged category of co-ordinate systems, and force is defined with respect to fields as extended objects, as opposed to fields as a distribution of properties across points in spacetime.
We can apply the same line of reasoning to when you move your arm. When you are stock still your arm does not experience acceleration. Then you choose to move your arm and it undergoes acceleration, whereas the rest of your body does not. Why does your arm undergo acceleration but not your body? Because you chose to move it, not your body.
That we can ascribe a zero co-ordinate velocity to your arm doesn't capture the fact that you chose to move your arm and not the rest of your body. This is why you experience acceleration around your arm, because if you didn't chose to move it (as opposed to your body), there would be no experience of acceleration.0 -
To my mind, it seems as though the relationalist is employing a mathematical device to describe a physical situation. This is, of course a very useful and very necessary process. But, it doesn't refute the claim that when you move your hand your hand is actually moving, or that when you and I are at rest relative to each other and you start walking, it is you that is actually moving.
A relationalist would not necessarily disagree with motion as not "actual". Instead, they would argue that actual motion is not an intrinsic property. It is a a relational property. Your choice to move your hand results in a relational property, such that a insect crawling on your hand is free to regard itself as at rest.It doesn't refute this because we can employ the co-ordinate reference frames in this case, in exactly the same manner. Essentially, what we mean when we say that a body has a co-ordinate velocity of zero is that it has a velocity of zero relative to itself, which of course is a tautology. It also means that it has a zero velocity relative to an imaginary set of co-ordinates that can be viewed as an extension of itself (or which can theoretically be constructed using real world instruments).
Essentially, the physical motion between two bodies is prior to the mathematical description of it.
If you are a relationalist, a description of e.g. object X as moving and Y as at rest is not prior to the mathematical description. We can say that in a sense motion might be prior but if motion is a relational property then the language you have been using (e.g. "it is you that moves and not me") is not.If we go back to the example of you and I at rest relative to each other. You makes the decision to move the muscles in your body in a process called walking. This causes you to experience acceleration. You experience this because you change your state of motion. You go from not moving, to moving.
What do you mean by change state of motion? Remember that while non-inertial motion might be absolute, inertial motion is easily understood as relational. You will e.g. experience acceleration whether you are changing from what you call "not moving" to "moving" or from "moving" to "not moving".We can apply the same line of reasoning to when you move your arm. When you are stock still your arm does not experience acceleration. Then you choose to move your arm and it undergoes acceleration, whereas the rest of your body does not. Why does your arm undergo acceleration but not your body? Because you chose to move it, not your body.
That we can ascribe a zero co-ordinate velocity to your arm doesn't capture the fact that you chose to move your arm and not the rest of your body. This is why you experience acceleration around your arm, because if you didn't chose to move it (as opposed to your body), there would be no experience of acceleration.
Remember though, that a relationalist would say the acceleration you described here is acceleration according to a class of co-ordinate systems, and not an intrinsic property of the things these systems describe as accelerating. And, depending on the kind of relationalist they are, they would explain the dynamic affects of this acceleration with either an ontology that includes fields, or some machian relationalism.0 -
An issue that I have with the relationalist position is statements like this, about the insect, because to say that the insect is free to regard itself as at rest is an absolute statement. Again, the question is relative to what is the insect at rest? In this case it is the arm. But, we can then investigate the situation where the insect chooses to walk along the arm and so it is no longer at rest relative to it. The contention is that, in this case, we can then conclude that either the insect or the arm moved in an absolute sense.A relationalist would not necessarily disagree with motion as not "actual". Instead, they would argue that actual motion is not an intrinsic property. It is a a relational property. Your choice to move your hand results in a relational property, such that a insect crawling on your hand is free to regard itself as at rest.
Maybe it is just comes down to a question of which a person finds more compelling. I don't doubt the application of the relationalist framework, I just think it is incomplete.
To my mind it makes perfect sense to say that, when I choose to move my arm, my arm does not stay at rest, it moves, in an absolute sense. It always remains at rest relative to itself, but that is a tautology and we can employ a co-ordinate system which ascribes a zero co-ordinate velocity to it, but to my mind this is just a consequence of the tautology.
Would the change in my muscles not be an intrinsic property of my arm?
Apologies, I'm not sure I follow the last sentence. I [think I] am saying that motion is prior to the mathematical description.If you are a relationalist, a description of e.g. object X as moving and Y as at rest is not prior to the mathematical description. We can say that in a sense motion might be prior but if motion is a relational property then the language you have been using (e.g. "it is you that moves and not me") is not.
We are starting from the observation of relative rest, so we can ignore the very idea of "not moving". The relative motion just tells us that one of the two must be moving. It might have been the case that both moving to begin with. The one which undergoes acceleration must move.What do you mean by change state of motion? Remember that while non-inertial motion might be absolute, inertial motion is easily understood as relational. You will e.g. experience acceleration whether you are changing from what you call "not moving" to "moving" or from "moving" to "not moving".
Even going from moving to not moving tells us that at least one of them must have been moving.
The physical sensation of undergoing acceleration is surely independent of any class of mathematical co-ordinate system? It must be intrinsic in some sense, no?Remember though, that a relationalist would say the acceleration you described here is acceleration according to a class of co-ordinate systems, and not an intrinsic property of the things these systems describe as accelerating. And, depending on the kind of relationalist they are, they would explain the dynamic affects of this acceleration with either an ontology that includes fields, or some machian relationalism.0 -
You guys are absolutely adorable even if you are not familiar with the purpose of Sir Isaac's absolute/relative space and motion and I daresay you wouldn't want to know anyway.
Mathematicians make poor astronomers so it is understandable when the late 17th-century experimental theorist encountered the procedures, methods and insights of the first heliocentric astronomers and the antecedent Ptolemaic astronomers, he carefully crafted a misadventure to suit himself.
The following graphic is not geocentric and does not constitute relative space and motion -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes_Kepler#/media/File:Kepler_Mars_retrograde.jpg
How do I know this - well Kepler himself explains that it is the motion of the Earth and Mars simultaneously and if the Earth is moving then forget geocentricity -
"Copernicus, by attributing a single annual motion to the earth, entirely rids the planets of these extremely intricate coils, leading the individual planets into their respective orbits, quite bare and very nearly circular. In the period of time shown in the diagram, Mars traverses one and the same orbit as many times as the 'garlands' you see looped towards the centre, with one extra, making nine times, while at the same time the Earth repeats its circle sixteen times " Kepler Astronomia Nova 1609
Sir Isaac thinks if you plonk the Sun in the centre of the diagram you get absolute space and motion hence his clownish take on direct/retrograde motions -
"For to the Earth, planetary motions appear sometimes direct, sometimes stationary, nay, and sometimes retrograde. But from the sun they are always seen direct,..." Newton
I mean, surely people are not so devoid of their perceptive faculties that they can't understand a basic astronomical diagram ?. I don't mind that mathematicians are wasting their time with astronomical perspectives that they don't understand but my goodness, have they ever made a fuss over the last 250+ years while wasting everyone else's time.
Mathematicians can't compete with a genuine astronomer and neither should they try, however, one with the slightest trace of a perceptive balance can dig themselves out of worthless 17th-century perspectives.
This is what direct/retrograde motions ( and the imaginary loops) look like from a faster-moving Earth as it overtakes the slower-moving Jupiter and Saturn -
https://apod.nasa.gov/apod/ap011220.html0 -
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An issue that I have with the relationalist position is statements like this, about the insect, because to say that the insect is free to regard itself as at rest is an absolute statement. Again, the question is relative to what is the insect at rest? In this case it is the arm. But, we can then investigate the situation where the insect chooses to walk along the arm and so it is no longer at rest relative to it. The contention is that, in this case, we can then conclude that either the insect or the arm moved in an absolute sense.
A relationalist says there is a frame of reference that labels the insect as at rest, and there is a frame of reference that does not, and neither is more reflective of the underlying state of affairs. This is what I mean by saying the insect is free to regard itself as at rest.Would the change in my muscles not be an intrinsic property of my arm?
A relationalist would say the relative configuration of particles that make up your muscles has changed. A relative configuration would be characterised by a list of inter-particle distances, as opposed to a configuration, which is characterised by a list of positions in space.We are starting from the observation of relative rest, so we can ignore the very idea of "not moving". The relative motion just tells us that one of the two must be moving. It might have been the case that both moving to begin with. The one which undergoes acceleration must move.
Even going from moving to not moving tells us that at least one of them must have been moving.
It doesn't say at least one must be moving. It says the distance between them changes, and that this distance, a relation between them, is primitive.The physical sensation of undergoing acceleration is surely independent of any class of mathematical co-ordinate system? It must be intrinsic in some sense, no?
Is the sensation frame-dependent description? No. It is independent in this sense. But it is intrinsic? A relationalist would explain this sensation with relative configurations, and not a substantival space.0 -
The Sun is a fixed/ central/stationary reference for the motions of the planets as seen from a moving Earth -
https://sol24.net/data/html/SOHO/C3/96H/VIDEO/
For astronomers rather than mathematicians, the planets Jupiter and Saturn are moving from right to left although observed moving from left to right *. The bright star near Jupiter is a testament to orbital motion in one direction around the Sun. The stars are not used as a fixed reference for the orbital motion of those planets but rather the Sun as seen from the C3 camera tracking with the Earth's orbital motion.
All astrophysics is based on a rotating celestial sphere (RA/Dec) although it is projected as a fixed background framework -
https://community.dur.ac.uk/john.lucey/users/solar_year.gif
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BYy0EQBnqHI
"PHÆNOMENON IV.
That the fixed stars being at rest, the periodic times of the five
primary planets, and (whether of the sun about the earth, or) of the
earth about the sun, are in the sesquiplicate proportion of their mean
distances from the sun." Newton
I don't really mind if mathematicians show little or no understanding of Newton's agenda based on warping the original astronomical methods, insights and conclusions rather than the nonsensical idea of 'warping' space. Astronomy is both a perceptive and interpretative discipline hence cannot be broken down into components of time, space and motion much less idiosyncratic terms such as absolute/relative.
Society doesn't need these self-aggrandising things -
"These are the imaginings of incomplete- notions-philosophers who make space an absolute reality. Such notions are apt to be fudged up by devotees of pure mathematics, whose whole subject- matter is the playthings of imagination, but they are destroyed by higher reasoning" Leibniz
* The stars change position from left to right with the Sun as a fixed reference because the Earth moves.0 -
Thanks Morbert, I understand why the relationalist would label the insect as "at rest" but presumably the relationalist would also need to specify, relative to what the insect is at rest, since the statement, "the insect is at rest", is not a relational statement; it's an absolute one.A relationalist says there is a frame of reference that labels the insect as at rest, and there is a frame of reference that does not, and neither is more reflective of the underlying state of affairs. This is what I mean by saying the insect is free to regard itself as at rest.
You said that we can, instead, think of it in terms of co-ordinate velocity and say instead that there is a reference frame which ascribes a zero co-ordinate velocity to the insect. Again, however, presumably the relationalist would need to specify relative to what the insect has a zero velocity.
But, all of this would apply to the absolutist as well, wouldn't it? Would the absolutist not apply co-ordinate reference frames in precisely the same way - although they mightn't label the insect as "at rest"?
My thinking is that the change in the configuration of particles is fundamental and comes prior to any quantification of that change; the basic fact that there is a change in the configuration would allow us to conclude that at least one of the particles must have moved.A relationalist would say the relative configuration of particles that make up your muscles has changed. A relative configuration would be characterised by a list of inter-particle distances, as opposed to a configuration, which is characterised by a list of positions in space.
The absolutist position I'm advocating here, does not contradict the fact that the distance between them changes, it simply says that there are 3 possible reasons for why the distance changes:It doesn't say at least one must be moving. It says the distance between them changes, and that this distance, a relation between them, is primitive.
1) Body A moves
2) Body B moves
3) Both bodies A and B move
All three would result in relative motion and a change in the distance between the bodies.
It seems as though the relationalist position can be boiled down to, the distance between the bodies changes because the bodies move relative to each other, which would be a tautology.
My thinking is that a change in configuration would be explicable by one of the three scenarios above.Is the sensation frame-dependent description? No. It is independent in this sense. But it is intrinsic? A relationalist would explain this sensation with relative configurations, and not a substantival space.0 -
My thinking is that the change in the configuration of particles is fundamental and comes prior to any quantification of that change; the basic fact that there is a change in the configuration would allow us to conclude that at least one of the particles must have moved.
The absolutist position I'm advocating here, does not contradict the fact that the distance between them changes, it simply says that there are 3 possible reasons for why the distance changes:
1) Body A moves
2) Body B moves
3) Both bodies A and B move
It seems as though the relationalist position can be boiled down to, the distance between the bodies changes because the bodies move relative to each other, which would be a tautology.
My thinking is that a change in configuration would be explicable by one of the three scenarios above.
If you are a relationalist, the changing distance is the primitive relational property. You are invoking 1) 2) or 3) as an explanation for changing distance, but it is the changing distance that is primitive and grounds the three equally valid descriptions. It is not the case that 1) 2) or 3) must be what is the case. Instead, the changing distance is what is the case, and 1) 2) and 3) are equivalent descriptions of what is the case.0 -
If you are a relationalist, the changing distance is the primitive relational property. You are invoking 1) 2) or 3) as an explanation for changing distance, but it is the changing distance that is primitive and grounds the three equally valid descriptions. It is not the case that 1) 2) or 3) must be what is the case. Instead, the changing distance is what is the case, and 1) 2) and 3) are equivalent descriptions of what is the case.
1) 2) and 3) aren't equivalent though, are they? In one case, I exercise my free will and make the choice to move, in another you exercise your free will, and in the third we both exercise our free will. They all give rise to the equivalent result, the changing distance, but each one has a different causal chain. My free will causes me to do something, not you. Just as your free will causes you to do something, not me.0 -
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1) 2) and 3) aren't equivalent though, are they? In one case, I exercise my free will and make the choice to move, in another you exercise your free will, and in the third we both exercise our free will. They all give rise to the equivalent result, the changing distance, but each one has a different causal chain. My free will causes me to do something, not you. Just as your free will causes you to do something, not me.
1) 2) and 3) only assert motion of the bodies A and B. If we want we can write down three distinct states of affairs from a relationalist perspective:
a) A chooses to reduce the distance between A and B
b) B chooses to reduce the distance between A and B
c) A and B choose to reduce the distance between A and B
Then, for any given state of affairs, we can apply a discription corresponding to 1) 2) or 3). E.g. The description 2) (Body B moves) is compatible with the state of affairs a) (A chooses to reduce the distance between A and
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To my mind, there is some information missing from these statements. Namely, how does A and/or B reduce/increase the distance between A and B? If A chooses to reduce the distance it means that A must choose to perform an action. A cannot choose for B to perform an action. That action is what we refer to as "moving".1) 2) and 3) only assert motion of the bodies A and B. If we want we can write down three distinct states of affairs from a relationalist perspective:
a) A chooses to reduce the distance between A and B
b) B chooses to reduce the distance between A and B
c) A and B choose to reduce the distance between A and B
This would give us a situation where A chooses to move, with the result being relative motion between A and B. B also moves relative to A, although not by their own volition.
This is distinct from the vice versa situation, and the one where both choose to increase/reduce the distance. We have three distinct and distinguishable situations which are not equivalent.
Again, the statement, "Body B moves", is an absolute statement, not a relationalist one. A relationalist statement would be that Body B moves relative to Body A. That statement is also true in each of the above cases, where there is absolute motion. But we have three distinct situations which account for the relative motion.Then, for any given state of affairs, we can apply a discription corresponding to 1) 2) or 3). E.g. The description 2) (Body B moves) is compatible with the state of affairs a) (A chooses to reduce the distance between A and
A purely relationalist position seems to only give us the statement that A is moving relative to B and B is moving relative to A. Or, if it does extend to saying that A chooses to increase/reduce the distance between A and B, it seems to stop short of saying how A does this.0 -
You are tacitly assuming the distance between A and B is not primitive, and must be explained in terms of something more primitive. A relationalist would reject this, and any association of action with absolute motion. E.g.To my mind, there is some information missing from these statements. Namely, how does A and/or B reduce/increase the distance between A and B? If A chooses to reduce the distance it means that A must choose to perform an action. A cannot choose for B to perform an action. That action is what we refer to as "moving".
This would give us a situation where A chooses to move, with the result being relative motion between A and B. B also moves relative to A, although not by their own volition.
This is distinct from the vice versa situation, and the one where both choose to increase/reduce the distance. We have three distinct and distinguishable situations which are not equivalent.
If 1) 2) and 3) are interpreted as asserting absolute motion, then a relationalist would reject all three and instead identify a) b) or c) as the fundamental state of affairs.Again, the statement, "Body B moves", is an absolute statement, not a relationalist one.0 -
It's not that the distance is not primitive, it's just that, to my mind, the change in distance requires an explanation that goes beyond the tautological statements of A moves relative to B and the vice versa that B moves relative to A. It's these statements which require the explanation.You are tacitly assuming the distance between A and B is not primitive, and must be explained in terms of something more primitive. A relationalist would reject this, and any association of action with absolute motion. E.g.
The relationalist position only seems to give us those tautological statements.
I'll address a) b) and c) below.
As I mentioned, to my mind the statements a) b) and c) stop short of giving us an explanation for the observed relative motion. Let's look at a)If 1) 2) and 3) are interpreted as asserting absolute motion, then a relationalist would reject all three and instead identify a) b) or c) as the fundamental state of affairs.
a) A chooses to reduce the distance between A and B
This begs the question, how does A's choice to reduce the distance between A and B? A's choice is a causal influence which sets off a causal chain. A's choice results in A taking action. It doesn't result in B taking action. The choice made by A is to move their legs and perform an action that is commonly referred to as "walking".
So A walks, while B does not walk. To my mind, and I don't think this seems entirely unreasonable, A's walking action causes A to move. It doesn't cause B to move because A cannot control B's actions.
Note, however, we still have room for the relationalist position here because A's action causes A to move relative to B and vice versa, B moves relative to A.0 -
It's not that the distance is not primitive, it's just that, to my mind, the change in distance requires an explanation that goes beyond the tautological statements of A moves relative to B and the vice versa that B moves relative to A. It's these statements which require the explanation.
I'll address a) b) and c) below.
As I mentioned, to my mind the statements a) b) and c) stop short of giving us an explanation for the observed relative motion. Let's look at a)
a) A chooses to reduce the distance between A and B
This begs the question, how does A's choice to reduce the distance between A and B? A's choice is a causal influence which sets off a causal chain. A's choice results in A taking action. It doesn't result in B taking action. The choice made by A is to move their legs and perform an action that is commonly referred to as "walking".
So A walks, while B does not walk. To my mind, and I don't think this seems entirely unreasonable, A's walking action causes A to move. It doesn't cause B to move because A cannot control B's actions.
Note, however, we still have room for the relationalist position here because A's action causes A to move relative to B and vice versa, B moves relative to A.
What I don't understand is why you think the changing distance between A and B demands an explanation beyond A's or B's choices in a way that absolute substantivalist motion of A or B does not.
On a fine-grained level, a relationalist would write down a relative configuration space encompassing the bodies and Brains of A and B, and evolve a state forward under the laws of physics. Depending on the initial conditions we would e.g. see the distances between potassium ions in A's brain change, followed by a change in the distance between A's legs followed by a change between A and B. This description is internally consistent. And we can 'explain' the evolution of these relational distances with our initial conditions and our laws of physics. The laws of physics have a nomological character that might not satisfy your explanatory demands, but this nomological character is just as present in a substantivalist account with a substantivalist configuration space.0 -
I'm not saying it needs an explanation beyond the choices of A or B, I'm saying that if we unpack the consequences of the choices of A or B, it would - to my mind - seem to lead us to an inescapable conclusion of absolute motion.What I don't understand is why you think the changing distance between A and B demands an explanation beyond A's or B's choices in a way that absolute substantivalist motion of A or B does not.
The sentence I've highlighted in bold above is the key point, in my mind. A makes a choice which causes A's legs to move. A's choice doesn't cause B's legs to move. Therefore, A is the one who moves. B still moves relative to A, but A moves in an absolute sense, by virtue of their choice.On a fine-grained level, a relationalist would write down a relative configuration space encompassing the bodies and Brains of A and B, and evolve a state forward under the laws of physics. Depending on the initial conditions we would e.g. see the distances between potassium ions in A's brain change, followed by a change in the distance between A's legs followed by a change between A and B. This description is internally consistent. And we can 'explain' the evolution of these relational distances with our initial conditions and our laws of physics. The laws of physics have a nomological character that might not satisfy your explanatory demands, but this nomological character is just as present in a substantivalist account with a substantivalist configuration space.
Let's think in terms of one person only for a moment and consider the process of joining hands together. Let's say that A is holding her hands a certain distance apart from each other. There are 3 ways in which A can join her hands together:
1) Choose to move the left hand towards the right.
2) Choose to move the right hand towards the left.
3) Choose to move both hands towards each other.
In each of the three scenarios the hands move relative to each other but they are three distinct scenarios, in which one of the hands moves in an absolute sense (1 &2) or both move in an absolute sense (3), by virtue of the choice of A.0 -
This is a substantivalist account. A relationalist says A makes a choice which causes relative distances between A and B to change.The sentence I've highlighted in bold above is the key point, in my mind. A makes a choice which causes A's legs to move. A's choice doesn't cause B's legs to move. Therefore, A is the one who moves. B still moves relative to A, but A moves in an absolute sense, by virtue of their choice.Let's think in terms of one person only for a moment and consider the process of joining hands together. Let's say that A is holding her hands a certain distance apart from each other. There are 3 ways in which A can join her hands together:
1) Choose to move the left hand towards the right.
2) Choose to move the right hand towards the left.
3) Choose to move both hands towards each other.
In each of the three scenarios the hands move relative to each other but they are three distinct scenarios, in which one of the hands moves in an absolute sense (1 &2) or both move in an absolute sense (3), by virtue of the choice of A.
You're running into the same problem here. A relationalist would say there are three ways:
a) Choose to reduce the distance between the left and right hand and keep the distance between her right hand and her body fixed.
b) Choose to reduce the distance between the left and right hand and keep the distance between her left hand and her body fixed.
c) Choose to reduce the distance between the left and right hand and do not keep the distance between her body and her left or right hand fixed
In all three cases distance is always a relational property whether it is between the hands or a hand and a body. What I asked in my last message is why you think 1) 2) or 3) is the more correct primitive description than a) b) or c)0 -
But if we just take the relationalist account. To go from A makes a choice which causes relative distances between A and B to change skips over the part where A makes a choice to "walk". It is this walking, which is done by A and not B, which causes the distance between A and B to change.This is a substantivalist account. A relationalist says A makes a choice which causes relative distances between A and B to change.
Alternatively B could make the choice to walk, which would also result in a change of distance. In this instance it is B's walking which causes the change in distance.
If neither A nor B walks, then there is no relative motion between A and B. In order for there to be relative motion between A and B, either A must walk or B must walk or both must walk.
Walking is a subset of the category known as "moving".
Yes, distance between two things is a relationalist property, but the cause of a change in distance, I am saying, requires absolute motion to explain it.You're running into the same problem here. A relationalist would say there are three ways:
a) Choose to reduce the distance between the left and right hand and keep the distance between her right hand and her body fixed.
b) Choose to reduce the distance between the left and right hand and keep the distance between her left hand and her body fixed.
c) Choose to reduce the distance between the left and right hand and do not keep the distance between her body and her left or right hand fixed
In all three cases distance is always a relational property whether it is between the hands or a hand and a body. What I asked in my last message is why you think 1) 2) or 3) is the more correct primitive description than a) b) or c)
If we examine the statements a) b) and c) above. We can ask what would happen if she chose to keep the distance between both hands and her body fixed. The answer is of course, there would be no relative motion.
Let's break it down further:
So, she decides to keep the distance between her left hand and the body fixed. What is the result? Well, we don't know what she is doing with her right hand. Keeping her left hand fixed relative to her body is a partial explanation of the situation above, where there was no relative motion. We need to specify what she does with her right hand to know if there is relative motion or not.0 -
But if we just take the relationalist account. To go from A makes a choice which causes relative distances between A and B to change skips over the part where A makes a choice to "walk". It is this walking, which is done by A and not B, which causes the distance between A and B to change.
But if we just take the relationalist account. To go from A makes a choice which causes relative distances between A and B to change skips over the part where A makes a choice to "walk". It is this walking, which is done by A and not B, which causes the distance between A and B to change.
Alternatively B could make the choice to walk, which would also result in a change of distance. In this instance it is B's walking which causes the change in distance.
If neither A nor B walks, then there is no relative motion between A and B. In order for there to be relative motion between A and B, either A must walk or B must walk or both must walk.
...
Yes, distance between two things is a relationalist property, but the cause of a change in distance, I am saying, requires absolute motion to explain it.
You are claiming any relationalist account must be explained by a substantivalist account. No academic believes this. If we are a substantivalist, absolute motion like acceleration follows from our physical theory and initial conditions. If we are a relationalist, all relative motion follows from our physical theory and initial conditions. We do not need to invoke any substantivalist notion of motion in the latter.If we examine the statements a) b) and c) above. We can ask what would happen if she chose to keep the distance between both hands and her body fixed. The answer is of course, there would be no relative motion.
Let's break it down further:
So, she decides to keep the distance between her left hand and the body fixed. What is the result? Well, we don't know what she is doing with her right hand. Keeping her left hand fixed relative to her body is a partial explanation of the situation above, where there was no relative motion. We need to specify what she does with her right hand to know if there is relative motion or not.
Yes, we build a relative configuration space to describe all relevant bodies, including both hands.0 -
Not so much that it must be, rather that it appears to me to be an inescapable conclusion. The relationalist account, to my mind, seems to stop short of drawing all the possible conclusions form the situation at hand.You are claiming any relationalist account must be explained by a substantivalist account. No academic believes this. If we are a substantivalist, absolute motion like acceleration follows from our physical theory and initial conditions. If we are a relationalist, all relative motion follows from our physical theory and initial conditions. We do not need to invoke any substantivalist notion of motion in the latter.
If you and I are at rest, relative to each other and I exercise my free will to start walking, then it is I who does the moving and not you. It might be possible to construct imaginary, mathematical reference frames to describe the situation where I am labeled as "at rest" but that just appears to be an abstraction, given the nature of mathematical reference frames.
It also seems to me that the relationalist position leads to a necessary conclusion, in the form of the Block Universe, which directly contradicts the very notion of free will and the notion that quantum mechanical experiments are not deterministic.0 -
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I get the giggles nowadays when I encounter the Scholium IV of Sir Isaac where he leads the reader into a definitional absolute/relative time, space and motion nightmare-
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-stm/scholium.html
The axiom for the orbital motion of the Earth is based on the motion of the Sun through the background field of stars-
"Here, take notice, that the Sun or the Earth passes the 12 Signs or makes an entire orbit of the Ecliptic in 365 days, 5 hours 49 min. or thereabout, and that those days, reckon'd from noon to noon, are of different lengths; as is known to all that are versed in Astronomy. " Huygens
In Sir Isaac's idiosyncratic version, the Earth's orbit around the Sun equates to the Sun's orbit of the Earth-
"That the fixed stars being at rest, the periodic times of the five primary planets, and (whether of the sun about the earth, or) of the earth about the sun, are in the sesquiplicate proportion of their mean distances from the sun...This proportion, first observed by Kepler, is now received by all astronomers; for the periodic times are the same, and the dimensions of the orbits are the same, whether the sun revolves about the earth, or the earth about the sun." Newton
Would anyone like to discuss what he was trying to do and why it is vandalism of Kepler's correlation between the orbits of two planets and their distance from the Sun ?-
"But it is absolutely certain and exact that the ratio which exists
between the periodic times of any two planets is precisely the ratio
of the 3/2th power of the mean distances, i.e., of the spheres
themselves; provided, however, that the arithmetic mean between both
diameters of the elliptic orbit be slightly less than the longer
diameter. And so if any one take the period, say, of the Earth, which
is one year, and the period of Saturn, which is thirty years, and
extract the cube roots of this ratio and then square the ensuing ratio
by squaring the cube roots, he will have as his numerical products the
most just ratio of the distances of the Earth and Saturn from the sun.
1 For the cube root of 1 is 1, and the square of it is 1; and the cube
root of 30 is greater than 3, and therefore the square of it is
greater than 9. And Saturn, at its mean distance from the sun, is
slightly higher than nine times the mean distance of the Earth from
the sun." Kepler
Easy enough to pick the distortions created by absolute/relative distinctions apart and remove this type of 'definitional' vandalism from astronomical observations0 -
Not so much that it must be, rather that it appears to me to be an inescapable conclusion. The relationalist account, to my mind, seems to stop short of drawing all the possible conclusions form the situation at hand.
The problem is, to draw those conclusions you characterise as inescapable, you are implicitly relying on a set of assumptions about the kinds of things that exist in reality. To give sense to your decision to move your hand, your are implicitly invoking an ontology of your hand with a property 'motion' given sense by a substantive account of space.
If you do not adopt this ontology, and instead adopt a relationalist ontology where relational properties are primitive and motion is a derivative of these properties, then the inescapable conclusions are the relationalist conclusions, not the substantivalist ones, as there is no sense of motion or space that exists divorced from your relations to other things.
E.g.
If instead of invoking an ontology where motion is in some sense intrinsic to you, we invoke an ontology where the relational distances between you and other things are more fundamental, then your choice to walk imparts a change to the primitive relational properties, and not some non-existent intrinsic sense of motion.If you and I are at rest, relative to each other and I exercise my free will to start walking, then it is I who does the moving and not you. It might be possible to construct imaginary, mathematical reference frames to describe the situation where I am labeled as "at rest" but that just appears to be an abstraction, given the nature of mathematical reference frames.0 -
Is the Block Universe an inescapable conclusion of the relationalist position?The problem is, to draw those conclusions you characterise as inescapable, you are implicitly relying on a set of assumptions about the kinds of things that exist in reality. To give sense to your decision to move your hand, your are implicitly invoking an ontology of your hand with a property 'motion' given sense by a substantive account of space.
If you do not adopt this ontology, and instead adopt a relationalist ontology where relational properties are primitive and motion is a derivative of these properties, then the inescapable conclusions are the relationalist conclusions, not the substantivalist ones, as there is no sense of motion or space that exists divorced from your relations to other things.
EDIT: Is the relativity of simultaneity an inescapable conclusion of the relationalist position?0 -
Is the Block Universe an inescapable conclusion of the relationalist position?
EDIT: Is the relativity of simultaneity an inescapable conclusion of the relationalist position?
The block universe and relativity of simultaneity are not inescapable conclusions of the relationalist position. Relationalists are not substantivalist. They do not believe in a substantive sense of spacetime.0 -
Ah OK, I thought the relativity of simultaneity (RoS) - and therefore the block universe - were a necessary consequence of the relationalist position.The block universe and relativity of simultaneity are not inescapable conclusions of the relationalist position. Relationalists are not substantivalist. They do not believe in a substantive sense of spacetime.
Would you say that RoS and free will are incompatible?0 -
If instead of invoking an ontology where motion is in some sense intrinsic to you, we invoke an ontology where the relational distances between you and other things are more fundamental, then your choice to walk imparts a change to the primitive relational properties, and not some non-existent intrinsic sense of motion.
There is something which I am missing in my understanding of the scientific interpretation of absolute motion - as I'm sure is clear to you. To my mind, I'm not sure how I am invoking any particular ontology. Am I right in saying that either/both a relationalist and a substantive interpretation can be applied?
While there is a gap in my understanding of the scientific interpretation of the relationalist and substantivist positions, I'm left with the feeling that the relationalist position doesn't capture something that, to my mind, is self-evident.
Namely, that when you and I are at rest relative to each other, if neither of us moves then there will be no relative motion. Then, by your own free will, you decide to move your arm, or you decide to start walking. Your decision has a causal effect on you, not on me. If neither of us made a free choice to move then there would be no relative motion. So, by virtue of your decision there is a sense in which you have moved where I have not.
This 'sense' in which you move but I don't is what I mean by 'absolute motion' because it is not necessarily relative to anything, because in the sense of relative motion, I move relative to you - so the relationalist position cannot capture this sense in which you are the one who moves.
I don't see how any particular ontology would be applicable here bcos in every case it would be your free choice and your movement.
I mistakenly assumed that the relationalist position necessitated Einsteinian relativity and therefore the relativity of simultaneity. I was taking this as an argument against the relationalist position because the relativity of simultaneity is incompatible with the notion of free will in quantum mechanics.0 -
Namely, that when you and I are at rest relative to each other, if neither of us moves then there will be no relative motion. Then, by your own free will, you decide to move your arm, or you decide to start walking. Your decision has a causal effect on you, not on me. If neither of us made a free choice to move then there would be no relative motion. So, by virtue of your decision there is a sense in which you have moved where I have not.
This 'sense' in which you move but I don't is what I mean by 'absolute motion' because it is not necessarily relative to anything, because in the sense of relative motion, I move relative to you - so the relationalist position cannot capture this sense in which you are the one who moves.
The bit in bold is where an implicit ontology is smuggled in. A relationalist would say you have decided to induce a relative motion between your arm and other objects like your body etc. This is interpreted/described by you as you moving your arm.
You on the other hand, assume the "moving of the arm" is the more fundamental ontic fact of the matter, and that the moving of the arm gives rise to relative descriptions of motion.I mistakenly assumed that the relationalist position necessitated Einsteinian relativity and therefore the relativity of simultaneity. I was taking this as an argument against the relationalist position because the relativity of simultaneity is incompatible with the notion of free will in quantum mechanics.
I'm not sure I understand the last sentence here. Are you saying relativity of simultaneity, free will, and quantum mechanics cannot all be reconciled?0 -
Alternatively, we could make the conscious decision to induce relative motion between a leg and our body, where the arm remains at rest relative to the body. Or we could induce relative motion between the arm and the body, the leg and the body, and the arm and the leg - in a motion where the knee is raised towards the abdomen and the arm is lowered towards the knee, until such time as they meet.The bit in bold is where an implicit ontology is smuggled in. A relationalist would say you have decided to induce a relative motion between your arm and other objects like your body etc. This is interpreted/described by you as you moving your arm.
You on the other hand, assume the "moving of the arm" is the more fundamental ontic fact of the matter, and that the moving of the arm gives rise to relative descriptions of motion.
We might do this once and then the second time choose only to induce relative motion between the leg and the body. The third time, only between the arm and the body.
In the second scenario a conscious free choice is made to move the leg but not the arm, while in the third scenario a choice is made to move the arm but not the leg. Yes, in all cases we choose to induce relative motion between parts of our body but that would appear to be an incomplete description of nature. We induce relative motion because we consciously choosing to move specific parts of our body. We can determine this, as in the example above, by isolating different parts of the body and choosing to induce relative motion at one time but not at another.
I'm saying that if the relativity of simultaneity necessitates that all moments/events on an objects worldtube share equal ontological status i.e. that future states are just as real as past and present, then that is incompatible with free will.I'm not sure I understand the last sentence here. Are you saying relativity of simultaneity, free will, and quantum mechanics cannot all be reconciled?
The reason being, if all the events on the worldtube of an observer co-exist in the overall structure of the universe, then the event that is the outcome of a decision co-exists with the event of making the decision, meaning that the outcome is pre-determined and there is only ever one possible outcome.0 -
It might be worth stating that in the case of many worlds, where more than one outcome is realised, free will is still negated by the relativity of simultaneity if all events on a worldline/tube co-exist in the universal structure because the outcome(s) of a decision co-exists with the making of that decision.The reason being, if all the events on the worldtube of an observer co-exist in the overall structure of the universe, then the event that is the outcome of a decision co-exists with the event of making the decision, meaning that the outcome is pre-determined and there is only ever one possible outcome.0 -
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In the second scenario a conscious free choice is made to move the leg but not the arm, while in the third scenario a choice is made to move the arm but not the leg. Yes, in all cases we choose to induce relative motion between parts of our body but that would appear to be an incomplete description of nature. We induce relative motion because we consciously choosing to move specific parts of our body. We can determine this, as in the example above, by isolating different parts of the body and choosing to induce relative motion at one time but not at another.
How would you isolate different parts of the body? If you have a disembodied leg and nothing else, in what sense does it move?
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