The waning of American Hegemony

amaltom

An illegal intervention in Syria will not only fail to sustain American hegemony in West Asia but also provide a shot in the arm for Assad’s regime


Once carried out, the Obama administration’s thoroughly telegraphed strike on Syria, ostensibly over alleged chemical weapons use there, will mark an important inflection point in the terminal decline of America’s West Asia empire. Most importantly, it will confirm that America’s political class, including President Barack Obama himself, remains unwilling to face the political risks posed by any fundamental revision of Washington’s over-20-year, deeply self-damaging drive to dominate the region.
Mr. Obama initially ran for President pledging to end the “mindset” behind the strategic blunder of America’s 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq; in his first term, he committed to ending America’s war in Afghanistan, too, and to “rebalancing” toward Asia. But Mr. Obama was never ready to spend the political capital required for thoroughgoing recasting of U.S. foreign policy; consequently, the dissipation of American power (hard and soft) evident under George W. Bush has accelerated.
Mr. Obama’s approach to Syria illustrates why. Since conflict started there two and a half years ago, Washington has had openings for a negotiated resolution. This, though, would entail power-sharing between Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and oppositionists and cooperation with Russia, Iran, and China to fix a settlement. Instead, Mr. Obama doubled down on reasserting American hegemony.
Desperate moves
When unrest began in Syria in March 2011, Mr. Obama and his team were desperate to show — after the loss of pro-Western regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and near-misses in Bahrain and Yemen — that the Arab Awakening did not just threaten authoritarian orders that subordinated their foreign policy to Washington. They wanted to show that leaders committed to foreign policy independence — like Mr. Assad — were vulnerable, too. They also calculated that Mr. Assad’s ouster would tilt the regional balance against Tehran, generating leverage to force Iran’s surrender of its right to an internationally safeguarded but indigenous nuclear fuel cycle.
Two years ago, Mr. Obama declared that Mr. Assad “must go,” eviscerating prospects for a political settlement. Mr. Obama further damaged diplomatic prospects with three U.N. Security Council resolutions effectively authorising coercive regime change in Damascus, which Russia and China vetoed. His Syria strategy rested on the surreal proposition that a staggeringly fractious “opposition,” much of which publicly aligns with al-Qaeda and is not supported by anything close to a majority of Syrians, would unseat Mr. Assad, who (according to polls and other evidence) enjoys support from at least half of Syrian society.
Mr. Obama compounded all this with an equally foolish declaration that chemical weapons use was a U.S. “red line” — giving those looking for U.S. intervention motive to gas innocent civilians. Now that such weapons have been used, Mr. Obama cannot entertain that oppositionists may be responsible, for this would undercut his Syria strategy. His administration has presented no evidence that Mr. Assad’s forces used chemical weapons in Ghouta; when it alleged chemical weapons use at Khan al-Assal in March, it also offered no evidence of government responsibility. By contrast, Russia publicly presented a detailed forensic analysis showing that neither the munitions used at Khan al-Assal nor the chemical agent in them had been industrially manufactured and that, “therefore, there is every reason to believe that it was the armed opposition fighters who used the chemical weapons.” Washington rejected this —and, after trying to derail a U.N. investigation of more recent allegations about Ghouta, has pre-emptively dismissed whatever U.N. inspectors there now may conclude.
No justification
With these positions, Mr. Obama has left himself no option except using force to preserve U.S. “credibility.” His planned strike, though, is illegal. Even if chemical weapons were used, it does not justify U.S. aggression. Syria is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which it is a party, only proscribes chemical weapons use in war against another state. Neither designates Washington as its “enforcer.” More broadly, the United Nations Charter, which America largely drafted, forbids using force except under two circumstances:
• “f an armed attack occurs against a” member state; regardless of who used chemical weapons in Syria, no other state was attacked or threatened with attack, so the “right of individual or collective self-defence” posited in the Charter does not apply (unless one stretches the definition of “self-defence” to mean “anything Washington does not like”).
• When the Security Council authorises force “to maintain or restore international peace and security”; no such resolution is in effect for Syria, and Russia and China will prevent the Council from adopting one.
Lack of legality is undermining the willingness of the Arab League and even of usually reliable hangers-on like Britain to endorse a strike. When Mr. Obama moves, he may have a smaller coalition than Bill Clinton or George W. Bush had for their illegal wars in, respectively, Kosovo and Iraq.
Mr. Obama’s strike will further accelerate erosion of America’s position in West Asia. Mr. Assad will emerge with greater political support, not less; Russian and Chinese influence will be enhanced. While backing Mr. Assad has cost Iran and Hizbollah some of the popularity they accrued with Sunni Arab publics from their long records of “resistance” to Israel and America, both judge that, if either America or Israel becomes militarily involved in Syria, this will undercut Saudi-sponsored narratives depicting the conflict in sectarian terms, transforming it into more Iranian-led resistance. Mr. Obama is about to oblige them — ushering in a regional balance increasingly tilted against the United States.

BuilderPlumber

amaltom wrote: »

An illegal intervention in Syria will not only fail to sustain American hegemony in West Asia but also provide a shot in the arm for Assad’s regime


Once carried out, the Obama administration’s thoroughly telegraphed strike on Syria, ostensibly over alleged chemical weapons use there, will mark an important inflection point in the terminal decline of America’s West Asia empire. Most importantly, it will confirm that America’s political class, including President Barack Obama himself, remains unwilling to face the political risks posed by any fundamental revision of Washington’s over-20-year, deeply self-damaging drive to dominate the region.
Mr. Obama initially ran for President pledging to end the “mindset” behind the strategic blunder of America’s 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq; in his first term, he committed to ending America’s war in Afghanistan, too, and to “rebalancing” toward Asia. But Mr. Obama was never ready to spend the political capital required for thoroughgoing recasting of U.S. foreign policy; consequently, the dissipation of American power (hard and soft) evident under George W. Bush has accelerated.
Mr. Obama’s approach to Syria illustrates why. Since conflict started there two and a half years ago, Washington has had openings for a negotiated resolution. This, though, would entail power-sharing between Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and oppositionists and cooperation with Russia, Iran, and China to fix a settlement. Instead, Mr. Obama doubled down on reasserting American hegemony.
Desperate moves
When unrest began in Syria in March 2011, Mr. Obama and his team were desperate to show — after the loss of pro-Western regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and near-misses in Bahrain and Yemen — that the Arab Awakening did not just threaten authoritarian orders that subordinated their foreign policy to Washington. They wanted to show that leaders committed to foreign policy independence — like Mr. Assad — were vulnerable, too. They also calculated that Mr. Assad’s ouster would tilt the regional balance against Tehran, generating leverage to force Iran’s surrender of its right to an internationally safeguarded but indigenous nuclear fuel cycle.
Two years ago, Mr. Obama declared that Mr. Assad “must go,” eviscerating prospects for a political settlement. Mr. Obama further damaged diplomatic prospects with three U.N. Security Council resolutions effectively authorising coercive regime change in Damascus, which Russia and China vetoed. His Syria strategy rested on the surreal proposition that a staggeringly fractious “opposition,” much of which publicly aligns with al-Qaeda and is not supported by anything close to a majority of Syrians, would unseat Mr. Assad, who (according to polls and other evidence) enjoys support from at least half of Syrian society.
Mr. Obama compounded all this with an equally foolish declaration that chemical weapons use was a U.S. “red line” — giving those looking for U.S. intervention motive to gas innocent civilians. Now that such weapons have been used, Mr. Obama cannot entertain that oppositionists may be responsible, for this would undercut his Syria strategy. His administration has presented no evidence that Mr. Assad’s forces used chemical weapons in Ghouta; when it alleged chemical weapons use at Khan al-Assal in March, it also offered no evidence of government responsibility. By contrast, Russia publicly presented a detailed forensic analysis showing that neither the munitions used at Khan al-Assal nor the chemical agent in them had been industrially manufactured and that, “therefore, there is every reason to believe that it was the armed opposition fighters who used the chemical weapons.” Washington rejected this —and, after trying to derail a U.N. investigation of more recent allegations about Ghouta, has pre-emptively dismissed whatever U.N. inspectors there now may conclude.
No justification
With these positions, Mr. Obama has left himself no option except using force to preserve U.S. “credibility.” His planned strike, though, is illegal. Even if chemical weapons were used, it does not justify U.S. aggression. Syria is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which it is a party, only proscribes chemical weapons use in war against another state. Neither designates Washington as its “enforcer.” More broadly, the United Nations Charter, which America largely drafted, forbids using force except under two circumstances:
• “f an armed attack occurs against a” member state; regardless of who used chemical weapons in Syria, no other state was attacked or threatened with attack, so the “right of individual or collective self-defence” posited in the Charter does not apply (unless one stretches the definition of “self-defence” to mean “anything Washington does not like”).
• When the Security Council authorises force “to maintain or restore international peace and security”; no such resolution is in effect for Syria, and Russia and China will prevent the Council from adopting one.
Lack of legality is undermining the willingness of the Arab League and even of usually reliable hangers-on like Britain to endorse a strike. When Mr. Obama moves, he may have a smaller coalition than Bill Clinton or George W. Bush had for their illegal wars in, respectively, Kosovo and Iraq.
Mr. Obama’s strike will further accelerate erosion of America’s position in West Asia. Mr. Assad will emerge with greater political support, not less; Russian and Chinese influence will be enhanced. While backing Mr. Assad has cost Iran and Hizbollah some of the popularity they accrued with Sunni Arab publics from their long records of “resistance” to Israel and America, both judge that, if either America or Israel becomes militarily involved in Syria, this will undercut Saudi-sponsored narratives depicting the conflict in sectarian terms, transforming it into more Iranian-led resistance. Mr. Obama is about to oblige them — ushering in a regional balance increasingly tilted against the United States.

American intervention in Syria will make matters worse longterm (indeed, the fall of Assad when and if it happens will make matters worse in the region). Assad is a dictator who can be ruthless when he needs to and is very like a less charismatic version of Saddam. Syria has been lead by the Assad family for decades and was generally one of the more peaceful and stable Middle Eastern countries up until around 2-3 years ago. Now, it has reversed that status and is one of the most dangerous and unstable countries in the world.

American intervention would mean the war would probably spill over. Syria borders other already or potentially chaotic and unstable countries like Iraq, Israel, Palestine and Lebanon with Egypt not too far away either.

You have a movement in terrorist organisations that do not recognise any of the current Arab states and want to rule a caliphate that would stretch right across the Arab world from Morocco to Iraq for starters (and would aim to anex Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and other Persian/Turkish/Kurdish lands as well). Now, there is no popularity among the people for al Qaeda's ideas but there is often an underlying resentment of corrupt dictators and monarchs who tend to rule all of these countries.

Syria traditionally was a buffer between the chaos in Iraq and that in Israel/Palestine and Lebanon too. Obviously, Syria's conflict will destabilise these already volatile nations too.

American intervention will only bring more nations into the conflict. France for starters as well as some involvement by Arab countries like Saudi Arabia. While I believe the Americans would prefer to leave Assad in power for now, they want to contain and put manners on him. It is a bit of a mixed up response.

Iran and Russia clearly favour Assad but I cannot really see either of them sacrificing theirselves for him either. So, their support will remain rather limited and indirect. Hezbollah come in handy here. The new, moderate government in Iran wants to do a deal with America and end a lot of the issues that have contributed to a poor relationship but US intervention in Syria will make doing that deal more difficult.

Generally, things are too late for Syria. Deals were possible in 2011 but the damage is now done and with or without the Americans, the country is destined for a bleak future. It is sad and should not have been allowed to happen.

Walker34

Hi,
I still struggle to react rationally to the western (read US/Israel/France) well rehearsed marketing sh-peal of "Weapons Of Mass deception". Its like when a particularly repulsive sales rep shows up at yer door selling the same old rubbish, and even-though you slam the door in their face and tell them to go away rudely, they come back again and again.

I remember covering the First World War for Leaving Cert and our excellent history teacher telling us that, while Chlorine gas was a great terror/propaganda weapon, it was totally ineffective as a strategic weapon. The line went that it usually killed as many of the instigators of attacks as it did the intended victims. It was totally at the mercy of atmospheric conditions (i.e Wind) which changed direction regularly.

Its other main problem was/is the difficulty in delivering adequate quantities over a large area quickly and in large enough amounts. I abhor all military conflict personally, seeing it as a total failure of reason,morality and politics , something that the west seems to increasingly excel at. They seem to believe that if there is a problem, its not the strategy that's at fault,.................... its just the "sales pitch".Hence Sky News/CNN.

Chemical weapons are equally ineffective as strategic weapons, as the low death toll of the known attacks attest to. The initial conventional bombing of Baghdad in Gulf War Shock`NAWW is reputed to have killed 10,000 civilians. Iv no doubt the military would have calculated it down to a standard dollar cost per cadaver produced,being the cost-conscious "people" they are.