War of Independence in Dublin 1919-1922: IRA organisation & activities

Seanchai

If the mods don't mind I'll try the Dublin Forum for answers first, but maybe the history forum would be better.

Very little seems to be written about the IRA in Dublin, at least I cannot find a book such as David Fitzpatrick's study of the IRA in Clare during the same war.

Does anybody know where I can find information specifically about the Dublin Brigade (s?) of the Irish Republican Army during the War of Independence? If one studies the IRA in Kerry, for example, you'll find they were stronger in the mountainous land, and other such characteristics. And so on across different regions in Ireland.

How about Dublin? What was the spatial support base for the IRA here? What parts of the city were particularly active? What factors made the IRA stronger in certain areas - strength of Conradh na Gaeilge membership? GAA membership? education level? resentment about familial loss in WW I? a larger population of country people in the area? A larger population of "true blue" Dubs in the area? And inversely where was it weakest and why?

How was the IRA organised in the city? What were the positions of people like Oscar Traynor and Rory O'Connor? I'm aware that at least in some big attacks, guys were brought up from the country - such as Dan Breen organising the Ashtown ambush in 1919. How many members did it have? According to this article there was 700 members of the Anti-Treaty IRA alone in Dublin City during the Battle of Dublin in June 1922. What events made it stronger or weaker during the war? To what extent did it implement guerrilla warfare à la Breen or Barry in an urban environment?

Anybody have any insight into this topic? Much more questions than answers at the moment, alas!

coolemon

Try here: http://www.bureauofmilitaryhistory.ie/

There are hundreds of witness testimonies on that website of volunteers who fought in the Easter Rising, WoI and Civil war.

Here is a good example of the testimonies on the site: - http://www.bureauofmilitaryhistory.ie/reels/bmh/BMH.WS0678.pdf

Mr Simpson

I think History is the best place to discuss this. I'll leave it up to the local mods from here.

Mark

WIZE

my Grandad was the Quarter Master in the south Dublin Brigade

jonniebgood1

WIZE wrote: »

my Grandad was the Quarter Master in the south Dublin Brigade

Could you expand on this, more detail on what his role entailed would be of great interest...

Fratton Fred

A city in turmoil by Padraig Yeates looks good. He was on newstalk the other night.

It looks at the war of independence from. Dubliner's point of view. It may not be glamorous and rose tinted enough for the republican fan boys though.

jonniebgood1

Fratton Fred wrote: »

A city in turmoil by Padraig Yeates looks good. He was on newstalk the other night.

It looks at the war of independence from. Dubliner's point of view. It may not be glamorous and rose tinted enough for the republican fan boys though.

Ah Fred- Would you not like a bit of glamour

pedroeibar1

The more I read of the ‘history’ of the Troubles the more I’m coming to the conclusion that a considerable amount is guff, fairytale and myth. The OP contains “If one studies the IRA in Kerry, for example, you'll find they were stronger in the mountainous land, and other such characteristics.”

Now, if you put “Sneem” (which is surrounded by mountains in South Kerry) into the Search function of the BMH site you get such gems as (Witness statement 961)

When the Redmondite split occurred the Volunteers in Sneem broke up and were not reformed until 1917. There was no organisation in the Sneem area in 1916 and consequently we took no part in preparing for the rising.

and

In 1920 the Sneem Company were preparing an attack on the local R.I.C. barracks but when we got to the barracks we found that the R.I.C. had left. We burned the barracks and the courthouse which adjoined it. Before the burning of the barracks we had organised a boycott of the R.I.C.

and

in 1920 or 1921, I am not sure of the date, two R.I.C. men came home on what was supposed to be ordinary leave. We held them up in the village of Sneem and as they did not put up their hands when ordered we fired on them. Both of them were slightly wounded.

and

The new Battalion area contained no British garrison and the only targets were the convoys which were much too strong for our arms.

Heroic deeds indeed.

For info on the Dublin activities I've often used ‘Kingsbridge’ as a search word, the railwaymen did sterling intelligence work and shows how the IRA maximized use of the railway system as a means of communication both for personnel and information.

Neutronale

pedroeibar1 wrote: »

The more I read of the ‘history’ of the Troubles the more I’m coming to the conclusion that a considerable amount is guff, fairytale and myth. The OP contains “If one studies the IRA in Kerry, for example, you'll find they were stronger in the mountainous land, and other such characteristics.”

Now, if you put “Sneem” (which is surrounded by mountains in South Kerry) into the Search function of the BMH site you get such gems as (Witness statement 961)

and

and

and

Heroic deeds indeed.

For info on the Dublin activities I've often used ‘Kingsbridge’ as a search word, the railwaymen did sterling intelligence work and shows how the IRA maximized use of the railway system as a means of communication both for personnel and information.

Heroic enough, they were facing the might of the evil empire who would have little compuction in using brutal terrorism against ordinary civilians let alone volunteers.

I think we should be proud of people who used minimum violence to achieve their aims and not caused a blood bath...

pedroeibar1

Neutronale wrote: »

Heroic enough, they were facing the might of the evil empire who would have little compuction in using brutal terrorism against ordinary civilians let alone volunteers.

I think we should be proud of people who used minimum violence to achieve their aims and not caused a blood bath...

If you put aside your agenda of ‘evil Empire’ and read what was written by the OP and me in a historical, not political perspective you might not make trite comments like that.

The OP in the context of city –vs-country wrote “If one studies the IRA in Kerry, for example, you'll find they were stronger in the mountainous land, and other such characteristics.”

I responded with several quotations from a referenced source to prove the contrary to what was claimed.

The guerrilla is the fish that swims in the sea of population; those ‘out on the mountain’ depended on locals to sustain, warn & harbour them. They had sympathy, knew the terrain and could perform in ‘hit & run’ tactics. Those in cities had other functions (primarily arms importation, facilitating communication and intel gathering), usually less support from the local population and operated in a totally different environment. Planning and executing an ambush on Grafton Street cannot be compared to one on a country road; nor would it have the desired media/propaganda result, particularly if civilians were killed/injured. (That was the era before the newspeak of ‘collateral damage’).

There was plenty– to use your own words – of ‘brutal terrorism’ on both sides. And I include ‘two R.I.C. men came home on what was supposed to be ordinary leave. We held them up in the village of Sneem and as they did not put up their hands when ordered we fired on them’ in that category.

kabakuyu

The new Battalion area contained no British
garrison and the only targets were the convoys which
were much too strong for our arms.
All the officers in the Sneem Company volunteered
for Column service but we were told by the Vice O/C
of Kerry No. 11 Brigade (John Joe Rice) that there were
not enough arms to take any more men into the Column.
There were no spies or informers discovered in
our area all through the Tan war.
I have been asked whether there was an order
issued to us that the Sneem area was to be kept quiet.
I never heard of any such order before or after the
Truce. If such an order was ever issued I must surely
have known of it. The only reason why there was no
fighting In the Sneern area is that we had no one to fight
when the R.I.C. cleared out and we were too weak to attack

the convoys which passed through.

That passage above was from the same witness statement 961 which was alluded to in an earlier post, read all the statement for a fuller picture. Surely Sneem cannot be taken as the only "mountainous" area of activityand is hardly typical of the conflict in Kerry.As the witness stated they had no enemy to fight and were only armed with a few shotguns, it was hardly the ingredients for heroic deeds, attacking a convoy with shotguns would have been suicide,and the fact that they displayed common sense and sound military tactics not to attack a force with superior firepower should not condemn them to present day scorn or the labels of cowards/exaggerators in some peopls eyes today.

pedroeibar1

In fairness Kab, I think you have got the wrong end of the stick. Nor is my quote overly selective. I’m not pouring scorn on anyone nor did I ever suggest that someone shoould take on a Crossley with a .22 or a 12 bore. What I said at the outset was

The more I read of the ‘history’ of the Troubles the more I’m coming to the conclusion that a considerable amount is guff, fairytale and myth.

Many present day commentators on the ‘Troubles ‘would have us believe that the hills and mountains were ringing to the sound of gunfire, there were ‘boys on the run’ everywhere and every TD’s granddad had a rifle in the haystack. The OP said

If one studies the IRA in Kerry, for example, you'll find they were stronger in the mountainous land,.....

I’ve never been convinced of this and took as an example a typical, well-known Kerry village - Sneem. It is on the edge of the Reeks, its road network in the first quarter of the 1900s was minimal (therefore access was easily observed & controlled) and it had telephones so it would be an ideal place for ‘disruption’ and guerrilla tactics. That did not happen; instead a few unarmed RIC men were shot and and a few unoccupied houses (or those occupied by retired old colonels) were burned. The same I believe could be said of many other districts around Ireland. That is not heroic, nor is it guerrilla warfare.

Remaining in Kerry, the mountainous area around Barraduff was (open to correction on this) more in the hands of the Corkmen but around Glencar (hardly a village but it’s in the mountains) the IRA seemed primarily to come from the plains areas of Kerry, Castlemaine and Cromane. See witness Stmt 1000 – e.g.

The R.I.C. made very few arrests in the Miltown area. The R.I.C. Sergeant was a decent type. His name was Whinton. He was a protestant and he wanted no trouble in his district.

In January, 1920, things were very quiet in our Battalion area and In order to get things going some of us decided to go 'on the run'. I went with ......... The Kerry No. 1. Column had established a Headquarters (which was also Brigade Headquarters) in a hut at Keel. Keel is a mountaine area on the north side of Castlemaine Bay between Castlemaine and Inch. The hut was built against a rock formation on the face of a hill and it was not visible from the road.

In fairness, those guys wanted to make things happen, (I love -

There was a punt gun at the side of the school-house...... and it was the intention to open the attack by firing the gun at the first lorry and put it out of action)

A read of that statement in full shows some enthusiasm but total amateurism and at times stupidity.

The picture I cannot erase is of a very small number of ‘active’ units, the remainder being ‘hangers on’ and mostly everyone, despite the fancy rank titles, being limited by the unavailability of arms/ammunition, military knowledge and training. And this was just after a period during which training was readily available (in the Volunteers, etc.) Why were they so disorganized and such total amateurs?

Even in the Dublin suburb of Dalkey (OMG) the phone wires were cut on a very regular basis and trenches were dug across roads – this does not appear to be widespread elsewhere. Why?

Dr.Nightdub

Pedro, don't forget that at an early stage, in the spring of 1920, the RIC withdrew from over 400 isolated posts and concentrated in bigger barracks in the main towns; bearing in mind that the IRA was mainly part-time and locally-based, it was hardly their fault if there was no-one to fight. Even in a militant and active area such as Clare, this led to an effective stalemate, with the British (meaning army / RIC / Auxies / B&Ts) only able to venture out in convoys that were too big for the IRA to attack.

I know you mentioned weapons scarcity, but the impact of this is often overlooked. Take Antrim, which I know is an extreme example, but my granda was Brigade O/C there in early 1921. To feed the five thousand, Jesus had five loaves and two fish; to take on the local element of the British Empire, my granda had just over a hundred men and eighteen rifles.

Robert Lynch's "The Northern IRA and the Early Years of Partition" claims nothing happened there prior to May 1922. However digging through local papers shows that on 27th Jan 1921, an ambush was prepared but the RIC patrol took a different route; the next day, a barracks was attacked, though unsuccessfully; on 5th Feb, an RIC patrol was attacked but suffered no casualties; on 7th Feb, another barracks was attacked and burned to the ground, though again with no RIC casualties; on 14th Feb, two coastguard stations were raided for arms. Word came down from Belfast to lay off attacking the RIC so my granda turned to the railway network and on 14th March, six train stations were burned on a single night and at the end of March an attempt was made to derail a train. In mid-April, my granda was in the process of forming a flying column, but was captured. Then it all went quiet.

Now none of that is on the scale of Kilmichael or Crossbarry, but I suspect that Antrim was typical of so-called "quiet areas" of the country - no huge events that anyone would write a ballad about, but rather a lot of relatively low-level, niggly war of attrition type activities.

Incidentally, Antrim also illustrates your point about fancy titles - in August 1921, after Trucileers had more than doubled the Brigade strength to 260, these were still spread across twelve companies; the whole Cushendall "Company" consisted of just eight men. Bless.