Eisenhower vs. Montgomery,who was right ?

Delancey

From Summer 1944 onwards Eisenhower insisted on his '' Broad Front '' strategy being followed while Montgomery pressed for his ''Full-Blooded Thrust '' to be implemented , Monty was convinced this would end the war quickly while Ike believed his broad front approach was safer and would make it impossible for the Germans to cover all areas of the front line .

Apart from the fiasco which was Operation Market Garden ( and no , I don't subscride to Motgomerys view that it was '' 95% successful '' ) , the Broad Front strategy was adopted but I wonder was it really the right approach. Was Eisenhower overly cautious ?

Comments welcome

dresden8

delancey42 wrote: »

From Summer 1944 onwards Eisenhower insisted on his '' Broad Front '' strategy being followed while Montgomery pressed for his ''Full-Blooded Thrust '' to be implemented , Monty was convinced this would end the war quickly while Ike believed his broad front approach was safer and would make it impossible for the Germans to cover all areas of the front line .

Apart from the fiasco which was Operation Market Garden ( and no , I don't subscride to Motgomerys view that it was '' 95% successful '' ) , the Broad Front strategy was adopted but I wonder was it really the right approach. Was Eisenhower overly cautious ?

Comments welcome

Eisenhower didn't want to give Monty what he saw as a "pencil like thrust".

Monty didn't want this either, he wanted all resources diverted to him, to the detriment of everything else, especially the Americans.

As a compromise, Eisenhower gave him the "pencil like thrust" that was Market-Garden, that nobody originally wanted.

Monty's legacy was that he talked sh1te about how everything turned out as he originally planned, even when this was plainly ludicrous.

The western allies were not capable of driving from the Normandy beaches to the heart of Germany in such a relatively short time.

It took the Russians two years from Kursk to Berlin, with everthing they had going for them at that stage, especially supply lines, massive manpower, and overland. A drive from Caen to Berlin in six months would be hugely optimistic. Or more likely, delusional.

gizmo555

dresden8 wrote: »

Monty's legacy was that he talked sh1te about how everything turned out as he originally planned, even when this was plainly ludicrous.

Here's Eisenhower's view on Monty's character, from the transcript of a 1963 interview with The Longest Day author, Cornelius Ryan:

First of all he’s a psychopath. Don’t forget that. He is such an egocentric that the man — everything he has ever done is perfect — has never made a mistake in his life and on top of that he is just a . . . His memory is bad, very bad, but he thinks it’s perfect, so I don’t . . . He even says that all of the tactical operations after we landed from D-Day went absolutely according to plan!

http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/books/article2836267.ece

Morlar

gizmo555 wrote: »

First of all he’s a psychopath. Don’t forget that. He is such an egocentric that the man — everything he has ever done is perfect — has never made a mistake in his life

Wasn't he also based in Ireland after WWI - during the buildup to the War of Independence ? I am pretty sure he was on that Collins Documentary the other night on RTE.

I think if you asked Rommel who was he more worried about Patton, Bradley or Monty he would not have said Monty. Neither would his subordinates like Hans Von Luck who fought against the british in the deserts of North Africa throughout he had a withering opinion on monty's actual abilities as opposed to his publicity. All the more so in europe post d-day.

gizmo555

Morlar wrote: »

Wasn't he also based in Ireland after WWI - during the buildup to the War of Independence ? I am pretty sure he was on that Collins Documentary the other night on RTE.

He was. Also, his cousin, Lt Col Hugh Montgomery was one of the British officers shot on Collins's orders on the morning of Bloody Sunday, Nov 1920.

He seems to have borne a grudge - Lavinia Greacen describes in her excellent biography of Eric Dorman Smith how Monty organised a boycott of Irish army officers visiting the British army staff college at Camberley in 1927.

Fratton Fred

"Indomitable in retreat, invincible in advance, insufferable in victory." — Prime Minister Winston Churchill's observation of "Monty" in Spring of 1943.

I find it odd that whilst Monty had the reputation for being the gob****e, 99% of the quotes between the two are from Eisenhower. I personally find Eisenhower a bit of a Churchill like character. it is as though he has been lifted to the position of hero and therefore there can be nothing wrong with anything he has ever said or done.

We can only summise about monty's plan, but i don't think it was as daft as Ike made out, what monty didn't appreciate though, was that Eisenhower was more a politician than a General and there was no way anyone other than an American was going to run things in Europe.

Delancey

I agree that Montgomery was probably a total **** and a lousy general as well , Von Runstedt described him as '' cautious , predictable and habit-ridden ''. That said , a few years ago I was lucky to meet and talk to an Arnhem veteran who thought Monty was the ' Dogs Bollix ' and laid the blame for the Market Garden fiasco squarely on the Americans ( particularly the Air Force ) !! There have been numerous cricisms of Monty up to and including a suggestion he had Paedophile tendencies !

But what about his ' Bold Thrust ' idea ? Eisenhowers ' Broad Front ' approach does really seem uninspired and cautious , whereas Montys idea does sound exciting . My question is : Would the ' Bold Thrust ' have worked ? Could it have worked ? Was Ike playing politics or were there sound military reasons behind the Broad Front approach ?

Morlar

delancey42 wrote: »

were there sound military reasons behind the Broad Front approach ?

I think any attempt by the british to get from normandy to berlin in 6 months was (assuming it it was a genuine expectation and not a propaganda goal) to be seen as extremely over optimistic.

Had that been the policy of one 'bold thrust' concentrated in one single point then it would more than likely risked being cut off with overstretched supply lines by pincer movements and taken apart in isolation. Even with the Germans in retreat you would be a fool to believe your own PR (Monty) and underestimate the German army.

Fratton Fred

Morlar wrote: »

I think any attempt by the british to get from normandy to berlin in 6 months was (assuming it it was a genuine expectation and not a propaganda goal) to be seen as extremely over optimistic.

Had that been the policy of one 'bold thrust' concentrated in one single point then it would more than likely risked being cut off with overstretched supply lines by pincer movements and taken apart in isolation. Even with the Germans in retreat you would be a fool to believe your own PR (Monty) and underestimate the German army.

there were different political forces involved as well don't forget.

The US were convinced they only had to make it to the Rhine and Germany would surrender, they were also concerned with body counts and would rather have pushed slow and cautiously for two years than hard and fast for one.

The British had one eye on the aftermath and were concerned that the russians were going to beat them to Berlin and wanted to reduce the influence Stalin had on europe.

I don't think supply issues would have come into it any more than they did with the broad front strategy, ultimately you are resupply the same number of men with the same amount of equipment.

Morlar

Fratton Fred wrote: »

there were different political forces involved as well don't forget.

The US were convinced they only had to make it to the Rhine and Germany would surrender, they were also concerned with body counts and would rather have pushed slow and cautiously for two years than hard and fast for one.

The British had one eye on the aftermath and were concerned that the russians were going to beat them to Berlin and wanted to reduce the influence Stalin had on europe.

I don't think supply issues would have come into it any more than they did with the broad front strategy, ultimately you are resupply the same number of men with the same amount of equipment.

The lines would get stretched due to the speed of the advance and the distance to their main forces.

The germans faced this in russia they advanced too far too fast, in fact many of the sharper ones thought they were being drawn into a trap as a result.

Actually during the first Iraq war this was being talked about too - whether or not saddam was doing a stalin-like move by allowing a massive advance at extreme speed in order to then cut the spearhead off.

Obviously Saddam was not. Stalin took advantage of the later situation rather than the initial collapse being part of some baldrick-like cunning plan.

Had the brits tried this after normandy I believe it would have been a genuine risk that their lines (not due to the scale of the supplies required - but due to the speed and distance of the advance) would get cut off.

Even if they had not been cut off from their supply & communication lines the risk of a swift counter attack and having their spearhead cutoff in pincer movements would have been real.

What do you think the germans would have done in this scenario ?

A single concentrated advance led by montgomery (who they had little respect for) covering a lot of ground in a short time, seems to me it would make more sense from their perspective to give him just enough rope to hang himself with.

Alternately the other argument is that you don't rush your closing moves in a chess game that you know how to win.

The only possible justifications for this were mentioned, post war balance of power. Where everyone would be when the music stopped. On balance I think despite the russians getting to berlin first the american approach was the more sensible one. Why rush at breakneck speed when there is no requirement to take that inevitable additional risk ?

Delancey

Correct me if I am wrong but was it not decided at Yalta that the Russians would get Berlin after the war ? If that was indeed the case then it would explain Eisenhowers reluctance to go there - why fight a battle only to have to give up the prize ? Not to mention that Marshal Zhukov lost 100,000 men taking Berlin - would the Western Allies have tolerated such losses ?
The points made about Allied supply lines is interesting when you consider that their logistical effort suffered a massive setback when Monty failed to take Antwerp , this resulted in Allied supplies having to be hauled over the Normandy beaches - this surely put a strain on their ability to fight ?

Fratton Fred

Yalta was after Market Garden so the decision was already made regarding allied strategy. IIRC, supplied were re-directed to Market Garden rather than its failure causing a problem with supply. It did hold the Canadians up and the Battle of the Scheldt which meant that Antwerp wasn't opened up as quick as possible. this was a major **** up imho. i would argue that the liberation of Belgium should have happened a lot sooner, before the allies worried about southern France. Maybe Ike favoured Patten and wanted to make the US army look good?

As it was, supplies were a major problem in the US/British/Canadian advance anyway, because the supply lines were spreading all down a 1000 mile front. I don't think supplies would have caused monty's plan to fail as such, but the pincer counter-attack would have been a huge problem, although I believe the front line was supposed to be more wedge shaped to try and prevent this.

it is difficult to say that ike was wrong though, because it worked but i don't think monty's plan was as foolish as it was made out to be.

Manic Moran

It is a fairly basic tenet of warfare that you strike with a closed fist, not an open hand. I will agree that driving in a straight line to Berlin is ridiculous as a concept, but focusing all assets on a single point of penetration, and then maneuvering accordingly is not. The possibility of fast encirclements of German forces againt the Channel or North Sea, for example, would have had great benefit.

I will agree that there was a lot of politics behind the decision. Probably politics outweighed military sense, given that the Allies could probably afford to play politics, they were in the better position.

NTM

Delancey

Thanks for the replies , as it happens I saw a programme the other day ( Discovery or something like it ) that touched on the issue of Broad Front vs. Bold Thrust , all the analysts interviewed said that the Bold Thrust would almost certainly have failed because of supply issues and flanking counter attacks by the Germans.
It would seem that Montys belief in the Bold Thrust was predicated on a slow response by the Wehrmacht and then light resistance , apparently Eisenhower had nightmares about it all ! It was also mentioned that Ike's personal issues with Monty may have coloured his opinion !

Good to see some good analysts on this board !! Thanks again

Manic Moran

delancey42 wrote: »

Thanks for the replies , as it happens I saw a programme the other day ( Discovery or something like it ) that touched on the issue of Broad Front vs. Bold Thrust , all the analysts interviewed said that the Bold Thrust would almost certainly have failed because of supply issues and flanking counter attacks by the Germans.
It would seem that Montys belief in the Bold Thrust was predicated on a slow response by the Wehrmacht and then light resistance , apparently Eisenhower had nightmares about it all ! It was also mentioned that Ike's personal issues with Monty may have coloured his opinion !

Good to see some good analysts on this board !! Thanks again

Define 'bold thrust' in this context.

Focused operations of a less-grand scale than driving to Berlin could, I believe, have worked out rather well.

NTM

Delancey

Manic Moran wrote: »

Define 'bold thrust' in this context.

Focused operations of a less-grand scale than driving to Berlin could, I believe, have worked out rather well.

NTM

Bold Thrust refers to Montys all or nothing plan for a massive and rapid drive to Berlin - we are talking about ( if you'll pardon the pun ) The 'Full Monty' ! This would have involved Generals Patton and Bradley ceasing offensive operations as the Bold Thrust would require all supplies available to the allies.

TerrorFirmer

Obviously it goes without saying that in the initial period after D-Day a rapid thrust would have been untenable, the Germans still possessed the means by which to encircle such spearheads or launch relatively fierce counter attacks. But by Market Garden a rapid thrust would have been a possibility, in my opinion, especially after January 1945 with allocation of Armour being pitiful for the western front. But the Americans preferred a cautious approach anyway, and even Anthony Beevor noted that was reflected in the behavior of the troops...the average American infantryman was no match for his German counterpart, and any massive operation might have been less of a success then you might imagine. It's a common misconception that the Russians steamrolled the Germans from mid 1944 to the end of the war - and that they did, but only through massive casualties on both sides - casualties that would have been unaccpetable to either the Americans or the British. Had the Russians afforded their troops the approach that the western allies did, the war would have gone on for years (a-bomb notwithstanding). Of course, we're talking here about the possibility of a rapid thrust were it might have made a difference...no point talking about rapid thrusts in March/april 1945 by which time it had been decided they would have yielded little worthwhile return.

theparish

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MAJR

I find there is some confusion as to what Montgomery's plan was as opposed to what people think Montgomery's plan was. The generally accepted idea is that Montgomery's plan was to concentrait the Allied Forces into one thrust aimed immediately at Berlin but this isn't the case.

In the direct aftermath of the Battle for Normady Montgomery laid out to Eisenhower a plan he thought would bring the war in Europe to an end as quickly as possible. This was that plan:

*21st and 12th Army Groups should stick together as one massive force that need fear no enemy.

*Together they would advance along the coastline with the Canadian Army being used to clear ports along the way and the American Armies used to protect the Allied flank.

*Once Belguim and the Low Countries had been cleared the Allies would halt at the Rhine near Aachen, then they would clear Antwerp for use, build up their supplies and create a strong airforce on the European mainland.

*They would then launch a massive concentraited attack across the Rhine with the aim of capturing the Rhur industrial center and reducing it, thus taking away the main production source of the German war machine.

*Then they would march on Berlin in early 1945.

Montgomery never planned to just drive straight for Berlin, he planed a clear stage by stage advance with stops along the way to resupply and cement the Allied presence in Europe. In this he was not being unrealistic.

In truth, as a general military theory, Montgomery had the right of it. Military theory states that you do not disperse your manpower and material if you want to win, you concentrait it and put it against the crucial point.

Eisenhower's Broad Front was a failure. It failed in the Autumn and Winter months of 1944. 21st Army Group ground to a halt in Belguim and the Low Countries, 12th Army Group ground to a halt in the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine region and 6th Army Group ground to a halt in the Alsace region. All of them lacked the manpower, material or firepower to push on because it had been split over a 230 mile front between every advance and Eisenhower had been unable to creat a proper strategic reserve with which to reinforce someone because all his manpower was being thrown into battle everywhere along the line.

BlaasForRafa

gizmo555 wrote: »

Here's Eisenhower's view on Monty's character, from the transcript of a 1963 interview with The Longest Day author, Cornelius Ryan:

. . He even says that all of the tactical operations after we landed from D-Day went absolutely according to plan!

http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/books/article2836267.ece

Oh come on Operation Goodwood was a tactical triumph....oh wait...