Mens rea and intoxication.

NUTLEY BOY

What is the Irish legal approach to intoxication and mens rea ?

Suppose that D is extremely drunk but manages to drive his car. He has no sense of what he is doing and drives in to a pedestrian who is killed by the collision.

D is charged with dangerous driving causing death.

Does D have any defence available on the basis that he was so drunk that he was incapable of knowing what he was doing and that he was unable to exercise any judgment ?

Put another way, could D's severe intoxication stand up an argument that there is no mens rea / recklessness ?

I always had the idea that if you allowed yourself to become voluntarily intoxicated that did not provide an excuse for the consequences.

ohnonotgmail

Could it not be said that getting oneself so drunk as to be unaware of what one is doing is reckless in itself?

Clegg

Being tipsy isn't enough. You have to be so drunk that you're out of your own mind.

hullaballoo

Some hazy memory is coming back to me that if you're relying on the automaton defence, the cause of your state has to be external to you, so drinking yourself into that kind of oblivion is not a good defence. However, the mens rea element of the specific offence mentioned in the OP may be up for question. I am not an expert on this but if you are capable of the coordination required to drive at all, even horrendously badly, perhaps you are not so out of it that you have no control over what you are doing?

GM228

There is actually very little case law here on the matter and I havn't looked at this is a while but....

DPP vs Beard [1920] AC 479

Evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had that intent

Intoxication is a defence in crimes of specific intent (it can reduce a crime from specific intent to basic intent - murder to manslaughter). It is not a defence in crimes of basic intent or strict liability.

In DPP vs Majewski [1977] AC 443 it was held that in a crime of basic intent the accused may be convicted even though by virtue of intoxication the accused may not possess the necessary mens rea equired and may be in a state of automatism.

Intoxication is not a defence in crimes of specific intent that can be committed by being reckless, however as per DPP vs Caldwell [1982] AC 341, if the accused considered whether or not there was a risk and decided (incorrectly) that there wasn’t they could be acquitted.

The above have been approved here (with the exception of Caldwell I believe), but the CCA case DPP vs Reilly [2004] IECCA 9 is probably the best read on the matter.

http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECCA/2004/9.html

It should be made very clear what this Court is being asked to decide. The question is not whether intoxication is in itself a defence to a charge of manslaughter, and indeed if that were the question this Court would have no hesitation in answering ‘No’. Neither is the question whether automatism may ever be a defence to a charge of manslaughter. This Court accepts that there are circumstances in which it may be a defence, and indeed this was clearly the direction given by the learned trial Judge to the jury in the present case. He emphasised that the jury should acquit if there was a free standing situation where the Applicant was not in control of himself. The issue is whether the jury could or should acquit if there was a situation where the Applicant at the time of the death of Oisín was in a condition where he could not control himself or prevent the actions that led to the death of Oisín, but where such condition was brought about by the Applicant’s excessive consumption of alcohol. If those circumstances afford a defence to the Applicant, then clearly the issue of whether the facts supported that defence should have been left to the jury. 

The learned trial Judge directed the jury quite clearly in accordance with the Majewski decision. His charge can only be challenged if that decision, which is not binding on this Court, ought not to be followed in this jurisdiction. This Court has carefully considered the reasoning in the O’Connor case in Australia and in the more recent Canadian cases rejecting the Majewski decision. The O’Connor case, which it should be said was only determined by a majority of four to three in the High Court of Australia, rejects the distinction between a specific intent and a general or basic intent. It can certainly be argued that it is illogical to have such a distinction or to have what appear to be two levels of mens rea in relation to different types of crimes. However, that distinction, both in theory and in practice, has been present in the common law since before the foundation of this State and has been the basis of numerous decisions, particularly in the realm of unlawful killings and unlawful assaults. If such a distinction is to be removed, that can only be done by the Legislature. This Court would reject the basis of the majority decision in the O’Connor case.

With regard to the Canadian cases, the Court much prefers the arguments in the Leary and Bernard cases to those in the Daviault case. In particular, the Court would reject the view that the implementation of the Majewski decision in any way jeopardises the right of an accused to a fair trial or offends the principles of fundamental justice. 

As has been pointed out the issues in this case cannot be determined by pure logic. The Majewski decision is undoubtedly illogical in that it could be said that it ignores the question of mens rea, although this is an essential element of manslaughter. It is indeed reasonable to ask whether a person should be punished for an action which he was incapable of preventing, whatever may be the reason for such incapacity. It is equally illogical that a person should escape the consequences of an action which he performed while drunk, while he would be liable for the results of such action had he been less drunk, provided of course that his consumption of alcohol was voluntary. However, whatever may be the logic, the Court is here concerned with the commission of actions of violence by one person against another. It is not sufficient to make decisions on such issues in a purely theoretical manner. The Court must have regard to the rights of an accused person, but it must also have regard to the interest of the public at large who are entitled to be protected from acts of violence. If a person by consuming alcohol induces in himself a situation in which his likelihood to commit acts of violence is increased, particularly to the stage where he commits an act which he would not have committed had he not consumed the alcohol, then surely the Courts would be failing in their obligations to the public if they allowed the cause of his violence, namely the alcohol, to excuse his actions. The reasoning behind the Majewski decision appears to this Court to achieve the balance between the rights of the accused, who would be entitled to be acquitted if the jury found automatism which was, in the words of the trial Judge,“Free standing”, as against the rights of the public to ensure that the Applicant will be held liable for actions which were induced by alcohol voluntarily consumed.

This is a tragic case, and the Court has great sympathy for everybody concerned, including the Applicant. However, the Court is satisfied that the charge by the learned trial Judge, based on the Majewski decision, was perfectly correct and that leave to appeal must be refused.

GM228

hullaballoo wrote: »

Some hazy memory is coming back to me that if you're relying on the automaton defence, the cause of your state has to be external to you

Your memory is serving you well hullaballoo

See the Reilly case.

JimsAlterEgo

what about a situation where a person was drugged or slipped more alcohol than they thought they were drinking?

GM228

JimsAlterEgo wrote: »

what about a situation where a person was drugged or slipped more alcohol than they thought they were drinking?

This is known as innocent or involuntary intoxication and does provide a defence, it applies to say being spiked or an unforseen reaction to prescription medicine for example.

Mr. Incognito

You are confusing tort law and breach of statute.

Intoxication is no defence to the road traffic acts in fact it acts as a breach of road traffic acts.

It is allowed for diminished responsibility if you kill someone to allow you plead manslaghter as opposed to murder.

So it doesnt act as a mitigating factor for the intoxication charges

It does for the manslaughter.

dense

GM228 wrote: »

There is actually very little case law here on the matter and I havn't looked at this is a while but....

DPP vs Beard [1920] AC 479



Intoxication is a defence in crimes of specific intent (it can reduce a crime from specific intent to basic intent - murder to manslaughter). It is not a defence in crimes of basic intent or strict liability.

In DPP vs Majewski [1977] AC 443 it was held that in a crime of basic intent the accused may be convicted even though by virtue of intoxication the accused may not possess the necessary mens rea equired and may be in a state of automatism.

Intoxication is not a defence in crimes of specific intent that can be committed by being reckless, however as per DPP vs Caldwell [1982] AC 341, if the accused considered whether or not there was a risk and decided (incorrectly) that there wasn’t they could be acquitted.

The above have been approved here (with the exception of Caldwell I believe), but the CCA case DPP vs Reilly [2004] IECCA 9 is probably the best read on the matter.

http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECCA/2004/9.html

http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECCA/2004/9.html

feargale

He who killeth a man drunk sober shall be hanged -

16th century English legal maxim.

GM228

feargale wrote: »

He who killeth a man drunk sober shall be hanged -

16th century English legal maxim.

16th to 19th century, originating from the Reniger vs Fogassa [1552] 1 Plowd case, the position held until the R vs Grinley - unreported 1819 case (and which was cited in the Beard case I quoted previously).

Despite the Grinley case the maxim once again returned in the R vs Carroll [1835] 7 C&P145 case (interestingly the same judge from the Grinley case), but again the position of Grinley returned in the R vs Monkhouse [1849] 4 COX CC55 case and then stood the test of time.

Hows that for a history lesson

ED E

GM228 wrote: »

This is known as innocent or involuntary intoxication and does provide a defence, it applies to say being spiked or an unforseen reaction to prescription medicine for example.

I assume the burden of proof is on the accused for that?

Say D puts Ketamine in own drink(so as to contaminate glass) but claims in court his drink was spiked by another?

NUTLEY BOY

GM228 wrote: »

16th to 19th century, originating from the Reniger vs Fogassa [1552] 1 Plowd case, the position held until the R vs Grinley - unreported 1819 case (and which was cited in the Beard case I quoted previously).

Despite the Grinley case the maxim once again returned in the R vs Carroll [1835] 7 C&P145 case (interestingly the same judge from the Grinley case), but again the position of Grinley returned in the R vs Monkhouse [1849] 4 COX CC55 case and then stood the test of time.

Hows that for a history lesson

Amazing and fascinating. Have you ever been on University Challenge ?

GM228

ED E wrote: »

I assume the burden of proof is on the accused for that?

Say D puts Ketamine in own drink(so as to contaminate glass) but claims in court his drink was spiked by another?

There is no case law here on such, but generally (unless statue or common law states otherwise) the burden of proof always lies with the prosecution - that is to say you raise the defence and they rebut it.

That said, involuntary intoxication is not what you are aiming to show per se, you would still have to raise the defence that you were sufficiently intoxicated as to be lacking full mental faculties, you can give evidence you were spiked but still not provide any evidence of lack of mental faculties and of course still be found guilty.

Evidential burden of proof can't change to the accused unless statute or common law requires the accused to prove their defence and I'm pretty certain even in other jurisdictions there is no such requirement for such a defence.

However look at murder for example, the "accused person shall be presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his conduct", even with intoxication (voluntary or involuntary) you will still need to rebut that presumption because as I said you can be intoxicated and still have your faculties and intend the consequences of your actions.

See R vs Meade [1909] 1 KB 895 for example (which isn't approved here but cited in Beard).

A man is taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts. This presumption may be rebutted –

(1) in the case of a sober man in many ways;

(2) it may also be rebutted in the case of a man who is drunk, by showing his mind to have been so affected by the drink he had taken that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous, i.e. likely to inflict injury. If this is proved, the presumption that he intended to do grievous bodily harm is rebutted

GM228

NUTLEY BOY wrote: »

Amazing and fascinating. Have you ever been on University Challenge ?

Still awaiting the call......

alligatorncroc

What if any are the legal defenses to intoxication in a public place ? Surely this cannot be a defenseless crime ?

C3PO

https://www.boards.ie/discussion/comment/122729078#Comment_122729078

Why don’t you start a new thread rather than resurrecting two really old ones?

Donald Trump

https://www.boards.ie/discussion/comment/122729078#Comment_122729078

Here's some for you

1. I wasn't there. It must have been someone else giving the guard my details
2. I wasn't intoxicated at all. The Garda made a mistake.
3. It wasn't a public place

Good luck with convincing the court on them though. Third one easier to establish if true

chrisd2019

https://www.boards.ie/discussion/comment/122729078#Comment_122729078

Appearing to be intoxicated while under another influence such as medication perhaps.

Peregrinus

You can defend any charge by challenging the facts — arguying that the prosecution evidence doesn't prove the essential alements of the offence, or seeking to rebut the prosecution evidence with evidence of your own. "I wasn't intoxicated" or "it wasn't a public place" would be defences of this kind.

But we also use the term "defence" for a situation in which the elements of the offence are admitted or established — yes, I was drunk; yes, it was a public place — but some additional circumstance means that you are not criminally liable. If you argue that some essntial element of your behaviour was involuntary — you were administered alcohol without your knowledge, or you were brought by force to a public place — that would be a defence of the second kind.