Worst Decision in WW2

motherfunker

What do you think was the single worst decision in WW2 made either by the Axis or the Allies. What one decision had the worst repercussions for those who made it.
I cant narrow it down in my mind just yet, Barbarossa, switching to bombing of cities instead of RAF bases, pearl harbour, I could go on. The list of bad decisions is endless, but which one was the worst?

kinkstr

Dropping the atom bombs in Japan. Repercussions being the fall out afterwards

Agent Smith

switching to bombing of cities instead of RAF bases

Run_to_da_hills

Fot the Nazis it was the attack on Stalingrad, a decision that would eventually weaken them and would cost them the war.

mike65

Barbarossa surely? Unless Stalin would have invaded Germany when they weren't paying attention.

Mike.

return guide

Killiing six million people of the jewish religion, and all the the slav's they came across

KdjaCL

Hitler going for Russia without fully securing the oil fields of eastern europe, surely had he done that they would have won the war.

The RAFs missions in bombing the oil fields in romania etc ended the war as far as Hiter taking on both the Allies and Russians were concerned. Some careful thinking and listening to Rommel instead of trying to kill him would have ensured we would be speaking german now.


kdjac

TerrorFirmer

Invading Russia and declaring war on America, though the second one was only of real consequence with the first mistake a reality.

Fratton Fred

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

Invading Russia and declaring war on America, though the second one was only of real consequence with the first mistake a reality.

invading Russia was always his plan though, so it was alway going to happen I suppose.

Latchy

Turning his attention away from Britain and attacking Russia .

Trying to fight a war on two fronts while denying his generals the extra supplys equipment and troops they required, made all the more difficult by a severe russian winter was from a military point of view a big mistake . Hitlers earlier pact with Stalin allowing him to attack and invade poland ,and churchills refusal to negoiate any deal with him backfired .

The killing of 6 million jews (and to a lesser degree the allies chance to bomb the concentration camps ) was also totally wrong

marcsignal

Mr.Blue Sky wrote: »

switching to bombing of cities instead of RAF bases

+1

I'd also say not concentrating on destroying the Radar Stations in southern England. It would have resulted in Adolf losing far fewer aircraft and good pilots. If he had beaten England with fewer losses at this point, it may have enabled him to attack Russia earlier, and with a stronger Luftwaffe contingency.

return guide wrote: »

Killiing six million people of the jewish religion, and all the the slav's they came across

+1

As well as just being plain Wrong, morally and ethically, and any other way you care to mention..

Belfast

Axis
Germany not accepting Stalin's offer of peace deal better than the Brest-Litovsk in 1918. In late 1941 as the German troops were approaching Moscow.

Japan decision to attack pearl harbour.
even if they had sank the aircraft carriers and put the battle ships out of commission long term.
the Japanese's had defence against the American submarine fleet cutting off their resource by sinking the merchant fleet.

Lockstep

I'm going to go with the flow and say Barbossa.
Bad decision.

Nolanger

humberklog

Georg Elser setting the bomb for 21.20. Hitler left the building at 21.07.(nov.8 '39).
One individual's decision, acting by himself.

Grizzly 45

"Nah they are a flight of B17s. We are expecting them... "

USAF Major in control of radar defences on the morning of Dec 7th 1941 in Pearl harbour 15 mins before the first Japanese bombs fell.

TerrorFirmer

humberklog wrote: »

Georg Elser setting the bomb for 21.20. Hitler left the building at 21.07.(nov.8 '39).
One individual's decision, acting by himself.

Staffenburg choosing to only use half the amount of explosives he had, with experts agreeing today had he used the full amount - as planned - everyone in the room would have been killed.

humberklog

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

Staffenburg choosing to only use half the amount of explosives he had, with experts agreeing today had he used the full amount - as planned - everyone in the room would have been killed.

Indeed, however it always struck me as less significant. Timing for one(bit late in the day),also they head there heads in the clouds as far as the settlement they thought they could achieve with the allies and the stuffiness of that Prussian push wasn't very romantic. Hitler's one true German antagonist realising what needed to be done, acting alone without consensus for a greater good. One man making one singular decision. No debating, meetings or rubbernecking required. Just a choice...What time to set bomb. Simplicity.
Bismark's line about "german people lack moral courage and when they don a uniform it deserts them completely" craws at me a lot when it comes to Staffenburg.

Prefabsprouter

TerrorFirmer wrote: »

Invading Russia and declaring war on America, though the second one was only of real consequence with the first mistake a reality.

This was by far and away the worst decisions made by the Axis. The war was lost by the Germans in the East. At no stage did the Wehrmacht have less than 80% of its forces in the East and still the Russians pushed them back.

dogmatix

Allied bad decisions:
1. Britain's decision to intervene to help the Greeks against the Axis in 1941. If they had stayed out they would have finished off the axis in north africa in 1941 instead of having the fighting there drag on until mid 1943.
2. Britains decision to interfere with neutral Norway in 1940 gave the Germans the excuse they needed to invade Norway. This gave Germany a valuable source of Iron ore and bases from which to attack the Atlantic and Artic convoys.
3. The allied strategic bombing campaigns against Germany - there is some evidence to indicate it had only a minor effect on Germanys industrial output and did not justify the massive loss of men and aircraft. It also cast a serious doubt on the allies moral stance as it was pretty obvious they knew they knew they where causing large civilian casualties.

arnhem44

I think for me the worst decisions would be lack of development of the Luftwaffe from the start of the war,the redicolus decision to halt at Dunkirk and not advancing on the British and french,the invasion of Russia even though this was done for materials it opened up two fronts and finely exausted men and supplies and lastly the battle of Arnhem,even though good progress had been made at the early stages poor planning would have to be blamed for lack of support due to the road network,a complete oversight

TerrorFirmer

arnhem44 wrote: »

I think for me the worst decisions would be lack of development of the Luftwaffe from the start of the war,the redicolus decision to halt at Dunkirk and not advancing on the British and french,the invasion of Russia even though this was done for materials it opened up two fronts and finely exausted men and supplies and lastly the battle of Arnhem,even though good progress had been made at the early stages poor planning would have to be blamed for lack of support due to the road network,a complete oversight

Dunkirk. It's a pretty widely propagated 'blunder', especially among casual readers of history (not implying you are, just saying). The truth is that Hitler wanted the elite of his army preserved for battle elsewhere, for two reasons. One, being that France at this stage wasn't defeated, and although in hindsight we clearly know it was, at that time, the German command thought a new French line would form further down and thus that leads onto point 2, crushing the small British army wasn't of valuable consequence in comparison to the prospect of crushing France and overrunning the entire country. Which again, though its obvious to us now France was already finished and destroying the British would have ended the war completely, back then, it wasn't that clear; wasting time attempting to destroy a British beachhead when French forces could possibly be reforming for counter attack or to stiffen defenses would have been a poor decision. Dunkirk was a lost opportunity, but strategically it was a sound decision that simply happened to prove unnecessary, something some people conveniently overlook.

arnhem44

In hindsight Dunkirk is easy to look back on and see from a later stand point,still its a battle to this day that some questions will never be answered,the offensive to the south had already been planned but had not started,Hitlers trust in Goreing to kill the British on the beaches was a poor decision alone,the luftwaffe having only two good days of weather and no air superiority.Throw the theories into this of Hitler wanting to seek a peace deal with the British,was Paris the main prize or was even Blitzkreig partly to blame.Maybe its not one of the worst decisions but a very badly missed opportunaty

Morlar

How the germans discarded the pre-requisites for successful blitzkrieg campaigns on entering russia. Allowing their armies to become too far seperated to be of much use to each other. This led to encirclements & defensive pockets emerging in the likes of Krimea, cholm, demjansk & Stalingrad etc. Losing the initiative and becoming trapped leading to massive often fruitless and expensive rescue missions which tied up yet more resources and damaged morale. The obvious counter-argument would be the scale of the enterprise and the vastness of the territory required the armies to become so far seperated.

Winter clothing for the eastern front. The lack of suitable clothing being issued in time led to misery and countless deaths damaging morale and fighting efficiency.

Battle of britain - this could easily have gone the other way if as mentioned the radar stations and raf bases had been the primary targets.

The mishandling of the normandy landings - holding the panzers too far in reserve and under orders not to advance until a point in time after the allies had gained a foothold. Had the local commanders been given more autonomy they could have pushed the allies back into the sea, knocking any repeat landings back at least 2 years if at all. Having vital units sitting idle in the middle of south france was also an error in hindsight or at least not having clear transport lines to speed their movement was also unhelpful.

North Afrika - not pulling their army out until it was too late.

U-boats numbers - had they had enough uboats early on they could have starved britain out of the war. This would have caused civil unrest & led to problems in the wider british empire.

Dunkirk was a blunder - though as mentioned this was probably a combination of Hitler believing Goering's bluster mixed with the desire to leave the british with a defeat they could disengage from.

Reliance on Vengeance weapons - good for propaganda and morale but a drain on resources and not strategically effective.

You could argue that the Germans keeping their women out of the factories hindered them earlier on but was probably better for morale and compensated for by compulsory labourers from occupied territories.

The 'fight to the last man' orders - there were times when retreat and consolidation would have been possible but instead men were ordered to stay put and fight to the end. This led to a fearsome reputation but also led to countless avoidable deaths.

Tony EH

Chamberlain's bluff of war in 1939 was certainly catastrophic. This turned a local war between two European states, Germany and Poland, into a new European wide war and subsequently a new World War. Without it, Hitler would have invaded Russia after neutralising Poland...and WWII (in Europe) would have been reduced to a conflict involving Germany and Russia.

Although, the declaration of war on the 3rd September 1939, eventually paved the way for an Allied victory in 1945, this was through stumbling fortune rather than design. Chamberlain's cabinet never really believed that Hitler would be willing to go to war with both Britain and France (over Poland) and would back down, choosing to go back to the negotiation table.

Unfortunately, Hitler called his bluff and the stakes were raised considerably. Chamberlain was shocked that the bluff didn't work and the British didn't have a plan B. In fact, they didn't have a plan A.

Without Britain's declaration of war on Germany, there is no invasion of Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium or France, i.e. no war in the West. There is no war with Britain. There is no Battle of the Atlantic. There is no German interference in the Mediterranean either, as Mussolini probably wouldn't have chanced his arm without the German victories in France etc. The war becomes reduced be a substantial margin. In short, many Countries are untouched by war.

The wildcard, though, is Japan. If we assume that Japan still attacks the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour, does Germany come in on her side still? I think not as without a war in the Atlantic and a threat from the US, there is no need.

However, Russia, in all probability will still defeat Germany in a prolonged Eastern European war, or perhaps they ground each other to an uneasy stalemate.

Basil Liddel Hart also suggests that it was Britain's "about-face" regarding Poland that made war a certainty. Up until 1939, Britain's policy had been almost supportive of Hitler's moves. But the sudden change in policy and a "guarantee" to Poland pushed the situation over the edge.

Personally, I believe that Hitler attacks Poland anyway, or at least gets her onside for an attack on Stalin's Russia, which after all is Hitler's "be all-end all" reason for going to war in the first place.



One wonders, if Chamberlain was privy to Hitler's designs on Bolshevik Russia, a Nation more hated than Nazi Germany at the time, would he have offered a "guarantee" to Poland at all?