AAIU says Spanish aviation regulator contributed to Cork airport crash in 2011

Iwannahurl

The Air Accident Investigation Unit's final report on the Manx2 flight 7100 crash in Cork in which four passengers and two crew were killed has found that Spain's aviation regulator AESA was partly to blame for the crash because of inadequate oversight of the Spanish operator, Flightline.

The AAIU's investigation also found deficiencies on the part of Flightline and identified errors made by the crew.

AAIU press release: http://www.aaiu.ie/node/626
RTE report: http://www.rte.ie/news/2014/0128/500565-cork-airport/

"The Investigation determined that the probable cause was ‘Loss of control during an attempted go‐around initiated below Decision Height (200 feet) in Instrument Meteorological Conditions’.

The Investigation identified the following factors as being significant:

• The approach was continued in conditions of poor visibility below those required. The descent was continued below the Decision Height without adequate visual reference being acquired. Uncoordinated operation of the flight and engine controls when go-around was attempted.
• The engine power-levers were retarded below the normal in-flight operational range, an action prohibited in flight.
• A power difference between the engines became significant when the engine power levers were retarded below the normal in-flight range.
• Tiredness and fatigue on the part of the Flight Crew members.
• Inadequate command training and checking.
• Inappropriate pairing of Flight Crew members, and
• Inadequate oversight of the remote Operation by the Operator and the State of the Operator.

Systemic deficiencies at the operational, organisational and regulatory levels were also identified by the Investigation. Such deficiencies included pilot training, scheduling of flight crews, maintenance and inadequate oversight of the operation by the Operator and the State of Registration."

keith16

Sounds like there is a lot of excuses in this. Sorry for sounding harsh.

lambayire

I would have been totally crapping myself as a passenger on a third attempt to land.

I know precious little about aviation but is "Tiredness and fatigue on the part of the Flight Crew members" a common issue?

cml387

Very few accidents can be atttributed to a single cause.

It seems clear from the report that the complicated licensing arrangement (the ticket seller contracted the operator who leased the aircraft from the owner - three separate parties) led to a poor oversight and management situation whereby training of aircrew and maintenance were substandard.

Iwannahurl

lambayire wrote: »

I would have been totally crapping myself as a passenger on a third attempt to land.

One of the survivors, ex-policeman Mark Dickens, was interviewed as part of the BBC Radio 4 Face the Facts investigative documentary about the crash. His detailed account was harrowing. Excerpts here: http://www.thejournal.ie/virtual-airline-behind-cork-air-crash-in-danger-of-losing-its-licence-to-fly-130887-May2011/

Manx2 has been described as a "virtual airline", which is part of the systemic failures that apparently increased the likelihood of a crash.

lambayire wrote: »

I know precious little about aviation but is "Tiredness and fatigue on the part of the Flight Crew members" a common issue?

Yes, unfortunately: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/uk-airline-pilots-union-balpa-fatigue-survey

Mick55

It seems the co-pilot was in control of the plane at the time of the crash, the commander was controlling the thrust. The first event it seems was that he powered the engines back to '' Below flight idle ''.. which according to the report the pilot of the plane would have not been expecting and is 'prohibited in flight'. The next event was that when they declared missed approach the commander powered both engines up to near full throttle.. this surge of power in addition to the pilot compensating for a roll to the left caused the plane to roll excessively to the right and the wing to touch the ground. As always with aircraft crashes it is a 'perfect storm' of faults that cause the accident.. The inexperience, the fog, poor company procedures etc.. Either way a very sad and tragic outcome.

Link to full report: http://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/report-2014-001.pdf

miss no stars

Mick55 wrote: »

It seems the co-pilot was in control of the plane at the time of the crash, the commander was controlling the thrust. The first event it seems was that he powered the engines back to '' Below flight idle ''.. which according to the report the pilot of the plane would have not been expecting and is 'prohibited in flight'. The next event was that when they declared missed approach the commander powered both engines up to near full throttle.. this surge of power in addition to the pilot compensating for a roll to the left caused the plane to roll excessively to the right and the wing to touch the ground. As always with aircraft crashes it is a 'perfect storm' of faults that cause the accident.. The inexperience, the fog, poor company procedures etc.. Either way a very sad and tragic outcome.

Link to full report: http://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/report-2014-001.pdf

I'd modify that to inexperience and negligence. The transcripts from the cockpit voice recorder are shocking. PNF didn't even know how to enter the holding pattern into the GPS and neither did the PF. Commander joked about how he normally has info on the alternates with him and never needs them but now he needs them and has no info on them :eek:. Make it worse? Co-pilot didn't even know that info on the alternates existed! (sorry, alternate singular - despite KNOWING that the conditions were below minimum they only nominated one alternate) Blatent disregard for the law from the pilots and an absolute mess of an organizational structure that allowed for the pairing of two inexperienced and inadequately trained pilots, physical problems with the airplane causing thrust imbalance (present for the 106 hours of flight data recordings but not once noted in the tech log) and a general attitude of not giving a **** and nobody having responsibility - which trickled down to an in-cockpit attitude of no actual chain of command and nobody willing to take a decision or follow the fcuking procedures. The two boys are are dead now but I hope the "ticket seller", owner, operator and AESA are sued successfully by all the passengers and their families.

ETA: The fog didn't cause this accident - negligence did.

cml387

There was sopme puzzlement about how long it was taking release the report.

But having read it today, it is obvious why it took so long. The level of detail and the extent of the investigation is staggering.
It's a credit to the AAIU. One hopes their recommendations are followed.

Iwannahurl

Will there be more rule changes following this report?

Aestivalis

cml387 wrote: »

There was sopme puzzlement about how long it was taking release the report.

But having read it today, it is obvious why it took so long. The level of detail and the extent of the investigation is staggering.
It's a credit to the AAIU. One hopes their recommendations are followed.

Yes tha AAIU do good work with their investigations. If you go to the Uk's AAIB website, you can compare some reports. They dont even release most of them to the public in the UK and the summaries are lacking at best.


I think one of the most frightening things in this report is the picture from inside the cabin. Its literally 50% muck, upside down, and theres hardly any room at all in there.
How 18 seats were accessible is beyond me.
2 tonnes of dirt was removed from the cockpit alone! :eek:

Irish Steve

I would hope that the regulators, especially in Spain, start with their own house, and then move on to tighten up very significantly, across the board.

I have not seen such a damning report with so many recommendations into a European accident in a very long time, and I watch these things closely.

A lot of people at both regulatory and operational levels have a lot of very hard issues to face, and some of them should be faced in front of a judge and jury, there were clearly some very inappropriate activities going on over a significant period of time.

The crew were not the only contributory factor, though they had a lot of culpability, even if they didn't realise it, given their inexperience. Others, some in high places, also have a lot to answer for the fact that 6 people died as a result of the failure of the system. That must not be allowed to happen again.

miss no stars

Irish Steve wrote: »

I would hope that the regulators, especially in Spain, start with their own house, and then move on to tighten up very significantly, across the board.

That'd be nice, but I'd say the Spanish and Manx authorities are more likely to sling mud at the report and try to claim the report is flawed... Any other action would be seen as taking responsibility for any part of the incident, and as we all know from the report, none of the parties involved want to do anything other than avoid responsibility. I'd say they're also afraid that if they accept the findings of the report (and enacting any of its recommendations voluntarily might be seen as accepting the report) they'll make themselves an easy target for being sued. I won't be holding my breath.

kub

Could this accident make it onto that series on Discovery where they re enact airline accidents?

Irish Steve

kub wrote: »

Could this accident make it onto that series on Discovery where they re enact airline accidents?

Because of the findings, and the implications, it should, but unfortunately, making the program would not be easy, for all sorts of technical reasons, getting access to a similar aircraft to record the relevant bits would not be easy, and they flight deck is small, so hard to work in, The other sad fact is that while it is a hot issue here in Ireland, the number of deaths is (thankfully) low, so it does not have the "interest" factor that is unfortunately so much a part of the Air crash investigation series. I would be pleased to see them take it on board, but I will be surprised if they take it on board.

Mick55

miss no stars wrote: »

The transcripts from the cockpit voice recorder are shocking. PNF didn't even know how to enter the holding pattern into the GPS and neither did the PF.

True, this is shocking. This is scary actually.. he is the 'senior' crew member.

miss no stars wrote: »

present for the 106 hours of flight data recordings but not once noted in the tech log

Shocking also, surely this constitutes as gross negligence from the maintenance staff? Although I'm not convinced from the report of just how much this fault contributed to the loss of control. I think its what caused the aircraft to roll slightly to the left. The PF overcompensated and paired with the commander moving the throttle to near full power caught him off guard. I think a more experienced pilot would have been able to maneuver his way out of the situation. The blame, by no way, lies directly with him though the poor chap.

miss no stars wrote: »

The two boys are are dead now but I hope the "ticket seller", owner, operator and AESA are sued successfully by all the passengers and their families.

Here here.

cml387 wrote: »

The level of detail and the extent of the investigation is staggering.

It is put together very well. A standard to rival the US or any other country.

Aestivalis wrote: »

I think one of the most frightening things in this report is the picture from inside the cabin. Its literally 50% muck, upside down, and theres hardly any room at all in there.
2 tonnes of dirt was removed from the cockpit alone! :eek:

Its a powerful image, it must have been an truly awful environment after the crash.

cml387

From the CVR you don't get the impression of a Captain and FO, more like a couple of lads having a go. This was referred to in the report as a "shallow authority gradiant". (I think this is the term used,one minor niggle is that the pdf of the report is not searchable).

miss no stars

cml387 wrote: »

From the CVR you don't get the impression of a Captain and FO, more like a couple of lads having a go. This was referred to in the report as a "shallow authority gradiant". (I think this is the term used,one minor niggle is that the pdf of the report is not searchable).

I think they may have called it horizontal :eek:

L1011

cml387 wrote: »

(I think this is the term used,one minor niggle is that the pdf of the report is not searchable).

Noticed this last night. VERY odd decision - it takes a fair bit of effort to actually do that. Any attempt to copy content out comes out as gibberish as they've done-in the underlying font data. I wonder if it actually even prints properly.

KnotABother

Was I the only one reading the CVR data and almost shouting "GO TO KERRY!!" at my screen?

Dublinflyer

Going to sound a bit harsh here but regardless of how complex setup of the companies involved the ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of an aircraft lays with the two people in the seats at the front. The AAIU report is very carefully worded to be very factual and not lay blame in any one place but the pilots made some questionable decisions and seemed to be unsure of the next action to take. A lot of training goes into CRM and how to make collective decisions but there needs to be one person in charge to make the final call, at the same time a second in command should not be afraid to question something if it needs to be done. It's not an easy balance and it is an issue with some airlines where the captain is king and nobody questions him/her.

The whole episode is a very dark day for Irish aviation, regardless of the causes people have lost their lives. I hope lessons are learned and something like this does not happen again. Where I sit I am overlooking 10/28 and it's always in the back of my mind that I could see something like this one day.

Another sad aspect of this is that a pilot who left the company a week before the accident blamed himself and took his own life.

http://www.thejournal.ie/former-pilot-of-cork-airport-crash-plane-takes-his-own-life-128443-Apr2011/

miss no stars

KnotABother wrote: »

Was I the only one reading the CVR data and almost shouting "GO TO KERRY!!" at my screen?

I know!!!

But then again... The captain (I use that word loosely) didn't remember to bring that thing that's on the notice board in the office that tells them about other airports with him... They also couldn't work the GPS properly so even if they'd decided to go there...

In seriousness, Kerry was wide open. They should have diverted or stayed in te holding pattern for another few minutes. They had options and should have used them. Then again, they also shouldn't have gone below the CAT I minimum never mind having gone below the CAT II minimum at DH. They also should have checked the weather. And picked more than one alternate. And had a clue.

The report is a masterpiece, but I imagine its desperately difficult reading for the families of those who died and for those who survived. It would be one thing for a crash to happen because of an act of god, so to speak, but my heart goes out to anyone involved because it was (and reads as) one fcuk up after another.

miss no stars

Dublinflyer wrote: »

The whole episode is a very dark day for Irish aviation, regardless of the causes people have lost their lives. I hope lessons are learned and something like this does not happen again. Where I sit I am overlooking 10/28 and it's always in the back of my mind that I could see something like this one day.

Another sad aspect of this is that a pilot who left the company a week before the accident blamed himself and took his own life.

http://www.thejournal.ie/former-pilot-of-cork-airport-crash-plane-takes-his-own-life-128443-Apr2011/

The only involvement Irish aviation had was on the ground in the form of Cork ATC, rescue services and the AAIU, all of whom can hold their heads high. Dark day for Spanish and Manx aviation, though.

ProfessorPlum

Dublinflyer wrote: »

Going to sound a bit harsh here but regardless of how complex setup of the companies involved the ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of an aircraft lays with the two people in the seats at the front. The AAIU report is very carefully worded to be very factual and not lay blame in any one place but the pilots made some questionable decisions and seemed to be unsure of the next action to take. A lot of training goes into CRM and how to make collective decisions but there needs to be one person in charge to make the final call, at the same time a second in command should not be afraid to question something if it needs to be done. It's not an easy balance and it is an issue with some airlines where the captain is king and nobody questions him/her.

The whole episode is a very dark day for Irish aviation, regardless of the causes people have lost their lives. I hope lessons are learned and something like this does not happen again. Where I sit I am overlooking 10/28 and it's always in the back of my mind that I could see something like this one day.

Another sad aspect of this is that a pilot who left the company a week before the accident blamed himself and took his own life.

http://www.thejournal.ie/former-pilot-of-cork-airport-crash-plane-takes-his-own-life-128443-Apr2011/

You are absolutely right, but, and I say this with the caveat of having really only scanned the report so far: The captain and co-pilot were barely, if even, trained and checked. They were woefully inexperienced and should never have been flying together. They messed up, sure, but they should never have been put in that position in the first place. Serious questions to be asked from those involved in training and standards, and the regulator. The two crew paid for their mistakes. Will anyone else?

blah

cml387 wrote: »

From the CVR you don't get the impression of a Captain and FO, more like a couple of lads having a go. This was referred to in the report as a "shallow authority gradiant". (I think this is the term used,one minor niggle is that the pdf of the report is not searchable).

Page 118:

JuanJose

cml387 wrote: »

one minor niggle is that the pdf of the report is not searchable).

CTRL + F key should throw up a search box for you.

notharrypotter

Can anyone please explain "Flat Cockpit Authority Gradient"?

L1011

notharrypotter wrote: »

Can anyone please explain "Flat Cockpit Authority Gradient"?

No obvious Captain / FO authority difference.

cml387

notharrypotter wrote: »

Can anyone please explain "Flat Cockpit Authority Gradient"?

A steep authority gradient is one in which the FO may be very junior and the captain very senior. In this case the FO may be reluctant to challenge the captain's authority.

Here we have the opposite case, where no one appears to be in charge and thee is no clear decision maker.

Lustrum

miss no stars wrote: »

..... They also should have checked the weather. And picked more than one alternate. And had a clue.
......

Just on this point - I agree with all the sentiments on here, and while it doesn't make a difference now, in (slight) defence of the crew the TAF for the day was reading BCMG 1009/1011 11010KT 9999 NSW SCT010 BKN020 - they first intercepted the ILS at 0858, and while the fact lvps had been in place for the previous day should possible have suggested to them to have several alternates, it is not unreasonable of them having read the taf to think that they should have no problem landing in Cork either at their ETA or within a short time of it.

Similarly that's not to put any blame on the met people, unfortunately none of us can control nature

ProfessorPlum

Initial response of IALPA to AAIU report:

http://www.impact.ie/14/01/28/Pilots-respond-to-final-report-on-Cork-air-crash.htm

Dublinflyer

miss no stars wrote: »

The only involvement Irish aviation had was on the ground in the form of Cork ATC, rescue services and the AAIU, all of whom can hold their heads high. Dark day for Spanish and Manx aviation, though.

I was just referring to the fact that we had the accident on Irish soil. You are right in that the services involved, especially the rescue services in the airport, should be very proud of their performance and without a doubt prevented further loss of life.

miss no stars

Then by that logic the Asiana crash in San Fransico is a dark day for American aviation? Nah, it's just unfortunate that showers of cowboys crash in someone else's country.

ProfessorPlum

Lustrum wrote: »

Just on this point - I agree with all the sentiments on here, and while it doesn't make a difference now, in (slight) defence of the crew the TAF for the day was reading BCMG 1009/1011 11010KT 9999 NSW SCT010 BKN020 - they first intercepted the ILS at 0858, and while the fact lvps had been in place for the previous day should possible have suggested to them to have several alternates, it is not unreasonable of them having read the taf to think that they should have no problem landing in Cork either at their ETA or within a short time of it.

Similarly that's not to put any blame on the met people, unfortunately none of us can control nature

I think the met report was fairly accurate? 6 mins after the crash conditions had improved to better that CAT 1. They should have nominated 2 alternates.

McCrack

A very detailed and technical report however I still don't understand why the plane rolled so suddenly to the right causing the wing-strike.

Can anybody explain in layman terms the reason for that please?

Red Nissan

McCrack wrote: »

A very detailed and technical report however I still don't understand why the plane rolled so suddenly to the right causing the wing-strike.

Can anybody explain in layman terms the reason for that please?

The port engine was running faster than the starboard, thus a right turn was being experienced for over 100 hours of flight. It was being compensated for by turning the aircraft left.

It seems that this aircraft was going to crash, it just depended on how hard, in the event in that fateful moment the engines were put on full throttle with the port engine delivering more power and it caused a right turn lift that cartwheeled the aircraft into the ground.

This sudden maneuver was not compensated for by being turned left, thus the catastrophic effect.

miss no stars

Red Nissan wrote: »

The port engine was running faster than the starboard, thus a right turn was being experienced for over 100 hours of flight. It was being compensated for by turning the aircraft left.

It seems that this aircraft was going to crash, it just depended on how hard, in the event in that fateful moment the engines were put on full throttle with the port engine delivering more power and it caused a right turn lift that cartwheeled the aircraft into the ground.

This sudden maneuver was not compensated for by being turned left, thus the catastrophic effect.

Would it not have more to do with the wrong person having paws all over the throttle?

Red Nissan

miss no stars wrote: »

Would it not have more to do with the wrong person having paws all over the throttle?

Don't know, the command structure was not in effect so very possibly. The aircraft was almost on the ground. it was more committed to landing than to another abort.

miss no stars

Red Nissan wrote: »

Don't know, the command structure was not in effect so very possibly. The aircraft was almost on the ground. it was more committed to landing than to another abort.

What I was getting at is that (provided I'm remembering correctly) the report says that although the guy in the right seat was supposedly pilot flying, the "captain" was making the inputs to the thrust, stuck it into the beta range and then powered on. If you're the one flying - and there's a thrust imbalance to begin with - but can't anticipate changes in thrust because someone else is doing that, how do you accommodate for them? Never mind when someone's doing stuff that amounts to an action prohibited in flight! :eek:

Red Nissan

miss no stars wrote: »

What I was getting at is that (provided I'm remembering correctly) the report says that although the guy in the right seat was supposedly pilot flying, the "captain" was making the inputs to the thrust, stuck it into the beta range and then powered on. If you're the one flying - and there's a thrust imbalance to begin with - but can't anticipate changes in thrust because someone else is doing that, how do you accommodate for them? Never mind when someone's doing stuff that amounts to an action prohibited in flight! :eek:

Indeed it is confusing, The Co Pilot FP [590 hrs flying time] was flying the aircraft, the Commander NFP [1,800 hrs flying time] did indeed throw the throttles open when they were possibly just 30 feet off the ground.

I'll have to read it again to be clear as to where they were sitting [to me they occupied each others seats ??? which put the FP {Co Pilot} in the left seat]

eatmyshorts

Red Nissan wrote: »

The port engine was running faster than the starboard, .

Port and starboard are nautical terms. Never used in aviation.

ProfessorPlum

Red Nissan wrote: »

The port engine was running faster than the starboard, thus a right turn was being experienced for over 100 hours of flight. It was being compensated for by turning the aircraft left.

It seems that this aircraft was going to crash, it just depended on how hard, in the event in that fateful moment the engines were put on full throttle with the port engine delivering more power and it caused a right turn lift that cartwheeled the aircraft into the ground.

This sudden maneuver was not compensated for by being turned left, thus the catastrophic effect.

I'm not sure if that is exactly what happened, and I think it's a bit of a push to say the aircraft was destined to crash.
The asymmetry was present as you say for over 100 hours and two goarounds were performed during this time with no untoward effects. It was compensated for by setting the throttles asymmetrically during flight.
The asymmetry really only became a factor when the throttles were operated outside the normal flight envelope (retarded below flight idle), resulting in a marked decrease in airspeed, asymmetric negative torque, and the subsequent roll to the left, and then to right as power was increased rapidly,( and I would presume the crew made some effort to compensate for the roll to the left.) There is nothing in the report to suggest that under normal operating conditions, the asymmetry would have been critical.

Xpro

eatmyshorts wrote: »

Port and starboard are nautical terms. Never used in aviation.

True enough, but I seen it in Atpl's

Storm 10

Port and Starboard are terms used exclusively in Ships and Aircraft, look at wing lights red on left wing and green on right wing, ships have the same lights read it on this link

http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Why_the_airplane's_left_side_and_right_side_called_as_port_and_star_board

Red Nissan

ProfessorPlum wrote: »

I'm not sure if that is exactly what happened, and I think it's a bit of a push to say the aircraft was destined to crash.

Destined to crash are my own words.

Go to page 59 /1.16.4 , in layman's terms, I suspect it is accurate enough.

ProfessorPlum

Red Nissan wrote: »

Destined to crash are my own words.

Go to page 59 /1.16.4 , in layman's terms, I suspect it is accurate enough.

Like I said, the mismatch only became critical after 9 seconds before impact, which is when the throttles were brought back below flight idle. During normal flight, there was a mismatch, but it was not critical, and was managed by adjusting the power levers, not 'turning left' as you said. There is nothing to say that the aircraft was not airworthy, which I would expect would be a highlight of a report into an aircraft that was 'destined to crash'.

Red Nissan

ProfessorPlum wrote: »

that was 'destined to crash'.

It was, or it was to have a hard landing and these otherwise unextraordinary circumstances, did make the difference between such.

ProfessorPlum

Red Nissan wrote: »

It was, or it was to have a hard landing and these otherwise unextraordinary circumstances, did make the difference between such.

I'm confused now.Why do you think it would have a hard landing or crash??

Go to pg 152 of 'conclusions' - it lists the torque differential as being No. 5 in a list of contributory factors, and states that the issue "became significant when the engines were operated below flight idle". Operation below flight idle is prohibited in flight, so in normal operation, the 'significant' condition should never occur.

Red Nissan

ProfessorPlum wrote: »

by adjusting the power levers, not 'turning left' as you said. .

Correct, there is the preliminary and the detailed findings. In the last few seconds both engines were pushed past 80%

Red Nissan

ProfessorPlum wrote: »

Go to pg 152 of 'conclusions' - it lists the torque differential as being No. 5 in a list of contributory factors, and states that the issue "became significant when the engines were operated below flight idle". Operation below flight idle is prohibited in flight, so in normal operation, the 'significant' condition should never occur.

It says operating in Beta reduces engine 2's response and performance but significantly increased torque. So initially we have a left pull which suddenly becomes a right push into the ground.

It's obvious that the Commander thought he was lower to the ground, he was about 30ft, so he was [probably] right but then lost confidence and pushed the throttles beyond the point where the 5% offset for engine 2 was effective.

ProfessorPlum

The point is the engines should never have been operated in the range below flight idle in the first place. Granted, when they were, it made it very difficult to recover. But saying the aircraft was destined to crash is a bit of a stretch, to say the least.

miss no stars

Red Nissan wrote: »

It says operating in Beta reduces engine 2's response and performance but significantly increased torque. So initially we have a left pull which suddenly becomes a right push into the ground.

It's obvious that the Commander thought he was lower to the ground, he was about 30ft, so he was [probably] right but then lost confidence and pushed the throttles beyond the point where the 5% offset for engine 2 was effective.

But none of that means that the airplane was destined to crash or unflyable. Their actions caused it to crash. The difference between the engines was certainly a contributory factor, but had they not being trying to land illegally, with a totally messed up system of one doing throttle and one doing control column AND had they not performed an action on the engines that's prohibited in flight they probably wouldn't have crashed. It was what they did that caused the plane to crash, not the problem with the plane itself.

I'm not trying to get at you here, but using terminology like "destined to crash" can be quite dangerous and insidious when talking about cases like this because on some level it alleviates personal responsibility. Like when a boat goes out in a storm and is damaged by the swell and sinks and people say "oh they were hit by a rogue wave, it was so unfortunate". That is SO dangerous compared with saying "they shouldn't have gone out in that. Rogue waves are VERY rare, it was more than likely just the conditions overwhelmed the boat"

By misplacing fate, destiny and acts of god in place of personal responsibility, people are inhibited from learning from the mistakes of others. Yes, there was a fault with the engines. But the airplane still spent at LEAST 106 hours flying with it, taking off and landing regularly without incident. Therefore it was NOT destined to crash, but it prevented two badly trained, inexperienced and negligent pilots from getting out of a bad situation that they got themselves into. They shouldn't have been in that situation to begin with.