777x fuselage splits - another problem for Boeing.

Henry Ford III wrote: »

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/27/boeing-777x-fuselage-reportedly-split-during-september-stress-test.html

Between this, the 737NG cowling issue, and the 737 Max disaster things aren't looking too good for Boeing.

p.s. anyone brave enough to buy their shares yet?

It’s hardly fair to compare this event to those issues. This is a ground test of a new type, specifically designed to push the airframe well past expected loads and right up to the edge of the calculated point of failure. The frame failed just below that point, but isn’t that why they do the test?

Inquitus wrote: »

Aye, but worth noting the A350 passed this test.

Was it the exact same forces? According to the source article, Boeing pressurised the cabin more than they were required to

And the interior of the plane was pressurized beyond normal levels to about 10 pounds per square inch — not typically a requirement for this test, but something Boeing chose to do.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-777xs-fuselage-split-dramatically-during-september-stress-test/

I'm amazed how strong the current 777 is.
The BA that landed short stayed together perfectly.
The crash landing at San Francisco was unbelievable in that the main fuselage stayed intact.
I think they was another crash landing too with similar results.

Henry Ford III wrote: »

I'm not doing a comparison. I'm adding these issues together and wondering is the something wrong with Boeing's ability to make quality new products.

Not a comparison then, more of a false equivalence by even listing them together. If this happened on an airframe that had been certified and sold to a customer, it’d be fair enough to cite it as evidence of a failure in their ability to make quality products. But how are they supposed to make quality products without testing them, with the possibility of occasional failure?

Henry Ford III wrote: »

p.s. That test wasn't a destruction test. They expected the fuselage to remain intact.

I didn’t claim it was, I said they were purposely pushing the airframe close to the predicted point of failure.

While I’m at it, the cowling issue also doesn’t seem to me to call in to question the quality of their products. It’s a part that was widely accepted to be safe and fit for purpose to protect against a separate risk that is already pretty well mitigated. The Southwest accident revealed an unforeseen failure mechanism, and the system is essentially working as it should - investigators, regulators, manufacturers and operators finding and implementing a fix to prevent a repeat of the incident.

I’m in no way a defender of Boeing and have serious concerns with their (and their regulator’s) approach to quality control based on MCAS and other reported issues, I just think that you’re trying too hard to link these two things to something wider that’s already been fairly well evidenced.

As far as I’m concerned, this and the cowling issue actually show the industry’s safety management systems working well, proactively in the case of the 777X pre-certification testing, and reactively with the investigation and overhaul of the CFM56 cowling.

murphaph wrote: »

I would suggest there is a cultural problem within Boeing management.

The issues raised wrt angle grinders and hammers being used at subcontractors to get supposedly precisely machined parts to mate should have been an early indicator of some serious quality problems creeping into the company.

It's really sad. I've always just accepted the fact that Boeing would always "do things properly" and not put the share price at the very top of the priority list.

This is a really interesting article on that topic, that argues their current woes can be traced back to a particular moment that Boeing stopped being a company run by engineers: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/how-boeing-lost-its-bearings/602188/