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How to play like Phil Ivey

  • 13-07-2005 4:09pm
    #1
    Registered Users, Registered Users 2 Posts: 6,696 ✭✭✭


    Stolen from 2+2, posted by someone who played with him for a day.


    At his first table, Ivey could be counted on for at least one raise per orbit, sometimes two, and that raise was always three times the big blind. Usually, if it was folded to him in the cutoff or on the button, hed raise. Sometimes hed take down the blinds. Others hed be called. If he was forced to play after the flop, he could be counted on to bet two-thirds of the pot on the flop, whether in or out of position. Usually the bet was enough to take a pot, but on occasion hed was raised or check-raised. Most of the time, he folded to the pressure.

    Ivey would also call raises in position, from either the cutoff or on the button. In these situations as well, he could be counted on for a bet if checked to.

    The reasonably simple strategy of raising and then following up on the flop worked amazingly well. While he had to fold a number of hands after facing raises, his gains far outweighed his losses. And the predictability of Ives action had the effect of forcing the players around him to define their hands. With Iveys bets all but inevitable, his opponents needed cards in order to bet or raise.

    Ivey seemed privy to a stream of information his opponents lacked. He knew when they had a hand. All they knew was that he was betting yet again.

    When action extended beyond a single flop bet, you could be certain that both Ivey and an opponent held a decent hand. And at these points, Ivey was surprisingly circumspect. When he had a hand worthy of a showdown, hed often call bets on multiple streets, keeping the pot relatively small. For example, with blinds at 50/100, Ivey raised under-the-gun to 300 and was re-raised to 1000 by the big blind. Ivey called. On a flop of [2]-[3]-[6], Ivey called a 2k bet. On the turn and river, a [9] and [2], both players checked. Ivey showed down pocket jacks to the opponents [A]-[K], and he took the pot.

    At times when Ivey called a bet in position, I felt like I was watching a cheetah on the prowl. He targeted and isolated the weakest players, those who couldnt stand pressure from a universally feared player.

    As he picked up a number of small- and medium-sized pots, Ivey equipped himself with a stack that could withstand both episodes of bad luck and the occasional bad play.

    With the blinds at 100/300, Ivey raised under-the-gun to 900 and was called by a late position player and the small blind. On a flop of [2♠]-[6♦]-[4♠], the big blind checked to Ivey, who bet 2400. After a late position fold, the blind, whod been playing aggressively, raised to 5400. Ivey quickly called. On the turn, the blind moved in for his remaining 12,850. Ivey took some time, his eyes darting as he considered the situation. It was a draw-heavy board, full of potential straights and flushes. The opponent seemed to be playing as though a fold from Ivey would be a welcomed outcome. Ivey called, and was displeased to see his opponents pocket [4]s. Heflopped a set and hit a full house on the turn. Ivey had pocket [9]s and lost a considerable pot.

    For most players in the WSOP such a misread means a trip to the rail. But Ivey had collected enough chips in the previous rounds to leave himself with a reasonable stack after this hit.

    This loss and the diminished stack did nothing to slow Ivey. He continued to employ the strategy that had treated him so well.

    Over the hours that followed, Ivey continued to gradually build his stack, adding 1000 or 1500 at a time. He was never among the chip leaders, but he stayed around average or slightly above average.

    He moved to the second day or play in the middle of the vast pack.

    The early stages of day 2 treated Ivey well. After some initial setbacks, he caught a fortunate flop, hitting the nut diamond flush to an opponents lower flush.

    A short while later, Iveys late-position aggression seemed ready to reap great rewards. With blinds of 400/800, Ivey raised to 2400 form the cutoff. The blg blind raised, making it 7k. Ivey wasted no time and moved all-in. The blig blind called. Ivey, who could have made that initial raise with almost any two cards, held pocket [K]s to his opponents [A♥]-[Q♥]. The board came [Q]-[10]-[5]-[3]-[Q], and Ivey lost more than 31k from his stack.

    Down to under 20k for the first time in hours, and possessing less than 30 big blinds, Ivey was unbowed. He stole pots and doubled up again. And yet again, he was back in the mix.

    Midway through day two, with around 50k in chips, Ivey was a long way from the chips leaders, one of whom had as much as 600k. But nobodys counting Phil Ivey out, and no one wants this immense talent at his table.


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