The distribution of wealth

cavedave

What ways have been defined for fair division of resources and what advantages/disadvantages do you see of each?
The ones I can think of
Maximin of John Rawls.

Rawls defined this principle as the rule which states that social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that "they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society". In other words, an unequal distribution can be just when it maximizes the benefit to those who have the most minuscule allocation of welfare conferring resources (which he refers to as "primary goods")

Maximum total. Maximise total wealth. I believe the utilitarians believe something like that total utility should be maximised.

the moral worth of an action is determined solely by its contribution to overall utility: that is, its contribution to happiness or pleasure as summed among all people

Equality (egalitarianism)- everyone should have exactly the same resources or as close to this as possible.

Capitalistic- People get what they agree to swap in a trade.

Do you know of any other 'fair' distributions of wealth?

Joe1919

Isaiah Berlin maintains that there is always a trade off between equality and liberty (value pluralism) and hence there will never be a completly 'fair' way to distribute wealth. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berlin/

There is also a trade off (IMO) between equality and work incentive. People are often motivated to work in order to get ahead so why bother work if you are not going to be rewarded for this.

I suppose governments have to reach some kind of a balance or comprimise but they cant make everyone completly happy.

silverharp

A couple of questions I would have for the Rawls view, is there a logical weakness in his principles as they stop at the border?
Also with his thought exercise where you imagine yourself as being at the bottom rung of society and ask what kind of society you would favor, doesnt it still come down to the risk preferences of the person pondering the question?
Then how does his thoery deal with/calculate the affect of moral hazzard and associated free rider issues?

cavedave

Joe1919

Isaiah Berlin maintains that there is always a trade off between equality and liberty (value pluralism) and hence there will never be a completly 'fair' way to distribute wealth. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berlin/

There is also a trade off (IMO) between equality and work incentive. People are often motivated to work in order to get ahead so why bother work if you are not going to be rewarded for this.

Well imagine there was a situation where there was a free lunch. Someone dies and leaves a group of people her possessions. How are the goods divided out? In a way that
Everyone gets as close to possible equal amounts -egalitarianism
Total happiness is maximised -utilitarianism
The person who gets least gets the most they can -Maximin

In the estate division problem egalitarianism could result in even the worst person getting less then maximin on the grounds of keeping everyone equal.
Utilitarianism could result in someone getting very little.
Maximin could make people annoyed they didnt get as much as someone else and that total happiness was reduced to keep one person happier.

So which do you think is fairer? and are there any other fair division systems?

silverharp good questions. I do not feel I understand Rawls arguments well enough to be able to answer them. Would libertarian belief systems (Nozick, Rand) also suffer from the problem that principles stop at the border?

Joe1919

I think every parent has to personally face this dilemma at some time. I have three children and it has been suggested to me that I make a will. The problem I have is that my three children are all different individuals. They are not equal and hence, I can not treat them equally.

Its also the case, as it is with a parent and their children, that children have different needs and some are probably more deserving than others.( I know, this is a subjective view but what other view is there? )

The problem with the utilitarian system is that it can ignores this fact. But happiness is not an entitlement, it is something that we persue, it is a motivator and something we strive for. (life is tough)

So in the end, I think its down to judgement and I dont think there is any neat little formulae or principle.

But if you want to be objective, there is actually only one principle.........'might is right' .or as thrasymachus said "justice is the advantage of the stronger"....(social contract theory). Everything else is a matter of opinion.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thrasymachus

silverharp

cavedave wrote: »

Would libertarian belief systems (Nozick, Rand) also suffer from the problem that principles stop at the border?

What I am trying to tease out is how far back you can get so that you end up with core almost axiomatic principles on which everything else can be built. Rawls would appear to be arguing that coercive behaviour is acceptable at the indvidual level but that states should behave with each other using Libertarian principles.
Even within such a state his idea of social justice relies on the fact that one group must have their right to justice curtailed. If one if going to run/judge a society on the basis on give me justice, even if it means the destruction of society (cant remember who the quote is from) then the principles need to be solid.

Joe1919

silverharp wrote: »

What I am trying to tease out is how far back you can get so that you end up with core almost axiomatic principles on which everything else can be built.

But you are pre-supposing 'foundationalism' i.e. that there are foundational principles. Many would disagree. The reason why you cant find these 'core almost axiomatic principles' is perhaps because they dont exist or died with the gods.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-foundationalism

cavedave

Joe1919

I think every parent has to personally face this dilemma at some time. I have three children and it has been suggested to me that I make a will. The problem I have is that my three children are all different individuals. They are not equal and hence, I can not treat them equally.

Say you think each child should get equal amounts of your estate. Also assume the estate is a load of little items that cannot be split up into little pieces the way a cake or money can. Now you could sell all the items and then just split the cash. But this does nto seem right as your old chair may have sentimental value and such.

Now you could give each child 100 units to use in the bidding. They then place a bid on each item. They could then run an auction on all the possessions. If they wanted the chair more they would bid higher for it. The more you buy something for the less units you have left. A capitalist might claim that such a system would result in a fair division of your estate.

An egalitarian might take the bids and divide up the things so that each child got as close to possible the same units as each other.

Rawls would have the child you gets least getting the most units of their desire that can be gotten.

silverharp's questions are interesting but they bring in the messiness of life (immigration, free riders etc) so i want to break the question of distribution to as simple a case as possible.

So your kids place bids on what of your stuff they want. You have given each a set amount of units to bid with.What do you do with the bids? Auction, maximin, equality etc?

Joe1919

cavedave wrote: »

.....So your kids place bids on what of your stuff they want.....

But the last thing that a parent would want is competition or bidding between their children. Each child is unique, is different and has different needs. Trying to introduce some type of set of rules or bidding game for the sake of equality would be crazy. It like trying to force equality where equality does not exist. (Does equality exist?)

I suppose my point is that the state sometimes has to take a paternal role (if it can) and sometimes the citizens are like children: they are greedy and dont know whats good for them. But then again, perhaps I too am idealist in this sense and its often the case that those who are most greedy get the most.

cavedave

But the last thing that a parent would want is competition or bidding between their children

Even if such a bidding resulted in a 'fairer' (by whatever definition you pick) division? You could well be right though. The idea that even a fair division system could not be used to to possible jealousy is a scary one.

Each child is unique, is different and has different needs

If they have different needs they can place their bids based on those needs. If you need a chair bid highly for it. If you don't need a table bid low for it.

It like trying to force equality where equality does not exist. (Does equality exist?)

Well then don't go for the system where the children get (nearly) equal levels of what they want go for an auction or another system.

I suppose my point is that the state sometimes has to take a paternal role (if it can) and sometimes the citizens are like children: they are greedy and dont know whats good for them

That is a good point, I have been basing this on an assumption we should give people what they want whereas maybe we shouldnt.

potlatch

OP: Rawls' Theory of Justice was deliberately an attack on utilitarianism, it's a mistake, as you do, to imply they are related.

Terrible injustices, and inequalities, can occur under utilitarianism (greatest happiness for the greatest number). A Theory of Justice was precisely to apply a metaphysical foundation for conditions of freedom.

However, I find liberal theories of (in)equality to be insufficient - they reduce power to abstract notions to do with individual preference. Therefore, on the subject of inequality, liberalism is at best found wanting and at worst complicit in social injustice.

A recently-deceased theorist on freedom and equality, G.A. Cohen, sought to show logically how money is itself a form of power and, therefore, its uneven distribution the founding conditions of inequality.

cavedave

potlatch

OP: Rawls' Theory of Justice was deliberately an attack on utilitarianism, it's a mistake, as you do, to imply they are related.

I believe Rawls theory of justice places a different measure on a groups utility then utilitarianism. How did I imply they are related?

silverharp

cavedave wrote: »

....so i want to break the question of distribution to as simple a case as possible.

Thats cool, doesnt it depend on what you are trying to distribute. what if the assets are a business that some of the offspring are involved in. or a farm? what if one of the kids is an alcoholic and one of your assets is a wine collection?

joey1919 wrote:

But you are pre-supposing 'foundationalism' i.e. that there are foundational principles. Many would disagree. The reason why you cant find these 'core almost axiomatic principles' is perhaps because they dont exist or died with the gods.

is there not a core human nature that suggest that certain principles are warranted. We are talking about human action not laws of gravity but at the same time even the extreme political experiments of the 20thC acknowledged certain human behaviour that couldnt be controlled by the state

cavedave

silverharp

Thats cool, doesnt it depend on what you are trying to distribute. what if the assets are a business that some of the offspring are involved in. or a farm? what if one of the kids is an alcoholic and one of your assets is a wine collection?

True it does. There is the Shapley Value to calculate how much people 'deserve' in such situations. And there are many other such mathematical ways (which wont work in practice) to figure out what people deserve based on what they did. But if we assume the people 'deserve' the same allocation we still have the hard problem of deciding what is a fair division.

The wine collection problem is a good one. If you think of alcoholism as something that limits a persons free will, makes them less of a rational agent, then you could treat the person differently in an estate division. So even in this ideal case human nature gets in the way.

silverharp

cavedave wrote: »

True it does. There is the Shapley Value to calculate how much people 'deserve' in such situations. And there are many other such mathematical ways (which wont work in practice) to figure out what people deserve based on what they did. But if we assume the people 'deserve' the same allocation we still have the hard problem of deciding what is a fair division.

The wine collection problem is a good one. If you think of alcoholism as something that limits a persons free will, makes them less of a rational agent, then you could treat the person differently in an estate division. So even in this ideal case human nature gets in the way.

Is your inheritance situation meant to parallel a state solution to an issue of resource allocation? or are you looking at it as a stand alone ethical issue?

cavedave

silverharp
Is your inheritance situation meant to parallel a state solution to an issue of resource allocation? or are you looking at it as a stand alone ethical issue?

Mainly a stand alone ethical issue. But I would hope ethics feed into how the state sets fairness criteria.

Though I see little mathematical difference between

Aunt Mary's will trying to divide a table,chair, cake and wool between her nieces and nephews.

An Arctic negotiation between different states to see who gets fishing, oil, shipping and conservation rights where.

A bankrupt company having assets of headquarters, their name, land and left over metal to be divided amongst creditors.

silverharp

cavedave wrote: »

Mainly a stand alone ethical issue. But I would hope ethics feed into how the state sets fairness criteria.

Though I see little mathematical difference between

Aunt Mary's will trying to divide a table,chair, cake and wool between her nieces and nephews.

An Arctic negotiation between different states to see who gets fishing, oil, shipping and conservation rights where.

A bankrupt company having assets of headquarters, their name, land and left over metal to be divided amongst creditors.

The Libertarian perspective would shift the focus back to the giver and their subjective value system, there could not be an "ought" to. possible solutions might take into account the givers judgement of individual relationships, moral hazzard in our alcoholics example, charity if one of the cousins is less successful then the others.

Joycey

silverharp wrote: »

is there not a core human nature that suggest that certain principles are warranted. We are talking about human action not laws of gravity but at the same time even the extreme political experiments of the 20thC acknowledged certain human behaviour that couldnt be controlled by the state

I would need to be convinced that there is any such thing as "human nature" in the sense that you want there to be. Certainly the notion that we can reduce the entirety of human experience and behaviour to selfish individuals acting selfishly is absurd IMO. To base a political ideology on such grounds is a further step towards complete lunacy

cavedave

Say we break it down to a table of items to be divided and peoples professed valuations

Person Hat scarf jumper
Alice 40 29 31
Bob 29 41 30
Clare 36 35 29

Now we could divide out the items 'fairly' (where first person gets hat second scarf third jumper) as

Utilitarian (auction): Alice Bob Alice. total utility 112. Worst off person gets 0

Maximin: Clare Bob Alice. total utility 108. Worst off person gets 31

Egalitarian: Bob Alice Clare. total utility 87. Worst off person gets 29

Which of these are fairest? Bear in mind these are some fairly randomly chosen numbers some other set could make maximin and egalitarian very different from each other. What other ways of dividing these items with the given valuations could be considered 'fair'?

silverharp

Joycey wrote: »

I would need to be convinced that there is any such thing as "human nature" in the sense that you want there to be. Certainly the notion that we can reduce the entirety of human experience and behaviour to selfish individuals acting selfishly is absurd IMO. To base a political ideology on such grounds is a further step towards complete lunacy

if I can have an exception form Goodwin for a mo, the example that had popped into my mind was the fact that even in Nazi Germany where the state had absolute power, the greater population had to be kept in the dark about the excesses of the state in relation to the treatment of people sent to the camps. One would have to assume that there is an innate sense of justice allbeit the boundries can only be drawn with a ruddy big crayon? Other examples maybe communist Russia where people were allowed to have a private life within their own homes. One would have assumed if human nature didnt count for anything that the Communist new man would have been a success or that they could have dissolved the family unit completely. More current might also be demonstrations in China when people are forced to move before their houses are demolished to make way for new developments.
I'd be more interested to see how a theory of justice could be defined that would sit best with our human nature. define human nature as you will, it may be hard wired or the product of our cultural heritage, I cant say.

Joycey

silverharp wrote: »

if I can have an exception form Goodwin for a mo, the example that had popped into my mind was the fact that even in Nazi Germany where the state had absolute power, the greater population had to be kept in the dark about the excesses of the state in relation to the treatment of people sent to the camps. One would have to assume that there is an innate sense of justice.

Why does it have to be innate? If the sense of justice, or more accurately in this case, the sense of what is beyond the bounds of acceptable treatment of human beings, was learned as opposed to innate then that would be reason enough for the Nazis to cover up their atrocities.

Other examples maybe communist Russia where people were allowed to have a private life within their own homes. One would have assumed if human nature didnt count for anything that the Communist new man would have been a success or that they could have dissolved the family unit completely.

Im not sure I understand your point here. Firstly, if what human nature didnt count for anything? Secondly, surely you can account for the failings of Soviet Russian society in more ways than simply putting it down to some notion of human nature which was violated by the way in which the society was organised politically?

I'd be more interested to see how a theory of justice could be defined that would sit best with our human nature.

What human nature?

define human nature as you will,

But im not the one
(A) asserting its existence (at least in the terms relevant to this discussion) or
(B) attempting to ground a grandiose political ideology on it

it may be hard wired or the product of our cultural heritage, I cant say.

The whole point there being that if its not hard wired its not human nature, its a product of our living and communicating together and not something we should take as given when attempting to work out how best to manage our society.

The main question I am left with after reading your post is that if every single argument you have ever made in defence of libertarian ideology is based on your conception of "human nature", and this conception is so unclearly defined even in your own mind that you aren't sure if we hold this nature by virtue of our very being human or whether it is entirely dependent on the operation of the society in which we live, then how do you expect anybody to listen to any of the conclusions which follow from such an unexamined and shaky foundation?

Kama

I'd suggest that the 'human nature' claim can be run the other direction too; we seem as a species to have a relatively 'hardwired' sense of fairness - vide ultimatum games where an unfair distribution is rejected even though acceptance is the rational self-interest result.

When the right (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) is shut down (with transcranial magnetic stimulation), the way they play starts to change. When given a low offer, they still feel it is deeply unfair. But, instead of rejecting it as they usually would, their selfish, ultra-rational side wins out over their emotional reaction against the other player’s meanness.

Citation

So, to accept a unfair distribution, we need to selectively 'knock out' sections of the brain; I for one welcome our new Capitalist-Constructivist Overlords, and proffer this pice of advice for maintaining an unfair distribution - break out the brain surgery

The less flippant point being, in small group size, with high likelihood of a repeat encounter, a sense of fairness is efficient and pretty optimal, and neurologically we are pretty 'set' (endless debates about the reification or illusion of 'human nature' aside). We don't like to see others suffer, and have a relatively strong internal 'incentive' to treat them fairly. Those who lack entirely such empathic responses, we tend to label somewhere between malignant narcissism and sociopathy.

However, we tend not to be nearly so pleasant towards those with whom we have no direct relationship, and are unlikely to see again. Ethics, unfortunately, seems to fall off somewhat beyond the 'tribal', but I'd suspect the sense-of-being-shafted doesn't diminish correspondingly. Note that a dominant emotional register of the Left is one of anger at injustice, to state-the-blatantly-obvious. I'd also note that the Inuit 'solution' or social-evolutionary control mechanism for sociopathy - invite them out fishing them, then push them into the icy water - also doesn't scale well, hence the argument which shades into Conspiracy Theory that our contemporary society is encouraging sociopathic behaviors.

cavedave wrote:

Though I see little mathematical difference between...

I'd tend to agree with Joe1919 on Thrasymachus and anti-foundationalism against axiomatic justice, but I guess thats my conflict theory leanings showing out. Value requires an evaluator, appears irreducible to an objectivized determination, regardless of its window-dressings of mathematics or axiomatic necessities.

Take a axiom of Mises: 'Action is an attempt to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory one. We call such a willfully induced alteration an exchange.' Such a quote could be easily appropriated by a meliorist-socialist approach, like that advocated in evidence-based style by The Spirit Level, but the 'unfixed' nature of satisfaction also supports a satisfaction-by-inflicting-disutility, aka spite.

Which was the first thing I thought of when I saw the example of a will; my family back a generation nearly tore itself apart in an exercise of spite over just such a distribution. Hence the rationale for bringing the emotional-behavioral perspective as an intervention.

(I don't think the rhetoric of DF, among others, that the socialist urge is partly spite-based is entirely off, btw; I would however argue that the spite response tends to emerge when distributions are (subjectively speaking) manifestly unfair.)

Returning to Thrasymachus, by quoting security analyst John Robb:

We live in an age where wealth and influence is growing ever more concentrated and thereby increasingly unjust/unstable, while the ability to do everything, from making war to building things to mass communications, can now (or soon will) be accomplished by nearly anybody with the desire to do so.

Fairness may be a Stirnerite 'spook', along with Thatchers 'society', but its relevance as a perception is critical for legitimacy. The other salient variable is the ease with which power can be exerted to effect, pace Mises, a 'more satisfactory state of affairs'.

cavedave

Kama

I'd tend to agree with Joe1919 on Thrasymachus and anti-foundationalism against axiomatic justice, but I guess thats my conflict theory leanings showing out. Value requires an evaluator, appears irreducible to an objectivized determination, regardless of its window-dressings of mathematics or axiomatic necessities.

But if people value the items themselves does this not remove this evaluator problem? Except to agree what justice criteria will be used.

Kama
Which was the first thing I thought of when I saw the example of a will; my family back a generation nearly tore itself apart in an exercise of spite over just such a distribution. Hence the rationale for bringing the emotional-behavioral perspective as an intervention.

I would say this is also an argument for bringing a widely agreed upon unemotional 'fair' algorithm into the process.

Kama
(I don't think the rhetoric of DF, among others, that the socialist urge is partly spite-based is entirely off, btw; I would however argue that the spite response tends to emerge when distributions are (subjectively speaking) manifestly unfair.)

Spite has afaik never been shown to exist in nature (pdf). But i do agree that people have some judgements of fairness that include envy.*Edit actually this is wrong spite is seen all the time, So i would have to add "make everyone get as little as possible" as a possible fair division. This is a Minimax division.

The example will of Hat, scarf, jumper assumes no one is freezing to death or has a wool addiction and one more scarf will see them spiral into homeless destitution. This makes the exercise unrealistic for the real world.

Still if even with this idealised situation we cannot argue some merits of different social justice criteria then a 'fair' division algorithm seems unlikely to be popular.

Kama

cavedave wrote:

But if people value the items themselves does this not remove this evaluator problem? Except to agree what justice criteria will be used....I would say this is also an argument for bringing a widely agreed upon unemotional 'fair' algorithm into the process.

If agreed criteria exist, and aren't contested - assuming the can-opener of a working and accepted algorithm - the distribution will be 'fair' because it is the result of that algorithm. While true, it seems trivially so. Problem being, we have oft-irreconcilable and competing 'can-openers', from a Peter Singer distribution to an Ayn Rand. The design of the canopener instantiates the values, the tool is anything but neutral.

I'd also query the superiority of the 'unemotionally fair' presupposition. Fairness, I'd argue, requires emotion; its an empathetic relation more than a rational calculation. Solomons Judgement comes to mind here; surely half a child would be fairer in calculated-rationality terms to everyone concerned? The unvoiced in the linked articles are what interests me most; we now have the means to excise or edit all those pesky 'emotional' responses of justice and fairness and so forth...

Now, what would interest me would be a mashup between the TMS experiment above, and the classic 'stingy economists' studies.

It would be hard to argue that the sense-of-fairness isn't culturally modulated to some extent, so the 'consensually accepted algorithm' (again to go Conflict on this) would be a legitimatory ideological brainwashing for those who do not agree with its premises or axioms.
The technique, as for an ideology, is to convince people to accept the definition of fairness presented.

Still if even with this idealised situation we cannot argue some merits of different social justice criteria then a 'fair' division algorithm seems unlikely to be popular.

One of my flippant definitions of fairness on a day-to-day level is that its when everyone is complaining, rather than satisfied. Fairness, here, is inherently unpopular, since everyone gets less than they want. This does, unfortunately, create a definite incentive to whine and whine loud; current cutbacks context being a case in point. Assuming the previous canopener-algorithm, it would be quite consistent to assume an objectively-fair distribution that is perceived by all parties as unfair and unjust.

cavedave

Kama

If agreed criteria exist, and aren't contested - assuming the can-opener of a working and accepted algorithm - the distribution will be 'fair' because it is the result of that algorithm. While true, it seems trivially so. Problem being, we have oft-irreconcilable and competing 'can-openers', from a Peter Singer distribution to an Ayn Rand. The design of the canopener instantiates the values, the tool is anything but neutral.

Well the crietria exist and they are competing. The Pete Seiger one being Maximin (the person who does worst does as well as possible) and Ayn Rand MaxiMax (the person who has the highest value on an iem gets it). I would say such a tool is neutral except for the choice of criteria.

surely half a child would be fairer in calculated-rationality terms to everyone concerned?

A child is pretty much the definition of an indivisible good. But I agree I would not expect any super algorithm to work everything out they would more be a tool in decision making that require sanity checks on the input and output. This does seem to be moving to some sort of dystopian nightmare where a fairness computer works out your life for you though.

It would be hard to argue that the sense-of-fairness isn't culturally modulated to some extent

Tahts a good point if you look at the ultimatum game research across different cultures you get very different results. A group of Randians might go for MaxiMax allocation but other people for something else.

Kama

Tahts a good point if you look at the ultimatum game research across different cultures you get very different results. A group of Randians might go for MaxiMax allocation but other people for something else.

The relevant issue here is how fairness is cognitively framed. So I'd be very interested in the fMRI approach with different baskets of ideology/cultures.

Taking it further than that, something similar can be seen outside of homo sapiens: here's fairness in Capuchin Monkeys, and in dogs. Fairness, arguably, is a necessity for group cooperation; so long as we may have to rely on others in the future, fairness is a worthwhile investment. If, however, we can be realistically sure that we will not need to rely on others, then is there any reason for fairness?

cavedave

those are great links.

Maybe it comes down to risk aversion. If people accept risk they might go for the utilitarian criteria. If they are cautious maximin.

Kama

If we take that assumption, then 'fairness' would seem to reduce to 'what suits me'. Which is the advantage of the Rawlsian Veil as a thought experiment, I guess...

silverharp

Kama wrote: »

The relevant issue here is how fairness is cognitively framed. So I'd be very interested in the fMRI approach with different baskets of ideology/cultures.

Taking it further than that, something similar can be seen outside of homo sapiens: here's fairness in Capuchin Monkeys, and in dogs. Fairness, arguably, is a necessity for group cooperation; so long as we may have to rely on others in the future, fairness is a worthwhile investment. If, however, we can be realistically sure that we will not need to rely on others, then is there any reason for fairness?

The Youtube vid was cute. We still do rely on others dont we? due to the fact that we trade our labour for goods and services we expect not to be ripped off when we exchange our tokens

Kama

I try to do youtube links as little as possible, but I liked that one, or just monkeys generally.

Following up on that, my suspicion is this 2 monkeys had already met, had had some form of relation; iteration or the possibility of iteration skews the outcome. In-group versus out-group makes quite the difference, I'd be wagering. Standards of fairness in cultures often codified this differential treatment: the 'other' as untermenschen, not 'one of us', and hence ethical duties were not equivalent or enforced.

I agree that we expect not to get ripped off, and have distinct emotional-physiological reactions to being treated (as we see it) unfairly, which affect behavior. In 'organic' communities, the penalties for unfairness can be enforced easier, while I'd argue with the transition to a more modern/atomized system of relations, where ones relations of dependence on others are more fungible with other providers, the scope for unfairness as an adaptive strategy increases; a conman would run out of 'marks' in a small situation, but in the flaneur conditions of a city the ecology is more supportive, and the maintenance of existing relations can be substituted by the acquisition of new relationships.

Or more abstractly, we can have conditions which engage the 'ripped off' feeling, without having an identifiable 'unfair party' to whom we have potential or actual physical proximity. Marxist labour theory arguments about 'exploitation' I'd include here, or the more libertarian argument on the 'theft' of inflation. A wrong is perceived, an unfairness felt, but there is no direct personal relation as with the monkeys.

silverharp

Kama wrote: »

I agree that we expect not to get ripped off, and have distinct emotional-physiological reactions to being treated (as we see it) unfairly, which affect behavior. In 'organic' communities, the penalties for unfairness can be enforced easier, while I'd argue with the transition to a more modern/atomized system of relations, where ones relations of dependence on others are more fungible with other providers, the scope for unfairness as an adaptive strategy increases; a conman would run out of 'marks' in a small situation, but in the flaneur conditions of a city the ecology is more supportive, and the maintenance of existing relations can be substituted by the acquisition of new relationships.

I find it interesting that smaller communities would be less tolerant of shirking behaviour or antisocial behaviour. As for larger societies today technology is playing a part in restoring the balance somewhat. ideally you can now look for user reviews so reputation is more important to defend and sloppy or rip off behaviour can be more easily kept track of. This also supports the Libertarian position of the advantages of private regulation over gov. regulation. Ideally depositors , patients etc would be better served by paying for reviews and ratings over gov. regulation which normally suits the producer.